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This thesis proposes that there is systemic failure in financial services and financial product regulation 
in Australia. Australian law regulating and supervising Non-Bank Financial Entities (NBFEs) has 
failed those it purports to protect: the vulnerable investing public. Systemic failure manifests in 
extraordinary loss of investor funds: this thesis contains the sole holistic empirical analysis.  
Australian regulation of financial products and financial services requires substantive strategic law 
reform. Without it, this thesis predicts systemic deficiencies in regulation will remain, repeating their 
cyclical manifestations. This study of Australian financial services and products regulation traverses 
four primary periods from 1981 to 2018. It explains the economic conditions which drove the 
development of the legal framework, traversing four discrete periods: ‘Deregulation and 
Entrepreneurship’ (1981–2001), ‘Disquiet’ (2002–2009), ‘Reaction’ (2010–2013) and the ‘Age of 
Statutes’ (2013 et seq.).  
This thesis analyses judicial responses which demonstrate Australia has a long history of subsuming 
fiduciary principles in financial products and services provision, hiding behind statutory and 
contractual frameworks which facilitate grudging disclosure and creeping corruption. 
Using doctrinal, empirical, qualitative, and comparative international legal analysis from five 
jurisdictions, this thesis demonstrates that comprehension of fiduciary principles is limited, applied 
haphazardly, often ignored, and subservient to statutory provisions which focus on compliance rather 
than investor value outcomes. Community expectations of what each market participant should do is 
often different from what they actually do. These ambiguities led investors to a false sense of security 
which was sadly and damagingly misplaced. There is a trust deficit. 
The list of failures is long and often well known. What is less well known is the extraordinary loss of 
client and investor funds. Losses amount to some AUD52.25 billion from more than 1.915 million 
investors in 199 senior court cases and a substantial loss of economic productivity. Australia’s plight 
is not unique but no other nation with a sophisticated economy now suffers comparatively. There is 
substantial systemic risk buried deeply in the governance of entities in the financial system. 
Remedying this risk will require substantive law reform to eliminate or ameliorate its causes. 
There has been a plethora of law reform proposals in financial products and services regulation. 
Largely these reforms have been tactical, not meeting their objectives because of systemic and 
cyclical failure in the implementation of each element of Australia’s market model (ie Disclosure, 
ii 
Advice, and Financial Literacy). This thesis tests that proposition. There is limited commonality of 
view and only superficial questioning of the basic tenets upon which Australia’s regulation of 
financial products and services is based. Blame is being attached to the basic policy framework 
whereas in fact it is policy implementation and enforcement that has allowed systemic failures to 
manifest.  
Similarly, it appears likely that inattention to these systemic deficiencies renders the Australian 
compulsory superannuation system fraught with contingent risk. This empirical analysis has 
predictive veracity. As Commissioner Heydon noted: History appears to be repeating itself. 
Australia has benefited from its Twin Peaks market based regulatory system and arguably has 
progressed toward the first objective of an entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with its 
global peers in many asset classes. The second objective, being financial stability and risk mitigation, 
has for many people exposed to NBFEs, an abject disaster. The inherent tensions between 
entrepreneurship and investor risk, optimal investor outcomes balanced with compliance, are not of 
themselves contradictory in a market based system, but they rely upon defining objectives, 
eliminating conflicts of objectives and conflicts of interest, significantly enhanced behavioural 
standards of market participants, and the de-politicisation of the regulatory environment.  
Accretive statutory change is not enough. Cyclical corruption rooted in cultural mores requires 
excision, not management. Excision requires surgery. These issues recur in every segment of the 
NBFE sector, plagued by egregious related party transactions, their inherent conflicts of interest, and 
propensity to deceptive and misleading conduct, dishonesty and fraud.  
Any discussion of law reform needs to comprehend the two problematic themes of expecting 
accretive statutory change to address cultural deficiencies and the primacy of fiduciary principles. 
The first theme is better understood and implemented by reflecting on international practice in 
comparable jurisdictions. The second theme will require a national sustained education and 
enforcement campaign to inculcate NBFE industry participants with fiduciary concepts. Cultural 
change to inject and extend fiduciary obligations and principles is a generational task. Presently, to 
the extent fiduciary principles are understood at all, their comprehension is not widespread, applied 
haphazardly, often ignored, and subservient to adherence to specific statutory and contractual 
provisions which focus on statutory compliance rather than value outcomes, being a principle of trust 
law.  
iii 
This thesis demonstrates that it is only the courts that have applied those principles in meeting 
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media attention has resulted. Both are germaine to this thesis. They are referred to in the chapters and 
in the Postscript. 
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CHAPTER 1: W[H]ITHER AUSTRALIA? 
Financial regulation and supervision at a cross-roads 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This is the story of modern Australia: why parts of the Australian economy struggle in a twenty first 
century globalised world. Australian industry is heavily dependent on non-bank financing: Non-Bank 
Financial Entities1 have filled these financing gaps. 
[T]heir growth leads to a virtuous cycle through which countries benefit from broader access to 
financial services and a more competitive, diversified financial sector … offer[ing] individuals and 
small- and medium-scale enterprises a broader menu of financial services … creating jobs … 
promot[ing] competition by introducing new industries that challenge the services and capacities of 
banks …2 
NBFEs have played an extremely important role in business, asset, and consumer finance, particularly 
for ventures with limited ability to access bank finance. NBFEs have funded ventures which would 
not otherwise have been funded, and have been considerable sources of employment: they are 
marginal sources of capital. This thesis analyses the impact of the NBFE sector on Australian 
investors and the legal reasons why NBFE failures are cyclical and deeply rooted in deficiencies in 
the law. 
NBFEs include those entities providing financial advice and wealth management, bank controlled 
wealth management entities, non-bank financial products providers, collective investment schemes, 
investment managers, trustees, custodians, research houses, asset allocation consultants, securities 
brokers, securities platforms, hedge funds, insurance entities, finance companies, workers entitlement 
funds, and superannuation entities (public, industry, corporate, and self-managed super fund 
(SMSF)). Their main distinction is not being authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), and apart 
from some superannuation entities, not being prudentially regulated. These attributes set NBFEs apart 
from mainstream commercial banking, although many banks participate in NBFE markets through 
related party structures becoming vertically integrated financial conglomerates. Non-banks have also 
become financial conglomerates but have not been subject to prudential regulation. Some have been 
private or publicly listed vertically integrated multi-function financial entities; some are multinational 
                                                                  
1 NBFEs, sometimes referred to as Non-Bank Financial Institutions or NBFIs (a narrower term), colloquially 
known as shadow banking, terminology commonly used in other jurisdictions. 
2 Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, ‘The development and regulation of Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions’ (Report, World Bank, 2002) xi. 
2 
financial services and funds management conglomerates; some have been taken into public ownership 
given their local systemic importance. ‘[N]o unique classification of institutions provided is 
appropriate to all situations’.3 Shadow banks may include some commercial activity within banks, 
being a ‘broad definition that captures many forms of financial intermediation that are important for 
economic growth’.4  
NBFEs are sometimes categorised as ‘investment banks’. This, and ‘investment banking’, are ill-
defined terms. As Tuch notes, they can include, in the same entity: securities advice to wholesale and 
retail clients, underwriting, corporate advice, securities trading, investment research, securities 
dealing, corporate finance, asset management, private equity, hedge funds and foreign exchange 
trading.5 
The influence of investment banks in the financial system and broader community is vast and their 
importance is increasing. The transactions on which they advise can have significant consequences for 
business competition and employment, often on an industry-wide or national basis.6  
Some become financial conglomerates. ‘Financial conglomerates span industry domestic boundaries 
and international boundaries’.7 They also span regulatory jurisdictional boundaries. 
Modern financial intermediation processes add newer elements that do not always fit into the 
traditional silo based ways of … market based-regulations … or market-specific supervision. Reform 
approaches need to be more holistic.8  
With limited exceptions, none of the entities categorised as conglomerates in the empirical analysis 
are ADIs. The exceptions are multi-function holding entities which have acquired or control an ADI 
(eg a building society, general insurer). ADI functions of banking conglomerates which control 
financial planning and wealth management entities are excluded from the analysis. 
NBFEs, however categorised are socially important and underpin the operation of the modern 
economy in Australia and elsewhere. They are systemically important and ‘may contribute to the 
                                                                  
3 Ibid 5. 
4 Stijn Claessens and Laura Kodres, ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some 
uncomfortable questions’ (Working Paper No 14/46, International Monetary Fund, March 2014) 19. 
5 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) Melbourne 
University Law Review 478, 486. 
6 Ibid 484. 
7 Jeffrey Carmichael, ‘Regulatory lessons from the Crisis: A view from Down Under’ (Presentation to 
OECD/ADBI Roundtable, February 2010); see also, Mohamed Ariff, John H Farrar and Ahmed M Khalid 
(eds), Regulatory Failure and the GFC – An Australian Perspective (Elgar Online, 2012) ch 12. 
8 Claessens and Kodres, above n 4, 4. 
3 
build-up of systemic risk and severity of financial crises’.9 These risks have included runs on funds 
and contagion. Other authors agree: ‘Systemic risks emerged, yet went undetected or not addressed 
for some time and then created great havoc’.10 This author’s empirical analysis illustrates the point. 
Tuch notes the ‘social repercussions and its public dimensions’.11  
This thesis shows that many NBFEs have been and are of the size and systemic importance that the 
regulatory distinctions between ADIs and non-ADIs, and between ex ante supervision and ex post 
market conduct, may be obsolete and should be reviewed. The Australian superannuation asset base 
is larger than that of its banking system and heavily exposed to other NBFEs. 
1.1 The Law Matters 
The law matters. ‘The law can facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, regulate and 
control’.12 This maxim is being lost in present day Australian NBFE regulation and needs to be 
recovered. It can also have the opposite result. There is ‘a positive relationship between financial 
sector functions and economic growth’.13 ‘Law Matters’ means a jurisprudence regime which allows 
investors to feel confident of expected economic outcomes, uncorrupted by the political milieu. Is 
this the case in Australia today where significant numbers and groups of investors lack confidence in 
financial entities and their regulators? ‘[T]he state should create the framework ― the rules of the 
game for the economy’.14 
The general legal framework is arguably the single most important determinant of a sound NBFI[E] 
sector. Legislation underpinning the specific framework for NBFIs [E’s] is the foundation of good 
regulation … There should be no ambiguity.15  
[C]ountries that lack a coherent policy framework and effective regulations, nonbank financial 
institutions [NBFEs] such as insurance, leasing and finance companies, and collective investment 
                                                                  
9 Elias Bengtsson, ‘Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis’ (2014) 
23(2) Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 101. 
10 Claessens and Kodres, above n 4, 4. 
11 Tuch, above n 5, 505 citing Charles R Geisst, Investment Banking the Financial System (Prentice Hall 
Business Publishing, 1995) 1. 
12 Justice Michael Kirby, 'The company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Tasmanian Division, Hobart, 1998). 
13 Carmichael and Pomerleano, above n 2, 12, citing Ross Levine, Norman Loaya and Thorsten Beck, 
‘Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes’ (World Bank Development Research Group, 
1999). 
14 Matthew Qvortrup, Angela Merkel Europe’s most influential leader (Duckworth Overlook, 2017) 338. 
15 Carmichael and Pomerleano, above n 2, 198. 
4 
vehicles, can exacerbate the fragility of the financial system. This fragility is often the result of a 
conscious effort to arbitrage and circumvent banking regulations.16 
The Law Matters thesis ‘constitutes the crucial bedrock’ that underpins economies.17 Empirical 
analysis proves that law matters in NBFE regulation, supervision and governance including the 
selective application and enforcement of present law.18  
Policymakers should create a regulatory environment that provides a platform for diffuse securities 
ownership which may then deliver superior economic results. This underpins a modern economy.19 
Why should the law matter? To whom does the law matter? 
The essential insight underlying the ‘law matters’ thesis is that, in an unregulated environment, there 
is a real danger that a company’s ‘insiders’ (controlling shareholders and senior executives) will cheat 
outside investors who own equity.20  
Indeed, this empirical legal analysis of Australian NBFE related party transactions supports that 
insight. Expropriation of value also occurs by tunnelling,21 being non-related party transactions, 
addressed extensively in Germany and the EU through codified civil law duties of care and loyalty. 
Egregious transfer of shareholder value is facilitated by the narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty 
and the limited universe to which it is applied in Australia. 
The Law Matters thesis is not without its critics: ‘the historical experience in the US and the UK 
[casts] doubt on whether law is as pivotal and the thesis implies’.22 Its basic premise ‘seems 
irrefutable, but how much it matters indeed, is a matter of much conjecture’.23 In practice, the ‘law is 
one of many influences that shape economic development … differences in the nature and 
effectiveness of a country’s financial system depend on investor protection.’24 But the law is not the 
                                                                  
16 Ibid 19. 
17 Ibid 346. 
18 Evan Jones, ‘CBA, ASIC and the political class: partners in crime’, Independent Australia, 7 July 2014 
<http://www.independentaustralia.net/.../cba-asic-and-the-political-class-partners-in-crime>. 
19 Brian R Cheffins, 'Corporate Law and ownership structure: A Darwinian Link?' (2002) 25(2) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 346, 347, citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (Transaction, 1932). 
20 Brian R Cheffins, ‘Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public 
Companies’ (2003) 23(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 6. 
21 Li-Anne Elizabeth Woo, ‘The Importance of the Law Matters Thesis’ (2006) 3(4) Corporate Ownership & 
Control 219, 221, citing Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines and Andrei Shleifer, 
‘Tunnelling’ (NBER Working Paper No 7523, 2000) 12. 
22 Cheffins, ‘Law as Bedrock’, above n 20. 
23 Woo, above n 21, 226. 
24 Ibid 220. 
5 
only factor.25 To whom law matters and which law matters are identified in this thesis ― options for 
its future development are proposed in Chapter 6. 
1.2 Historical background. 
The story of modern Australia is a history of law reform designed to promote economic development 
circumvented and corrupted by malfeasors using legal uncertainties and omissions to further their 
own interests. The accretive culture, fragmentation and complexity of Australian law leads to 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and enforcement deadweight costs for investor and regulators. If Australia 
wishes to pursue an agenda of increasing living standards based on agility and innovation, then law 
reform is an essential pre-condition.  
Australia has considerable history of NBFEs (including NBFIs).26 This analysis of corporate failures 
in these Australian financial services and financial products providers since 1981 reveals a long litany 
of prominent NBFEs which have failed, with severe consequences for investors, creditors and 
governments. 
Traditional assumptions that private investors are rational, accessing and applying all disclosed 
information are false. More modern behavioural economics theory,27 leads to different conclusions 
and different regulatory postures. Behavioural economics recognises that investor biases and 
irrationality, often on the same set of disclosed facts in ‘complex situation-dependent ways’,28 lead 
to different behaviours and decisions. This need not, nor should it as some suggest, provide an excuse 
for further government intervention. It does emphasise a community need for financial literacy 
competencies and a regulatory posture that treats investors as financial consumers learning from their 
financial advisers who tutor them in teachable moments. These insights have been implemented in 
Canada and Germany. 
Australia is a global outlier in many important aspects of its NBFE regulation, although not alone in 
its original Twin Peaks architecture. It does not follow international standards and practice. 
Specifically, it is almost unique in the use of trusts as large commercial trading enterprises, low 
licencing and capitalisation barriers to entry, limited fit and proper competency requirements, non-
                                                                  
25 Katharina Pistor, ‘Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1647, 1669. 
26 Above n 1. 
27 See, eg, the work of Richard H Thaler, Robert J Shiller, and Xavier Gabaix; R Thaler and C Sunstein, 
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) 7. 
28 Noah Smith, ‘Wanted: A Unifying Theory of Behavioural Economics’ (6 January 2018) 
<https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/2018/01/05>. 
6 
adherence to many International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 1 & 11 provisions, regulation of custody, and its poacher-
gamekeeper model for collective investment schemes (Managed Investment Schemes or MIS). 
Its corporate governance regime has often failed those it purports to protect: the investing public. 
Failure is not rare. Remediation is costly, of limited financial veracity, with significant time elapsed 
to achieve limited results. Systemic and cyclical failures are found in the implementation of each 
element of the Wallis29 market model reforms (ie disclosure, advice, and financial literacy) of 1997 
and the Managed Investments Act of 1998. This thesis tests that proposition since there is limited 
commonality of view30 and public questioning of some of the basic tenets upon which Australia’s 
regulation of financial products and services is based. Market conduct regulation largely deals with 
problems after the event: unlike prudential supervision it doesn’t prevent them (not always 
successfully). Blame is being attached to the basic policy framework. But it is incomplete policy 
implementation and poor governance that has allowed systemic problems to manifest themselves, 
partly hidden until the GFC. This unveiling ‘inspired a tornado of excoriating criticism of financial 
markets and their participants’.31 Corporate governance is the implementive cousin of market conduct 
regulation: prudential supervision is its sibling, accompanied by familial moral hazard. 
This research identifies more than 1 915 608 investors in Australia who have been financially 
damaged by corporate failures in NBFEs. Direct aggregate reported negative financial impacts are 
estimated to be at least AUD52.25 billion. This represents c 0.46% of 2016 – 17 nominal GDP. 
Consistently, EU law reform of retail investor capital markets was estimated to increase EU GDP by 
‘between 0.5 and 0.7% [pa].’32 More importantly, it implies a foregone GDP growth rate of c 23.14% 
p.a. assuming GDP represents all Australian economic activity. The essential insight is that the 
cumulative misallocation of capital in aggregate ― the opportunity cost ― causes lower economic 
growth. This is particularly so because NBFE financing is at the margin ― it finances projects that 
would not otherwise occur. 
                                                                  
29 S Wallis, Australian Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
March 1997) ['Wallis']. 
30 Kevin Davis, ‘Study of Financial System Guarantees’ (Australia Treasury, 2004) ch 2. 
31 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142. 
32 Friedrich Heinemann and Mathias Jopp, ‘The benefits of a Working European Retail Market for Financial 
Services: Report to European Financial Services Round Table’ (Institute für Europäische Politik, Berlin, 
2002); See especially, Niamh Moloney, ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law: The 2004 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’ (2005) 6 European Business Organisation Law Review 354 
citing ZEW/IEP, ‘The Benefits of a Working European Retail Market for Financial Services’ (Report, 
European Financial Services Round Table, 2002). 
7 
This data does not include consequential financial losses or other personal consequences. These losses 
are not aberrations. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) estimate that c 
AUD66.00 billion has been lost by investors in GFC related collapses from 2007-9.33 These losses 
include entities that are not NBFEs. It can be misleading to blame the GFC for failures which should 
properly be attributed to other causes. The GFC merely exposed underlying systemic weaknesses. 
For instance, ASIC also estimate that c AUD20.00 billion of retail investment funds in NBFEs were 
‘frozen’,34 some never to be recovered. Chapter 3 of this thesis contains the only other authoritative 
empirical data.  
Despite scholarly observations of ‘reasonable expectations’ in 200535 and some tactical regulatory 
change, very little has been implemented that would prevent another major collapse or scandal 
involving a NBFE. Failure has been and will be cyclical. These failures arise from a number of 
systemic causes. These include: flawed business models; related party transactions and conflicts of 
interest; poor investor outcomes arising from conflicts of economic objectives through tunnelling; 
complete loss through legally compliant financial products and procedures; deceptive and misleading 
conduct; fraud; and under capitalisation. These manifestations of systemic failure arise from 
uncertainties in the law, practical impediments to its application, lack of harmonisation between 
sources of law, and lack of investment economic objectives being an integral part of the body of law 
in superannuation and non-superannuation environments. These factors lead to arbitrage 
opportunities for those inclined to mal-, mis-, or non-feasance. 
Australians (compulsorily) invest in an environment of a multitude of complex financial products 
(direct, corporate and superannuation) but are not afforded the protections they assume are there. It 
also appears likely that inattention to systemic deficiencies renders the Australian superannuation 
system fraught with contingent risk. 
Subsequent regulatory response has been directly related to the degree of public pressure from those 
aggrieved seeking remedies as a result of a crisis, or a report driven by economic policy objectives. 
Many of the responses have been lacking insight and are mostly tactical.36 However, these are not 
                                                                  
33 Tony D’Aloisio, ‘Responding to the global financial crisis: the ASIC Story’ (Speech delivered at the 
Trans-Tasman Business Circle, 30 November 2010). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Tuch, above n 5, 478, 482 citing Paul Finn, ‘Contract and the Fiduciary Principal’ (1989) 12 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 76, 84. 
36 Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, 'Developments in Financial Services Law of the last 30 years' (Speech 
delivered at the Banking and Finance Services Law Association 30th Annual Conference, Gold Coast QLD, 
Australia, 30 August 2013). 
8 
new issues: ‘the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s portrayed a failure of law, policy, and 
ethics’.37 In the US, the law attempts to encourage entrepreneurship, the theory being that an 
entrepreneurial economy makes for a richer and more productive society. The law provides the 
architecture and it can mitigate investor risk. Since NBFEs are derivative exposures of the underlying 
real economy, the law of itself cannot prevent the underlying attrition of those market linked assets. 
However, for superannuation entities, Australian law now provides that directors and trustees must 
take into account market and longevity risks.  
Shifting policy sands, constantly changing regulation, regular judicial review, and subsequent 
statutory responses make it extraordinarily difficult for a non-professional director, a director of a 
corporate trustee, or a trustee in person, to either understand the law or to properly discharge their 
duties. The present difficulty for regulatory reform in Australia is vested interest with differing 
objectives influencing a volatile political milieu.  
Judicial review has led the way in the development and enforcement of present law, noting the need 
for statutory reform. Judicial opinion has been scathing about the deficiencies and uncertainties in the 
law regulating Australian financial products and financial services.38 Other legal opinion is equally 
severe: ‘overly prescriptive, complex and poorly drafted [PDS]: The regime relies upon definitions 
within definitions and exceptions within exceptions. It is difficult for lawyers to get their heads around 
– let alone investors lacking in legal training’.39  
Australian law has been demonstrably deficient, especially compared with some comparative 
jurisdictions such as Canada, Germany and Singapore. Australian investors, other participants in the 
investment chain, and the broader economy have suffered as a result. Statutory reforms alone, whilst 
                                                                  
37 Kirby, above n 12. 
38 See, eg, Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42 [122] (Kirby J); 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 Summary 3 (Rares 
J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Limited 
(Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation)(Controllers appointed)(No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 
December 2013) [463] (Murphy J); Re Environvest Ltd (No 4) [2010] VSC 549 [2]–[3] (Judd J); Aequitas v 
AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 [363] (Austin J); Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW); 
Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 [37] (Murphy J); Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 836 [17] (Barrett J) citing Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss Securities Ltd [2002] NSWSC 684 (Palmer J); 
Trilogy Funds Management Limited v Sullivan (No 2) [2015] FCA 1452 [1] (Wigney J); ASIC v Vines [2006] 
NSWSC 738 [14] (Austin J). 
39 Garry T Bigmore and Simon Rubenstein, ‘Rights of Investors in Failed or Insolvent Managed Investment 
Schemes’ in Stewart J Maiden (ed), Insolvent Investments (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015) 238. 
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superficially attractive given the relative ease of implementation, have not and will not resolve 
systemic deficiencies in regulation nor their cyclical manifestations. 
1.3 Creeping corruption in Australian NBFEs 
Uncertainties in the law and inconsistences in its application have led to systemic creeping corruption 
in some financial services and financial products NBFEs. This has resulted in investor disbelief and 
in some cases, significant judicial interventions. Creeping corruption, sometimes arising from 
grudging disclosure, aided by uncertain and complex law, poor advice and unknowledgeable 
investors is systemic in the Australian NBFE sector. ‘[C]omplex legislation may mean that for those 
who deliberately seek not to comply with the law, they can readily do this…’.40 This has not been 
restricted to Australia: in the UK, such sentiments are expressed as creative compliance and 
regulatory arbitrage. UK legislative recognition of the economic importance of Small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) was a driver of statutory reform41 to meet the ‘reasonable expectations of 
business people so that regulatory traps for the unwary are avoided’.42 Directors, particularly of 
private companies were considered not to be able to understand their duties. 
In Australia creative compliance or creeping corruption occurs where statutory provisions are 
interpreted narrowly and corruption escapes close scrutiny. In the longer term, this subverts the 
economic interests of investors and beneficiaries. The economic interests of investors and 
beneficiaries supported by holistic fiduciary standards in the investment chain is a different 
proposition from compliance with regulation. It leads to a different result: 
It [Creative Compliance] is essentially the practice of using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and 
to do so with impunity.43 
Australian regulation of financial products and financial services requires substantive law reform and 
reforms designed to enhance productivity in the economy. Without substantive reform, there will be 
no remedy of the systemic deficiencies in regulation nor of their cyclical manifestations which harm 
productivity.  
                                                                  
40 Hui Xian Chia and Ian Ramsay, ‘Section 1322 as a response to the complexity of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth)’ (2015) 33 Companies & Securities Law Journal 389, 394. 
41 Companies Act 2006 (UK). 
42 John Lowry, ‘Codifying the corporate opportunity doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 2006’ (2012) 5 
International Review of Law 1, 3. 
43 Simon Ashby, ‘The Turner Review on the Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services 
Forum’ (Nottingham University, 2009) 17. 
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Regulation can influence the growth of NBFIs [-Es] in two main ways: (a) repressive regulation can 
retard NBFI growth, and (b) inappropriate regulation or poorly designed regulatory structures can 
stimulate NBFI[-E] growth for the wrong reasons, often creating incentives for regulatory arbitrage 
and the emergence of unanticipated systemic problems.44 
Australian law permits the contracting out of fiduciary obligations. In retail financial advice, the 
Corporations Act subsumes general law fiduciary obligation beneath regulatory process, the result 
being a mismatch of community fiduciary expectation with industry practice. In superannuation, 
statutory intervention excludes access to the ‘general law relating to conflict of interest’.45 
Consequently, significant numbers of investors in Australia today have lost their trust in the financial 
system. Community expectations of, and trust in what each market participant should do is often 
different from what they actually do. These ambiguities have led investors to a false sense of security 
which was sadly and damagingly misplaced. Whilst Australia has benefited from its Twin Peaks 
market based regulatory system (posited by this author to be ‘Triple Peaks’, given the integral role of 
the industrial system in superannuation savings),46 and has arguably progressed toward the first 
objective of an entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with its global peers in many asset 
classes, the second objective, being financial stability and risk mitigation, has for many people been 
an abject disaster.  
This thesis quantifies their direct losses and analyses the economic consequences to the nation. Its 
empirical analysis demonstrates that failure is predictable, cyclical, and has deep legal systemic 
roots.47 The empirical data points to failures of law on a massive scale. It also points to legal solutions 
to the problem of anti-entrepreneurial repressive legislation (accretive statute) and to solutions to 
unanticipated systemic failures particularly of vertically integrated NBFEs in a consolidating market. 
These solutions can also be applied to NBFE entities associated with commercial banks.  
There has been no quantitative assessment of the costs to the economy of legal complexity and 
uncertainty. These costs include compliance, director and trustee insurance, limited mutual 
recognition through lack of harmonisation, reduced capital inflows, reduced real economy 
investment, and reform fatigue.48 Some might argue reform solutions will reduce the entrepreneurial 
capacity of the Australian economy. The contrary is the case. Restore the trust and the economy will 
respond. The economic losses directly incurred directly by investors and beneficiaries, added to 
                                                                  
44 Carmichael and Pomerleano, above n 2, 208.  
45 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 58B. 
46 See fig 1.1. 
47 See below ch 3, tab 3.25. 
48 Chia and Ramsay, above n 40, 403. 
11 
foregone investment that may have taken place, has resulted in Australia having an economy reliant 
less upon domestic savings and more upon foreign capital to finance new business investment. The 
reform objective must be to re-establish trust, confidence and respect, which has been lost in several 
decades of often anonymous or poorly-informed financial product selling to vulnerable retail 
investors, despite repeated analysis and with similar conclusions from 2001.49  
Reform requires significant elapsed time, probably a decade, and it must be sequenced. Strategic 
reform requires acceptance and implementation by the various stakeholder groups. Tactical reforms 
can be imposed legislatively. The effectiveness and stability generated by prudential supervision 
needs to be embedded as a governance value system – a culture – within the non-prudentially 
regulated NBFE sector. Successful implementation aligns interest of provider and consumer: it also 
changes the role of the regulators: they become educators, supervisors. A healthy culture results in 
enforcement becoming a last resort. 
The inherent tensions are entrepreneurship versus investor risk; compliance versus optimal investor 
outcomes; legal rights versus economic interest, conflicts of interest and objectives, ex ante 
supervision versus ex post market conduct regulation, and the implementive power of sound corporate 
governance. That these tensions need not be contradictory is lost in the politicisation of the debate. 
1.4 Reform implementation objectives 
The neo-classical market model as envisaged by Campbell50 and Wallis sought to create a regulatory 
environment that led to investment opportunities that did not exist previously and may not otherwise 
have existed at all. Given the societal need for a sound NBFE sector, these market freedoms were not 
matched by effective implementation of the strategic underpinnings of Wallis, being disclosure, 
advice, and investor empowerment and knowledge through education, nor in many cases, corporate 
governance responsibility and ethical standards. 
Australia has not been alone in seeking to implement reform of its financial sectors. There are and 
will be contested reform agendas. These include the tension between investor empowerment and 
libertarian paternalism.51 Their resolution will depend on acceptance of the reasons for failure. 
                                                                  
49 Lord Myners, United Kingdom HM Treasury, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (March 2001). 
50 Sir Keith Campbell, Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Cat No 8104251, Canberra, 1981) [‘Campbell’]. 
51 Jeremy Cooper, Review of the Governance, Efficiency, Structure, and operation of Australia’s 
Superannuation System (Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 2010) [‘Cooper’]. 
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International precedent provides a framework, offering three options.52 Were the Wallis and other 
Australian market reforms faulty, or was their implementation faulty (if only because of political 
constraints)? Were there sequencing issues, or a simplification of the links between desired economic 
outcome and legal reform? Were the reforms incomplete?  
Analysis, in a different but comparable context,53 ‘blames the poor post-reform outcomes on uneven 
and incomplete reform implementation’.54 Political interest generates contested reform 
implementation in Australia. Similarly, in the US, trade protectionism since 2016 challenges the 
Washington Consensus and is inconsistent with delayed reform and statutory repeal in its financial 
services markets, or indeed the rollback of previous reform.55 Whatever the architecture, political 
constraints to reform implementation come at a price to the financial consumer. 
1.5 Four distinctive periods 
The history of the development of the law of the Australian financial services and products regulatory 
sector would be incomplete without an understanding of the economic conditions which drove the 
development of the legal framework. This framework can be divided into four primary periods: The 
Age of Entrepreneurship and Deregulation (1981-2001), The Age of Disquiet (2002-2009), The Age 
of Reaction (2010-2013) and the Age of Statutes and Compliance (2014 et seq). It illustrates the 
tension between market based principles of Australian financial system regulation and those that 
oppose or seek to modify a market based approach.  
The historical background 1981-2018 is found in Chapter 2. The works cited include most of the 
inquiries and reviews of the period. Each of these works has influenced the law and regulation of 
NBFEs. They are largely tactical responses to crisis, not a repair of the systemic problems underlying 
regulatory failure in Australia. Chapter 3 quantifies the losses suffered by investors and beneficiaries 
and their broader economic impact. The empirical analysis has predictive veracity in identifying 
                                                                  
52 Nancy Birdsall, Augustus de la Torre and Felipe Valencia Caidedo, The Washington Consensus ― 
Assessing a Damaged Brand (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 5316, May 2010) 21. 
53 The Washington Consensus is a package of economic policy objectives, including deregulation of 
financial sectors, designed to promote economic development in emerging economies. See especially John 
Williamson, ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’ (Paper presented at the conference ‘From the 
Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance’, Barcelona, 24–25 September 2004). 
54 Birdsall, de la Torre and Caidedo, above n 52, 22 citing Agnes A Belaisch et al, Stabilisation and Reform 
in Latin America; A Macroeconomic Perspective of the Experience Since the 1990s (International Monetary 
Fund, Occasional Papers No 238, 2005). See also Anne O Krueger, ‘Meant Well, Tried Little, Failed Much: 
policy Reforms in Emerging Market Economies’ (Speech delivered to the Economic Honours Society, New 
York University, New York, 23 March 2004). 
55 See, eg, Nicolas J Firzli, ‘Understanding Trumponomics’ (26 January 2017), Revue Analyse Financière 
<http://analysefinanciere.org/2017/01/26/understanding-trumponomics/>. 
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likely lawless behaviours. Chapter 4 analyses the judicial response and the resulting evolution of 
directors and trustee duties. Chapter 5 provides insights into comparative jurisdictions – Singapore, 
Germany (and EU), UK, Canada and the US. Chapter 6 proposes four strategic reform themes 




2. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Understanding how Australia has arrived at this point in its regulation of financial services and 
financial products provides the research basis for determining which analytical methodologies to 
apply in the quest for solutions to a national problem. It requires analytical proof that systemic failures 
and cyclical manifestations continue to exist. 
Is Australia unique? Or is it an outlier on the international stage, particularly in respect of comparative 
jurisdictions? Can this affect capital flows and investment? Do the experiences of other jurisdictions 
where there has been systemic failure provide guidance for Australian law? Are there recurring 
threads across common law jurisdictions? Do civil law jurisdictions provide insight? 
What of the relationship between modern statutes and equity? How does increasing scale and scope 
of statutory interventions affect traditional fiduciary concepts of trust and loyalty, standards which 
are embedded in community expectation? How important is judicial intervention in meeting that 
expectation, and is it required in the future? 
Do these questions manifest in uncertainty and weakness in Australian law? Do they provide 
opportunities for malfeasors? If so, what are those weaknesses and how can they be remedied? How 
can contagion between sectors of the financial economy be prevented by law reform? 
What legal solutions are there to hypothesised systemic and cyclical failure? If proven, how can law 
reform be implemented in a contested intellectual and political environment? What are the objectives 
of proposed law reform and what is the pathway to resolution on a national scale? 
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3. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Relevant law includes a number of Australian statutes and their interaction with the general law. The 
primary legislative instruments which seek to regulate director, officer, and trustee responsibility for 
the governance of NBFEs are the Corporations Act,56 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act,57 
and the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act.58 The three primary regulators are 
subject to their own legislation: ASIC Act59 (market conduct), APRA Act60 (prudential supervision), 
and Fair Work Act61 (the link between Australia’s industrial and superannuation systems). As 
Murray62 and Heydon63 demonstrate, this interface is largely unexplored territory which may expose 
Australian superannuation to substantial contingent risk since it directly influences and determines 
corporate governance practices. Other relevant legislation includes the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorism Financing Act,64 The Public Interest Disclosure Act,65 and the Competition and 
Consumer Act.66 In addition, there are sectoral governance rules and standards.67  
  
                                                                  
56 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
57 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). 
58 Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act 2016 (Cth). 
59 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
60 Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority Act 1998 (Cth). 
61 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
62 David Murray, Financial System Final Report (Australia Treasury, 2014) [‘Murray’]. 
63 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report 
(December 2015) (Commissioner Heydon). 
64 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth). 
65 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth.) 
66 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
67 John Farrar and Pamela Hanrahan, Corporate Governance (Reed International – LexisNexis Butterworths, 
1st ed, 2017) [30.2]. 
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This thesis tests theories and practices of regulation, supervision, and governance applying traditional 
doctrinal legal analysis balanced with other research methodologies. These include empirical 
analysis, qualitative field research, and comparative law. Specifically, empirical analysis of senior 
court judgments supported by qualitative, interview based, original research tests the conclusions of 
doctrinal analysis. That is, set in both historical and thematic constructs. It demonstrates how 
Australia has themes of deregulation to facilitate entrepreneurship competing with accretive statute 
based compliance. The conclusions from this combination of research methodologies are then tested 
against the comparative law of other jurisdictions, being Canada, US, UK, Germany (and EU) and 
Singapore. These jurisdictions, despite differing legal traditions (civil and common law, statute and 
trust law) and their modern interpretations have sufficient commonality to provide insightful points 
of reference. Whilst Australia and Canada stem from the same legal family, their approach to 
solutions of similar legal problems can be quite different. Similarly for Singapore. This comparative 
law provides solutions to the issues identified from doctrinal and empirical research as being 
problematic in Australia. It draws upon the experiences of those comparative jurisdictions in the 
relationship between social sciences research in behavioural economics and traditional law.  
The empirical analysis of content of senior court judgments and other primary sources demonstrates 
the workings of present law as it is: it proves the gap between community expectation and legal reality 
particularly as espoused in statutes. ‘[I]n Australia, comprehensive case data regarding filed cases or 
settled cases are not available’.68 This empirical analysis is of published senior court judgments69 of 
NBFE cases (n=320, of which 199 have authoritative primary data) 1981–2018. There is no electronic 
search system which captures the reasons for these senior court judgments and reliance on case 
catchwords can be misleading. These hand-collected data from the content of the judgments are 
supplemented by data sourced from other authoritative sources. This empirical research can be 
replicated by other legal scholars provided their coding of data and the necessary use of inference are 
consistent in their identification of outcome patterns. 
These multiple research methodologies eliminate subjectivity and opinion: the outcomes are objective 
and evidence based, each methodology tested against the others. This combination of methodologies 
allows the development of four thematic reform objectives supported by tactical interventions, each 
                                                                  
68 Jenifer Varzaly, ‘The Enforcement of Directors Duties in Australia: An Empirical Analysis’ (2015) 16 
European Business Organisation Law Review 281, 300. 
69 HCA, FCAFC, FCA, NSWSC, NSWCA, VSC, VSCA, QSC, QCA, SASC, SASCA, WASC, WASCA. 
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of which will require additional research in their implementation. These themes provide strategic 




5. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 
Australian law and regulation of financial products and services has largely developed in response to 
crises and public policy imperatives.70 These 
[c]rises are more likely to reveal critical features of a complex system that remains undetected in the 
normal state. The purpose of a crisis analysis is not primarily to understand the cause of a specific 
corporate governance failure, but to learn about the system in which this failure occurred.71 
There has been significant judicial review and intervention throughout this period followed by 
legislative reform of statutes. The ‘institutional autops[ies]’72 of major cases have steadily, if 
haphazardly, focussed and enhanced the duties of directors and trustees with a plethora of judicial 
interventions over this period in response to the cyclical nature of the underlying systemic problems 
unearthed. In Australia, 
[t]he law regulating managed investment schemes (and other commercial trusts) remains seriously 
inadequate, a situation that should be regarded as intolerable in respect of entities that are permitted to 
raise funds from the public … Australian trust law … suffers fundamental structural weaknesses as a 
system for regulating large and complex enterprise entities.73 
Reform needs: ‘a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; 
understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with 
societies’ goals…’74 and resisting ‘ fine tuning regulations’.75 ‘The sad news is that the general 
approach to reforms [ha]s largely still been based on an outmoded and by now largely repudiated 
conceptual concept of regulations, which does not start from the “system-wide” characteristics of 
risks and often misses key risks’.76 
The starting point for Australian reform is where matrices identify a 90% greater or equal correlation 
between the selected variables.77 Related party transactions and misleading and deceptive conduct 
are closely correlated (93.42%). There are high correlations between incidences of dishonesty, related 
parties/conflicts of interest (95.31%), breaches of directors’ fiduciary and best interest duties 
                                                                  
70 de Jersey, above n 36. 
71 Pistor, above n 25, 1666. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Nuncio D’Angelo, ‘The CAMAC Report on managed investment schemes: Another opportunity missed?’ 
(2012) 23 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 253, 254. 
74 Claessens and Kodres, above n 4, 2. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid 4. 
77 App 2. 
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(95.31%), and failures in disclosure (92.97%). Tactical implementation can be achieved through the 
harmonisation of directors and trustee duties, reform of the use of trusts as commercial investment 
entities, and the international harmonisation of Australian corporate governance and financial product 
standards.  
Specifically, IOSCO, Financial Stability Board, MiFID 1 and 11, embrace of the Global Corporate 
Governance Standard,78 licensing and capitalisation, and asserting the primacy of fiduciary and 
fiduciary-like responsibility. Consistency between in-country reforms and globally is sound policy. 
To not achieve at least these results risks the Australian NBFE funds management industry becoming 
a global outlier with negative economic consequences. These strategies may also render reform less 
politically contentious. IOSCO has a well-defined assessment and implementation process including 
for market confidence and integrity, investor protection, and reduction of financial crime.79 
Risks will remain: ‘a fully “fail-proof” financial system may not be the most efficient in delivering 
economic growth or other desirable outcomes’,80 including the development of financial literacy 
competencies as an alternative to libertarian paternalism. There could be ‘less emphasis on formal 
rules and give more discretion to [reformed] supervisory agencies … perhaps avoid the proliferation 
of rules that may add more costs than they provide benefits and may even increase overall risks’,81 a 
suggestion consistent with this thesis. 
Harmonisation includes the need to address the scope and importance of applying fiduciary principles 
to governance of the NBFE sector. The objective should be quality assurance of the investment chain 
for the benefit of the financial consumer. This is an accepted principle in other scholarly disciplines. 
Presently, there are differing statutory interventions ranging from none to significantly prescribed 
statutory fiduciary duties in the governance of superannuation entities, a greater statutory intervention 
than embodied in the Corporations Act. The backgrounds of directors and trustees influence their 
understanding of and implementation of fiduciary principles, and the personal risks they assume 
arising from these roles. There are directors of responsible entities (REs) of MIS who do not 
understand that a responsible entity is also a corporate trustee, subject also to trust law.  
The duties and responsibilities of directors and directors of trustees and registered organisations are 
not consistent across the Corporations Act, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) (SIS) Act, and 
                                                                  
78 Centre for Fiduciary Excellence LLC and fi360 Inc 11, ‘Prudent Practices for Investment Managers: 
Defining a Global Fiduciary Standard of Excellence’ (2013 Worldwide edition). 
79 IOSCO, Impact Assessment Guidelines (July 2011) [1.5]. 
80 Claessens and Kodres, above n 4, 12. 
81 Ibid 23. 
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Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act. Inconsistencies in the law have led to 
opportunistic behaviour by some directors and trustees. Whilst arguably complying with statute, they 
do not follow the spirit of the law and do not optimise investor outcomes. In some cases, despite the 
provisions of statutes and general law, shareholders and unitholders have been asked to approve, 
usually through a sequence of transactions, often between related parties including directors and 
entities controlled by them, outcomes which are suboptimal and which enrich those who govern the 
NBFE. Sober analysis reveals outcomes which, had they been concluded in a single transaction, 
would be prima facie cases of non-, mis- and malfeasance.  
There is considerable systemic risk generated by related party transactions and consequential conflicts 
of interests and objectives. These occur in a complex investment chain controlled by multiple 
intermediaries and is incompatible with the concept of a fiduciary having stewardship of client 
property. Related party transactions are common in NBFEs. Present financial advice regulation is 
directed at prioritisation rather than prohibition of conflicted dealings. For financial products subject 
to trust general law or its statutory implementation in the SIS Act, there is prohibition, although not 
exclusively.82 Murray83 noted that there is increasing industry consolidation and vertical integration. 
This results in increasing number of related parties and increased potential for conflicts of interest.84 
Directors are often placed in situations of conflict of interest and conflict of economic objective by 
virtue of the architecture of their organisations. 
The law governing the supply of financial products and services by NBFEs is a field where opposing 
political, social, and economic interests compete intensively.85 NBFEs and their regulators operate in 
a political milieu. It is assumed that there is a level playing field in Australian regulation. This may 
not be the case. Some NBFEs have better access to agents of the state than others and governance 
structures that can influence political outcomes unavailable to others.86  
  
                                                                  
82 APRA, Conflicts of interest (at July 2013) Prudential Standard SPS 521. 
83 Murray, above n 62. 
84 ASIC, Culture, conduct and conflicts of interest in vertically integrated businesses in the fund-
management industry (Report 474, March 2016). 
85 de Jersey, above n 36. 
86 Cheffins, ‘Corporate Law and ownership structure’, above n 19, 361. 
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6. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF INACTION 
The financial system is based on trust.87 Whilst there are some compensation arrangements in place 
in Australia, notably for APRA regulated superannuation funds, and remedies sought as a result of 
successful class actions, for the most part, investors have not been compensated.88 In this sample, a 
4.24% remediation result. This has three direct and lasting results: investors lose trust in the financial 
system and stop or reduce investing,89 capital availability becomes restricted and economic activity 
is reduced, impoverishment ensues, increasing welfare reliance.  
There is a considerable historical literature on the relationship between law and economics. These 
include assertions of efficiency and inducement of efficiency of common law based on judicial 
interpretations of fairness, justice, and rights;90 legislative capture by special interest groups;91 the 
economics of models of regulation;92 and legal empirical analysis.93 ‘There is a very general need for 
empirical work on the legal system to be undertaken’.94 That includes definition of efficiency: 
economists apply consumer welfare benefit rather than legal efficiency. In Australia, examples of 
legislative capture include the FoFA and registered organisation reforms, both contested by interest 
groups and politicised. Reform of superannuation fund governance remains contested. Each of these 
examples should be subjected to the spotlight of empirical legal analysis to improve economic 
outcomes for their respective financial consumers. 
That the Australian economy has not developed its innate entrepreneurial qualities into an ecosystem 
comparable with the US95 and Germany is in part a result of legal uncertainties and complexities. 
Risks include permanent life changing personal consequences of being a director, trustee, or officer 
                                                                  
87 Chris Bowen, 'Overhaul of Financial Advice' (Media Release No 036, 26 April 2010).  
88 ASIC, Compensation for retail investors: the social impact of monetary loss (Report 240, May 2011) 13-
14; The Australian Government the Treasury [Richard St John], 'Compensation Arrangements for 
Consumers of Financial Services: Future of Financial Advice' (Report, April 2012) iii ['FoFA'].  
89 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Governance of Collective Investment 
Schemes' (White Paper, 2005) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/financialmarkets>. 
90 Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen Publishers, 2011) cited in Lewis Kornhauser, ‘The 
Economic Analysis of Law’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Metaphysics 
Research Lab, Stanford University, Fall 2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/legal-
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91 Simon F Deakin, ‘The legal theory of finance: implications for methodology and empirical research’ 
(2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 338. 
92 Cento Veljanovski, The Economics of Law (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2nd ed, 2006) 145. 
93 Richard A Posner, ‘The economic approach to law’ (1975) 53 Texas Law Review 757, 782 cited in Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Economic Analysis of Law’ in A J Auerbach and M Feldstein (eds), Handbook 
of Public Economics (Elsevier Science BV, 2002) vol 3, ch 25. 
94 Kaplow and Shavell, above n 93, vol 3, ch 25 [7.3] 1765. 
95 See, eg, Bernard Salt, ‘What happened to the spirit of the Aussie entrepreneur?’, The Weekend Australian 
(Sydney), 10–11 March 2018. 
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seeking to balance entrepreneurial opportunity with capital preservation. Foregone economic activity 
is also a function of the loss of capital quantified in Chapter 3 and consequential risk aversion of 
Australian investors, institutional and private, from the losses resulting from an inchoate regulatory 
system. It is not possible for a risk seeking entrepreneurial ecosystem to grow sustainably with such 
a loss of capital. Hence the paucity of capital availability for Australian SMEs. These companies 
wither. 
Some authors96 claim causality between legal origins and financial market outcomes, a primary legal 
distinction being common and civil law origins.  
Legal protections not only facilitate diversification of financial commitments by the existing investor 
base, but also and in addition, must encourage small investors to put their savings in equity. This then 
leads to the broadening of the investor base which is associated with bigger and deeper markets. Thus 
law begets markets.97 
Comparative law research supports this conclusion, with differing legal methods achieving similar 
desired outcomes for securities investors. Similarly, differing jurisdictions change market practices 
using methods other than legal tools to implement policy reform: ‘law is hardly ever the only or even 
the culprit of a crisis. Conversely, legal solutions are not necessarily the most important remedy … 
actual change is contingent on non-legal factors...’98 The importance of behavioural economics 
research is understated and under-researched in Australia, where emphasis on statutory accretion 
serves as ‘diagnostic tools for policy reform’99 without applying the insights from comparative 
jurisdictions. Emphasis on objective strategy based on multiple tools in Australia would serve to 
reduce the impact of interest group driven politicised policy recently experienced in the financial 
planning and superannuation sectors.  
Community expectations of, and trust in what each market participant should do has often been 
different from what they actually do. ‘Be under no illusion, there is still a trust deficit between investor 
and customer…’100 Ambiguities lead to a false sense of security which have been sadly and 
damagingly misplaced. ‘Lilliputian battles … whose petty victories ... were trumpeted in the columns 
of their fawning acolytes in the press’101 gave comfort that these problems were being resolved. 
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98 Ibid 1669. 
99 Ibid 1658. 
100 Niall Coburn, ‘Compliance challenges facing the financial services industry – how do I turn risk into 
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Wallis inspired principles of disclosure, advice, and financial literacy, whilst commendable, have 
been implemented with a certain naivety leading to severe personal and nationwide economic 
damage.  
One court likened Australia’s financial services and financial products industries to Dante’s Inferno. 
It chose vivid adjectives ‘byzantine’ and ‘purgatorial’.102 This speaks loudly of the need for rational 
reform in the provision of financial products and financial services. Reform objectives must be to re-
establish trust, confidence and respect, lost in several decades of often anonymous or poorly-informed 
financial product selling to vulnerable retail investors, despite repeated analysis and with similar 
conclusions from 2001.103  
The goal of reform must be clearly directed at restoring public trust, confidence, and respect. 
Fundamentally, this requires recognition of fiduciary obligations to investors and beneficiaries often 
wrongly assumed by them to exist. Directors, trustees, and those that advise them are responsible. 
Often not deliberately dishonest, sometimes ‘messianic’104 but nonetheless not fit and proper in any 
meaningful sense.  
The spirit of Wallis principles of disclosure are not always adhered to. Nor is disclosure always 
understood by readers. Disclosure has not prevented manifest conflicts of economic interest in the 
management of those activities. In the application of the second Wallis principle, financial advice, 
there is a distinction between the general law duties of skill and care and fiduciary obligation, 
constrained by associated contractual provisions in the relationship, and the Corporations Act. 
Investors may be surprised to learn that in 2018 there is no statutory fiduciary duty to the client in 
respect of this second limb of Wallis. The assumption that fiduciary principles always apply is false. 
They do not, and the fact that statutory application of fiduciary principles was proposed to apply to 
what was sold as professional advice speaks volumes for the corrupted ethical cultures of the 
organisations and individuals involved. It speaks loudly of systemic deficiencies in Australia’s 
financial culture, but a deficient statutory solution. The modern fiduciary standard is a general law 
standard now subsumed by a statutory best interest duty.  
General law principles of reasonable skill and care had not in many cases been applied either, with 
the financial advice and wealth management sectors being captured by a commission driven sales 
culture in large and small financial institutions. This is not the case in other jurisdictions. Even before 
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Hayne,105 large Australian financial institutions added to the unease by needing to compensate clients 
for advice that was contracted but not provided. Whilst this is not of itself a breach of fiduciary duty, 
it underscores legal uncertainty in the mind of a layperson, a financial consumer. Fiduciary duties in 
Australia are not directly concerned with the quality of advice, although that quality may differ 
depending on whether any fiduciary duty obligations are discharged or not. However, the law still 
provides a basis for corruption of these principles by not making a clear demarcation between 
financial products sellers and financial products advisers. There is still the basis for conflicts of 
interest to arise, including arising from fee structures. 
In the US, there is a similar debate, politicised as in Australia, also extending to the regulators. Retail 
investors (Moms and Dads) typically are exposed to brokers and, separately, investment advisers. 
There has been no uniform fiduciary standard for brokers and investment advisers, although there has 
been a best interests test. Brokers have typically earned a fee from product manufacturers and mutual 
funds whilst making suitable recommendations and in some cases managing client accounts, whereas 
investment advisers typically earn an asset based fee. The US Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) intended a uniform fiduciary standard for all retail investor retirement advice. The SEC has 
the regulatory power under Dodd-Frank106 but political division and continued lobbying has 
prevented implementation. Financial professionals who provide advice related to retirement monies 
must act as fiduciaries (in the US interpretation of fiduciary) and brokers who manage retirement 
monies must act with best interest, and similarly for non-retirement accounts where they have 
investment discretion or asset related fees. Fiduciary responsibilities are to be underpinned in 
enforceable best interest contracts. Judicial review in the US and Canada has extended fiduciary 
relationships ‘to be used for creating new forms of civil wrong’, being from an Australian perspective 
an ‘unsatisfactory development of the law of fiduciary obligation’.107  
Investors may also be interested to learn that a custodian in Australia does not necessarily have the 
meaning assumed by an investing layperson. There is a disconnection between public expectation 
and industry practice. Many people assume that the mere attribution of the custody title confers 
fiduciary duty and protection to an investor akin to a trustee. It does not. Deficiencies in the Australian 
custody sector were identified in 2003 and Australian law does not follow international standards. 
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Arguably the Australian custody sector has been charging fees commensurate with community 
service expectations but without providing a level of service and risk mitigation assumed by investors. 
The investing public does not necessarily understand the legal nuances between a managing trustee, 
and a custodian trustee, nor the distinction between a custodian trustee and a bare trustee. 
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7. COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS ― DISCONNECTION WITH THE TWIN 
PEAKS MODEL OF REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
Community expectation is tempered by belief systems, behavioural norms, and financial 
competencies leading to systemic misunderstandings based upon ‘limited ability to unravel risks...’108  
Discussion of expectation, culture, and intervention is incomplete without a wider view of the value 
to individual investors and the entrepreneurial economy of investors having access to various types 
of financial product, including MIS. Should the libertarian paternalism espoused by Cooper109 in 
respect of superannuation investment be copied in these other investment asset classes? If so, what is 
the effect on the entrepreneurial economy? At an individual level, would such policy enhance 
financial literacy? Probably not, since impairment of capital is one element of understanding risk. 
Some jurisdictions do restrict retail investor access to many types of financial product,110 a 
consequence being more reliance on government and less individual endeavour. However, this is not 
the optimal response to the systemic problems in Australia. ‘Where should responsibility for citizens’ 
longer term financial security lie?’111 Policy conflicts arise from investor realisations post-NBFE 
collapses where ‘little active supervision is revealed, financial consumers are incredulous, angry and 
mistrustful’.112 Disclosure assumes that ‘all investors are the same’113 and make informed decisions. 
This is not the case, despite their having responsibility for decision making. In Australia, there are 
‘limited and sparse existing programs of investor education and assistance’,114 with ASIC concluding 
that ‘investor education is worthwhile though it must be pursued in the long term in tandem with 
other strategies that build in the fact that retail investors are not the hard-headed decision makers 
often supposed.’115 Implicit recognition of the importance of behavioural economics theory. 
Expectations gaps between regulators and stakeholders ‘resonate today, arising as they do out of legal 
and technical difficulties in applying a single regime to a disparate collection of investment and quasi-
investment arrangements that utilise different legal forms and are used for different commercial 
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purposes’.116 This is particularly so for unregistered MIS and those common enterprise MIS where 
there may be no tangible trust property, investor benefits being limited to choses in action, sometimes 
only exercisable through conflicted power of attorney. Desire for retribution from those aggrieved is 
compounded by ASIC not choosing ‘to use enforcement as a primary means of shaping MIS 
jurisprudence’.117 More recent policy directions to address culture, director and investor education 
seek to facilitate its mandate by lifting ethical and educational standards across its regulated universe, 
with the proposed caveat of statutory criminal penalties on those responsible for poor organisational 
culture. If continued, these strategies are generational and rebalance ASIC as a Responsive Regulator, 
less reliant upon statutory compliance and more focussed on the import of fiduciary concepts. 
One of the benefits of Australia’s Twin Peaks model is the application of differing approaches to 
similar problems. A primary difference between ASIC and APRA (and the Registered Organisations 
Commission) is the number and diversity of NBFE entities regulated. APRA is more closely involved 
with its regulated entities through ex ante supervision than ASIC with its ex post market conduct 
model, until recently largely adversarial, relying on court based enforcement.118 The former makes 
for relational regulation based upon earlier interventions. ASIC’s recent focus on culture and 
education makes for a more relational environment: Responsive Regulation. This form of regulation 
‘champions internalisation … it is usually impossible for society to organize its resources so that 
rewards and punishments await every act of compliance or non-compliance’.119 The objective is to 
achieve compliance by internal means, sometimes underscored by means of enforceable 
undertakings,120 commonly used in Australian financial services and financial products regulation.  
Active involvement (common in prudentially regulated entities) can diffuse required behaviours into 
NBFE governance and at many levels of the entity, not just its compliance management. This would 
require additional skills sets in ASIC to embrace microeconomic analysis and its inclusion in 
disclosure documents. It would be an ex ante extension of present licencing powers to prevent, restore 
and rehabilitate. It balances its ex post adversarial powers. ‘This would mean a cultural change in 
firms and the board and senior management working to change the acceptance of regulators in 
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firms’.121 Such policy does not have the ‘public drama of prosecutions’, requiring political will.122 
Lack of public confidence has resulted in ASIC’s review of its Australian Financial Services Licence 
(AFSL) and Credit Licence banning powers concurrently with the introduction of the Banking 
Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR) for ADIs.123 
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8. COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS ― GAP WITH MARKET PRACTICES IN THE 
GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
A consumer of financial products and services is often vulnerable because of lack of experience and 
expertise in investment. This vulnerability should enliven fiduciary obligations. The important 
characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is one of trust and confidence, the fiduciary acting for or on 
behalf of the interests of another.124 The fiduciary power must be exercised in the interests of the 
investor or client with no unauthorised profit or conflict accruing to the fiduciary. Fiduciary 
relationships should occur at every point in the investment chain where there is discretion or advice. 
Economic interest of the ultimate consumer should be paramount. The beneficiary must have 
confidence in the agent even if that agent is several steps removed. Trust in the investment chain is 
only as ‘strong as the trust in the weakest link of that investment chain’.125 Defining status-based 
fiduciaries is fundamental. 
Directors are often placed in situations of conflict of interest and conflict of economic objective by 
virtue of the architecture of their organisations. Considerable systemic risk is generated by related 
party transactions and consequential conflicts of interests and objectives. These occur in a complex 
investment chain controlled by multiple intermediaries and is incompatible with the concept of a 
fiduciary having stewardship of client property. Related party transactions are common in NBFEs.  
Present financial advice regulation is directed at prioritisation rather than prohibition of conflicted 
dealings. For financial products subject to trust general law or its statutory implementation in the SIS 
Act, there is prohibition, although not exclusively.126 Murray127 noted that there is increasing industry 
consolidation and vertical integration. This results in increasing number of related parties and 
increased potential for conflicts of interest.128 ASIC’s report particularly relates to financial product 
manufacturing and distribution, outsourcing, fiduciary obligations, remuneration, ownership 
interests, and use of information. These and other conflicts also arise in prudentially regulated NBFEs. 
ASIC specifically suggests ‘better training for directors’,129 the ‘engagement of separate external legal 
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advisers’ in conflicts of a fiduciary nature,130 and cultural responses to conflicts management 131 to 
disrupt ‘systemic conduct that is driven by poor culture’.132 
But, conflicts and the taking of profits have often arisen permitted by the subsuming of fiduciary 
principles by contract and statute. Australian Softwood Forests is an example at the commencement 
of this study period:  
The schemes are generally designed so that all the investors ever receive are the pieces of paper 
constituting the agreements … promoters design increasingly more sophisticated schemes in attempts 
to circumvent the laws.133 
Directors of companies and trustees have differing fiduciary responsibilities. ‘As a general rule, all 
powers vested in directors under the company’s articles are fiduciary powers to be exercised in the 
interests of the company’.134 Fiduciary responsibilities are also set out in statute, specifically the 
Corporations Act and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, but not in the Fair Work 
(Registered Organisations) Amendment Act where general law fiduciary duty traditionally applied in 
the context of dependence. 
The director of a trustee and a director of another entity associated with the asset can concurrently be 
the same person managing the same underlying assets. This is one of many conundrums leading to 
uncertainty in NBFE governance. Harmonisation of fiduciary duty across the governance of the 
NBFE sector is required to eliminate inconsistency in the law. Like the cleansing effects of economic 
recession, a statutory prohibition on conflicts of interest is required to eliminate ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and redevelop lost confidence in a market based regulatory system. Statutory 
interventions prioritise not prohibit. This is dangerous for beneficiary, client, and trustee director 
alike. They do not resolve the cultural problems identified by Heydon, opining that poor culture drives 
poor conduct.  
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There is no controversy over the existence and scope of a fiduciary’s fundamental proscriptive duties, 
although there may be [is]135 over the precise nature and extent of them.136 There is ‘no standard test 
to be applied to determine whether the parties are within a fiduciary relationship’.137 It depends on 
the facts and the context, including ‘contractual arrangements’.138 The essence of the fiduciary 
relationship is the exercise of power by one party for the benefit of another, the principles being: 
unless there are some special circumstances in the relationship, the duties that equity demands from 
the fiduciary will be limited to what he described as the ‘two core obligations’ relating to unauthorised 
benefits and conflicts of interest.139 
The determining factor is ‘the well-established rule that the scope of the fiduciary duties in a particular 
relationship will vary and is to be determined according to the nature of the relationship and the facts 
of the particular case’.140  
The need to analyse each discrete case for fiduciary obligation strikes at the heart of the systemic 
cause of the chasm between client or investor expectations and market practices in financial services 
advice or financial products selling. There have been misplaced expectations by investors in NBFE 
financial products and services transactions that there is a relationship based in fiduciary principles. 
Part of the mismatch in expectations has been poor financial literacy and misunderstanding of the law 
(including fiduciary law), but part is innate trust based on fiduciary principles assumed by investors 
in professional persons with whom they deal. 
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9. THE EXPERIENCES OF COMPARATIVE JURISDICTIONS 
Australia is not unique: other jurisdictions have implemented a variety of solutions to remedy 
comparative systemic deficiencies. This study of comparative jurisdictions is insightful: ‘[C]ross-
country differences in legal systems and accounting standards help to explain the cross-country 
differences in the development of financial intermediaries’.141 ‘[C]ountries with a German legal origin 
have better-developed financial intermediaries…’142 with particular insights into regulatory posture, 
fiduciary-equivalent obligation, and the relationship between regulation and corporate governance. 
Of the common law jurisdictions, Canada has the closest affinity with the traditional German civil 
law model. Germany has the closest pure liability model of all of the jurisdictions studied. When 
Germany in 2007 departed temporarily from its legal traditions in NBFE regulation, it suffered results 
similar to those in Australia: ‘Heuschrecken’143 descended, necessitating reversion to legal traditions, 
now codified in EU statutes. 
These insights are of practical relevance, if emulated could significantly improve Australian law and 
regulation. They provide the basis for the re-establishment of investor trust and confidence and 
enhancement of national economic productivity. Inter-jurisdictional transfer difficulties can arise, but 
the more successful regulatory experiences in comparative jurisdictions provide reform options to 
address identified systemic deficiencies in Australia. These experiences fall into two distinct 
categories – strategic policy reforms and tactical statutory reforms. 
The German (EU), Canada, US, UK, and Singapore jurisdictions demonstrate there is no one solution 
to the resolution of systemic problems in those jurisdictions and manifested in Australia. These 
experiences fall into two distinct categories – strategic policy reforms and tactical statutory reforms. 
They will require amendment to Australian statutes. 
For example, if Australian NBFE directors were subject to German (now EU-codified) duty of care 
civil law untreue and culpa in contrahendo fiduciary-like doctrines (in their proscriptive and 
prescriptive formulations), supreme rather than subordinate, they would be less likely to hide behind 
statutory and contractual box-ticking. For Australian investors, it would extend duties of advisers 
beyond present statutory best interest with a personal conduct obligation to explain, fully disclose, 
deal fairly and positively pursue their economic interests. German legal tradition has facilitated the 
maturity of its private banking sector, yet to be emulated in Australia. In Germany, investors are now 
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consumers of financial products and services, not capital suppliers in a NBFE market. This is a 
completely different posture to Australian market practice. 
Canada has significantly extended fiduciary doctrine across the investment chain, adopted 
Responsive Regulation, with NBFE directors and financial advisers having a direct, prescriptive 
fiduciary nexus with whom they deal. By contrast, NBFE regulation in the US is a politicised, 
convoluted, unresolved, inconsistent mess blowing with the political winds of the day. Its fragmented 
regulatory architecture, which has led to jurisdiction shopping, ‘has been heavily discredited’.144 The 
UK has attempted to quality assure its investment chain by proposing substantially extended fiduciary 
obligation, eliminating legal ability to contract out of that obligation, and extending it to end 
beneficiary. To date, those attempts have failed. Singapore has a national strategy of being a global 
finance hub. Regulatory veracity has been achieved using other methods. These include statutory 
personal liability in financial advice, personal fiduciary liability for directors of actively managed 
collective investment schemes (CIS) regulated by its Business Trusts Act145 (the equivalent of small 
unregistered MIS in Australia), and much greater barriers to entry for NBFE market participants. 
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10. IMAGINE 
You are a director of an Australian company which holds an AFSL and acts as RE of a number of 
MIS, in-house and for third parties. It has multiple international subsidiaries and operations. The 
company owns a wealth management business which employs and authorises a number of financial 
advisers. It also has a Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) License to act as trustee of 
superannuation funds of various forms and, as RSE, is responsible for investing those funds inter alia 
into managed investment schemes for which it is also the RE. Some of those invested funds are 
superannuation industry default funds. Your officers are often asked by beneficiaries and investors to 
advise them on their superannuation and other investment arrangements. The capital structure is 
complex with a mix of securities on issue. There are multiple senior and junior banking facilities and 
a related party finance company. Your company is proposed to be acquired by a foreign company. 
The foreign company is based in Canada and its shares are publicly quoted on a US securities 
exchange. It manages a UK pension fund. Such scenarios have been commonplace. Increasingly so 
as NBFE sector consolidation occurs encouraged by regulators seeking scale and fee reductions in 
the NBFEs they regulate.146  
What are your duties? How do you balance the exercise of them in governance of entities which are 
subject to multiple and inconsistent law? Where do you find a summary of your duties? What are 
your options should you disagree with the proposals of other directors? Do you assume personal 
liability? If so, how and when? What constitutes an appropriate set of board papers? You step up into 
the role of chair of the board. How do your responsibilities change?  
There has been significant judicial intervention and extra-curial review of these complex governance 
problems: 
The intent of the business judgment rule was to balance directors’ duties and liabilities with the needs 
of an independent corporation to engage in ‘economic entrepreneurship’, and to avoid the evisceration 
of companies such that none could make serious commercial decisions without the daily approval of 
lawyers.147 
‘Rather than add certainty, AICD submits that the result will be to increase uncertainty’.148 
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The law governing the imposition of duties upon persons who act for or on behalf of corporate entities 
should be clear, simple, and as far as reasonably possible, certain of application. In my opinion, the 
current law does not meet these objectives.149  
The respective roles of the board and senior management and the resulting allocation of responsibilities 
is a fundamental aspect of corporate governance … if the balance is not appropriate, the fundamental 
governance structure of the company will be flawed and may lead to poor company performance.150 
Companies are regulated by the Corporations Act, SIS Act (where superannuation and insurance 
entities are involved), the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules (for publicly quoted 
companies in Australia listed on the ASX), and the general law. The ASX Listing Rules require 
companies to have an audit committee, but not a risk committee, although it is common for NBFEs 
to have risk committees advising their boards.151 A study of the top 20 ASX listed companies and a 
sample of 10 small capitalisation companies reported that ‘ninety per cent of the top 20 companies 
listed determination/approval of financial reports as a responsibility of the board but only 30% of the 
small capitalisation companies did this’.152 Most NBFEs are of small capitalisation. Given that the 
financial services entities in this research sample included AMP, ANZ Bank, Commonwealth Bank, 
Macquarie Group, National Australia Bank, QBE Insurance, Suncorp Group, and Westpac Banking 
Corporation,153 each and all of whom have had systemic and cyclical failures in at least their NBFE 
operations, illustrates that their corporate governance arrangements have not worked as they should. 
For the most part, directors of Australian NBFEs are lay people, not professional directors.154 Large 
corporate entities tend to be governed by individuals with claim to professional competencies but this 
is not the norm in NBFEs. Neither are the individuals holding these positions appropriately 
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remunerated to be able to devote sufficient time for study and analysis of the law to properly 
understand its evolution and application. They therefore place considerable reliance upon third party 
advisers, a path that is increasingly dangerous for them.  
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11. STATUTES AT VARIANCE ― THE CREATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN 
DIRECTORS DUTIES AND TRUSTEE DUTIES 
NBFE directors are confronted by overlapping and confused trust law, general law and statutory 
provisions. They can rarely be certain of their duties. This confusion extends to those who invest in 
their entities, their legal advisers and to those determining whether appointees meet fit and proper 
criteria,155. ‘A legal vacuum has been created by the evolution of the trust as a vehicle for large scale 
enterprise, and the apparent tardiness of Australian legislatures to accommodate this development’.156 
‘[T]rustee-directors should not have to collate rules from multiple sources in order to understand their 
core duties’.157 
There are differing standards applying to director duties under the Fair Work Act (Registered 
Organisations) Amendment Act, Corporations Act, and SIS Act. Many NBFEs are multifunction 
financial institutions of considerable size subject to regulation by or the influence of each of these 
statutes. 
Like Esau and Jacob, ‘vying for power even in their mother’s womb’,158 the jurisdictional differences 
in history, culture, and desire for specific types of governance lead to a zero sum game. Whilst there 
may be some tactical reform, these struggles for power and influence have not necessarily improved 
conditions for the people they purport to protect. ‘Appointees [to the Fair Work Commission] are 
regularly described as “union friendly” or “employer friendly”’ giving rise to ‘claims of bias’.159 
Neither is there unanimity of professional opinion as to the solutions.160 The Corporations Act 
impacts on ‘ASIC’s ability both to respond to the recommendations made in this report, and on its 
ongoing and future ability to fulfil its mandate efficiently and effectively’.161 It cites ‘legislative and 
regulatory complexity … and in particular the application of the Corporations Act’.162 During the 
period covered by this thesis, its word count has increased from 257 419 to 729 056.163 These concerns 
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are ‘shared by numerous members of the judiciary who note that ‘every significant amendment to the 
corporations legislation … has added substantially to complexity’ such that it is now “inescapably 
complex”’164 ‘Treacherous’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘as clear as mud’, are other judicial adjectives.165 
Cooper has previously proposed a rewrite of the SIS Act citing complexity grounds.166 To add to the 
confusion, four recent reform proposals have failed or struggled to gain necessary political support,167 
with compromised reform to the governance of registered organisations finally enacted in December 
2016.168 
These sentiments are not new. ‘There is a point where company law ends and trust law takes over’,169 
not a distinction recognised by many directors. Many NBFEs, particularly MIS and superannuation 
entities, are trusts with a corporate trustee. Trust structures were not originally intended to be used 
for risk seeking commercial business activities, or to be leveraged with debt to fund those activities. 
An MIS is a trust. Trust law applies.170 These distinctions apply particularly to unregistered and/or 
insolvent MIS, transfers of property by a fiduciary, superannuation entities, asset allocation decisions 
or cases involving Canadian and US participants.  
For directors of complex NBFEs, these legal uncertainties, overlaid with beneficiary and investor 
expectations of value outcomes rather than rights make for difficult territory. In Sino Iron,  
To require that a defendant must actually appreciate that the relevant facts constitute a trust in law 
would favour the legally ignorant over the legally aware, when the facts and knowledge are otherwise 
identical.171 
In Immobiliari v Opes Prime, ‘Again, one might justifiably question whether even the trained legal 
mind is capable of making such fine distinctions.’172 ‘[T]here is a clear twin policy imperative for 
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pursuing legislative reform of the Corporations [Act] law ― to both simplify and contemporise the 
law’.173 
Since trusts and MIS are not legal entities, they cannot become insolvent. There has not been a body 
of law developed to administer situations where the assets of the trust are not sufficient to meet the 
liabilities required to be discharged by the trustee or the RE, themselves normally contractually 
indemnified from those assets. Consequently, directors and trustees need to understand multiple and 
inconsistent statutory provisions, general law, and equity.  
The insolvency provisions of the Corporations Act relating to formal administration, receivership, 
and liquidation do not apply to trusts and MIS. Registered MIS have some limited statutory 
provision,174 not applying to unregistered MIS. The trustee or RE may become insolvent whilst it 
administers entities where their underlying assets are insufficient to meet creditor liabilities. There 
are also cases where the trustee or RE also administer trusts and MIS which are commercially sound, 
although the trustee or RE is not. Further complications arise where leverage, sometimes multiple 
layers of it, is part of the capital structure. For trusts and MIS which are listed on the ASX of other 
securities exchange, the listing rules apply to the trust or the MIS, but not to the trustee or RE and 
their directors. 
Personal liability in commercial trusts is also different in the US, being statute limited for investors,175 
by trust law for trustees176, and for investors in Canadian trusts by provincial statute.177 In Singapore, 
its Business Trust Act178 eliminates personal liability for unitholders whilst extending personal 
fiduciary liability of trustee directors to them. 
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12. THE CREATION OF UNCERTAINTY ― W[H]ITHER AUSTRALIA? 
There is no commonality of strategy and no policy consistency from the competing political parties. 
Empirical research demonstrates that ideological orientation influences regulatory policy.179 
Despite Australia’s elaborate regulatory architecture, which of itself created community expectations, 
Australia has a regulatory malaise in the NBFE sector which the inconsistencies of, and conflicts of 
interest in, public policy are ill-equipped to remedy. The current system is complex and ineffective.180 
The report into ASIC itself demonstrates clearly that there are ‘broad systemic problems in the 
financial advice industry’ which may recur.181  
It is manifestly important that Australia subscribe to international regulatory standards and that its 
own funds management products and services can be readily available in other jurisdictions. As with 
financial literacy, this should be seen as a productivity measure. Financial products harmonisation 
with international standards could assist Australia develop commonality of strategy and consistency 
in public policy. It would also remove some of its systemic deficiencies in the regulation of financial 
products and services and improve access to capital for companies, another productivity measure. 
Campbell’s underlying philosophy was for government intervention principally to open markets. 
Structure and regulation were addressed by Wallis advising a policy of non-interference in the market 
but with more streamlined and disciplined industry structures. These were designed in part to reduce 
regulatory fragmentation and overlap (and hence the ability to treaty shop) and to eliminate regulatory 
gaps arising from regulator specialisation. 
This led directly to the creation of APRA, the APRA Act requiring it to supervise prudentially 
regulated financial institutions including superannuation entities.182 APRA absorbed and consolidated 
the prudential roles of the Reserve Bank, Financial Institutions Commission, and the Insurance and 
Superannuation Commission.183 The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) presently has responsibility 
for the regulation of the SMSF sector, however it is an ex post environment and more focussed on 
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eliminating tax leakage from related party transactions rather than prudential oversight. The Financial 
Services Reform Act aimed to achieve a similar result for providers of financial products operating 
under the Corporations Act. 
These later reforms of the non-prudentially regulated sector were consistent with Wallis. Wallis relies 
on disclosure of information, honest conduct, and the abilities of consumers in a competitive and free 
market to make informed decisions based on unconflicted advice. Twin Peaks in practice are now 
Triple Peaks with the passage of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act in 2016. 
APRA regulated entities are prudentially supervised: other collective investments are not. Australia 
has a market conduct disclosure based regime, not a merits based regime (although Cooper184 moves 
towards the latter). Historically there has been no suitability requirement, no interventions power into 
financial product design, no prudential regulation of many financial products, and no licensing of 
investors. 
Prima facie, there may be argument for combination of the regulatory functions into one entity since 
many NBFEs are regulated by both ASIC and APRA (and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission [ACCC]). Superannuation trustees are regulated by ASIC, APRA, ATO, and Austrac. 
This argument does not survive insightful scrutiny.185 All four regulators, in the same jurisdiction, 
are required to develop policy responses and manage problematic issues which have some 
commonality. Their differing powers and cultures result in differing responses. This is a useful 
outcome and leads to a more diverse regulatory response based on learning and differing knowledge 
bases which can be shared. 
Whether there should be a single prudential regulator for the entire financial system was addressed in 
1996,186 and 2009.187 There is a difference between a capital guaranteed promise (eg ADI deposits) 
and a promise made in a managed fund or non-APRA regulated superannuation fund which have no 
such capital guarantee. These are two completely different regulatory environments. Extension of 
capital guarantees, ultimately by governments or industry levies, leads to significant moral hazard 
arising from community expectations, which cannot be met.188 The next step becomes political 
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influence. Ultimately it can lead to financial collapses (eg former State Banks) that prudential 
regulation is designed to avoid. That is not to say that prudential regulation cannot be applied by 
ASIC to the managed funds industry, only that it has a different result to that applied by APRA.  
The jurisdictional boundaries between the ISC (being the precursor to APRA) and the Australian 
Securities Commission (being the precursor to ASIC) resulted in ‘problems of trust management 
being placed in the hands of the ASC’.189 Public interest demands that the superannuation industry 
have its governance standards established and enforced. The SIS Act provisions, accordingly,  
reflect, or are emanations of, established common law rules … where statute and common law point 
in the same direction, it is, in my view, entirely appropriate to use such legislation to assist in 
illuminating the public interest in this matter. That interest is to protect investors from abuses of trust 
by ensuring proper standards are maintained in trust management and in trustee behaviour.190  
There is a moral hazard in that investor expectations may assume that the regulatory system is 
designed as a zero failure policy. It is not. There needs to be realistic community expectations as to 
what regulation and supervision can achieve in practice. 
Johnson191 is of the view that the separation of responsibilities has served Australia well and that the 
separation of prudential and market behavioural assists in the balance of regulation and supervision. 
Both Johnson and Cooper believe that the APRA approach of measuring institutional risk of failure 
and the systemic risk of that failure, then determining a graduated response is consistent with Wallis. 
Cooper did not favour a single regulator approach, and preferred a business: government efficiency 
model based upon a wider APRA mandate, closer working relationships between APRA and ASIC, 
enhanced resources for the ATO, and a Productivity Commission review five years thereafter. 
Cooper, without explicitly criticising Wallis, is intent on moving away from its paradigm under the 
guise of improving outcomes for members on the basis that ‘members are not in a position to drive 
changes themselves’;192 ie Wallis’ third limb of financial literacy has not worked in practice for 
superannuation NBFEs. Investor financial literacy is stated to be ‘an important long term goal, but a 
compulsory superannuation system cannot depend on all its participants having the skills 
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necessary’.193 Cooper is of the view that ‘disclosure is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
ensuring that member interests prevail’.194 This demonstrates a lack of confidence in Wallis’ first 
limb. The remaining limb, advice, has been addressed elsewhere, but trustees are likely to have greatly 
extended obligations to members in the provision of advice. 
Whilst Cooper does not envisage APRA’s role extending to intervening directly in trustee decisions, 
trustee directors are now subject to significantly enhanced statutory liability for beneficiary outcomes. 
This has major implications for director appointments, remuneration, and insurance. The tradition of 
general law principles based regulation rather than prescriptive statutory regulation has led to 
differing interpretations by directors, the regulators, and the courts. There is inherent tension between 
principles regulation and the need for clarity and certainty in the exercise of director and trustee 
duties, sought to be achieved by statutory extension. 
There is further tension between regulation and supervision.195 The Wallis posture of regulation based 
on intervention proportionate to the problem is different from direct oversight of financial institutions. 
Superannuation entities are subject to ex ante supervision, often active. MIS and other NBFEs are 
subject to ex post conduct regulation. Harmonisation needs to occur with ASIC moving to an ex ante 
supervisory agency, funded from industry levies (implemented 2017), and applying prudential 
supervision to registered MIS and other NBFEs. This would be a good result for ASIC and improve 
its ability to meet community expectation without destroying the three central tenets of Wallis: 
disclosure, advice and investor empowerment. ASIC would be able to focus on necessary reform of 
the MIS sector envisaged by the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC),196 at 
least in part. This includes elimination of the poacher/gamekeeper problem and proper prudential 
capital arrangements for MIS. It would also diminish the consequences of damaging ex post 
regulatory action on third parties since the NBFE market would become accustomed to a culture of 
supervision, different from regulation. Restoring the prescribed interest dual party system does not of 
itself provide better investor protection, although it would considerably widen the opportunity for 
remedy in the absence of MIS prudential regulation.  
The sources cited in this thesis sought to address many of the systemic problems attributed to 
disclosure and advice. For the market to hold directors to account, the third limb, investor 
                                                                  
193 Ibid ch 1, 4. 
194 Ibid. 
195 John Laker, 'Enhancing the competitiveness of financial services-lessons learnt and opportunities for 
improvement' (Speech delivered at the International Financial Services Association Annual Conference, 6 
August 2009). 
196 D’Angelo ‘The CAMAC Report’, above n 73, 256. 
45 
empowerment, as Cooper acknowledges, has limited success, and requires new strategy. 
Corporations Act amendments to improve investor empowerment apply only to companies, not to 
superannuation entities or registered organisations. Lifting financial literacy standards in Australia 
should be seen as a productivity policy and responsibility for its implementation given to an agency 
other than ASIC. Poor financial literacy is a common theme in the sources cited in this thesis. 
The collapse of HIH in 1991 resulted in a Royal Commission which required early structural changes 
to APRA. It was the beginning of a philosophy shift from neo-classical market driven mechanisms to 
‘a more sceptical, questioning, and aggressive approach’.197 It started the evolution from an ex post 
to an ex ante regulatory system. Later analysis followed this trend and recognised that honest 
disclosure alone aimed at removing information asymmetries is not sufficient where ‘individuals are 
not inherently rational in their actions and decision making’.198 
The alternative to investor empowerment is libertarian paternalism which has its own dangers. This 
philosophy of libertarian paternalism espoused by Cooper and enacted in a compulsory contributory 
superannuation system reform supposedly to ‘maximise outcomes for passive superannuation fund 
members whilst allowing the actively engaged to select their own direction’.199 Echoes of paternalism 
are to be found in MIS. For instance, the proposed liability of financial product manufacturers 
(normally fund managers) for the suitability of the product for specific investors is a preferred reform 
proposed by ASIC and includes a best interests duty and prohibitions or limitations on financial 
product availability. The result would be to extend product liability to the product originator and 
require them to have the infrastructure as if they were providing a potential investor with financial 
advice. 
This philosophy is used to justify a greater scope for government regulation and involvement, and is 
manipulated in the governance of industry superannuation funds by the application of the Fair Work 
Act to superannuation contributions. Presently, the superannuation sector is largely outsourced to the 
private sector. Default funds, and replication of that strategy to managed funds more generally places 
enormous economic power in the hands of the trustees.  
Without policy clarity in respect of the objectives of superannuation funds identified by Murray,200 it 
is but a short step to their application for economic development objectives, especially in a 
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constrained fiscal environment. By 2035, the Australian superannuation sector is expected to have 
AUD6.1 trillion under management,201 of which approximately 50% would be in default funds. These 
economic development objectives may include infrastructure investment, venture capital, 
government securities, and other sectors which are adept at influencing the political milieu. There are 
already examples in the industry superannuation fund sector, and including where there are related 
parties. ‘“Investment strategy” is not anywhere defined in the SIS Act … there is little guidance 
provided as to what constitutes an investment strategy nor of the level of detail required’.202 Peer 
pressure, whether it be from similar funds, government policy objectives, or community views, can 
easily lead to trustee diversion ‘from their single minded pursuit of members’ interests by the 
clamour…’203 What may constitute best interest in the pursuit of peer performance in other 
jurisdictions cannot necessarily be translated to Australia. 
It is a short step to part nationalisation of some of these funds, particularly default funds, with the 
management subsumed into government agencies,204 already publicly suggested. This may suit the 
proponents of libertarian paternalism, and there are obvious arguments to support such a strategy.205 
‘A public sector solution is likely to be most efficient, provided the annuitisation is compulsory’.206 
Such a policy would do little to meet the Wallis objectives of investor empowerment.  
Murray207 supports the present regulatory architecture. Murray expresses concern about political 
intervention and makes the point that governments have an obligation to act in the long term national 
interest rather than using the financial system for short-term political gain. Policy stability and lack 
of clarity as to objectives are key findings in Murray since they can lead to political influences and 
the corruption of the system. Murray has sounded the warning bell. The Murray approach is for 
tactical incremental reform provided these basic strategic issues have been addressed. Whilst he 
‘highlights [Australia’s] reliance on imported capital … and that unfair consumer outcomes remain 
prevalent’,208 there was no analysis of the underlying causes. These include the incidence of 
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malfeasance arising from injudicious incentives based on prioritisation rather than prohibition, often 
with related parties.  
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13. CULTURE AND ‘TAINT’ 
Heydon209 starts to explore the interface between the financial system and registered organisations. 
He identifies different standards for their directors and officers. The influence of criminality in 
registered organisations is of importance to the financial system given their influence over it directly 
and through their ASX shareholdings. Australia is known around the world as having the fourth 
largest pool of superannuation savings, and given their projected growth, identifying and removing 
systemic deficiencies is of national importance. Heydon210 is insightful and provides plentiful 
evidence to support the hypothesis of systemic and cyclical malfeasance. It also identifies two of the 
primary causes: deficiencies in regulation aided by an ‘unhealthy culture’. 
Statutory intervention into rectifying deficiencies in culture is not restricted to registered 
organisations. ‘Poor cultures, unsustainable business models, conflicted [financial product] 
distribution, and conflicts of interest’211 are sought to be eliminated by extending criminal sanctions 
to directors and officers. The thesis that poor culture drives poor conduct is of itself an admission that 
lack of effective enforcement of fiduciary obligations requires criminal remedies similar to those that 
presently exist in the Criminal Code.212 Whilst not deviating from its ex post posture to the extent of 
SIS Act supervision ― ‘we, as the regulator, won’t be looking over everyone’s shoulder to test their 
culture. We won’t dictate how a business is run’,213 nonetheless significantly extends the 
responsibilities of directors and officers. Specifically, further extension of director’s civil and 
criminal liability to financial services and products regulation in the Corporations Act.214 Extension 
of liability to subjective, ill-defined criteria would further add to uncertainty, with an additional best 
interest duty to customers, and further accessorial liability for market outcomes risks. It contradicts 
previous reform,215 and legal compliance with subjective opinion would be problematic.216 It is further 
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evidence of statutory intervention into fiduciary principles without elimination of the reasons for this 
intervention. A necessary policy objective, but consistently wrong solution.  
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14. DIRECTORS AND TRUSTEE DIRECTORS ― STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP OR 
BONDAGE? 
The only certainty for directors, trustees, and trustee directors is further uncertainty. Corporate 
governance reform of NBFEs is a priority, especially as the NBFE sector consolidates with resulting 
concentration of systemic risk. 
Inconsistency directly influences matters of great importance to directors including insurance and 
indemnities, content of board papers217 and access to entity information. Rights of access to 
information is mainly conferred for practical purposes by the general law in addition to statutory 
rights. Directors cannot rely for their defence on their management or on third parties, including 
auditors, or on the Business Judgment Rule,218 which in any event does not apply to entities regulated 
under the SIS Act, Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act or retail financial advice. 
Further, the law as to whom duty is owed is evolving. Presently in MIS, the director’s duty is to the 
company as RE and additionally a best interest duty to the members. In superannuation entities, the 
duty is to the trustee company, but has evolved directors also having a duty to the member directly. 
A nexus between director and member. Additional statutory duties for directors and trustees of 
superannuation entities result in directors having outcomes liability for market-linked, inflation, post-
tax, and longevity outcomes. These risks are largely outside of the control of the director, however 
well informed. 
Cooper admits that the present SIS Act is complex for both APRA regulated trustees and the SMSF 
sector and recommended a rewrite of it. Cooper proposes that there should be clarity about duties 
owed by trustee directors and the standard of competence they should possess and exercise. This 
combination of complexity and inherent differences between sectors can lead to regulators providing 
different interpretations, regulatory approaches, and responses.219  
In Australia, most directors are drawn from the general community, some as employer and employee 
representatives, including from registered organisations. Those from the latter are used to lesser 
statutory standards than those experienced with the Corporations Act and the SIS Act. Many of these 
appointments, whilst doubtless honourable and properly intentioned, are not professional directors 
and there would be few who know of or comprehend the different law applying to the basic obligation 
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of best interest. The only mandatory education proposed (with the ATO having enforcement power) 
is for SMSF trustees who have breached the SIS Act. 
Shifting policy sands, constantly changing regulation, regular judicial review, and subsequent 
statutory responses make it extraordinarily difficult for a director, a director of a corporate trustee, or 
a trustee in person, to either understand the law, or to properly discharge their duties. The Cooper 
requirements to be non-associated and the additional statutory duties in respect of conflicts of interest 
and higher standards of competency is likely to result in a smaller pool of eligible, suitably qualified 
trustee directors being available for board appointments. There is no Profession of Director in 
Australia from which to draw.220  
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15. CONCLUSION: FOUR THEMES IN LAW REFORM FOR A GLOBALISED 
WORLD 
Strategy and tactics 
Whilst Australia has benefited from its Twin Peaks (now Triple Peaks) market based regulatory 
architecture, its regulation of financial products and financial services requires substantive strategic 
reform supported by tactical interventions. This includes law reform and reforms designed to enhance 
productivity in the economy. Without substantive reform, there will not be adequate remedy of the 
systemic deficiencies in regulation nor of their cyclical manifestations which harm productivity. 
Present responses to public anger are mainly tactical in nature. That anger is based upon flawed 
community expectations and a belated understanding that what market participants do can be different 
from what those participants are expected to do. There is not, in Australia, sufficient understanding 
by the investing public of competing policy approaches or the benefits that the market based approach 
has brought to the community. Hardship driven policy change could destroy the economic benefits 
of an entrepreneurial society. 
Reform requires significant elapsed time, probably a decade, and it must be sequenced. Strategic 
reform requires acceptance and implementation by the various stakeholder groups. Tactical reforms 
can be imposed legislatively. The effectiveness and stability generated by prudential supervision 
needs to be embedded as a governance value system ― a culture ― within the non-prudentially 
regulated NBFE sector. Successful implementation aligns interest of provider and consumer: it also 
changes the role of the regulators: they become educators, supervisors. A healthy culture results in 
enforcement becoming a last resort. ‘The answer to cultural shortcomings is developing high 
standards of professionalism and excellence’.221  
The former Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) of 1997 provides a precedent for a 
series of strategic and tactical reforms which better implement Australia’s market based regulatory 
system and enhance its national productivity. Rather than change the regulatory architecture, reform 
should be directed at much better implementation of that architecture to eliminate its systemic 
deficiencies and cyclical manifestations. However, this is not as simple as some suggest.222 Australia 
requires more than incremental change to a failing system. This thesis proposes four law reform 
themes, implemented by four teams reporting to a senior ministerial level special purpose financial 
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consumer-centric Reference Group. That reflects the magnitude of the task ahead, strategic in scope 
and objective, each theme supported by tactical statutory interventions. 
The four reform themes are: Re-establishment of trust in the investment chain based on fiduciary 
obligation; Related party transactions, value shifting through tunnelling and conflicts of interest; 
Architecture for implementation at the financial consumer level ― financial planning and wealth 
management as a profession; and Market conduct regulation for the 21st century (including ASIC 
reform). To improve Australia’s position as a world financial centre, these reform themes are to be 
given tactical support in disclosure, NBFE corporate governance, MIS, and director and trustees 
competencies.  
The benefits of efficiently designed and implemented reform include increased capital availability for 
Australian industry, less systemic risk for investors, increased financial literacy and knowledge for 
investors, and harmonisation of Australian financial regulation with international norms. The latter 
opens the way for financial product portability internationally and more investment options for 
Australian investors. These reforms open the way for a true private banking industry in Australia. 




CHAPTER 2: TWIN PEAKS, THE ASCENT INTO UNCERTAINTY 
The regulation of financial services and financial products in Australia, 1981-2018 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter traces the twin themes of market conduct regulation of Non-Bank Financial Entities 
(NBFEs) and prudential supervision of superannuation savings which reflect Australia’s changing 
global circumstances and opportunities. On one hand, law reform to encourage entrepreneurship, on 
the other, compromised implementation leading to large financial losses, deep seated community 
anger, demands for revenge, and significant statutory responses. Despite this, intermittent but 
persistent pressures continue to direct superannuation savings to specific industry sectors. The 
tensions between entrepreneurial need and regulatory compliance is a recurring theme. This chapter 
identifies solutions.  
1.1 A nation in transition 
The story of modern Australia is one of political and economic transition. British entry into the then 
Common Market (now European Union) and withdrawal from military and imperial obligations ‘east 
of Suez’ in 1972 triggered the need for Australia to recognise that its place and role in the world was 
changing. Australia required economic independence. The complacency and prosperity of previous 
decades was to be challenged by an urgent need to diversify and modernise the industrial and 
economic base of the nation. The economy had been tightly controlled. It compromised mainly low 
value adding manufacturing industry protected by tariff barriers, infrastructure built primarily by 
government fiat, agriculture largely low value adding, and a nascent commodities oriented export 
mining sector. 
This was not the economy required for prosperity in a changed and globalising world. Previous 
periods of prosperity had been built on imperial preference and bountiful resources for a tiny 
population. An increasingly sclerotic economy prompted Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew’s aphorism: the ‘White trash of Asia’.1 In 1986, Australia’s own treasurer, Paul Keating warned 
of Australia becoming a ‘Banana Republic’.2 There was no recognisable venture capital industry. 
Business and consumer credit was constrained and expensive, and skilled people became an export: 
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a brain drain of its best talent. Australia was home to a small coterie of solid teaching universities, 
but there was no substantial research university building technological innovation into entrepreneurial 
global enterprises.  
The entry of foreign banks from 1984 not only led to increased competition, perceived and real, but 
also to new consumer and business financial products. Importantly, these foreign banks brought 
international business culture and skills to an oligopolistic banking sector. A nascent venture capital 
industry developed using Managed Investment Companies (MICs) as licensed tax preferred vehicles. 
A new awareness of what is possible led to equities market investment in university research projects, 
technical innovation, and the establishment and growth of entrepreneurial technically based business 
enterprises. This facilitated the renewal Australian manufacturing, some manufacturers becoming 
global brands with internationally significant market capitalisations. Many universities created spin 
off entities specifically to capitalise on newfound financing freedoms. Public sector agencies, 
including the Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) followed. Reform 
generated excitement and enabled entrepreneurship. This was the era of the ‘Industry Plan’ designed 
to modernise sectors of the economy. It was the era of Science and Technology Ministers at the 
Commonwealth and in the States wanting to emulate Wilson’s ‘White Hot Technological 
Revolution’3 of 1960s United Kingdom, albeit two decades later. More kindly, it was the emulation 
of Stanford University and Silicon Valley, the MIT corridor in Boston, Utah Innovation Foundation, 
and IC2 at University of Texas Austin which provided the role models for what could be achieved. 
Reform of the Australian financial system and its many consequences was followed by recession in 
1991. The Green Shoots of recovery from approximately 1994 created the conditions for the second 
generation of NBFE entrants able to capitalise on the reform agenda. Many in the first, 1980s 
generation, were destroyed or damaged by the recession and its attendant high nominal and real 
interest rates. This second generation had much greater scope and scale in consumer, business and 
industrial finance. Licensed MICs were replaced by tax preferred Pooled Development Funds (PDF), 
and later, Industry Innovation Funds (IIF) with additional tax preferred support for research and 
development investments. This tax preferred support created a new NBFE industry in leveraged R&D 
schemes (R&D Syndications) promoted by several major financial institutions, the leverage being 
over valuations of core technology which were often specious and subject to later regulatory review 
and litigation. 
                                                                  
3 Harold Wilson, ‘Labour’s Plan for Science’ (Speech delivered at the Annual Conference, Labour Party, 
Scarborough, October 1 1963). 
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Subsequently the NBFE sector has grown enormously across most asset classes. Today Australia has 
a recognised funds management sector, parts of which operate internationally. Not without tears, not 
without reputational damage, and in need of betterment. The reform process is far from complete with 
attendant opportunity costs.  
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2. THE AGE OF DEREGULATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1981–2001) 
2.1 Reform for a globalised world 
Stimulation of the economy required the release of the animal spirits of entrepreneurship. Law reform 
was designed to deregulate the financial system. In the 1970s, the Australian financial system was 
tightly controlled. Control stemmed from the recommendations of the Napier Royal Commission of 
1937. Tight control of the banking system resulted in the growth of NBFIs to satisfy unmet demand 
for capital, some of which were owned by the banks. Colloquially, Shadow Banking. This paradigm 
remains part of the system today, hugely expanded into NBFEs, including investment banks, 
collective investment schemes, and superannuation entities. There was a disconnection between 
entrepreneurial demand for capital and the institutional willingness to provide it, although there are 
records dating to 1882 where banks did provide start-up capital for mining enterprises. 
Initial reform of the capital markets commenced in 19814 allowing Australia to better satisfy the 
entrepreneurial qualities of its people by facilitating access to capital. Then, NBFEs were not of the 
size, complexity and commercial importance they subsequently became. Neither were trusts 
(Managed Investment Schemes [MIS], for example) generally used as trading enterprises.  
2.2 Steps towards financial deregulation in Australia 
Campbell believed that ‘less intrusive regulation and greater competition would lead to greater 
efficiency in the financial system and that consumers would benefit from these changes’.5 
Deregulating the Australian financial system included: modification of the tools of macroeconomic 
management; removal of controls on interest rates and portfolio composition; strengthen and preserve 
financial system stability; and removing barriers to entry (including the entry of foreign banks), 
mostly implemented by mid-1996. Campbell was the beginning of the end of post-war era of tight 
constraints over Australian capital markets. It facilitated deepening and growth of the Australian 
economy. 
Martin in 1984 specifically considered these recent developments ‘including regulation of [NBFIs]’ 
and those recommendations of Campbell designed to improve efficiency and stability of the 
Australian financial system.6 Martin largely validated Campbell. Specifically, that Australia create a 
                                                                  
4 Sir Keith Campbell, Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Cat No 8104251, Canberra, 1981) [‘Campbell’ or ‘Campbell Report’]. 
5 Phil Hanratty, 'The Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System: Summary and Critique' (Research 
Paper No 16, Department of the Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, 1997) 21. 
6 G C Lim, ‘The Martin Report’ [1984] 2 The Australian Economic Review 26. 
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desirable financial system that is efficient and competitive. Regulations impinging on that objective 
are undesirable and should be removed. It ‘did not see a need to extend controls over non-bank 
financial institutions’.7 Its preference was for market oriented policies rather than regulatory 
intervention. Martin noted that ‘there is no present need to extend prudential supervision to non-bank 
deposit taking institutions’.8 Campbell and Martin ‘argued very strongly for government [prudential] 
intervention’9 to deposit taking banking institutions. 
2.3 Regulating poor behaviour 
Where economic freedom is allowed to flourish, so financial abuses inevitably follow. After the stock 
market crash in 1987, it was feared that Campbell inspired deregulation had gone too far. An 
alternative approach was sought to ensure that bank customers received fair treatment. Martin in 
199110 concluded that the banks should be required to establish a formal system of self-regulation 
based on a government approved Code of Banking Practice.  
Martin cited the financial impracticality of laws and Courts to resolve bank disputes by all but a few 
of Australia’s wealthiest people. The code was therefore introduced as an alternative to Courts with 
cheap, speedy, fair and accessible alternative for customers to resolve complaints justly. This time, 
Martin was primarily concerned with the asymmetry of financial resources between large financial 
institutions and their customers. He did not research NBFEs, but similar dynamics are evident today 
in the asymmetries between them and their investors. 
Martin expressed concern for individuals and small businesses, giving particular attention to issues 
relating to the adequacy of means of redress available to customers in cases of dispute with their bank. 
It emphasised significant power imbalances between customers and banks, echoes of which recur in 
many subsequent cases. Financial institutions control relevant information and documentation and 
have been able to vary contracts unilaterally. They have access to specialist legal advice and financial 
resources to pursue disputes to the end with little incentive for banks to settle a dispute, unlike their 
customers, even if the bank would be likely to lose. They may even create a favourable precedent. 
Further, institutions have inherent faith in their internal operating systems and may be reluctant to 
admit failures in those systems. Their interest lies in resisting claims and outweigh that of an 
                                                                  
7 Ibid 27. 
8 By implication, no proclamation of the then Part IV of the Financial Corporations Act 1974 (Cth). 
9 Lim, above n 6, 31. 
10 V E Martin, Pocket full of change (Report, Parliamentary Inquiry into the Australian Banking Industry, 
1991) [‘Martin’ or ‘Martin Report’]. 
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individual customer in pressing it. They protect a system whereas the customer seeks redress on a 
one-off basis. Whistleblowers in financial institutions require moral courage and financial resources.  
2.4 Towards Twin Peaks – redesign of the regulatory architecture 
Campbell and Martin opened the door, their objective being an open, internationally competitive 
Australian economy. Wallis11 in 1997 then designed the strategic architecture to enable Australian 
financial institutions to compete in a globalising world. It resulted in the rapid evolution of financial 
products and services available to Australian consumers. Wallis essentially led to the financial system 
in Australia today, its economically important NBFE sector and investment opportunities which may 
not have otherwise existed. Present day NBFEs have a larger asset base than the Australian banking 
sector. 
Collectively, these reforms were economically Australia’s ‘Berlin Wall’ moment. As that monument 
to monopoly was destroyed, resulting freedoms produced anticipated and unanticipated outcomes: a 
temporary real estate boom followed by unanticipated sober realisation that there was much else to 
be done, taking many decades. Similarly, unanticipated outcomes occurred in Australia under 
completely different circumstances. Substantive reform is akin to throwing rocks in a lake which 
generate ripples. One ripple, or unanticipated outcome being the imbalance of power between capital 
providers and their clients. The unkind may say ‘victims’, sentiments which resonate strongly in 
2018.12 The volatility of equities markets in 1987, high nominal interest rates, the resulting recession 
of 1990–91 and its aftermath led to questioning of the reform agenda, but it was not the causal factor.  
Wallis13 designed a new financial system based on market conduct principles. Compulsory 
superannuation from 1992,14 hitherto the preserve of public sector employees and those in corporate 
superannuation funds. Previously, there were no industry superannuation funds, retail funds only 
receiving contributions on a voluntary basis. The superannuation reforms complimented Wallis. They 
have resulted in Australia having the fourth largest pool of retirement savings in the world, but still 
insufficient to reduce tax demand on future taxpayers. The majority of the working population remain 
reliant on a government aged pension. However, there is no sovereign wealth fund or national 
provident fund to provide for those pension expenditures in later years with the exception of the 
                                                                  
11 S Wallis, Australian Financial System Inquiry Final Report, (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia 
Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1997) ['Wallis' or 'Wallis Report'].  
12 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry (2018) yet to report.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth). 
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[Commonwealth] Future Fund (from 2006) for commonwealth public servants. In 2018, government 
and the beneficiaries still have to address the results of this policy. 
The Wallis objective was to redesign the regulatory institutional architecture and modernise financial 
system regulation in response to changing market and economic conditions whilst preserving safety 
and stability of the financial system.15 This reconfiguration also to enable customer stakeholders to 
access financial services on the most commercially favourable basis, improve efficiency and cost 
effectiveness through enhanced competition and contestability, with no compromises on financial 
system integrity, stability, and safety. These reforms required legislative intervention for their 
implementation by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). Wallis sought to 
‘harmonis[ing]e the regulation of collective investments and public offer superannuation funds’.16  
Wallis considered that an unintended consequence of Campbell and Martin ‘has been an increase in 
the extent and complexity of prudential and consumer protection regulation’.17 Deregulation was 
intended to yield benefits to consumers of financial products. Wallis concluded that: product choices 
have widened since the early 1980s, the quality of financial products had improved, the major 
exception being deficiencies in implementation of ‘the provision of information and advice’.18 But, 
[t]here is some evidence that consumers are frustrated by limited product knowledge, inability to make 
meaningful comparisons amongst products, and deficiencies in the information and advice supplied 
by vendors.19  
These are deficiencies in disclosure. 
Wallis redesigned Australia’s regulatory architecture. It replaced four regulatory agencies20 with a 
newly mandated Reserve Bank (RBA),21 the Australian Prudential Regulation Commission 
(APRC),22 and the Corporations and Financial Services Commission (CFSC).23 CFSC assumed 
consumer protection responsibility.24 
                                                                  
15 Ian R Harper, 'The Wallis Report: An Overview' (1997) 30 (3) The Australian Economic Review 288;  
Hanratty, above n 5, 21. 
16 Ibid 297. 
17 Ibid 290 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Reserve Bank, The Australian Financial Institutions Commission, Insurance and Superannuation 
Commission, Australian Securities Commission. 
21 Restricted to the conduct of monetary policy, financial system stability, and payment system integrity. 
22 APRC, now the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
23 CFSC, now the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
24 Now shared with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
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This architecture is the Twin Peaks (really ‘four peaks’, if including the Reserve Bank) model with 
Australia an early adopter. It separated market conduct regulation from prudential supervision, and 
from the financial stability mandate of the RBA. APRC was to be the single economy wide prudential 
regulator for the entire financial system, CFSC the disclosure regulator requiring participants act with 
integrity in an environment of mutual trust with adequate disclosure to facilitate informed judgments. 
This Twin Peaks model intended common standards across disparate NBFE sectors. Other countries 
subsequently adopted it.25 
Wallis acknowledged a regulatory system based on disclosure had inherent information asymmetries. 
Market failures may require government intervention, graduated according to need. He also 
acknowledged that regulatory reform can improve the performance of the managed funds industry. 
The Law Matters. 
Wallis was an early proponent of employees and superannuation fund members having a greater 
choice of fund. Regulation of collective investments26 and public offer superannuation funds should 
be harmonised, an objective not yet achieved acknowledging that prudential supervision implies 
moral hazard.  
Wallis, like Campbell, proposed strategic reform. The implementation of it evolved the Australian 
financial system. It was not without its critics: there were considerable concerns about the 
replacement of the dual party trustee system with a single licensing regime and its lack of a mandatory 
requirement for a custodian (balanced by limited statutory capital adequacy).27 Others viewed it as a 
strength of the new system. Some of the dissent was self-interested and conflicted. So there was no 
consistent, integrated set of alternative policy. Dissent included retention of consumer protection of 
financial products and services within the ACCC, responsibility for prudential regulation being 
mandated to the APRC, its separation from the RBA, and the evolution from financial institution 
                                                                  
25 Netherlands, Qatar, Switzerland, Spain, for example; see generally Andrew D Schmulow, ‘The four 
methods of financial system regulation: An international comparative survey’ (2015) 26 Journal of Banking 
and Finance Law and Practice 151, 160. 
26 In Australia, managed investments. 
27 Phil Hanratty, 'The Wallis Report on the Australian Financial System: Summary and Critique' (Research 
Paper No 16, Department of the Parliamentary Library Information and Research Services, 1997) 23–25; 
Alan Jessup, Killing Bambi – Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal and regulatory 
framework for protection of retail investors investing in collective investment schemes (SJD thesis 
application to University of Sydney, 2012); Grant Moodie and Ian Ramsay, Managed Investment Schemes: 
An Industry Report (Report, The University of Melbourne, 2003) 78. For an ex post analysis, see generally 
Kevin Davis, 'The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet' in H Gerard and J Kearns 
(eds), The Australian Economy in the 2000s (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011) 313;  Tom Valentine, 'The 
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274. 
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community service obligations to a market based environment including fees and charges. Reform 
created opposition. Abandonment of explicit deposit insurance for retail bank customers commonly 
used in other jurisdictions needed to be reinstated in 2009 although it did not extend to most NBFEs. 
2.5 Twin Peaks 1: Prudential Regulation: modernising superannuation savings  
The introduction of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act28 used market mechanisms of 
trustees, fund managers, and other NBFEs in the investment chain to modernise and promulgate 
superannuation across the community. Superannuation became a right, not a privilege.29 It fostered 
further growth of not-for-profit industry funds. Savings became compulsory with implementation 
outsourced to the private sector. It considered that ‘increased education of fund members, trustees, 
and other industry participants will assist in focussing attention on the prudential management of 
superannuation funds.’30 The SIS Act is the statutory framework for APRA regulated superannuation 
entities. It codified trustee duties, then existing in general law:31 ‘it supersedes the existing common 
law to the extent that the code and the common law conflict’.32 This codification represented a 
major change to the legal basis for the regulation and prudential supervision of superannuation funds 
in this country. To date, superannuation funds have relied largely on trust law and common law 
precedents … there have been relatively few statutory requirements …33 The legislation largely 
overturns the existing legal basis for superannuation fund operations and replaces it with the type of 
black letter law that now characterises the new corporations law that has been introduced with mixed 
success.34  
The policy aim was to codify the duty which trustees owe to beneficiaries,35 without it discouraging 
people from acting as a trustee. This was the reason for eliminating the experienced in business test36 
which would have had the practical impact of eliminating many candidates for board appointments. 
                                                                  
28 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) [‘SIS Act’]. 
29 Kevin Yi Liu, Australian Superannuation: Operational Structure, Investment Performance and Trustee 
Governance (PhD Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2013) 12. 
30 Commonwealth, Hansard, House of Representatives, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Bill 27 May 
1993 1101, 3–5 (Paul Keating). 
31 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52. 
32 VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] AATA 710 [294] (S A Forgie V-P and B H 
Pascoe). 
33 Ibid [308] (S A Forgie V-P and B H Pascoe). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Donald Duval, ‘The Objectives of the Superannuation Supervisory Legislation’ (Paper presented at the 
Conference of the Superannuation Committee of the Law Council of Australia, 1994). 
36 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(2)(b). 
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Importantly for directors and trustees, the SIS Act has a tension between the generation of investment 
return using market mechanisms and the prudential management of the fund. 
The trustee will need to exhibit some degree of entrepreneurial flair that could, perhaps be more 
conservatively described as business acumen. That is implicitly encouraged because the Government 
expressly recognised that good investment returns are critical to provide an adequate retirement 
income and restrictions placed on investments would lead to poorer returns. Business acumen also has 
its place in the prudential management of the fund. Without it, the fund might never grow and prosper. 
That would not be in the interests of the beneficiaries.37 
These legislative changes markedly affected directors as well as trustees, including ‘specific 
obligations on responsible entities [REs] which are individual trustees, and directors of companies 
which act as trustees’.38 Inconsistencies abound. For instance, the SIS Act codified the ‘ordinary 
prudent person’39 test whilst the general law referred to ‘an ordinary prudent person of business’.40 It 
refers to the duty ‘in relation to all matters affecting the entity’41 whilst the general law refers to 
‘managing trust affairs’.42 These inconsistencies and uncertainties in governance that subsequently 
arise were reported in 2010,43 and 201444 suggesting a rewrite of the SIS Act.45 
Trustee duties in the general law developed under judicial supervision and extended into 
administrative law. These duties were not developed in the  
context of supervision by a regulatory authority. What Parliament has done is to place standards that 
have their genesis in the general law, in s 52(2) and from there into the Trust Deed …46 obligations 
imposed on a superannuation entity in relation to the members be imposed individually on each 
member of the board of management of that entity,47 
                                                                  
37 VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] AATA 710 [530] (S A Forgie V-P, and B H 
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a situation not then prevailing in general law, now enacted in the legislation.48  
The SIS Act was not a restatement of the existing law relating to regulated superannuation funds. 
‘Supervision’ means much more. It intended codification ‘in clear statutory terms’49 of trustee 
fiduciary duties. This arose from a belief that: 
principles of trust law are poorly understood. They are also capable of being diluted by specific 
provisions placed in trust deeds ... [d]eeds or other instruments constituting superannuation schemes 
would not be able to derogate from their obligations50 … we have observed that a number of trust 
deeds gave effective power to a party other than a trustee.51  
2.6 Twin Peaks 2: Market Conduct Regulation: Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(CLERP)  
CLERP52 gave legislative effect to Campbell and Wallis financial efficiency and stability objectives. 
For NBFEs, legislation included the Managed Investments Act53 and the Financial Services Reform 
Act.54 The Managed Investments Act marked a radical shift in the policy of regulating collective 
investment schemes.55 
Efficiency objectives included facilitation of corporate fundraising, improvements to accounting 
standards (including international harmonisation), streamlining takeover rules, facilitation of 
electronic commerce, enabling comparable regulation of financial products, disclosure standards to 
enable comparisons between financial products, and licensing of intermediaries. Stability objectives 
included removing legal uncertainties for directors (and the introduction of a business judgment 
rule),56 allow the delegation of director functions to other persons, reliance on the information and 
advice provided by that person, clarification of directors’ indemnities and penalties for breach of duty. 
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2.6.1 Statutory Modernisation: Managed Investments Act57 and Financial Services Reform Act58 
The law relating to prescribed interests59 (prescribed interests dual party system) was replaced on 1 
July 1998 by the Managed Investments Act. The former system separated the roles of the manager 
(required to hold a securities dealer licence) and the trustee (required to be an approved trustee). Offer 
of prescribed interests were required to have an approved deed (unless an excluded offer) containing 
specific covenants. The separation of manager and trustee was regarded by some as unwieldy and 
inefficient, possibly anti-entrepreneurial. The Managed Investments Act facilitated the development 
of funds management companies across a range of asset classes offering a range of managed 
investment products and structures.60 The objective was to facilitate efficiency and safety by ensuring 
there was a single point of responsibility to avoid blame shifting between trustee and scheme operator. 
An unintended consequence was loss of revenue in the trustee and custody sector, both reliant on 
scale and information technology infrastructure. 
The new law replaced prescribed interests with an interest in a Managed Investment Scheme (MIS), 
requiring registration with the ASIC if it had more than 20 members or was promoted by a person in 
the business of promoting such schemes. A single RE replaced the separation of powers of 
manager/promoter and trustee. REs were required to be public companies, hold an AFSL, have a 
compliance plan (audited annually), with fund raising subject to prospectus provisions. All MIS 
property was to be held separately and be clearly identified. Transitional arrangements provided 
prescribed interests be converted to interests in a MIS. 
The economic intent of the new law was to unleash investment opportunities and their development 
potential. The risk lay in eliminating the separation of powers into a single RE structure, albeit subject 
to their Constitution and Compliance Plans, but nonetheless reliant on the Wallis principles of 
disclosure, advice, and investor financial literacy. Despite the public company requirement, REs 
required prudential capacity was minimal. Consequently, many were undercapitalised to properly 
fulfil their obligations. 
The Financial Services Reform Act (‘FSR Act’) introduced a single licensing regime for financial 
products, a single regime for regulating financial services (investment advice) and other financial 
                                                                  
57 Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth), now Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
58 Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth). 
59 Corporations Law s 9. 
60 Kevin Davis, 'The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet' in H Gerard and J Kearns 
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intermediation.61 It imposed disclosure requirements envisaged by Wallis based on efficient markets 
theory. The FSR Act amended the Corporations Act in 2002 giving effect to Wallis. 
The result was an approach to investor protection in non-prudentially regulated NBFEs based upon 
disclosure, advice, and investor empowerment through education. This was extended in 2010 with 
ASIC having responsibility for the regulation and enforcement of a uniform framework for most 
financial products and financial services providers. 
The Turnbull Review62 of the Managed Investments Act in 2001 expressed confidence in its integrity 
to deliver increased investor protection and ASIC’s capacity to fulfil its mandate as regulator of a 
diverse population of MIS. It proposed tactical legislative amendments designed to remove 
uncertainty and improve corporate governance standards. Turnbull was critical of the governance 
responsibilities of compliance committees and compliance plan auditors. It did not examine the need 
for mandatory custodianship of fund assets nor address the conflicted poacher-gamekeeper problem 
of eliminating the independent trustee. 
2.6.2 Statutory Modernisation: Business Judgment Rule (BJR)  
The intent of the business judgment rule was to balance directors’ duties and liabilities with the needs 
of an independent corporation to engage in economic entrepreneurship, and to avoid the evisceration 
of companies such that none could make serious commercial decisions without the daily approval of 
lawyers,63 particularly in respect of disclosure of information and business conduct. The Corporations 
Act s 180(1) seeks to codify general law duty of care, s 180(2) is the BJR, s 180(3) defines business 
judgment.  
The business judgment reform was based on US common law practice64 which ‘creates a clear 
presumption in favour of directors’,65 but subsequent judicial interpretation provides no meaningful 
statutory protection of directors under Australian law despite it having a BJR. 
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A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment is taken to meet the 
requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at common law and equity, in respect of 
their judgment if they: (a) make the judgment in good faith and for a proper purpose; and (b) do not 
have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and (c) inform themselves about 
the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and (d) 
rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.66 
The Australian BJR does not apply in insolvency situations with directors and trustees continuing to 
have personal liability for solvency.67 This is not the situation in the UK,68 USA, and Canada. These 
jurisdictions focus on the importance of disciplined corporate reconstruction to protect value. This 
task is carried out by Chief Restructuring Officers who have protection from charges of insolvent 
trading as a result of their jurisdictional business judgment rule, and other protections. 
2.6.3 Statutory Modernisation: Personal Liability for Corporate Fault  
The recurring tensions between the entrepreneurial objectives of corporations and the risk aversion 
of their appointed directors were sought to be addressed by the BJR. This important national 
productivity issue was addressed legislatively again in 2012 by enactment of the Personal Liability 
for Corporate Fault Reform Act69 and its State cousins. Whilst not in strict chronological order, it 
illustrates the ongoing interweaving of entrepreneurship facilitation and consumer protection 
legislation. 
Reaction to systemic regulatory and cultural problems in NBFEs should not serve to destroy 
economic activity or restrict investment choices. The productivity objective is to deliver ‘a nationally 
consistent and principles-based approach to the imposition of personal criminal liability for directors 
and other officers as a consequence of a corporate offence’.70 These principles are intended to apply 
consistently to all Australian jurisdictions and all agencies within those jurisdictions, administering 
hundreds of statutes and regulations, including the Corporations Act and the Foreign Acquisitions 
and Takeovers Act. 
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This legislation and its state counterparts sought to distinguish between direct personal involvement 
in malfeasance rather than criminal liability as a consequence of a corporation having committed an 
offence, reflecting the reality of many directors not working in executive roles by removing personal 
criminal liability for corporate malfeasance unless there is knowing assistance. Australian general 
law follows Barnes v Addy principles of knowing assistance for breaches of fiduciary duty.71 Where 
the director or officer: knows of the offence, was involved by encouragement or assistance in the 
offence, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the offence through negligence or recklessness, 
liability remains. The legislation applies only to criminal penalties, elimination or reduction in 
criminal liability being tempered by considerations of compelling public policy as to harm, including 
death and injury, environmental damage, financial markets confidence including insolvency, and 
morally reprehensible conduct. Knowing is not the same as intent. US jurisprudence disregards 
‘intent’ as a defence. ‘It is likely that Australian authorities will follow the [US] lead … regardless of 
whether the illegal/improper transaction[s] were intentional’.72  
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3. THE AGE OF DISQUIET (2002–2009) ― FAILURES IN IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Early results – Safe as Houses? 
Financial products often commence their life being only available on a wholesale basis to professional 
and sophisticated investors. Many, however, including those that rely on leverage (sometimes 
multiple leverage) find their way to retail and unsophisticated investors through the market 
mechanism of financial advice and described in lawful disclosure documents. These were all exposed 
to market linked risks. Mitigation of these risks was to be based on the Wallis principles of disclosure, 
advice, and investor empowerment through knowledge. However, belief in these market mechanisms 
proved to be substantially misplaced. The law of the period including corporate governance standards 
was insufficiently developed to mitigate these investor risks. Judicial intervention provided remedies 
and develop the law appropriately for a market based regulatory system, a process which continues 
today. 
Campbell, Wallis, and Johnson (in 2010) 73 wanted an Australia competing globally with its peers, an 
objective only partly achieved. Implementation competencies were far from prosaic. After Ripoll and 
ASIC’s review of agribusiness MIS, both in 2009, the truth dawned on an unbelieving investing 
public. Not only was the Australian system found to be substandard against its international peers, 
but ASIC found it necessary to determine whether some MIS were Ponzi schemes. Many had unsound 
business models and poor corporate governance. Empirical analysis demonstrates a surfeit of 
systemic failures arising from reliance on market mechanisms of disclosure and advice, undisciplined 
by an unknowledgeable investing public. Each of the market based mechanisms relied upon by 
Australia’s regulatory system was suffering systemic and cyclical failures.  
Johnson remained faithful to the Wallis entrepreneurial objective proposing mechanisms to 
ameliorate the disquiet. But against a background of increasing failure in the implementation of 
market conduct mechanisms including in superannuation entities. 
Johnson’s objective was to facilitate policy to develop Australia as an international financial sector. 
He follows Wallis principles whilst focussing on their implementation. In many respects, the 
regulation of NBFEs and their financial products in Australia does not meet international standards. 
For Australia to develop as an international financial centre facilitating inwards investment and for 
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the Australian NBFE sector to export its financial products and funds management skills, it needs to 
adopt global standards.  
Inter alia, Johnson’s concern was to ensure ‘care be taken that any new regulations are clearly 
necessary … and are implemented efficiently and effectively, avoiding costs to the corporate 
sector’.74 Further, ‘pressures from overseas for a more comprehensive and global approach to 
regulation, when combined with Australia’s desire to be seen as a good corporate citizen, may result 
in Australia adopting more regulatory layers which are neither necessary or relevant to our 
circumstances’.75 Wallis referred to ‘incentive bias’ towards excessive regulation accretion. This 
arises from community expectations of zero failure by governments and their regulators. Incentives 
are heavily skewed toward eliminating future corporate collapses, and the consequences that flow 
from them, by further prescriptive regulation, rather than reliance upon the implementation of 
principles based architecture. 
The Johnson approach is to develop mutual recognition principles for financial products and services, 
as in the EU, Singapore and Hong Kong, but implementation will rely on Australia adopting 
international standards. These necessarily include the elimination of the single RE model, which, in 
the eyes of some international institutional funds managers is akin to the poacher being the 
gamekeeper. Only one of eleven 2010 recommendations have been implemented (the investment 
manager regime). The mutual recognition objectives and the RE model remain unreformed. 
Consequently, Australia remains regionally uncompetitive as a financial centre.  
3.2 Failures in governance  
HIH failed on 15 March 2001. The HIH Royal Commission76 into its failure made 61 
recommendations, many of which were implemented in the CLERP 977 reform process.  
Former CLERP amendments78 which sought to make the Corporations Law more certain, had 
‘precisely the opposite effect’.79 The Commissioner, made a number of observations: there are gaps 
in the liability of company officers below board level; many of the undesirable practices within HIH 
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were undertaken by managers, not directors; in larger companies, many decisions are made by 
management without reference to the board and on a collegiate basis; current law on management 
liability is unclear and enforcement of governance standards can be ineffective; corporate functions 
performed by non-employees may not be subject to the Corporations Act duty obligations; March 
2000 CLERP amendments to statutory duties may have resulted in undesirable conduct; and that 
duties of executives within a corporate structure require clarification.80 
Whilst there were a number of causes of the failure of HIH,81 deficiencies in corporate governance 
were identified: 
non-executive directors [need] to appreciate their distinctive role to review the performance of 
management and to take the lead where potential conflicts of interest and duty arise … the benefits of 
good corporate governance … are more likely to be achieved if the non-executive directors are both 
independent and seen to be independent.82  
Legislative reform83 clarified duties and widened the persons subject to officers’ duties and 
responsibilities.84 The Commission, not wishing to reduce the liability of directors or shift 
responsibility to management, nonetheless identified a gap in liability below board level. Directors 
and trustees necessarily rely on the performance and efficacy of their officers. The statutory definition 
of the duties of officers of corporations has evolved85 to include ‘any other person who takes part in, 
or is concerned, in the management of a corporation’.86 The Commission intended to ‘impose duties 
on all persons performing functions for and on behalf of corporations, whether employees or suppliers 
of services under contract’.87 The narrowing of the classes of persons involved as a result of the 
CLERP 9 reforms88 was reversed.  
I can see no reason why the legislature would have intended to narrow the class of persons upon whom 
the liabilities created by s 1309 were imposed. If an employee provides information to a director or 
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auditor which he or she knows to be false or misleading, I can see no reason why they should not be 
held to have contravened the law.89  
This was intended to reflect the reality of management of a modern corporation being an integrated 
group exercise involving those who are not directors. ‘The uncertain state of the law in this area has 
been a source of difficulty in my assessment of those cases where there might have been a breach of 
the law…’90 ‘The law governing the imposition of duties upon persons who act for or on behalf of 
corporate entities should be clear, simple, and as far as reasonably possible, certain of application’.91 
Wallis explicitly recommended that the Commonwealth should not be responsible for the financial 
promises of financial institutions. Nonetheless, Recommendation 61 resulted in the HIH Claims 
Support Scheme providing approximately AUD640 million in compensation for policy holders. This 
outcome undermined the objectives of Wallis by creating community expectations of implicit 
government guarantees of prudentially regulated institutions.92 
HIH highlighted the jurisdictional differences between the market conduct regulator and the 
prudential supervisor.93 ASIC itself had concerns about the level of information sharing being 
provided by APRA. Legal culpability can be obscured amid jurisdictional confusion. These concerns 
had been expressed in the cases of the collapse of Tricontinental, State Bank of South Australia,94 
and Trio. In HIH’s case, ASIC did have an accounts surveillance program which ‘raised no significant 
issues’ in the accounts of either HIH or FAI. However, ASIC measured compliance of the accounts 
with the then accounting standards, themselves the subject of Commission recommendations. 
Strategically, other recommendations resulted in changes to the APRA Act and led to governance 
changes of APRA and the replacement of its non-executive board with an Executive Committee. It 
commenced the process of evolving from an ex post to an ex ante regulatory posture including 
enhanced prudential regulation (for insurers), and the development of the PAIRS95 and SOARS96 
management systems with a revised organisational structure.97 The management systems measure 
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entity scale rather than propensity to systemic risk.98 The Commission also recognised that APRA 
needed to increase its attractiveness to prospective employees, a recurring theme and for ASIC 
identified in qualitative research. 
Governance concerns extend to the regulators. Uhrig99 proposed that the Commonwealth clarify its 
expectations of statutory authorities in a statement of its ‘Expectations of Regulators’. ASIC and 
APRA, as statutory authorities charged with regulatory functions where ‘government is expected to 
retain control of policy and approval of strategy, are to be governed by an executive management 
group with an advisory board’.100 There is no commonality of view on the optimal form of corporate 
governance for APRA and ASIC. Uhrig confirmed the operational independence of APRA and ASIC 
under their governance structures.101 But it is a different proposition to statutory authorities with 
boards having the power to act, ‘including the freedom to appoint and terminate the CEO’.102 
3.3 Financial advice  
Financial advice is the second tenet of the Wallis reforms. Ripoll103 in 2009 addressed financial 
advisers being remunerated by the issuers of financial products product sold under the guise of 
providing independent advice, commission based payments, the general regulatory environment for 
financial products and services, potential for conflicts of interest, and the need for appropriate 
disclosure. In many NBFE collapses, the conflict between interest and duty is manifest. Commonly 
at this time, a financial adviser may be contractually bound by their employer to recommend only the 
financial products on the employers Approved Product List, being the products from preferred and 
sometimes in-house product manufacturers. This practice served the interests of the product issuer, 
product manufacturer and the adviser. It demonstrably did not serve the interests of the investor. 
Ripoll led directly to legislation, the Future of Financial Advice reforms (FoFA).104 Ripoll 
recommended the Corporations Act be amended to explicitly include a statutory fiduciary duty for 
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financial advisers operating under an AFSL. It be further amended to require more prominent 
disclosure of interests in financial products materials, disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, and 
a consultation process with the financial advice industry designed to eliminate payments from 
financial products manufacturers to financial advisers. 
All professionals have a general law duty of reasonable care and skill when giving advice. Most are 
not fiduciaries. This generated debate as to why a financial planner should have a statutory fiduciary 
duty at all and whether limitations should be placed on it. ASIC’s submission to Ripoll105 proposed 
that ‘legislation should expressly impose an explicit fiduciary duty on financial advisers requiring 
them to give priority to their clients’ interests ahead of their own’.106  
Lindgren107 suggests this is problematic in that an adviser would still be able to have conflicts of 
interest, but must suppress them and then only to the extent necessary to give priority to the clients’ 
interests. Prioritisation not prohibition. This arises also in the operation of MIS by Responsible 
Entities.108 He proposed that: 
all of the legal uncertainties would disappear if the present financial advice industry were to be divided 
into … independent financial advisers who are not constrained by reference to a list of products and 
receive no remuneration from product manufacturers, and ... selling agents who … are [not] so 
constrained and so remunerated.109  
Subsequent debate has centred on the difference between sales agents and client fee funded financial 
advisers. The Corporations Act defines whether financial advice is general or personal110 and to 
whom that advice is provided.111 Financial advice has also been divided into ‘advice about advice’, 
being a fiduciary construct, and ‘substantive advice’ the statutory construct.112 
ASIC proposed that ‘the Inquiry may need to readdress the balance reached by the Wallis Inquiry 
between market efficiency and investor protection because ASIC and industry action may not, within 
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the current policy settings of the FSR regime, adequately protect retail investors’.113 In the context of 
the ASIC submission, this demonstrates frustration with an ex-post regulatory environment.114 ASIC 
set out options for regulatory change, proposing statutory fiduciary duty tempered by proposing only 
a ‘fiduciary-style duty’.115 This is what occurred. ASIC raised the prospect of prudential regulation 
applying to a greater range of financial products,116 addressed the adequacy of the reliance upon 
disclosure,117 and investor education.118  
It is likely that face-to-face advice models will become increasingly obsolete for those that cannot 
afford professional fees. This is the UK experience. Disruptive technology will fill that gap: robo-
advice. Australians presently ‘unadvised are estimated to hold “dark savings” of $1.9 trillion (slightly 
less than the superannuation pool) and robo-advice providers have their eyes on the prize.119 Thus the 
need for reform becomes ever more pressing. Tactical responses to present business models cannot 
provide the regulatory environment for the future. 
Warning bells were evident in 2009. The Commonwealth responded with the FoFA120 reforms. They 
go beyond recommendations of Ripoll and ASIC, but did not extend to a statutory fiduciary duty, 
only a statutory best interest duty commencing on 1 July 2012.121 ASIC is also now able to investigate 
a manager in the absence of a formal complaint. However, the reforms particularly in respect of the 
payment of commissions to advisers were politicised and there was not bipartisan support for their 
implementation. The then government wished to address reform of financial advice in the context of 
the 2014 Cooper Review into superannuation which includes financial advice to fund members. 
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Different industry groups took dissenting positions in respect of the Ripoll recommendations.122 
These remain today, leading to uncertainty for the financial planning and wealth management 
industry, continued contingent risks for their clients and their need to rely on the general law. There 
has been reform to commission based fees but prioritisation rather than prohibition governs conflicts 
of interest. These regulations are set out in three lengthy Regulatory Guides123 which provide 
substance to judicial concerns of the interpretation of best interest.124 As yet, there is no case law 
interpretation.125 
3.4 Disclosure 
Whilst Ripoll focussed on financial advice provided to NBFE investors, Agribusiness Managed 
Investment Schemes126 focussed entirely on agribusiness MIS. These are similarly subject to the FSR 
regime of disclosure, advice, and informed decision making by investors with similar issues arising. 
ASIC again raised the issue of prudential regulation of managed investment schemes.127 
Many of these schemes had flawed business models requiring new investors to meet the costs of 
maintaining the economic interests and retiring the capital of previous investors. ASIC reviewed 
whether these are illegal investment schemes with Ponzi characteristics128 concluding that this was 
not the case. That it required discussion at all raises serious questions about these business models, 
disclosure, advice provided by conflicted advisers, and the inability of many investors to make 
informed decisions. It also raised serious questions about the impact of leverage used to purchase 
these investments, and the quality of advice attached thereto. As a result, far fewer of these schemes 
are now conceived for the retail investor market. 
Recurring systemic issues raised included conflicts of interest, the legal position of the RE, their 
ownership structures and prudential capital, the regulation of research houses,129 and the need for 
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regulatory change. No specific proposals were advanced, ASIC making it clear this is a matter for the 
Commonwealth. 
3.5 Financial Literacy  
Investor empowerment through education is the third tenet of the Wallis reforms. Literate consumers 
discipline market participants. ASIC considers financial literacy a vital skill for all consumers.130 It 
includes in its definition: mathematical skills, financial understanding, financial competence, and 
financial responsibility. These skills sets lead to the ability to make informed judgments and take 
effective financial decisions regarding money. 
Research indicates that Australians generally have low levels of financial literacy.131 The Financial 
Literacy Foundation (FLF) was established by the Commonwealth to recommend strategic remedies 
to this problem. The advent of the Compulsory Superannuation Guarantee charge in 1992 to address 
future retirement income and the means testing of the aged pension requires Australians to be well-
equipped to for the financial decisions they must make for their retirement. Many cases demonstrate 
otherwise. Financial products sold by non-superannuation NBFEs form part of retirement strategy. 
In 2008, responsibility for the FLF was transferred to ASIC, this transfer of responsibility being to 
strengthen policy direction through the use of the regulator.132 The Financial Literacy Board was 
established to advise ASIC and the Commonwealth on financial literacy issues. 
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4. THE AGE OF REACTION (2010–2013) 
2010-2013 was a period of Reaction: analysis of the MIS sector, compensatory remedies (St John and 
Trio Capital), simplification and risk mitigation in the superannuation system (default funds and 
‘Stronger Super’ reforms), and the first large scale international fraud on Australian superannuation 
(Trio Capital). Forestry MIS highlights the conflicts between economic development objectives, the 
promoters of forestry MIS investment and those 144 384 investors with aggregate losses of AUD5.8 
billion. 
4.1 First strategic insights: the end of the beginning  
By this time, the Australian media was replete with reporting of cases from aggrieved investors, many 
of whom had lost their life savings, had no possibility of reconstruction, and faced penury. This 
author’s empirical analysis reveals an increasing number of cases brought for judicial review in the 
senior courts.133 The cases demonstrated a tension, a disconnection, between the objectives of the 
Campbell, Wallis, and Johnson market approaches and their implementation. Is the objective of an 
entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with and leading its global peers, compatible with 
the objective of financial stability and risk mitigation? 
Arguably, the first objective has been within reach. For many people the second objective has been a 
disaster, as the empirical analysis explains.134 It has also been disastrous for many parts of the 
economy. It is not possible for more than 1 915 608 individual investor or beneficiary adverse impacts 
losing or have permanent risk of loss of c AUD52.25 billion without it impacting on the ability of 
capital markets to finance further productive investment. The cumulative misallocation of capital in 
aggregate causes lower economic growth ― the opportunity cost. Failure of the second objective 
compromises the first objective. ASIC’s review of unlisted property MIS,135 and subsequent analysis 
of that NBFE sector demonstrates that more than 50% of these schemes were defunct, illiquid, or are 
subject to various schemes (including Australian Securities Exchange [ASX] public offerings) which 
are unlikely to add value for the original investors. 
Johnson identifies a possible way out of this conundrum. This knowledge comes from a comparative 
study of other jurisdictions, including those where market approaches and access to financial products 
are different. However, before that can be achieved, there must be in Australia a better developed 
understanding in the investing public of the benefits and deficiencies of competing approaches. The 
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present danger to this understanding is The Reaction, which seeks to move Australia from its present 
market based regulatory system to a paternalist statutory system of supervision with consequent losses 
in investment choices. 
4.2 Consequences of deficient implementation of the market reforms 
Trio Capital was a multi-function RE, Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE), and funds 
manager.136 This case demonstrated the systemic risks associated with vertical integration in the 
investment chain. Many RSE licensees are also REs for MIS. Before Trio, a RSE licensee was exempt 
from the Corporations Act RE capitalisation requirement, now reformed by removing that 
exemption.137  
The Trio Capital fraud was complex138 involving two ASIC registered MIS with Trio as RE into 
which it allocated funds from superannuation entities under its control as RSE. From 2006, trustees, 
directors, and investors were continuously deceived throughout the operation of the MIS (Astarra 
Strategic Fund, ASF) about the existence of portfolio assets and their value.139 Trio received 
unqualified audit opinions. Governance and compliance reporting did not identify or prevent 
fraudulent conduct. That was left to an alert non-associated analyst in 2009.140 The fraud occurred in 
internationally domiciled hedge funds in which the Australian MIS invested. Neither APRA nor ASIC 
found evidence in their oversight that there was a fraud occurring. The offshore investment entities 
reported falsified valuations and fictitious returns to the Australian MIS.141 These were accepted by 
the then trustees, directors, and auditors without fully verifying their accuracy. 
APRA conducted five prudential reviews of Trio between April 2004 and June 2009.142 The 
prudential reviews commenced in 2004. In 2005, a prudential review was held with the management 
and the trustee executive directors in preparation for the new licensing regime for superannuation 
funds. Further prudential review occurred in late 2006 involving a review of the administrative 
systems and investment review with directors and management. These were comprehensive detailed 
reviews. In August 2008, APRA, in a broad ranging review, examined strategy, risk management, 
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governance, investments, and liquidity. In June 2009, a prudential review examined governance, 
strategy, and investments including valuations and liquidity.143 
APRA noted that in 2007 and 2008, the Trio funds received unqualified audit opinion and that ‘APRA 
had no reason to believe that the trustee directors were untrustworthy’.144 However, APRA stated that 
‘its main focus is on the conduct of trustees, not verification by auditors’.145 Its responsibility under 
the SIS Act is to ‘ensure the superannuation trustees conduct their affairs with appropriate level of 
fitness and propriety.’ 
APRA’s supervision of Trio Capital was described as Active Supervision meaning on-site visits, 
examination of investment policies, and concerns about the quality of the trusteeship, but not fraud.146 
The concerns about the quality of the trusteeship were ‘not to be of great urgency’.147 APRA’s 
required governance improvements included the appointment of a majority of independent non-
executive directors to the trustee but did not lead to the detection of fraudulent behaviours which 
continued throughout the life of the MIS.148 In its 2005 prudential review, APRA were ‘satisfied that 
governance issues (related party arrangements) appeared to be addressed’ and ‘information requested 
by APRA was being progressively provided’.149 In December 2009, APRA issued a ‘show cause’ 
letter why Trio should not be suspended or removed as trustee.150 
The PJC concluded that:  
APRA should not be exonerated for its lack of action in the oversight of Trio Capital … is concerned 
that APRA did not pick up key events … the first prudential review … in June 2004 … [was] not 
identified as problematic … does raise serious questions about the quality of APRA’s prudential 
reviews. [T]rustee’s tardiness … to provide basic valuation information should have raised strong 
concerns about the trustee [to a risk based regulator],151 especially one under ‘active supervision’.152 
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The ASIC files remained confidential at the time of this review.153 At the time, criminal investigations 
were continuing. ASIC reported that it was not until December 2009 that the directors of the ASF ran 
that fund for fraudulent purposes.154 ASIC had previously identified Trio as a high risk hedge fund 
and were focussed on identification of the existence and valuation of its assets.155 
ASIC attribute the collapse of Trio to ‘the failure of the investment manager, compliance committee, 
compliance plan audit, the three research houses, custodians, and the advisers to detect outright 
dishonest conduct’.156 If ASIC’s view is correct then systemic failures facilitated the fraud. The PJC 
concluded that ‘what is required is the more effective enforcement of existing laws’.157 In one fund 
(ARP Growth Fund), some investors were induced by a financial adviser to transfer funds from an 
APRA regulated fund to a MIS in which their self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) invested 
those funds, effectively removing prudential oversight and compensatory mechanisms.158 Despite 
these facts, APRA argued that these funds were lost ‘due to the failure of Bear Stearns and the severe 
market movements during the GFC and not due to fraud’.159 The PJC argue that ‘APRA holds this 
view because it has failed to fully investigate the alternative possibility: there may never have been a 
contract and the ARP Growth Fund was a fraudulent venture’.160 
A subsequent Treasury Review found that APRA (and ASIC) carried out their roles and 
responsibilities appropriately, but that the then board of Trio ‘failed to manage and monitor risks 
associated with overseas investments’.161 Treasury also correctly expressed concern about 
consequential losses arising from regulatory intervention. The losses incurred by Trio investors and 
its clients for whom it provided professional services were not restricted to the direct economic losses 
in two funds operated fraudulently.162 Trio regulatory intervention spread to some 26 other MIS and 
entities in their investment chain which otherwise may have met their commercial objectives.  
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Trio Capital directly influenced Cooper, St John and FoFA.163 It directly influenced the evolution of 
the SIS Act and identified statutory reform needs including: prioritisation of fiduciary duty, disclosure, 
related party transactions, whistleblowing, asset allocation strategy in superannuation, director, 
trustee and auditor competencies, recruitment, and resourcing, entity capitalisation, and 
compensation, including for risks associated with the single bridge model for REs. Trio was a clarion 
call to the systemic risks associated with a large Australian superannuation pool, its international 
investment diversification, and its attractiveness to malfeasors. 
4.3 Towards Stronger Super 
Cooper was the end of the beginning for ex post regulation of Australian NBFEs. The Cooper 
Review164 is insightful ― a strategic examination of the Australian superannuation system with far 
reaching implications. It analysed the governance and performance of superannuation entities, and, 
by policy extension, influences NBFEs more widely. Cooper implied that future regulation will 
significantly enhance expectations of trustees, trustee directors, and other NBFEs in the investment 
chain. Loss of investor confidence and criticism of ASIC (and APRA) encourages the growth of the 
SMSF sector implying a lack of confidence in prudentially supervised superannuation. Conflicts of 
interest and conflicts of objectives were rife, producing ‘an unhealthy culture’165 reflected in the 
Stronger Super legislative reforms.166 
Australia has a compulsory superannuation sector which has been fully outsourced to the private 
sector. The Wallis principles that superannuation funds members be treated as rational and informed, 
supported by general law, are stated to be ‘somewhat optimistic’ in the development of 
superannuation architecture.167 Compulsory savings based on informed investors making rational 
choices fails to confront the reality of poor financial literacy and lack of ‘systemic transparency’.168 
Superannuation entities (other than SMSFs) are regulated by APRA by the SIS Act169 and are normally 
governed by a corporate trustee. The vast majority of trustees of APRA regulated funds are companies 
with a board of trustee-directors. The trustee is the company, not the director.170 The trustee is 
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required to have an RSE license. Section 52(A) of the SIS Act171 redresses the situation where the 
directors’ duty is owed to the company, not the member, and places the director in the position of 
trustee as a natural person by synchronising the statutory covenants across the trustee company and 
the director. Further ambiguity arises in respect of when the director is entitled to be indemnified 
from trust assets and when there is personal liability. There is a conflict between s 197 of the 
Corporations Act and s 56 of the SIS Act in respect of the trustees’ right of indemnity which would 
not extend to the director as a natural person without reform of the Corporations Act.172 
There had not been a comprehensive review of the current superannuation system since its inception 
in 1992. Coopers’ 177 recommendations fall into 10 broad categories, many of which were adopted 
in the Stronger Super legislation. The then Commonwealth government rejected the recommendation 
to remove the mandatory requirements for trustee boards of employer-sponsored funds to have equal 
representation between employer and employee representatives. It also rejected the recommendation 
that boards be required to have a critical mass of independent (or non-associated) trustee directors, 
despite comparison with listed public company corporate governance models and supported by 
APRA. There is a clear dichotomy between those interests that favour the status quo, and those that 
favour moving to corporate governance models that are prevalent in the listed public company 
sector.173 
Cooper’s proposed the concept of trustee-director. ‘Trustee directors should not have to collate rules 
from multiple sources in order to understand their core duties’.174 These sources include several 
statutes, general law, and equitable fiduciary principles. Superannuation entities, being a specific type 
of trust with a corporate trustee provide financial products supplied as a financial service. 
Proscriptions175 are mirrored with prescriptive obligations under a different statute,176 with trustees 
and directors of industry superannuation fund trustees recruited as part of the equal representation 
model under another statute177 that has a different genesis and is from a different culture. Resolving 
this conundrum requires harmonisation of the different standards of director and trustee director 
duties embedded in the three statutes. 
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Prima facie, the concept of trustee-director, with a fixed and easily comprehended rule book would 
require the elimination of the application of prior general law, and the imposition of statutory 
fiduciary duty directly between trustee-director and beneficiary, the latter outcome desired by Cooper. 
Such a concept has not been previously viewed with undiluted pleasure: 
the controversial suggestion … that the duty of directors to their company can itself embrace some 
level of fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiaries of a trust of which their company is a trustee … is 
questionable … whether this heralded development in our law is as desirable or necessary one in the 
trust company context.178  
Superannuation entity director is now enshrined in Australian law with direct fiduciary obligations to 
the beneficiary.179 The result is more complexity: the trustee-director has a best interest duty to the 
beneficiaries and to the trust company which can conflict.  
Cooper’s new statutory office of trustee-director included a new set of statutory duties and proposed 
to reform the structure of trustee boards. All present statutory duties in the Corporations Act180 are to 
be included with additional duties to those in the present SIS Act.181 The SIS Act is to be amended to 
extend trustee duties to post-taxation consequences of investment decisions, transaction costs and to 
transparency in asset valuation.182 These duties considerably extend the liability of trustee directors 
for investment, community, and environmental outcomes making directors responsible for market 
risks and social policy. For Choice funds, director liability should a Choice member suffer loss is 
limited to only those circumstances where the member has chosen a specific course of action. The 
director is culpable if the Choice options have not been subject to satisfactory ‘investment option due 
diligence, liquidity, and due diligence into the legal structures of underlying investments and 
especially foreign domiciled entities with no legal presence in Australia’.183 In effect, an Approved 
Products List. 
Cooper sought to eliminate ambiguities: there should be clarity about duties owed by trustee directors 
and the standard of competence they should possess and exercise. There has been considerable 
uncertainty about the meaning of the ‘best interest duty’ in s 52(2)(c) of the SIS Act. The ‘regulator’s 
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interpretation (with its apparent focus on outcomes) is arguably at odds with the historical and general 
law interpretation of various duties and general industry understanding of those duties’.184 The 
ordinary prudent person standard becomes a prudent superannuation trustee and directors a 
superannuation entity director. The fit and proper standard was to be reformed. 
Cooper proposed major reform of trustee governance and standards required of trustee directors. 
Some of these will be additional statutory duties in the SIS Act with additional requirements for 
directors supervising MySuper Default products. There will be a non-binding Code of Trustee 
Governance designed for more rigorous and transparent governance with enhanced requirements in 
the management of conflicts of interest.185 There will be enhanced requirements in transparent 
disclosure of portfolio assets, which could be problematic for some funds managers. System integrity 
improvements include RSE-style licensing of fund administration and investment management 
functions where these are provided by third parties in the investment chain.  
Cooper suggests that the SIS Act is complex for both APRA regulated trustees and the SMSF sector. 
This combination of complexity and inherent differences between sectors can lead to regulators 
providing different interpretations, regulatory approaches, and responses,186 recommending it be 
rewritten.187 
Reform of trustee responsibility extended to MySuper Default funds. All MySuper products will be 
able to be nominated as default funds in industrial awards approved by Fair Work Australia. Trustees 
must provide investment advice and separate investment strategies for pre- and post-retirement fund 
members. Pre-retirement, ‘advice is to be available on as broad a range as possible of the financial 
issues members will face in retirement’.188 Post-retirement new and specific responsibilities to 
members include investment strategy not just for the fund itself but also ‘for the assets held on behalf 
of post-retirement members including those set out in the Act189 and inflation and longevity risk’.190 
The architecture governing MySuper products was a major reform and includes reform of the 
interface with the industrial award system and the Fair Work Act. The reforms to MySuper are 
designed to commoditise default superannuation funds, eliminate intermediation commissions, 
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eliminate intra-entity cross subsidisation, and with the requirement for economies of scale likely to 
further industry consolidation. This may however concentrate systemic risk. 
Different reforms are proposed for the SMSF sector including enhanced powers for the ATO, 
licensing of advisers to SMSFs, and auditor independence. The ATO was to be given the power to 
enforce mandatory education for trustees who have contravened the SIS Act. Otherwise, the Cooper 
reforms do not extend to mandatory training of trustee directors found in other jurisdictions. 
Proposed reform of the SIS Act would remove or override provisions in some fund constitutions 
requiring a trustee to use a specific service provider. It attempted to regulate administrative efficiency 
through the implementation of SuperStream, a package of measures designed to bring systemically 
significant back office functions ‘into the 21st century’.191 Logically, service providers should all be 
subject to APRA supervision, including prudential regulation, and should be licensed. This should 
include custodians. Many providers operate in a fragmented and low margin industry with limited 
ability to raise investment capital, this is likely to lead to consolidation of funds management services 
entities.192 Cooper recommended regulatory oversight of all critical elements of the investment chain, 
suggesting the superannuation system lacks ‘systemic transparency’.193  
These reforms opened the way for the appointment of independent directors not associated with 
employer or employee representation. It also requires directors to have specific skills necessary to 
govern the fund, without prescribing what these may be.194 The requirement to be non-associated and 
the additional statutory duties in respect of conflicts of interest and higher standards of competency 
is likely to result in a smaller pool of eligible, suitably qualified trustee directors being available for 
board appointments. 
Cooper proposed major reform to prudential regulation. Funds, including master trusts and companies 
where there is a trustee function within the conglomerate, will be required to establish operational 
risk reserves and to have their own prudential capital. This extends to funds administration entities in 
addition to new licensing requirements. Enhanced prudential requirements will be in addition to those 
required to maintain an AFSL.  
APRA is proposed to have enhanced powers including the power to impose ‘outcomes standards’. 
This extension of powers from prudential matters to the setting of operating standards are a form of 
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subordinate legislation made by the Executive Council and would be disallowable in the Senate. 
APRA will be able, as ASIC has presently, the power to impose contestable fines, as an alternative 
to criminal prosecution. The present APRA mandate is ‘piecemeal’:195 it needed a revised mandate, 
expanded and redesigned to implement Cooper recommendations.  
4.3.1 The legislative response 
Legislative amendments designed to give effect to Cooper’s recommendations became known as 
Stronger Super196 enacted in a series of new or proposed new statutes. Prudential standards were 
increased.197 These Stronger Super reforms reinforce, codify, and strengthen fiduciary principles 
from the general law. Some of these have been enacted, others await resolution of political 
impediments. The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Governance) Bill remains before 
Parliament five years after Cooper. 
The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Act198 
amended the SIS Act.199 It significantly enhanced the duties and responsibilities of the corporate 
trustee and its directors. Director duties are enhanced by the concept of a prudent superannuation 
trustee rather than an ordinary prudent person. Specific conflict of interest and fairness provisions are 
inserted into the SIS Act, and trustees are required to formulate investment strategy for each 
investment option, rather than the previous whole of entity approach. This includes valuation, 
taxation, costs, due diligence, diversification, economic scale, and liquidity considerations. These 
duties apply to individual directors personally as well as the corporate trustee. Substantive reform of 
the capitalisation of RSE licensees group ‘connected entities’ is required. Many are also REs. 
Undercapitalisation of the RE has been one of the systemic causes of the failures of MIS and requires 
prudential reform. APRA determines Prudential Standards; these regulate Fit and Proper200 (but with 
implementation by the RSE), Investment Governance,201 and Conflicts of Interest.202 ‘Fit and proper’ 
means APRA being satisfied as to competence, character, diligence, experience, honesty, integrity 
and judgment, akin to German standards. 
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A superannuation entity director is ‘a person whose profession, business, or employment is or 
includes acting as director of a corporate trustee of a superannuation entity and investing money on 
behalf of beneficiaries of the superannuation entity’.203 The legislation distinguishes trustee and 
director covenants to ‘hold trustees to a higher standard’,204 being that of a ‘prudent superannuation 
trustee’. These new trustee covenants include conflicts of interest, fairness, standards of care, skill, 
and diligence (for consistency with State trust law),205 investment strategy (scrutiny, diligence, 
appropriateness, risk, composition, liquidity, ability to discharge liabilities, transaction and operating 
costs, taxation, and availability and reliability of valuation information, ‘in particular [for] direct and 
unlisted investments that may be difficult to value’.206 Reformed duties of individual superannuation 
directors207 are an ‘objective standard’ and directors must ‘each understand the business of the trustee 
and its regulatory framework and be in a position to contribute to the meetings of the trustee’.208 Both 
the covenants of the trustee, and these new individual covenants ‘operate as if the director of the 
corporate trustee of the RSE was a party to the governing rules’.209 A member could personally seek 
redress for loss or damage from the person causing such loss or damage, although this liability has 
been ameliorated by the requirement for court approval to commence an action.210 
MySuper beneficiaries delegate all aspects of their superannuation to the trustee. For RSEs offering 
default superannuation products, the trustee directors have personal liability for choice of fund. 
Cooper211 proposed the selection and review of default superannuation products for listing in modern 
awards should include consideration of the quality of intra-fund advice.212 This acknowledged the 
importance of investor education. Elsewhere, there is acknowledgement that, over extended periods 
of time, investor empowerment may change the mix of superannuation fund selection between default 
funds and from them to choice funds. 
Criteria for the selection and assessment of superannuation funds eligible for nomination as default 
funds in modern industrial awards limit choice to those superannuation funds which offer a MySuper 
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product.213 This is the interface between Australia’s compulsory superannuation system and its 
industrial system. Superannuation was included as an allowable matter in awards in 1996.214 
Subsequently, 122 modern awards were developed by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission, now embedded in the Fair Work Act. In 2012, there were 104 superannuation funds 
named as default funds in at least one modern award.215 Of these, APRA reports that 50% are industry 
public offer funds. 
Stronger Super reforms sought to eliminate corruption in the investment chain. The Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment (Service Providers and Other Governance Measures) Act216 prohibits 
contracts where the trustee is required to use specific service providers, investment managers, or 
invest in specific financial products. Many of these have been related parties. It eliminates trust deed 
restrictions on voting power of individual directors. Such requirements, allowable under previous 
law, have been inserted into trust deeds particularly where there is common ownership or other related 
parties. Such provisions are void. The legislation restores the discretion of the trustee subject to the 
Prudential Standard.217 
The right to offer default superannuation products is commercially highly contested, with high 
percentages of superannuation funds being invested in these default products involving more than a 
trillion dollars.218 The Fair Work Commission creates the Default Superannuation List constructed 
by it as an Expert Panel. Only superannuation funds on this list may be designated as default funds 
in a modern industrial award.219 These are selected by the employer for employees who otherwise do 
not, or are not allowed to make their own choices.  
So, the governance of the selection process is paramount in default fund selection. In Financial 
Services Council v Industry Super,220 the Financial Services Council (FSC) succeeded in its 
application to have the construction of the Expert Panel declared invalid and have it reconstituted. 
Expert Panel Members became disqualified from the selection process because of conflicts of 
interest.221 Expert Panel Members are appointed ‘following the Minister being satisfied as to their 
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expertise in finance, investment management and/or superannuation’222 which can be politicised. 
They represent a minority of Panel Members, and can be outvoted, despite selection on 
competencies.223 Given the very significant commercial rewards, public conflicts between industry 
and retail superannuation lobbyists, and a contested political environment in superannuation, the 
governance of default superannuation selection requires reform. 
4.3.2 Remediation 
St John224 addressed investor compensation as a result of AFSL and RSE malfeasance. Under present 
law, some investors are able to access compensation, others, notably in the SMSF sector have not 
been able to do so. They may be invested in the same financial products: St John shines light on the 
plight of investors damaged in the collapse of Trio Capital. He highlights other recurring features225 
including unlicensed and unregistered MIS, business model failure; poor or inappropriate financial 
advice, deceptive and misleading conduct in respect of financial products, and commission based 
inducements for financial products recommendation. 
St John does not recommend a last resort scheme. Current compensation arrangements ‘do not purport 
to deal with loss or damage suffered by consumers from investment failures other than as a result of 
licensee misconduct’.226 The inquiry into the collapse of Trio Capital227 concluded in relation to MIS, 
that ‘if the objections raised by Mr St. John could be overcome, the concept of a levy on all MIS to 
fund a compensation scheme for fraud and theft has merit’.228 However, there are significant practical 
difficulties if applied to existing MIS. This is where much of the need for compensation has arisen. 
4.4 Entrepreneurship or South Sea Ponzi? ― Managed Investment Schemes in Australia 
The first decade of the 21st Century was a decade of prosperity in Australia. Some credit should be 
attributed to an entrepreneurial society using a reformed capital market and financial system able to 
source capital nationally and globally, to facilitate commercial expansion. It resulted in a plethora of 
new investment opportunities in MIS and superannuation entities. 
The far from prosaic inventive spirits of financial product developers were aided by financial advisers. 
Many investments were lawful, some were not. Many complied with black letter law, but not its spirit. 
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Investing clients often based decisions on trust, with limited product understanding sold to them by 
often conflicted financial advisers in an ex post regulatory environment. What should have led to a 
more entrepreneurial economy, and a richer more educated society instead inflicted continuing 
personal and economic damage. Recognition of a problem with MIS created the conditions for a 
Reaction. This was manifested in a series of reviews and reports. It began with an assessment of the 
legislative framework.229 
The statutory definition of MIS refers to investor contribution being ‘pooled or used in a common 
enterprise’.230 MIS are typically structured as trust based or contract based. In no other country does 
the use of trusts as commercial trading enterprises approach Australian practice.231 Trust based MIS 
operate as pooled investment fund involving investor contributions which become scheme property 
for application to scheme investments and operating costs. Common enterprise contract based MIS 
operate often on agency principles with investor contributions used in a common commercial 
enterprise without being pooled. Scheme property is separate to investor property. Investors, at least 
in theory and to satisfy tax authorities, needed to maintain the stance that they are carrying on a 
business. That their business sometimes had no commercial likelihood of success appears to have 
been irrelevant. 
The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee’s (CAMAC’s) 2011 review dealt with schemes 
and REs in financial distress. The financial damage had been of such an extent that the law required 
reform so that viable MIS under the control of a non-viable RE can be transferred to the control of a 
viable RE, potentially viable MIS can be restructured, and non-viable MIS can be wound up. There 
are legal and commercial impediments to each of these objectives. The 2009 Parliamentary Inquiry 
into Agribusiness MIS recommended a statutory amendment requiring ASIC to appoint a temporary 
RE. A major impediment, unless ASIC itself becomes the RE or indemnifies a new RE is the 
assumption of the liabilities of the former RE by its replacement. Historically, there has been a lack 
of REs prepared to assume responsibility for an existing MIS, even if it is financially sound. 232 This 
has led to orphan MIS.  
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Each MIS must have a RE. Accounting treatments and entitlements of scheme members are different 
for each MIS. A 
lack of adequate separation of the affairs of each MIS operated by the RE and legal uncertainty of 
various parties dealing with the RE as operator of the various schemes. The greater the complexity of 
the MIS structure[s], the greater the risk of entanglement and confusion of the rights of investors and 
other parties.233 
REs can be sole function or multifunction, and can be in-house where the NBFE also acts as promoter 
of the scheme (the Australian ‘poacher-gamekeeper’ syndrome).234 
Reforms of this period proposed: identify the affairs of each MIS that an RE operates, place controls 
on the use of scheme property, and set out the rights of creditors of each MIS.235 Rights established 
in the constitution of a MIS allowing the use of scheme property to pay debts of another MIS would 
be prohibited. Creditor rights would extend to scheme property and not be subrogated to the 
indemnity rights of the RE. 
Common enterprise schemes with multi-function REs have been problematic.236 Many agribusiness 
MIS fall into this category: ‘the problems with the operations of schemes … have arisen principally, 
if not exclusively, in the context of common enterprise schemes’,237 considering whether the law 
should permit only pooled schemes. It is not correct. This option was not adopted when Part 5C of 
the Corporations Act was adopted in 1998 and does not recognise that pooled MIS (and their REs), 
have faced considerable difficulties. 
Should the RE be sole purpose (MIS specific)? A large number of new REs, each with its own AFSL 
would be required. Equity capital to meet statutory AFSL capital adequacy requirements would be 
substantial. There would be no economies of scale. 
CAMAC proposed that there be legislative reform creating an alternative legal framework: the 
Separate Legal Entity (SLE). In essence, the SLE would only act as agent of the MIS, not principal, 
a position that exists in practice in the MIS sector currently. ‘Whilst the SLE proposal is theoretically 
workable, and if implemented, could be the answers to almost all of the issues’,238 it has not met with 
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scholarly approval.239 For those that are not structured in this manner, there would need to be taxation 
reform.240  
Many MIS finance the unlisted property sector. These MIS have been popular with retail investors in 
superannuation and non-superannuation environments. Some were unlawful unregistered MIS, being 
particularly problematic for investors exposed when the GFC uncovered their underlying legal and 
business model flaws. These flaws included non-compliance with AFSL conditions, poor compliance, 
risk management unsuited to the scale and complexity of the businesses, unsubstantiated cash flow 
forecasts, and related party transactions. Some related party transactions could not be shown to be in 
the interests of scheme members and ignored conflicts of interest compliance. 241 
Agribusiness and forestry MIS242 were common in Australia. ASIC previously had not ascribed Ponzi 
characteristics to agribusiness MIS. It did concede, that in relation to forestry MIS:  
where a RE of a forestry scheme is reliant on scheme sales for a substantial part of revenue for working 
capital, an interruption to scheme sales revenue could have significant implications for the RE, and its 
contractual obligations owed to growers … Some RE’s have not had sufficient reserves to fulfil their 
obligations to growers.243  
There was no prudential capital requirement for these, or property MIS, until statutory intervention 
in 2017 and then only for those entities categorised as non-ADI (authorised deposit-taking institution) 
lenders.244 They relied on attracting new investors to meet old obligations. Forestry MIS have often 
been highly leveraged using full recourse secured financial instruments, often provided by a related 
party of the RE. Most of these are common enterprise schemes where the investor is the ‘grower’, 
and where the entitlements of the investor/grower are not always clear. They created significant and 
ongoing financial hardship for their investors.  
ASIC attributed common factors in forestry RE and MIS collapses to: reliance by the RE on its 
holding company (often multi-function REs where the RE is owned by the scheme promoter); 
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business models reliant upon fees from investors/growers or new investors for working capital; and 
limited ability to collect management fees from investor/growers. 
ASIC noted that ‘despite the reviews [CAMAC, summarised here] and a significant amount of work 
in developing potential refinements, the legislative framework for MIS has remained largely the 
same’.245 That includes the statutory licensing obligations of ASIC in the granting of AFSLs and the 
registering of MIS. Licensing has been problematic for ASIC, including transfers of ownership of 
licencees. The FoFA reforms increased ASIC’s licensing powers, but unacceptable changes of 
ownership magnifies systemic risk. ASIC noted:  
conduct standards in the ASIC Act are at best an imperfect tool for a regulator seeking to address 
systemic or widespread issues ...246 findings that they have been breached tend to be specific in each 
case and rarely set a general rule or precedent,247  
perhaps reflecting internal frustration that its regulatory powers do not match community expectations 
of it.  
ASIC had previously questioned248 the commerciality of these forestry (mainly pulpwood) MIS, the 
poor quality or absence of disclosure, inappropriate, conflicted or misleading advice, and payment of 
excessive fees to related parties. Investors relied upon their contracts. Consequently investors in these 
MIS have to rely on the general law where a power imbalances make equitable claims difficult to 
sustain. Severe community criticism of profiteering by MIS promoters at the expense of the taxpayer 
and investor, asymmetric information, lack of accountability, internal transfer pricing to hide below 
forecast returns, fee gouging, and reliance upon investor tax benefits as a marketing strategy for the 
MIS249 demanded closure of these MIS and their banning from the retail investment market. 
Industry views, unsurprisingly, accord with existing practice: 
whilst it is acknowledged there have been concerns about past practices of MIS companies and 
financial advisers marketing MIS products … subject to appropriate standards of due diligence and 
corporate governance, the MIS structure and plantation taxation arrangements should continue to be 
available to support new plantation investment … the key point that AFPA would like to make is that 
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the MIS structure, in combination with the plantation taxation arrangement, has had some success in 
attracting private investment for new plantation establishment.250 
Quite! There are 144 384 investors exposed to six groups of forestry MIS251 to which external 
administrators were appointed between April 2009 and September 2012 and into which they had 
invested AUD5.812 billion. There are no reliable aggregate research data on consequential financial 
or human losses. 
ASIC acknowledged a ‘currently growing international interest in redirecting financial services 
regulation to more actively influence the quality of financial services and products provided to 
investors’.252 An evolution to more interventionist regulatory approach aligning regulation of MIS 
with company law,253 including ASX listed companies.254 MIS have evolved former prescribed 
interest collective investment schemes255 into large complex (sometimes listed) commercial 
enterprises structured as trusts controlled by multi-function REs, retaining different governance 
frameworks.256 Prescribed interest schemes separated the trustee from the management company, an 
approach favoured professionally.257  
Recommendations of CAMAC,258 ASX guidance for listed MIS,259 and international guidance260 
refer specifically to risk management, but the implications are clear that CAMAC believed that MIS 
should be regulated as companies. Reform options included investor rights in respect of oppression261 
and statutory derivative action.262 What constitutes a MIS and who constitutes a member of a MIS 
already have broad definitions. These and which schemes should be registered are proposed for 
                                                                  
250 Australian Forest Products Association, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Forestry Managed Investment Schemes (December 2014). 
251 Timbercorp Securities Limited, Great Southern Managers Australia Limited, FEA Plantations Limited, 
Rewards Projects Limited, Willmott Forests Limited, and Gunns Plantations Limited. Gunns had acquired 
nine of the Great Southern MIS and subsequently appointed an external administrator. 
252 ASIC, Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into 
forestry managed investment schemes, above n 242, 4 [7]. 
253 Australian Government, CAMAC, The establishment and operation of managed investment schemes 
(Discussion Paper, March 2014). 
254 Ibid 232. 
255 The position prior to the Managed Investments Act, now Chapter 5C Corporations Act. 
256 The CAMAC Stage 1 proposal for the establishment of a Separate Legal Entity has not proceeded. 
257 A Jessup, Managed Investment Schemes (Federation Press, 2012). 
258 Australian Government, CAMAC, The establishment and operation of managed investment schemes, 
above n 253, 65. 
259 ASX, Corporate Governance Principles and recommendations with 2010 Amendments (2nd ed). 
260 IOSCO, Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (2011). 
261 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 410. 
262 Ibid s 236(l). 
96 
reform. Alignment of MIS and company law results in reform of director’s duties. Presently, if a MIS 
is listed, but the RE is not, the directors of the RE are not subject to the same disclosure requirements 
as directors of listed public companies.263 
The MIS disclosure regime is not the same as for companies. The FSRA264 did not harmonise the 
disclosure requirements for differing financial products and instruments despite them being 
commercial enterprises operating in competition in similar markets with similar investors. CAMAC 
proposed reform and alignment of disclosure regimes. For instance, a prospectus is a general 
disclosure obligation, whereas a product disclosure statement is a directed disclosure.265 
Johnson266 and CAMAC267 both seek to align Australian practice to accommodate foreign investors 
in Australian MIS. It requires recognition of international standards of securities regulation: 
importantly, reforming architecture of a sole RE and asset valuation standards. There is a diversity of 
valuation methodologies used in Australia.268 Should a MIS ‘valuation procedure be limited only to 
those required by the accounting standards, regardless of the purpose of the valuation’? The 
International Organisation for Securities Commissions (IOSCO) sets out 38 principles required for 
Australia to meet international standards.269 
Should principles underlying MySuper default funds be applied to MIS in Australia, then the 
European model of UCITS270 compliant investment funds are a suitable model. These are able to be 
marketed across jurisdictions inside and outside of the EU, commonly so in some Asian jurisdictions 
including Singapore and Hong Kong, and are globally recognised. The UCITS framework has 
specific investor protection features including clarity about the depositary function. This contrasts 
with the uncertainty associated with the custodial function in Australia. 
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4.5 Do custodians protect the investing public? 
Custodial and depositary services providers are NBFEs.271 Essential infrastructure and governance of 
superannuation and non-superannuation investment, they may have provided false sense of security. 
Cooper and ASIC both note that there are not many custodial services providers272 in Australia,273 
despite increased international regulatory focus on the safety of client assets.274 This is one of the 
unintended consequences of the Managed Investments Act. ‘The market for custodian services has 
the highest level of [outsourced] concentration,275 the top five custodians claim[ing] 92% of the entire 
market’.276 This leads to the ability to charge higher fees.277  
Australian law is deficient by international standards in not mandating a requirement for an 
independent custodian to hold scheme assets. To permit self-custody and related party custody 
introduces a higher risk of maladministration.278 
Cooper observed custodians do not conduct due diligence to protect investors against investment 
risks. Custodians are conduits for trustees and are not responsible to fund members for failure by 
them or other service provider. Turnbull noted279 that custodians have never been intended to act as 
watchdogs and instead only act when instructed to do so and in accordance with instructions. 
Custodians can hold assets for many funds without impact on capital adequacy. They can also be part 
of a vertically integrated financial services business. These are sources of systemic risk. Systemic 
risks in the custody sector are recognised in Europe, less so in Australia by ASIC and APRA.280 Even 
for public offer funds, there is no link between the risks faced by the fund and the amount of prudential 
capital required. The provision of transactional back office services can lead to transactional error, 
but without the necessary capital adequacy for rectification. Client indemnities are of limited value. 
This was not previously so prior to the Managed Investments Act. At that time, trustee and custody 
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providers tended to be large, with considerable shareholder capital backed by insurance. Modern 
custody requires considerable capital investment in information technology. 
ASIC have identified additional risks281 including client money risk held in omnibus accounts in the 
name of the custodian or its nominee. Cooper observed that the prudential requirements for custody 
providers had not changed since 1983. ASIC has updated capital adequacy (separate from prudential 
capital) requirements for providers operating under an AFSL and RG166 in respect of managed 
investments schemes.282 
ASIC research283 analysed industry structure, regulatory regime, commenting on what it considers to 
be good practice. It did not establish new regulatory standards. ASIC reports an ‘“expectations gap” 
between custodians’ present responsibilities and the publics’ expectations of them in the safekeeping 
of assets and as gatekeepers for the identification and elimination of malfeasance’.284 This extends to 
spurious asset valuations. Reform proposals to reflect market practice by changing the title 
‘custodian’ to ‘Manager’s Payment Agent’ may not be in the interests of investors. Reform needs to 
address systemic problems, not tinker at the edges. 
Custodians are typically used by REs and RSEs in respect of superannuation entities where the RSE 
is the trustee. Custodians are defined in s 766E of the Corporations Act and Section 10 of the SIS Act. 
Persons holding the property of registered MIS are providing a financial service and are not providing 
a custodial or depository service. Similarly, a trustee of a RSE is not regarded to be providing custody 
services where that trustee holds the assets directly. The Corporations Act does not require the 
custodian to be named in Product Disclosure Statements, although this is common practice.  
The Corporations Act exempts custodians of assets of registered schemes from the requirement to 
hold an AFSL.285 They are not subject to statutory obligations regarding the holding of client money 
and property that apply to financial services licensees.286 This control is exercised through the 
licensing of the RE which requires the RE to impose minimum contractual standards on the custodian 
and ensure minimum standards. The common view is that the custodian acts as bare trustee on behalf 
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of and under instruction from the RE (or RSE) based in contract pursuant to the custodial 
agreement.287 This may not be the expectation of the investing public: 
The relationship between the trustee and its custodian is thus potentially quite variegated, containing 
elements of trust, agency, debt, and contract. This variegation is crucially important in understanding 
the different ways in which local failures in respect of custody services can propagate and hence 
assume systemic implications.288 
Custodians are commonly regarded as having a fiduciary responsibility to their RE and RSE clients.289 
They also have duties in respect of reporting suspected mis-, non-, or malfeasance.290  
CP 197291 proposed reform to address the deficiencies and uncertainties identified in the custody 
sector. These include pre-contract due diligence, watchdog function, and changes to terminology so 
that investors’ expectations are more properly aligned with industry practice. These reforms raise 
significant legal and costs issues for custodial service providers and, together with increased capital 
adequacy levels, will almost certainly result in fewer market participants. If the role of the custodian 
is to include the watchdog role (pre- and post-contract with its client) and its associated reporting 
requirements to the regulator, then it is highly likely that this will become a concentrated sector with 
higher fees. Arguably however, the Australian custody sector has been charging fees commensurate 
with community expectations of responsibility but without providing assumed levels of service and 
risk mitigation.  
These deficiencies and uncertainties were described in 2003.292 Many remain: [t]he increasingly 
diverse set of services they provide to superannuation funds gives rise to systemic risk within the 
superannuation system … [but] little is currently done to manage this risk.293 
Further, 
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ASIC and APRA are increasingly aware of the potential for local risks to have systemic implications 
… for a variety of institutional, political and jurisdictional reasons they appear to be ill-equipped 
currently to address the threat …294  
Australian law does not fully follow international standards.295 These require a custodian be 
functionally independent of the operator and always act in the best interests of investors.  
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5. THE AGE OF STATUTES (2014 et seq) 
5.1 Who is to blame? Has disclosure failed? 
The scope and scale of financial damage, direct and indirect, led directly to community anger, political 
pressure, and to the search for scapegoats. Community expectations were different from market 
realities across much of the NBFE sector. Resulting economic hardships inevitably lead to emphasis 
on past losses and the search for remedies and scapegoats. 
There are many thousands of cases which include:296 
• ‘Centrelink recipients earning A$23,000 p.a. aged 71 and 64 years receiving a loan of 
A$900,000 for investment into leveraged equities’; 
• ‘Now aged 64, no longer a home owner for the first time in 34 years, robbed of a chunk of my 
rightful equity…’ 
• ‘A single mother, advised by a broker to invest in property with a low doc loan, and struggling 
month to month to repay the loans’; 
• ‘A person on a disability pension, forced to rent out her home and live with her daughter’. 
These cases arose almost always from financial products investment through legally compliant 
disclosure documents and financial advice, undisciplined by financially literate clientele. The 
corruption of these Wallis inspired processes is facilitated by complex statutes and exposed in judicial 
frustration.  
In Wingecarribee: 
Those Acts that now deal with misleading and deceptive conduct, apply differently depending on 
distinctions such as whether the alleged misleading conduct is in relation to a ‘financial product or a 
financial service’,297 or ‘financial services’.298 Those apparently simple terms are nothing of the sort. 
… Obviously, there are differences in what each of these Acts and definitions cover – but why? The 
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cost to the community, business, the parties, and their lawyers, and the time for courts to work out 
which law applies have no rational or legal justification.299 
Public pressure and judicial findings led to reviews of ASIC’s performance in 2014 and 2015, a 
further Parliamentary Inquiry into agribusiness MIS (Bitter Harvest), and the Financial System 
Inquiry (Murray) in 2014. For superannuation entities, a continuation of the Stronger Super agenda. 
The Heydon Royal Commission into Registered Organisations corruption paved the way for 
legislative reform of these systemically important entities. 
There is no broad public understanding of regulators’ mandates nor of the legal constraints under 
which they operate, particularly of ASIC. There is unmet public expectation of a zero failure system. 
Key findings ‘resurface in different contexts throughout this work’:  
ASIC appears to miss or ignore clear and persistent early warning signs of corporate wrong doing; 
ASIC needs to have the skills and industry experience to be able to match the ingenuity of those trying 
to circumvent the law; trust of consumers is open to abuse; consumers have an unrealistic expectation 
of what ASIC can do to protect their interests; ASIC’s communication with retail investors and 
consumers needs to improve significantly; financial markets participants can assist ASIC enabling it 
to focus on serious and systemic matters; and some financial advisers, brokers, and lenders 
systematically targeted more vulnerable members of the community, especially older Australians with 
assets but without high levels of financial literacy.300 
Case studies (with similar modern echoes) include Commonwealth Bank Financial Planning (CFPL) 
where, 
in particular, it showed ASIC as a timid, hesitant regulator … CFPL advisers deliberately neglected 
their duties, placed their personal interests ahead of their clients, misallocated client assets without 
knowledge or permission, received bonuses for same, conducted forgery and concealed material facts 
dishonestly, with management accused of a conspiracy hide these facts.301 
Further: ‘malfeasance escaped scrutiny, CFPL’s compliance regime failed, and ASIC was too slow 
to recognise the seriousness of the problems within … with manifestly inadequate initial offers of 
compensation’. CFPL was not alone: other financial institutions have tolerated similar behaviours. 
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This ‘CFPL scandal needs to stand as a lesson for the entire financial services sector and that a Royal 
Commission into it is warranted’.302 The Hayne Royal Commission was finally constituted in 2018, 
yet to report. Further, ‘without a fairer and more responsive regulatory system, the future will simply 
bring more stories of suffering and injustice with the same issues identified as the culprits’.303 The 
public demanded action from ASIC to become a far more proactive regulator.  
There are ‘broad systemic problems in the financial advice industry’ which may recur.304 Recur they 
did requiring remediation of systemic deficiencies in ‘culture, remuneration, record keeping, 
monitoring, review and remediation’. These were subsequently quantified by ASIC.305 Empirical 
analysis identified compensation of AUD178.06 million to 203 452 investors who were financial 
advice clients of the financial planning arms of the four major banks and AMP.306 This data does not 
include estimates of compensation for malfeasance from other financial institutions. Subsequent 
analysis of vertically integrated wealth management entities owned by AMP, ANZ, CBA, NAB, and 
Westpac providing financial advice on in-house superannuation products to retail clients revealed that 
only 10% of their advisers provided compliant advice, 65% did not, and 10% provided advice leading 
ASIC to have significant concerns about the consumers financial position.307 
Financial literacy is the cousin of disclosure Australia in a market based regulatory regime.308 
‘Australia is out of step with international efforts to implement measures that would address problems 
associated with the marketing of unsafe products to retail investors,’309 but later improvements in 
disclosure regulation were mostly tactical.310 
This Senate Committee also recommended that the governance of ASIC revert to a two tier board 
structure with an executive and non-executive board, ‘with the Commonwealth amending the ASIC 
Act accordingly’.311 This approach must allow ASIC to better meet community expectations and 
address the financial literacy problem.  
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5.2 Second Strategic Insights: objectives and implementation 
A combination of community anger at a misunderstood and systemically deficient regulatory 
structure with an ageing demography preparing for retirement is toxic and dangerous. Economic 
change was predictable and predicted.312 Deficient regulation was not. Systemic deficiencies were 
hidden by legislative accretion. Hardship driven policy change can destroy the benefits of what was 
an entrepreneurial economy. These benefits include investment options and the learning of financial 
literacy skills by investing. Regulatory interventions which destroy those freedoms risk returning 
Australia to pre-Campbell. The Age of Entrepreneurship becomes the Age of Statutes. Cooper’s 
‘libertarian paternalism’ being intervention by the State results in loss of investment freedom. ‘You 
don’t get a choice’.313 
Campbell, Wallis, and Johnson acknowledged Australia’s potential place in the global economy, and 
recommended appropriate implement policies. The Financial System Inquiry (Murray)314 sought to 
remedy continuing policy deficiencies without damaging the entrepreneurial fabric. Australia’s 
responses to implementation problems involved more legislation and more proactive regulation. 
Murray, supporting evolution to an ex ante system, sensibly seeks to balance these responses with an 
educated view of the principles and benefits of the Wallis regulatory architecture. Murray aimed to 
build on Wallis principles whilst reforming their implementation, concerned that poor investor 
outcomes make the ‘system prone to more regulation… [and that] there does not need to be major 
change to Australia’s regulatory architecture’.315  
He expressed concern that reform should not be motivated by the political environment.316 
Governments have an obligation to act in the long term national interest not using the financial system 
for short-term political gain.317 This impedes resolution of systemic problems including: instability 
in public policy for superannuation, regulation not keeping pace with practice and structure. The 
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absence of an overarching framework with clear definable objectives and success criteria means no 
clear accountability for participants.318 
Murray proposed awarding ASIC a product intervention power to be exercised without a 
demonstrated or suspected breach of the law and extending to banning products, shifting from reliance 
on disclosure, advice and financial literacy to an ex ante posture. Failure risk is proposed to move 
from an ex post to an ex ante posture.319 Ex ante regulation may seem reasonable in hindsight, but 
application of subjectivity in standards has the potential to ban all MIS product regulated by ASIC. 
This would be inconsistent with his desire not to make the financial system more prone to regulation. 
It also raises moral hazard. This is not an issue related only to complex financial products. Restriction 
of consumer choice has been an historical norm in other jurisdictions, limiting investment options to 
fixed interest products and lack of consumer awareness of the diversity of investment options found 
in Australia. This does not meet the Wallis objective of increased financial literacy. Murray supported 
mandated product disclosure standards, default products with simple features and fee structures, and 
generally supports the CAMAC proposals for the regulation of MIS.320  
Murray opined that the current regulatory framework does not provide for the fair treatment of 
consumers of financial products and services. The Wallis principles of disclosure, advice and 
financial literacy are not met in practice. Eighty-five per cent of pre-retirees are not confident in 
having an informed conversation around retirement income.321 He supported aligning Australian 
regulation with peer jurisdictions. This should include an ‘appropriateness test’ at the point of sale. 
This regime with differing detail is in place in the EU, UK, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the 
US.  
Reform of some NBFE ownership and control is proposed including ASIC approval for change of 
control of AFSL entities.322 It mirrors proposed APRA approval for change of control of an RSE.323 
Murray considered (as does Johnson) that the Australian financial sector needs to be internationalised 
and that policy should avoid adopting unique Australian approaches inconsistent with international 
practice. For example adoption of common overseas collective investment structures (UCITS). 
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Elimination of the poacher-gamekeeper problem would require statutory amendment. Changes in 
other jurisdictions will need to be implemented in Australia as they occur.  
AFSLs are effectively franchised: it being attached to the business unlike in other jurisdictions where 
the licence is attached to the individual. The AFSL business recruits financial planners as authorised 
representatives or employees. This encourages treaty shopping by planners for lower educational 
barriers to entry, the most advantageous fee splits, and feeds the pernicious effects of the approved 
products list needing volume business models to meet regulatory costs. The Australian regulatory 
regime does not have the veracity of the Canadian or Singapore jurisdictions: A Royal Commission 
is needed to ‘compel relevant people to give evidence and to produce information or documents’.324 
Licensing of financial advisers would be personal, as in New Zealand and Hong Kong, rather than 
corporatised with an Approved Representative structure. This could fundamentally alter the valuation 
of those licenced NBFEs, explicit in Murray: 
the benefits of competition are central to the Inquiry’s philosophy. High concentration and steadily 
increasing vertical integration has the potential to limit competition in the future. Licensing provisions 
and regulatory frameworks can impose significant barriers to entry and growth of new players.325 
Lack of clarity around the objective of superannuation policy contributes to ad hoc short term decision 
making: it is not clear that the superannuation system is to provide an individual with an income in 
retirement. Murray proposed that this be enshrined in legislation. 326  
Without clarity of purpose, superannuation, retirement policy and regulatory architecture cannot be 
aligned and so cannot deliver the right outcomes. Whilst the accumulation phase in superannuation 
is heavily regulated, the retirement phase is underdeveloped and does not meet the needs of many 
retirees, needing reform of implementation. These include competitive selection of MySuper default 
funds, replacement of the industrial relations system in the selection of default funds, and alignment 
of the system to individuals, not employers.  
Murray considered two alternatives in the further reform of MySuper: (i) abolition of the Fair Work 
Commission (FWC) process for selecting default funds in awards; and (ii) enhance the default 
superannuation licensing regime and APRA’s role with it. It recommended that all employees should 
be able to engage with their superannuation and to choose their fund which receives their compulsory 
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superannuation contributions. This would require reform of the Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act to remove the exclusions given to enterprise agreements, workplace 
determinations, and some awards.327 
The industry raised other options,328 whilst preferring existing trust structures. These other options 
include a statutory government controlled fund, which, whilst it may have simple and prudential 
attractions, removes competition and investor flexibility. It also opens the way for investment 
allocation decisions in an ill-defined policy framework, even if trustees believe those decisions are in 
the best interests of members, however defined. Other jurisdictions have government controlled funds 
(eg Singapore Central Provident Fund). The Australian experience includes the Future Fund, QSuper 
and Queensland Investment Corporation. 
Governance is to be improved by a majority of independent directors on superannuation trustee 
boards and reforming director penalties for malfeasance with those for MIS329 Murray does not agree 
with the Cooper proposals for industry fund corporate governance believing it is more important for 
directors to be independent, skilled and accountable than representative.330 Murray believes that there 
is no evidence to suggest that the performance of these funds is driven by their equal representation 
model, and that good governance can add to pension fund investment returns. Some submissions331 
favoured the Cooper approach that superannuation trustees should exercise their fiduciary duty to 
additionally consider longevity and inflation risks.  
Alignment of penalties will expose directors of corporate trustees to similar civil and criminal 
penalties. In 2014, superannuation trustee directors were not subject to criminal or civil penalties for 
breach of duty to act in the best interest of members. APRA may seek to disqualify the director 
through court proceedings, but the position is inconsistent with the regime applying to RE directors 
under the Corporations Act.332 Murray also proposed significant increases in the penalty regime. 
ASFA suggests:  
There are mixed messages being sent by APRA in relation to its expectations around the obligations 
of boards … the approach adopted by APRA is not always consistent with the roles of boards and their 
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management … given the board role is strategic in nature, this is not an appropriate or constructive 
way to regulate boards.333  
ASFA research demonstrates: 
APRA (inappropriately) expects managerial level responsibilities [for] board members and that APRA 
should provide guidance to clarify its expectations on the role of boards and distinguish these from the 
operations of management.334 
Australia in 2018 does not have consistent corporate governance practices across the NBFE sector. 
Nor does it have consistent penalties for directors under each of the Corporations Act, SIS Act, and 
Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act, each the responsibility of different regulators. 
Some inconsistency is attributable to differing mandates and objectives, but evolutionary radiation of 
the statutes has resulted in different outcomes resulting in directors being required to ‘collate their 
duties from different sources’. There is limited alignment of director duties between APRA regulated 
superannuation trustees and funds with REs and registered MIS, even though they can have common 
ownership and common directors.335 Unit holders in a MIS can remove the RE, although they cannot 
remove individual directors. Members of superannuation funds have no such rights. The 
Corporations Act sets out the obligations of directors of a RE, but the regulatory framework is a 
different standard and not as comprehensive as its equivalent for an APRA supervised RSE. This 
complexity and inevitable uncertainty applies also to the regulators, whose officers need up-skilling 
to identify the investment trail through different structures, entities, and jurisdictions.  
Murray did not agree with other proposals to return APRA and ASIC to two tier board governance 
models. He did agree that ASIC and APRA are both subject to policies that limit their capacity to 
attract and retain skilled staff from the private sector. Of the three primary regulators, only ASIC is 
subject to the Public Service Act. Both are staffed predominantly by people with legal training. The 
reliance on litigation to resolve complaints in investment markets is likely to lead to unsatisfactory 
and highly selective caseloads, which explains in part the reliance on enforceable undertakings. 
He proposed that ASIC should emulate APRA and move to funding from industry levies, now 
enacted. This is consistent with the original but incomplete Wallis recommendations which in the 
event were only applied to APRA. Industry commentary is generally supportive of the outcomes 
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based approach adopted. Murray notes that confidence and trust cannot be prescribed in legislation. 
Neither can a disclosure based regime be relied upon in isolation. But his responses are mainly tactical 
with more accretive statutory change. His underlying theme is establishing and maintaining a healthy 
industry culture supported by well-staffed and funded regulators. He did not say how. That was left 
to Heydon. 
5.3 Revealing an Achilles Heel? ‘An unhealthy culture’336 
Australia is regularly reported to now have the fourth largest pool of superannuation savings in the 
world. There is an inevitable nexus between the world’s fourth largest pool of superannuation savings 
and its vulnerability to malfeasance. Aggregate superannuation assets were AUD2.504 trillion on 30 
June 2017.337 These assets are held approximately 25% each by industry, excluded public sector, 
retail, and small (SMSF) funds. APRA regulated funds of four or more members account for 
AUD1.62 trillion of assets. Control is highly concentrated across 138 RSEs managing 209 funds 
controlled by 1034 directors of those corporate trustees.338 These entities generate some AUD9.4 
billion annually in funds management fees. 20 funds control 90% of these funds.339 Superannuation 
default funds (112 MySuper products) account for 23.75% of aggregate superannuation assets or 
36.8% of APRA regulated entities. These are heavily skewed with industry funds holding 64.4% of 
their total assets in default funds,340 a larger proportion than other superannuation entities. Aggregate 
superannuation assets are approximately equal by some measures to the assets held by the Australian 
banking system.341 Approximately 23.4% of APRA regulated superannuation (AUD0.379 trillion) is 
invested in Australian listed equities.342  
Concentration of control in retail and industry funds, a limited pool of trustee directors, combined 
with substantial fee generation and ability to transfer RSE and AFS licenced entities by contract 
presents significant systemic risk. The interface between Australia’s industrial system (which governs 
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industry superannuation) and its superannuation savings system is therefore of national significance. 
As Murray and Heydon note, this interface is largely unexplored territory.  
The influence of Registered Organisations in the investment economy is driven by compulsory 
superannuation outsourced to the private sector. It is a recent phenomenon. This influence has not 
attracted the regulatory attention it deserves: until Heydon:343 
the existing criminal laws do not appear to operate as much of a deterrent to employers giving and 
union officials taking bribes, secret commissions and other lawful payments … History appears to be 
repeating itself …344 It is a recurring problem…. it is insidious. It is immensely damaging … 
longstanding … clandestine …345  
Heydon identified unhealthy culture facilitating corrupting benefits of various forms as related party 
transactions as cultural problems ‘antithetical to the rule of law ... if unchecked, the culture comes to 
taint and impact the wider society’.346 There are ‘significant issues about the scope and effectiveness 
of existing law concerning the duties of union officers … existing law appears to have done nothing 
to prevent the apparent egregarious misappropriations of … assets’.347 Utterly derisory … manifestly 
inadequate…’348 Systemic failure of regulation to prevent improper conduct by officers of registered 
organisations: members of the public and the organisations concerned surely would agree ― how can 
this be?  
Recent examples of financial misconduct within registered organisations have demonstrated that the 
existing regulatory framework is not sufficient to provide members of registered organisations with 
confidence that the management of registered organisations is accountable and transparent and that 
their membership contributions are being used for proper purposes.349  
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‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants …’350 
5.4 Registered Organisations 
A registered organisation is an organisation registered under the Fair Work Act.351 The relationship 
between a registered organisation and its officers is one of dependence. Trade unions and employer 
groups are registered organisations. Some have established funds for various objectives. Officers of 
registered organisations are fiduciaries owing their duty to the registered organisation rather than to 
its individual members. This is similar to previous law in respect of trustee directors of 
superannuation funds corporate trustees and present law in respect of directors of the RE of a MIS. 
Various duties are also imposed upon the officers of a registered organisation by the Fair Work Act.352 
It does not impose a series of general obligations owed by officers in the performance of their duties 
and in the exercise of their powers. The statutory duties only apply to financial management353 and 
compliance with certain orders and directions.354 ‘Financial management’ is not defined in the Fair 
Work Act. This is not the same governance standard applying to directors under the Corporations 
Act.355 Neither is the duty to act in good faith: the Fair Work Act (amended 2016) required an officer 
to act ‘in what he or she believes to be’ the best interests of the organisation, a lesser obligation than 
that in the Corporations Act.356 Despite their systemic importance, directors and officers of registered 
organisations emanate from a different tradition with lesser legal standards. That they also direct and 
manage superannuation entities and MIS with higher and different standards may not be recognised.  
Registered organisations represent approximately 1.9 million trade union members. There are 112 
registered organisations (109 in December 2015),357 of which 67 are ‘employee’ organisations, 49% 
of which control net assets of between AUD5.0 and AUD50.00 million.358 Registered organisations 
are ‘most likely to be small employer organisations or large employee organisations’359 (90% by type 
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with c 1.9 million members) being a significant imbalance in membership numbers. Some employee 
organisations have commercial size and complexity including companies and trusts, related parties, 
and operate in multiple jurisdictions. These data are estimates, tempered by ‘a high prevalence of 
failure to lodge reports, later reports, and inconsistency in reporting periods’.360 
Their officers ‘occupy a position of considerable trust. They are in charge of substantial sums of 
money which is not their own’.361 This trust may have been misplaced:  
the Commission have identified or exposed serious failures in the governance and financial 
management of a number of unions. Among other things …362 misappropriation; failures by 
committees of management to oversee; or to scrutinise union finances, either properly or at all; lack 
of internal accounting and audit; failure of external accounting and audit; lack of, or unawareness 
about, union policies dealing with financial matters; and misuse of credit cards, and ‘those in charge 
of the union treated the union’s money as if it were their own.363  
State statutes impose duties on officials of registered organisations which bear similarity to those 
statutory duties imposed on company directors by the Corporations Act.364 A registered organisation 
is a body corporate, a legal entity. This dual regulation of registered organisations varies between 
jurisdictions and opens the way for this ‘unhealthy culture’ to develop in those with lesser regulatory 
standards. In Queensland, there is a statutory obligation to have rules governing financial 
expenditures,365 which is not mirrored in other states or by the Commonwealth, a situation proposed 
to be rectified.366 This statutory obligation is to extend to financial disclosures, internal compliance, 
internal audit and compliance with separation of powers between the financial compliance officer and 
the Secretary, external audit requiring fit and proper assessment similar to company auditors, record 
keeping including minutes, and financial records. 
There has been debate as to whether the officers of a registered organisation are subject to the 
Corporations Act.367 Not unless the officers of the registered organisation conduct, proposes to 
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conduct, or make a decision to refrain from conducting business outside of Australia.368 The 
increasing scope and scale of commercial operations, including superannuation decisions, is likely to 
expose those officers accordingly, including criminal liability,369 to which they are not exposed to 
under the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act. Hence, the transfer of ‘unhealthy culture’ into 
entities differently regulated and supervised becomes a matter of diffusion without the relevant 
officers necessarily understanding the difference, and without other directors of those entities 
comprehending these traditional distinctions. This is extremely dangerous and compromises ‘fit and 
proper’ requirements of directors and trustees of those entities. 
Present Commonwealth statutory duties, whilst reflecting Corporations Act provisions are 
constrained by significant limitations which have allowed malfeasance develop. These include 
Commonwealth (not State) statutory responsibility limited to financial management (undefined);370 
the good faith duty defined as ‘in what they believe to be the best interests of the organisation’;371 
civil penalties only; no disclosure requirement or voting prohibition of related party and personal 
interests although the organisation itself is required to have such rules. ‘The obvious implication is 
that breaches of duty by officers in relation to matters other than those ‘in relation to financial 
management’ are unimportant’.372 ‘It seems peculiar that union officer’s statutory duty to the union 
should not extend to conduct that has an adverse financial effect on the union’.373 There are plenty of 
examples. Similarly, subjective qualification of the best interest duty is not comparable with the 
Corporations Act374 and an officer could only breach that duty ‘if that officer did not subjectively 
believe (now statutorily remedied) that what he or she was doing was in the best interests of the 
organisation’.375 The Corporations Act contained a similar phraseology until 1998,376 the intent being 
an objective standard, albeit with subjective elements.377 ‘It must be a view which a person in the 
same position as the officer, having the same knowledge and skills, could reasonably have formed’.378 
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Heydon opines that funds established by registered organisations ‘pose significant governance 
issues’.379 Those same officers may operate funds established by the organisation: 
often these funds have no adequate record keeping, management decisions are made informally or 
without due process, directors or shareholders meetings are not held, but if they are minutes are not 
kept, records are often maintained in a haphazard fashion, and transactions are often effected by 
cash.380  
This contrasts markedly with the obligations of directors of companies, REs of MIS, and 
superannuation trustee directors. These standards are higher particularly in respect of disclosure, 
conflicts of interest and related party transactions. They derive from the Corporations Act (including 
financial services provisions), Trustee Act(s), SIS Act, State industrial relations statutes, and general 
law principles. Some registered organisations are associated with REs and RSEs to which they 
appoint directors. The tradition of their lesser standards influences the governance of these entities 
and could in the future lead to the ability of superannuation entities to influence the governance of 
listed public companies through asset allocation decisions.381 Associated entities also include 
insurance and worker’s entitlement funds. ‘They provided only the most basic of information about 
related party transactions. Often the relationships between a union and trusts controlled by the union 
were not disclosed at all’.382 Whilst there is a requirement to comply with the Australian Accounting 
Standards, breach of this rule ‘has no financial consequences’.383 The commissioner expresses unease 
about the closeness of such arrangements especially where there is no choice of fund,384 proposing to 
amend s 32C(6) of the Superannuation Guarantee Act385 by deleting paras (d) and (h).  
Statutory386 and fiduciary duties are imposed on officers of registered organisations. Heydon did not 
explicitly deal with Barnes v Addy liability of fiduciaries, but does reflect on the importance of the 
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fiduciary tradition. He does document instances of the first limb transfer of trust property by 
fiduciaries with knowing assistance required for Baden second limb liability. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, ‘there are clear and convincing arguments in favour of maintaining 
statutory duties upon trade union officers backed by appropriate sanctions that can be requested by 
an independent regulator’.387 Registered organisations are bodies corporate with separate legal 
entities having officers and directors ‘in charge of other people’s money, with all the responsibilities 
and temptations that arise … both are fiduciaries’.388 However there are significant differences in that 
company shareholders have an economic interest where members of registered organisations usually 
do not have that direct economic interest. They do have an indirect economic interest through industry 
superannuation, direct investment, insurance and the management of workers’ entitlement funds. An 
analogy is the use of trusts for MIS, many of which are large complex commercial enterprises. 
Notably, there are many companies subject to the Corporations Act which are not-for-profit or 
charitable purposes. 
5.4.1 Disclosure 
Disclosure is at the heart of the Wallis principles governing collective investment schemes. 
Registered organisations have not been subject to the same disclosure requirements, merely being 
required to themselves have rules requiring disclosure of personal interests to the organisation and 
the members of it.389 Union officers can be indemnified by their union, and thus face no personal 
deterrent or consequences, fines being paid by the union members. However, the enforcement power 
‘requiring an individual to do anything is limited … [and] substantially undermines the effectiveness 
of the disclosure requirements’.390 Similarly, recusal from decision making where there are or may 
be conflicts of interest should be aligned with those for company directors.391 
5.4.2 Members’ powers 
Members have very limited powers to compensation for breach of duty in an environment of 
‘bullying, intimidation, and victimisation of those opposed to the interests of the union Secretary’.392 
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Alignment of member powers with company shareholder powers is proposed.393 Relevantly, there is 
‘no prescribed consequence for a person who continues in an office after disqualification’,394 whereas 
a company director would commit a criminal offence. Officers of registered organisations ‘who have 
committed significant criminal offences can still continue to hold office.’395 This also holds for those 
who have committed Fair Work civil offences. Substantive reform including a consistent ‘fit and 
proper’ requirement is required for better governance of registered organisations and to prevent the 
infection of other entities associated with them and their officers by this ‘unhealthy culture’. For 
members of a registered organisation, there is no provision for a member to take a statutory derivative 
action on behalf of that organisation. Any member who seeks a rectification of malfeasance within 
the organisation is statute barred from obtaining compensation.396 
5.4.3 Penalties 
Heydon proposed aligning civil penalty regimes by amending the Corporations Act to remove the 
fixed upper penalty limit measured in dollars397 and to impose criminal liability aligning the Fair 
Work (Registered Organisations) Act with it.398 Penalties enured by the insertion of a ‘corrupting 
benefit’ Commonwealth statutory criminal provision for givers and recipients,399 thus ensuring a 
‘uniform, clear and relatively simple regime applying throughout Australia.’400 
It is presently lawful for collective agreements and enterprise agreements to continue to contain terms 
which do not allow for choice of fund by the member, despite the compulsory nature of the 
superannuation fund contribution.401 Heydon recommends that these be deleted from the 
Superannuation Guarantee Act.  
A single Registered Organisations Commission (ROC), separate from ASIC, was established at the 
fourth attempt in December 2016.402 The ROC has similar powers to ASIC with ‘information 
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gathering, investigatory and enforcement powers’,403 and the power to accept enforceable 
undertakings.  
5.5 The diffusion of unhealthy culture 
The unhealthy culture identified by Heydon can be improved.404 But the training of registered 
organisation officers had limited and unenforceable statutory obligations.405 Repeal and replacement 
by a statutory provision requires ‘all members of the committee of management of an organisation or 
branch, and all officers whose duties relate the financial management of the organisation or branch, 
to undertake approved training’.406 This includes employees with financial responsibilities to also 
undertake approved training. Cultural change through education should not be restricted to those 
responsible for registered organisations. Lack of skills, knowledge, and adherence to general law 
fiduciary principles is problematic throughout NBFE governance.  
Examples of the diffusion of unhealthy culture can be found in the industry superannuation and 
registered MIS sectors involving related party registered organisations. For example, Cbus is a 
superannuation trust, part of a group of NBFEs managing some AUD32 billion of FUM (some 
categorised as Default Funds) with United Super Pty Ltd as trustee and Superpartners Pty Ltd as 
administrator. The directors of the trustee were comprised of employer and employee (three from the 
CFMEU) representatives with one independent director. Loss of default provider status with the 
CFMEU would amount to loss of 15% to 20% of revenue,407 the retention of which required the 
recruitment by Cbus of a former CFMEU as liaison officer with power to influence the identity and 
terms of building contracts funded by Cbus: 
the culture within Cbus is such that, even at the most senior of levels, staff are not willing or able to 
acknowledge (let alone address) the difficult and complex issues and conflicts of interest that arise as 
a result of the powerful position that the CFMEU holds vis-à-vis Cbus.408 
This culture resulted in the release of confidential information by the trustee to CFMEU officials 
potentially contravening the trust deed, Cbus privacy policy, contracts with employees, Privacy 
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Act,409 and the Corporations Act.410 It breached the sole purpose test arising from the financing of 
industrial litigation using members funds. Behavioural standards of related parties at the heart of 
governance of Cbus resulted in unlawful transfer of trust property, being confidential information. 
But that law abiding tendency may be less marked when the CEO of a business running a large 
superannuation fund heavily dependent on the goodwill of trade union officials to ensure a flow of 
contributions is rung up by a forceful and very senior CFMEU official with what the official views as 
a pressing request.411 
Workers Entitlement Funds are established, normally as joint ventures, to provide for employee 
entitlements, particularly in the construction industry. Aggregate FUM is reported to be 
approximately A$2.0 billion.412 WEFs are registered MIS, but are exempted from Part 5C of the 
Corporations Act.413 Most have a corporate trustee with its directors nominated by the joint venture 
partners, primarily from registered employer and employee organisations. There is ‘very little specific 
legislation regulating their activities’,414 and has led in some instances to the ‘substantial forfeiture of 
entitlements’.415 
Direct forfeiture risk and other risk of loss through grant payments to related parties is attributable 
directly to the Class Order exemption hitherto provided annually by ASIC which exempts these funds 
from normal mandatory disclosure requirements to MIS members. This class order is an example of 
statutory complexity producing a ‘double edged sword … alleviat[ing] the burden of compl[iance] 
where those requirements are not beneficial’,416 It explains how legal complexity, abetted by noble 
regulatory intention facilitates malfeasance. Mechanisms include: commissions and payments to joint 
venture partners; fees and charges; entitlement to payments from the fund; equal treatment of fund 
members by class; distribution of fund income as capital to joint venture partners rather than 
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members; entitlements if any paid in nominal dollars without the benefit of earnings generation and 
reinvestment, and costs arising from conflicts of interest and resulting breaches of fiduciary duty.417 
Direct net forfeiture and grant payments to related parties in the case of Incolink418 over the period 
2011–2015 amounted to AUD132.5 million representing approximately 19.24% of the nominal 
capital of the aggregate funds under management in 2015. This capital foregone, in a registered MIS, 
should have been deployed solely for the benefit of the MIS members. Other methods of tunnelling 
or abuse of related party transactions is to be found in the payment of directors’ fees to registered 
organisations rather than the director personally. Seventy per cent of these fees were made to a select 
group of trades unions.419 
Unhealthy cultures are not restricted to these examples. Financial advisers were previously only 
required to be RG146 competent,420 a standard not requiring a tertiary qualification, industry 
experience or professional accreditation. These educational standards have been a considerable 
source of concern and only since 2007 have advisers have been required to hold professional 
indemnity insurance. Historically, accreditation standards have been of poor quality, poorly 
supervised, corrupted by cheating and plagiarism, and diminished by unacceptable cultural and 
ethical standards with tragic results for clients. Bizarrely in Australia, an investors’ accountant is not 
able to provide financial advice to their client unless they are RG146 accredited, a much lesser 
qualification than their tertiary and professional accounting counterparts.  
From 2014, partly in response to public pressure generated by systemic failure at Commonwealth 
Financial Planning and Macquarie Bank, enforceable undertakings by them to ASIC and subsequent 
public policy responses industry participants began improvements to adviser and planner educational 
standards. AMP, BT Financial (Westpac), MLC (National Australia Bank), and Commonwealth 
Financial Planning commenced the process of catching up with community expectations, a process 
which continues in 2018. From 2019, educational standards will include Certified Financial Planner, 
Chartered Financial Practitioner or Masters in Financial Planning accreditations. These will have 
varying standards and varying implementation dates and provide the opportunity for candidates to 
treaty shop for the easiest and quickest route, as they presently do to become authorised 
representatives.  
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5.6 The legislative response: Twin Peaks to Triple Peaks 
Heydon sought to excise unhealthy culture. Cooper provided insight. Parliament has yet to debate its 
underlying causes. If it does, then it must confront the distinction between fiduciary and non-fiduciary 
duties and recognise the power of fiduciary law. Confused parliamentary leadership has facilitated 
corruption of the regulatory system.’[I]t is important [to] preserve fiduciary law … at least until a 
basis for expanding fiduciary law so that it incorporates prescriptive obligations is articulated 
rationally and accepted’.421 The UK and Canada have had such a debate. Canada has implemented it. 
Australia has not: 
member and community expectations regarding conduct of officers are high and dictate that they must 
act in the best interest of their membership at all times and conduct their business in a transparent 
manner … some registered organisations do not meet their obligations.422  
The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act and Superannuation Legislation (Trustee 
Governance Bill) seek to align the governance of registered organisations with companies and clarify 
their interface with APRA supervised superannuation funds. Australia’s regulatory system evolves to 
a ‘Triple Peaks’ model.  
The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Bills423 sought to amend existing 
legislation424 and remedy systemic deficiencies identified by Heydon. Limited reform was enacted in 
December 2016.425 It provided for an independent Registered Organisations Commissioner having 
powers modelled on the ASIC Act.426 The intent is to ‘create a stronger regulator and a real deterrence 
for non-compliance’427 which is stand-alone and independent, able to manage the imbalances in 
power and influence. Increased civil penalties and the introduction of criminal penalties ‘broadly 
mirror those that apply to companies and their directors’.428 
                                                                  
421 Matthew Harding, ‘Two fiduciary fallacies’ (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 1, 25. 
422 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Senate, Parliament of Australia, Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Amendment Bill 2014 (viii). 
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Organisations) Amendment Bill 2014 [No 2] (Cth). 
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426 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
427 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Senate, Parliament of Australia, Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Amendment Bill 2014 (xiv).  
428 Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Bill 2014 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Senate, 
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It did not fully address or implement the deficiencies identified by Heydon. Directors and officers of 
registered organisations continue to have differing duties to those of company and superannuation 
trustee directors. Alignment of registered organisations with companies did proceed in respect of 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, auditor appointments, penalties for statutory breaches, and a 
requirement for officers to undertake financial training. Importantly, significant whistleblower 
protections429 were added for the first time. The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment 
Act did not tackle the systemic problem of the same persons in multifunction NBFEs having to collate 
their duties from and align their behavioural standards with different and differing sources of law 
governing companies and superannuation trusts. 
APRA’s powers to intervene in governance related concerns are limited to ‘only after the RSE 
licensee has contravened the law’.430 The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee 
Governance) Bill431 would provide APRA with ex ante power to direct governance arrangements for 
a superannuation entity.432 It seeks alignment of ‘governance in superannuation more closely with the 
corporate governance principles applicable to ASX listed companies’.433 Cooper434 suggested 
‘governance principles that apply to ASX listed companies formed a good starting point…’435 ASX 
requires the benchmarking of corporate governance against criteria formulated by its Corporate 
Governance Council.436 The Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Governance) Bill, 
Cooper and Murray437 each favour reform of the SIS Act438 to eliminate the equal representation model 
of employee and employer sponsored trustee boards. Consistent governance standards with other 
prudentially regulated entities, (banks and insurers) and other jurisdictions would result. Murray’s 
preferred majority of ‘independent’ directors now evolved to at least one third ‘independent’ directors 
and an ‘independent chair. Cooper and Murray identified the need for financial expertise and 
professionalism of trustee board members over the present ‘equal representation’ selection method, 
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430 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 29EB. 
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free of the type of conflicts that may cause them (either intentionally or unintentionally) [to] serve the 
interests of the [employer and employee] sponsors, a related party or a subset of members, rather than 
the fund’s entire membership.439  
‘It is more important for directors to be independent, skilled, and accountable than representative’.440 
Empirical research supports this view: 
trustees lack experience, training or suitable knowledge, creating the potential for not fully 
understanding advice that they receive from outside experts.441 … Trustees decisions are important in 
how funds operate and their consequent performance442 … trustee boards exercise better governance 
practices than sponsoring firm boards [of corporate superannuation funds] in terms of transparency 
and disclosure.443 
Uncertainty arises from differing and vague definitions: independent is sought to be defined444 as 
‘independent of ownership relating to the RSE licensee and relationships that a RSE licensee might 
have, with APRA having the power to arbiter “independent”’.445 A person would not be ‘independent’ 
if: there is a direct or indirect interest of 5% or more in the ownership of the RSE; has been an 
executive officer; has had a business relationship; or has been a director or executive officer of a large 
employer related to the fund.446 This restricts the pool of competent people from which to draw trustee 
board appointments where there is ‘a serious problem in the culture of boards of Australia: the tiny 
gene pool from which directors are recruited’.447 These issues of independence are not resolved, open 
to manipulation, and reflect practical difficulties of providing for all possible situations in statute. 
Similarly, there is confusion as to the meaning of ‘best interests of the beneficiaries’.448 
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5.7 A ‘Bitter Harvest’:449 The scale of failure of Australian agribusiness MIS 
Cooper inspired reform of superannuation entities has not been matched in MIS: ‘[m]arket failure on 
such a scale that regulatory intervention is needed to remedy the shortcomings’:450  
in Australia, where the law has badly lagged behind commerce, and the use of the trust as a surrogate 
company has become entrenched … paradigm shifting reform [CAMAC’s SLE proposal] … might be 
regarded as revolutionary rather than evolutionary and would inevitably spark ideological objection 
and lengthy debates. It would be exposed to the vicissitudes of the legislative and political process … 
a battleground on which various stakeholder and interest groups…campaign to influence the process 
in their favour.451 
Hindsight is insightful: agribusiness MIS have been extensively reviewed and analysed.452 Leverage 
(sometimes double or triple leverage) compounded by full recourse loans, poor financial advice, 
breaches of general law fiduciary duty, failures in disclosure (real and imagined),453 mismatch of 
investor literacy with the financial products disclosure, perceptions of government endorsement 
(ATO financial product rulings), ethics and integrity deficiencies in financial advice, financial 
product selling, and research house expert reports provided to vulnerable retail investors are recurring 
themes. ‘Australia’s financial services regulatory regime, with its focus on disclosure, has not served 
Australian investors well and has not provided a reasonable level of consumer protection’.454 Investor 
vulnerability to predatory lending included lending to finance recurring MIS management fees, often 
from related parties of the RE, compounding the original debt. These loans are exempt from the 
responsible lending provisions of the NCCP.455 Falsified or unsigned documents with power of 
attorney to the RE456 continued despite warnings from the ASIC.457 
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Deficiencies in financial literacy lead directly to reliance on others, including financial advisers. 
Despite the FoFA reforms, there is no statutory fiduciary duty to clients imposed on financial advisers 
as originally proposed by Lindgren in 2010.458 The FPA (in respect of Trio) believe, 
few of the FoFA regulatory enhancements will have any impact on the prevention of future events … 
they have missed the opportunity to engage in a reform debate that would deliver transparent markets 
and product safety that would benefit all Australians, ultimately failing to deliver the effective 
consumer protection reform that FoFA promised,459 
arguing FoFA would only assist two of the 17 problems identified: conflicted remuneration and ASIC 
enhanced powers to award and terminate AFSLs.460 FPA supported the extension of the statutory best 
interest duty to product manufacturers, fund managers, research houses, and all AFSL holders. This 
is consistent, 461 but lesser duty than UK reform proposals to quality assure the investment chain by 
categorising all participants as fiduciaries. 
Investor reliance on trust in and liking for their adviser in a regulatory environment of prioritisation 
over prohibition is dangerous if the adviser is not a fiduciary. Lack of prohibition allows for the return 
of incentive based fee structures with informed consent. ‘The Committee cannot put a figure on the 
number of people who have suffered because of the inappropriate product promotion of MIS and the 
accompanying poor financial advice’.462  
Confusion of what investors own or have rights to is rife, particularly in common enterprise MIS. 
Despite have an RE (being a trustee), general law trust principles in these MIS are subsumed by a 
complex series of contracts, sometimes with the RE having a power of attorney over the investor’s 
contractual interest. Investor capital is aggregated into RE working capital, not used discretely. In 
many cases involving REs with multiple MIS, subscribed capital is intermingled, assisting marketing 
to future investors. Profits have been brought forward into earlier years inflating that reported 
accounting result. Later investors support the MIS of earlier investors: ‘a Ponzi outcome of collapse 
is likely’,463 the result being that these MIS collapsed when new capital subscriptions failed to 
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eventuate and where the RE was not sufficiently capitalised to continue to operate the MIS. ‘Such 
managed investment schemes should not be mistaken for real businesses’.464 
Wallis’ third principle: financial literacy has ‘got to get aggressive,465 becoming a ‘standing item on 
the COAG agenda’.466 Financial literacy is not restricted to strict notions of competency in various 
techniques of financial analysis: it should also mean thorough microeconomic business planning, its 
commercial robustness, and the suitability of that outcome to types of investors. In Australia, this is 
consistently missing as a disclosure standard. ‘At the basic, fundamental economic level, paying three 
or four times the value of productive farmland to plant a commodity crop on should send warning 
bells…’467 ‘MIS generated investment was not based on sound long term strategic investment 
planning but primarily motivated by tax incentives, which caused significant distortions within the 
markets in which they operated’.468 
ASIC does not have its previous financial product intervention powers, despite these being 
recommended by Murray.469 Reinstatement requires ASIC to have additional professional 
competencies to enable it to give effect to the statutory intent of disclosure.470 None of the more recent 
disclosure benchmarks require detailed business planning in financial product offer documents issued 
by financial product manufacturers. Whilst ASIC has moved in this direction,471 adoption of IOSCO 
principles in Australian regulation would further its implementation,472 and reduce foreign investor 
perceived risk of Australian collective investments.  
5.8 Mind the Gap: How can this be? 
A reasonable question for the investing public. Is ASIC Fit for the Future?473 ASIC performs 
adequately administratively, but is weak strategically. This conclusion stems from analysis of five 
themes: governance, expectations gaps, internal focus, reactive culture, and ‘future proofing’. The 
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expectations gap is ‘much greater than expected’…474 external stakeholders are not fully aware of the 
limits of what ASIC can and should do. This is demonstrated in the tendency for public reaction and 
criticism against ASIC where there is market failure or losses … and warrants immediate attention to 
improve clarity over ASIC’s mandate.475  
Expectations gaps are measured quantitatively and reported as the percentage variance between 
ASIC’s own expectations and those of an external stakeholder sample. It does not measure the 
variance between stakeholder expectation of ASIC and stakeholder views of ASIC practice. Nor does 
it comment on the absolute data: these give rise to significant concerns as to the efficacy of ASIC. 
These omissions are unfortunate since of the 25 measures of alignment/misalignment, only three are 
reported as having more than a 50% expectation of positive performance. These are market 
transparency, reliable company financial records and reasonableness of licensing costs (now 
reformed). In the reported measures, the greatest misalignment between ASIC’s view of itself and its 
stakeholders views are: proactivity in identifying risk, strategic thinking, responsiveness to emerging 
risks, use of resources, leadership capacities, and the compliance burden, the latter being supported 
by qualitative research. 
The expectations measurement of financial literacy results in an alignment of ASIC and stakeholder 
views (external stakeholders 21%, ASIC 18%, variance -3%) with the review concluding that ASIC 
does lead international best practice in advancing broad consumer financial literacy,476… while the 
overall financial literacy strategy is comprehensive and world best.477  
This conclusion needs to be challenged. The absolute data (rather than the variance data) demonstrate 
that there is an acknowledged problem with financial literacy in Australia. Education and guidance 
are the least intrusive and most cost effective tools available to ASIC.478 Misinterpretation of ASIC’s 
role also leads to expectations gaps in the award of AFSLs, the meaning of MIS PDS registration, 
expectations of fit and proper, and enforcement actions. 
ASIC’s mandate is to ‘promote the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers 
in the financial system …’479 It has not achieved this outcome. Reform is imperative commencing 
with a redefined charter and amendment of the ASIC Act. Governance reform to a two tier board 
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structure is proposed and consistent with Uhrig,480 since rejected by ASIC. Governance reform is 
generated by the breadth of ASIC’s mandate and its reactive, issue based posture, ‘not fully replicated 
by any other conduct regulator globally’,481 or by APRA and ROC.  
There is evidence that government lacks insight into ASIC’s need for governance and culture 
reform.482 It is not clear that ‘underfunding’ has been a problem,483 but there are dissenting views.484 
Revenue has been reformed, but governance, financial allocations and human resources must follow 
function. That has not been achieved. Behavioural economics research casts substantial doubt on new 
ASIC funding proposals. These are likely to prove costly to its clients and not address the underlying 
systemic problem. ‘[S]uch regimes increase governance costs without reducing the residual 
governance problems.’485  
5.9 Community expectation ― Responsive Regulation 
Cooper and Heydon provide the insight: fiduciary duty as the antidote to unhealthy culture, deficiently 
codified in superannuation supervision; in other entities, subsumed by complex and incomplete 
statutes. Diffusion of regulatory tools must reflect this reality and address the huge disparity in the 
number of entities for which ASIC, APRA, and the ROC are the responsible regulators. 
Community expectation that ASIC can police every commercial transaction is unaffordable, 
undesirable and unachievable. ASIC’s responsibilities include inter alia more than 2.1 million 
companies, 490 REs, 861 custodians, more than 2000 trustee entities, more than 5000 financial advice 
entities with 24 323 advisers.486 This mandate is proposed to be extended.487 It is ‘not feasible to 
contract [ex ante] for every contingency’.488 The Corporations Act attempts to achieve that to the 
frustration of the judiciary as Chapter 4 illustrates. Chapter 3 provides the empirical basis for ASIC’s 
future enforcement priorities.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EVIDENCE, CAUSE AND EFFECT 1981-2018 
An holistic empirical analysis 
Many reform areas have lagged for … a lack of a specific enough analytical framework and 
appropriate data with which to evaluate the possible costs and benefits of various regulations and their 
interactions, making reform steps consequently unclear; and a lack of practical methods of 
implementation…1  
This chapter provides that analytical framework. It provides insightful data in several dimensions 
which are indicators and tools to predict ex ante investment legal risk, hitherto ex post. This 
framework identifies previously unknown factors and the basis for strategic and tactical reform. 
3.1 Non-Bank Financial Entities (NBFEs) 
This empirical analysis quantifies the financial losses incurred by investors in the Australian NBFE 
sector through the period described in Chapter 2. Loss is defined as complete or partial loss of funds, 
impairment, or risk of complete or partial loss. Dates of these failures are estimated from the date of 
administrator or provisional liquidator appointments or the date of the first court judgment (including 
directions hearings). Malfeasance may have commenced at earlier dates but remained undiscovered 
or unreported. The sample includes failed NBFEs from 1981 to 2018, but excludes those frozen as a 
result of the GFC in 2008/9 and subsequently unfrozen.  
The categories of NBFE in the sample include: financial products and financial services 
conglomerates; investment banks, government rescued entities; insurance entities; hedge funds; 
Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) and debenture trusts (real estate); MIS (forestry and 
agribusiness); companies with similar agribusiness models to MIS; MIS (infrastructure); securities 
brokers and securities leveraged lending; securities trading platforms; wealth, financial planning and 
funds management firms and workers entitlement funds (being exempt MIS). NBFEs in the 
Australian superannuation industry include industry funds, retail funds, corporate funds, and SMSFs. 
There is a small (by number) government superannuation sector.2 
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3.2 Methodology 
‘[I]n Australia, comprehensive case data regarding filed cases or settled cases are not available’.3 A 
review of published senior court judgments4 of NBFE cases (n=320, of which 199 have authoritative 
primary empirical data) 1981-2018 (a 38 year investment period) forms the basis of this analysis. 
Many cases involved multiple proceedings. There is no comprehensive electronic search system 
which captures the reasons for these senior court judgments and reliance on case catchwords can be 
misleading. A reading of the judgments is required. These hand-collected data from the content of 
the judgments are supplemented by data sourced from other authoritative sources including Royal 
Commissions, Parliamentary Inquiries, ASIC and APRA documents, liquidators’ reports, and 
selected third party publications. Magistrates, District and County Court judgments are mostly 
excluded from the sample. Many of these are professionally unreported. The sample excludes 
unreported private ex-curial proceedings but does include cases where enforceable undertakings are 
an outcome of civil proceedings. Cases are grouped where related parties appear in similar judgments, 
but separated where a related party entity is involved in proceedings involving different issues of law 
or a different business type. For instance, a RE of one or more operational MIS may have a related 
party finance company. These are treated as separate cases, but multiple MIS with the same RE are 
treated as one case. This typology does not diminish the reporting of issues of law in Table 3.22. It 
does reduce the number of discrete incidences (there are many cases with similar multiple incidences 
in the same case), but does not reduce the number of investors or the quantum of their losses. 
There is a lack of consistency in court judgments in the reporting of empirical data. Inference is 
required in some cases. Where there is no reliable primary source, no assumptions have been made. 
Financial press reports are not sources. So it is likely that the data reported below are underestimates 
of the true position. Nonetheless, empirical and legal trends are clear. Care has been taken to avoid 
double counting of empirical data, for instance where a replacement RE becomes trustee for a MIS. 
The analysis identifies the primary legal issues addressed in the judgments, their legal effect, 
estimated number of investors and quantum of their losses and impairment, remediation, entities 
associated with each case, the responsible regulator, date of first reporting, and their legal citation. 
This data is summarised below. There is no other single holistic authoritative source. The primary 
data is in spreadsheet format. Much of the remedial data is publicly unreported, some is confidential. 
                                                                  
3 Jenifer Varzaly, ‘The Enforcement of Directors Duties in Australia: An Empirical Analysis’ (2015) 16 
European Business Organisation Law Review 281, 300. 
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What is reported illustrates a low rate of recovery.5 This is supported by this analysis with an average 
4.24 % recovery or remediation across the sample. There are some exceptions where recovery is 
significantly higher: these merely serve to emphasise the abysmal rates of recovery elsewhere, 
demonstrating that Australia’s ex post regulatory posture does not serve investors well. 
3.3 Summary of empirical data 
The following tables summarise the empirical data by type of NBFE with Tables 3.17 and 3.21 
reporting the aggregate data. The tables include the number of NBFEs in the sample, the number for 
which there is authoritative source data, investor funds lost or at risk of permanent impairment, and 
the number of investors or beneficiaries adversely impacted. In some cases, for example Table 3.2, 
government is the sole shareholder notwithstanding that prior to government control, many thousands 
of investors have been involved. In some superannuation entities (Table 3.13) a consortium is 
reported by its membership numbers, not by the number of investor beneficiaries in the consortium 
funds membership. 
TABLE 3.1 Financial services and financial products conglomerates 
This sample includes vertically integrated multifunction NBFEs. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
16 15 14,731 112,634 
TABLE 3.2 Government rescued financial entities 
During the sample period, government intervention has resulted in control. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
5 5 6,502 7 
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TABLE 3.3 Insurance entities 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
14 6 957 69,292 
TABLE 3.4 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are pools of capital, historically lightly regulated, mobile capital. Large quantities of 
hedge fund capital can rapidly be brought to bear opaquely on specific investment strategies globally. 
The owners of the capital, the investors, are typically the family offices of high net worth individuals, 
family trusts, and investment banks. Over time, they were joined by superannuation funds, retail 
investors, local government, and university endowment funds.  
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
4 3 738 1,745 
TABLE 3.5 Managed Investment and Debenture Schemes: real estate 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
81 56 10,423 291,517 
TABLE 3.6 Managed Investment Schemes: Forestry & Agribusiness 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
33 23 6,826 169,590 
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TABLE 3.7 Investment companies with similar business models 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
6 6 178 2,324 
TABLE 3.8 Managed Investment Schemes: Infrastructure 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
6 2 2,924 850 
TABLE 3.9 Securities broking & leveraged lending 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
9 8 1,105 2,304 
TABLE 3.10 Securities trading platforms 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
18 12 226 5,647 
TABLE 3.11 Wealth Management, Financial Planning, and Funds Management 
This sector is pervasive, often under-skilled, sometimes conflicted, and has seriously impacted the 
financial standing of many of its clients. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
72 43 4,018 423,741 
133 
TABLE 3.12 Retail superannuation funds 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
3 3 372.50 31,076 
TABLE 3.13 Industry superannuation funds 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
19 5 2,918 291,458 
TABLE 3.14 Workers Entitlement Funds (WEFs) 
WEFs are controlled by related party registered organisations, usually structured as exempt MIS. 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
7 2 146 24,730 
TABLE 3.15 Other superannuation entities 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
8 3 105 1,370 
TABLE 3.16 Finance companies 
No. NBFEs in sample No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
16 7 81 487,323 
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Other entities 
Other NBFEs not part of the sample include film schemes, property timeshare schemes, actively 
managed strata title schemes, contributory mortgage schemes, litigation funders, betting schemes, 
aged care and retirement accommodation, and management rights.6 
TABLE 3.17 Aggregate data 
No. NBFEs in sample  No. NBFEs with 
authoritative data 
source 
Funds lost or 
permanently 
impaired (AUD mill) 
No. investors or 
beneficiaries 
impacted 
320 199 52,251 1,915,608 
3.4 Table of Cases  
The individual cases and sources from which empirical data have been sourced are cited in Appendix 
2. 
3.5 A national productivity issue: the law matters  
NBFE investment is largely at the margin, being venture financing not provided by mainstream 
prudentially regulated banks. Whilst superannuation investment is prudentially regulated, interest 
group pressure is publicly applied to trustees to deploy capital in favoured ways, sometimes by related 
parties. Financing at the margin should earn a risk adjusted return. A proxy for the return expected is 
the ASX long term all accumulation index (ie dividends are reinvested). This is the risk adjusted 
return NBFE investors should have expected if capital had been successfully deployed in accordance 
with disclosure documents. That capital has not been successfully deployed in the cases cited. Much 
has been lost in deadweight costs (on investment and insolvency), with the balance lost, earning zero 
or considerably less than forecast. These are direct losses only. They do not account for indirect, 
consequential, and social losses or the increased risk aversion of other investors. Table 3.18 quantifies 
the adverse economic impact. This data is illustrative ― it is not definitive of the complete universe 
of NBFEs. It relies on extraction of empirical data from the unstructured data sets in the sample. 
                                                                  
6 Alan Jessup, Killing Bambi – Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the legal and regulatory 
framework for protection of retail investors investing in collective investment schemes (SJD thesis 
application to University of Sydney, 2012); Alan Jessup, Managed Investment Schemes (Federation Press, 




Hitherto, comparative conclusions have been largely anecdotal and ad hoc. Table 3.18 attempts to 
begin to quantify the social and economic costs of present Australian law. 
TABLE 3.18 Estimated impact of cumulative investor losses on Australian productivity7 
 
The aggregate adverse consequences are equivalent to over 0.46% of 2016–17 nominal Australian 
GDP. This capital should have been generating economic activity each and every year since 
investment up to the date of capital return and subsequent reinvestment. Had the capital been properly 
deployed in accordance with disclosure documents, it implies that the national economy could have 
grown 23.14% faster than it did, driven by entrepreneurial NBFE financing. The essential insight is 
that the cumulative misallocation of capital in aggregate ― the opportunity cost ― causes lower 
economic growth. This is particularly so because NBFE financing is at the margin ― it finances 
projects that would not otherwise occur. 
This has considerable economic costs for Australian business. It is a national productivity issue and 
is a direct result of systemic failures in the Australian regulatory regime. Risk aversion and reluctance 
to invest in NBFEs is a feature of the present investment landscape. Paucity of marginal sources of 
capital for ventures leads directly to capital constraints in the more entrepreneurial parts of the 
economy. It explains the paucity of available collective investment options, the distrust of mandatory 
superannuation and the preference for direct investment into real property, particularly by self-
managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) and discretionary trusts. 
Most investors are in the 25–64 age cohorts (being a 40 year investment period). Losses thus fall 
disproportionately on them. A large proportion of that potential cohort is limited to direct investment 
in compulsory non-SMSF superannuation, home mortgage, rental mortgages, and bank deposits. By 
inference, the investing cohort is smaller than the aggregate suggests. The percentage of investors 
affected in aggregate sets the lower bound which assumes 100% of the aggregate NBFE investing 
                                                                  
7 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Key Economic Indicators (Series 1345.0, 2017). 
GDP computation AUD billion
Accumulated investor losses 52,251                  
All Ords All Accum Index LT return 15% 7,838                    
Nominal Australian GDP 2016–17 1,693,452             
Loss % nominal GDP 0.4628%
Nominal Australian GDP growth 2016–17 2.00%
Loss % nominal GDP growth 23.14%
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cohort actually invests. Hence the proportion suffering adverse impacts is likely to be significantly 
larger than 15.87%.  
Much NBFE investing is through discretionary (family) and SMSF trusts, a lower proportion of 
investors than the aggregate cohort. Many of these operate through custodians or nominees. Many 
will have multiple investments, multiple investment structures, and will have been exposed in more 
than one instance. That is why the data is illustrative, not definitive. A definitive empirical data set 
demands transparency in beneficial ownership. This does not presently exist and cannot necessarily 
be extracted from the judgments. It also demands analytical resources which only the largest 
custodians or ASIC and APRA could have. Indeed, it may be beyond human intervention and, should 
transparency occur, require the use of cognitive, artificially intelligent digital robots to source, 
analyse, and report on the data. This data uses the number of SMSFs and Australian resident trusts as 
a proxy ― it seeks to do nothing more than provide a basis for assessing the macroeconomic and 
social impacts. The essential insight is it provides a methodological framework for when transparency 
of diffuse securities ownership and the application of artificial intelligence in the law allow. 
TABLE 3.19 Percentage of investing population directly affected8 
 
                                                                  
8 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (CIA, 2015) 
<www.indexmundi.com/australia/age_structure.html>; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Statistics 
Annual Superannuation Bulletin (June 2017) 10. 
Investing population analysis
Individuals male female
25–54 4,783,473             4,626,603       
55–64 1,321,246             1,341,329       
6,104,719             5,967,932       
Total possible investing population 12,072,651           
# Investors lost capital 1,915,608             
% of total possible investing population 15.87%
Corporate investors
# SMSF's 596,517                
# SMSF members 1,130,000             
# Discretionary trusts 642,000                
Total corporate investing structures 1,238,517             
Total estimated members 1,772,000             
# Investors lost capital 1,905,608             
% of total possible investing population 107.54%
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If individual discretionary and SMSF trust investors are used as a proxy, the proportion directly 
affected rises to 107.54%. So the range is 15.87% – 107.54%. Some investors use multiple structures 
and some invest personally outside of these structures which accounts for the statistical oddity in the 
upper bound data. The percentage accorded these investing structures is a proxy for the upper bound. 
Reduced propensity for NBFE investment by those not suffering direct losses would further increase 
this proportion. This implies considerable disruption of the NBFE capital markets. The costs of 
disruption have been quantified elsewhere with estimates of economic loss having a multiplier of 18 
times, much of it attributed to ‘unmanaged conflicts of interest’.9 
3.6 Hypothesis testing by qualitative research 
Confidential qualitative research interviews have been conducted with senior professional and 
investment persons (n=28) in each of Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. Each person was questioned 
using open ended technique from a prepared list designed to identify problematic issues requiring 
reform. Table 3.20 summarises the results of those interviews. Responses fell into 51 categories with 
significant geographic variances. Top quartile data are the averages across the three cities. Of the 43 
proposed reform options proferred, only one had significant support (50%), being the imposition of 
inalienable fiduciary duty in the investment chain, support being greatest from Sydney respondents 
(70.59%). This result is significant given Sydney’s prominence in Australian funds management. 
Melbourne respondents (n=5) had unanimous criticism of the prevalence of related party transactions. 
Their responses appear to be influenced by their proximity to the industry superfund sector, of which 
there was excoriating criticism. However, it is small sample size, but supports analysis reported in 
Heydon. 
                                                                  
9 Minouche Shafik, ‘From “ethical drift” to “ethical lift” ― Reversing the tide of misconduct in global 
financial markets’ (Panel Discussion at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Reforming 
Culture and Behaviour in the Financial Services Industry, 20 October 2016) 2. 
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TABLE 3.20 Qualitative research results from Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane 
 
3.8 Systemic causes of failure identified in the empirical legal analysis 
3.8.1 Methodology 
The senior court judgments have been analysed using the terminology in the judgments. That 
terminology is not always consistent. This analysis is summarised in Table 3.22 ‘Issues of Law’, 
ranked by absolute incidence of the issue and expressed as a percentage of the total incidences in the 
sample (917 incidences) from 320 cases. Many cases involve multiple breaches of multiple statutes. 
The primary Corporations Act provisions are cited indicatively to clarify the descriptors, but there 
are often multiple breaches of that statute. Other oft quoted statutes include the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission Act, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Act (formerly Trade Practices Act), and National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act.  
Top Quartile % Sample
Related party transactions 60.71%
Financial regulation in isolation: accretive tinkering: need trust principles 57.14%
Intrusion of 'black' letter law 50.00%
Conflicts of interest - related trustees & investment managers/promoters/advisers 50.00%
Box ticking regulation by ASIC 46.43%
Financial planning not a profession 46.43%
Appearances of probity only: self interest rules 39.29%
Australian financial sector not internationally competitive in structure or fees 35.71%
Ineffective leadership at ASIC/ wrong leadership motivations 35.71%
Smart lawyer manipulation of complex 'black letter' law 32.14%
Financial planners should have unqualified best interest duty to client 32.14%
Boards need more independent minds 32.14%
Adviser financial literacy often flawed 32.14%
Most favoured reform options
All to be subject to fiduciary principles 50.00%
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TABLE 3.21 Summary by category, funds lost/impaired and investors impacted 
 
Commercial issues including mismatch of assets and liabilities and leverage (common in MIS) are 
not included in the analysis but are additional non-legal causes of NBFE failure. In many cases, 
particularly in real estate MIS, financial planning, superannuation and finance companies, large 
numbers of investors are impacted as a result of one incidence. There are comparatively few discrete 
incidences in financial literacy. This does not mean an absence of systemic failure. On the contrary, 
Table 3.22 demonstrates otherwise: it is a function of the number of discrete incidences reported by 
typology in the judgment which determines their empirical impact. Financial literacy cases include 
those involving informed consent and contributory negligence. Arguably, the prevalence of 
lawlessness in unlawful unregistered MIS, egregious behaviour in registered MIS, and unlicensed 
financial services businesses is a financial literacy category since the investing community should be 
knowledgeable enough to identify and avoid such cases. That is not so and the data has not been 
treated so in this analysis.  
Similarly, where one entity the subject of judicial review operates multiple investment schemes (often 
a large number of registered and unregistered schemes), this is reported as one incidence of the issues 
in that judgment. Cases involving the antecedents of the Corporations Act (Corporations Law, State 
Companies Codes), and ASIC (State Corporate Affairs Commissions and Australian Securities 
Commission) are included in the equivalent modern Corporations Act provision. Incidence of 
breaches of fiduciary duty are likely to be understated because many of the entities are not regarded 
as fiduciaries in Australian law and, if they are, have the legal ability to contract out of that 
relationship. 
NBFE category # NBFE's with Funds lost/permanently impaired # beneficiaries/investors impacted
authoritative empirical data AUD million
Financial conglomerates 15 14,731 112,634
Government rescued entities 5 6,502 7
Insurance entities 6 957 69,292
Hedge funds 3 738 1,745
MIS/debenture schemes real estate 56 10,423 291,517
MIS forestry & agribusiness 23 6,826 169,590
Companies similar business model 6 178 2,324
MIS infrastructure 2 2,924 850
Securities broking & leveraged lending 8 1,105 2,304
Securities trading platforms 12 226 5,647
Wealth management/financial planning 43 4,018 423,741
Retail superannuation 3 372 31,076
Industry superannuation 5 2,918 291,458
Workers entitlement funds 2 146 24,730
Other superannuation entities 3 105 1,370
Finance companies 7 81 487,323
TOTAL SAMPLE 199 52,251                                           1,915,608                                       
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TABLE 3.22 Legal matters raised in the judgments 
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Legal matters raised in the judgments # by incidence % cases
Related party transactions CA s 191 76 23.97%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 71 22.40%
Fraud 53 16.72%
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 601FD 51 16.09%
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 47 14.83%
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 45 14.20%
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 45 14.20%
Unregistered unlawful MIS CA s 601ED 43 13.56%
Insolvency of NBFE (Incl RE/trustee) 33 10.41%
Judicial/Court directions 32 10.09%
Failure to properly disclose material matters CA s 191 32 10.09%
Untrue/defective/misleading prospectus/PDS disclosure CA s 728 26 8.20%
Improper financial advice 24 7.57%
Uncommercial/unconscionable transactions 23 7.26%
Breach of trustee &/or RE duties (uncategorised) 22 6.94%
Corporate governance failures/director competence/fit & proper 19 5.99%
Dishonesty/lack of integrity CA s 601FC,FD 18 5.68%
Knowing assistance, receipt, accessorial liability, Barnes v Addy 17 5.36%
Breach of care & diligence duty CA s 180 15 4.73%
Reckless conduct 14 4.42%
No lawful offer document CA s 1012,1013 14 4.42%
Improper/ misleading accounting treatments 13 4.10%
Ponzi scheme CA s 461 13 4.10%
Negligence 12 3.79%
Failure to properly keep books and records 12 3.79%
Breach of auditor duty 11 3.47%
Falsification of documents 11 3.47%
Inability to provide informed consent 11 3.47%
Public interest 10 3.15%
Spurious valuations/no valuations 9 2.84%
Continuous disclosure obligations/ ASX listing rules 9 2.84%
Trust Acts  (NSW, Qld, WA) ss 22, 59-63, 96 8 2.52%
Breach of sole purpose test (superannuation) SIS Act s 62 7 2.21%
Jurisdiction 7 2.21%
Restraint on travel/passport forfeiture CA s 1323 6 1.89%
Rescission/ ab initio 6 1.89%
Lack of fully informed consent 5 1.58%
Constructive trust 5 1.58%
Insider trading, market rigging,  CA s 1043A 5 1.58%
Privilege 4 1.26%
Tortious liability 3 0.95%
Briginshaw standard 3 0.95%
No replacement RE/trustee 3 0.95%
Court appointed investment manager 2 0.63%
Calderbank offers 2 0.63%
Improper custody of assets 2 0.63%
Costs reasonable 2 0.63%
Dividends out of capital 2 0.63%
CA ss 601NF, 1325, 2 0.63%
Inaccurate forecasting disclosure 2 0.63%
Breach of CA s 177 1 0.32%
Breach of CA s 283DA 1 0.32%
Breach of enforceable undertaking 1 0.32%
Unauthorised reduction of capital 1 0.32%
Chose in action 1 0.32%
CA s 674 1 0.32%
Inducement 1 0.32%
CA ss 249D, 249N 1 0.32%
Self dealing 1 0.32%
Related party power of attorney 1 0.32%
Total incidences in 320 cases 917
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3.8.2 Interpretation of data 
This data has then been ranked as top decile and top quartile prevalence of the legal issues identified 
in the judgments. These are the top 10% and 25% issues of law identified in the judgments. For 
example, related party transactions recur in 22.16% of the top 10% of issues of law addressed in the 
judgments.  
TABLE 3.23 Prevalence of issues of law as top decile and top quartiles of sample 
 
The primary issues of law have then been grouped into legal causes of systemic failure. Some of these 
groupings include multiple issues of law, others which are discretely identified are reported as in 
Table 3.22. For example, dishonesty includes direct judicial references to dishonest conduct, but also 
includes judicial references to spurious valuations, lack of integrity, falsification of documents, fraud, 
self-dealing, Ponzi schemes, inducement, insider trading, and knowing assistance. Fiduciary duties 
includes instances of improper use of trust assets, breaches of State Trust Acts, auditor duty, and 
constructive trust. 
Issues of law Top decile prevalence Top quartile prevalence
n =343 incidences n = 623 incidencies
Related party transactions CA s 191 22.16% 12.20%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 20.70% 11.40%
Fraud 15.45% 8.51%
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 601FD 14.87% 8.19%
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 13.70% 7.54%
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 13.12% 7.22%
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 13.12% 7.22%
Unregistered unlawful MIS CA s 601ED 6.90%
Insolvency of NBFE (Incl RE/trustee) 5.30%
Judicial/Court directions 5.14%
Failure to properly disclose material matters CA s 191 5.14%
Untrue/defective/misleading prospectus/PDS disclosure CA s 728 4.17%
Improper financial advice 3.85%
Uncommercial/unconscionable transactions 3.69%
Breach of trustee &/or RE duties (uncategorised) 3.53%
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TABLE 3.24 Incidence of systemic failures in the Australian regulatory system 
 
3.9 Predictive veracity of the empirical data 
There are predictive insights to be derived from the top decile, top quartile, and systemic failures 
tables. Table 3.25 is a correlation analysis where the correlated incidence is greater or equal to 90% 
of the principal variable identified in top decile, top quartile and systemic failure tables.10 These are 
not regression analyses with dependent variables. It reports incidences derived from the judgments 
and correlates those incidences against each of the other variables listed. 199 case analyses is a 
statistically substantial sample. Therefore, it a reasonable hypothesis that this empirical analysis has 
predictive veracity, and by inference, to non-curial cases.  
TABLE 3.25 Correlation analysis of principal variables  
 
                                                                  
10 For full correlation matrices, see below App 2. 
Systemic failures
(by category) # by incidence % incidence
Dishonesty 128 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 122 15.23%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 119 15.23%
Disclosure 108 14.86%
Misleading/deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12Da, ACCA s 52 94 11.74%
Fiduciary duty (statute & general law) 77 9.61%
Financial advice CA ss 780,781,911; Unlicensed/breaches of AFSL 71 8.86%
Unlawful unregistered MIS CA 601ED 43 5.37%
Governance 22 2.75%
Financial literacy 17 2.12%
Total incidences 801
Legal matters raised in the judgments Variable Recurrence % of sample Correlation
Top decile
Related party transactions CA s 191 1 22.16%
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 2 20.70% 93.42%
Top quartile
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Systemic causes - first variable correlation
Dishonesty 1 15.98%
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 95.31%
Disclosure 4 14.86% 92.97%
Systemic causes - second variable correlation
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23%
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180–184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 100.00%
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The correlation matrices point to substantial systemic risk buried deeply in the governance of entities 
in the financial system. Remedying this risk will require substantive law reform to eliminate or 
ameliorate its causes. A starting point is where matrices identify a 90% greater or equal correlation 
between the selected variables. 
Related party transactions and misleading and deceptive conduct are closely correlated (93.42%) ― 
statistical siblings. There are high correlations between incidences of dishonesty, related 
parties/conflicts of interest (95.31%), breaches of directors’ fiduciary and best interest duties 
(95.31%), and failures in disclosure (92.97%). Where there are related parties, there will be conflicts 
of interest with an absolute correlation with breaches of directors’ duties.  
Directors, regulators and investors should focus their attention on any transaction where there are 
related parties. A review of the complete correlation tables identifies other areas of the law requiring 
reform and its enforcement. This data suggest that present law, or its enforcement, is not effective. 
Incidences for which ASIC alone bears market conduct responsibility account for 81.23% of the 
sample. A minority of cases involve superannuation entities. There are relatively few judgments in 
the superannuation sector. Those cited, Commercial Nominees, Trio, Oasis, and some workers 
compensation MIS all involve related party transactions and resulted inter alia in fraud, misleading 
and deceptive conduct, asset impairment and direct consequential losses to superannuation and MIS 
beneficiaries.  
If the predictive qualities of this empirical data are correct, then the publicly reported cases of related 
party transactions in industry superannuation entities need to be thoroughly investigated by APRA, 
in Workers Entitlement Funds by ASIC and the ROC. There are many instances of related party 
transactions, conflicts of interest, questionable adherence to the sole purpose test, and payments made 
of questionable veracity. Such egregious behaviour blights the history of Australian MIS, as Heydon 
and Hayne identified, and have recurred in financial conglomerates, whether NBFEs or otherwise. 
3.10 Cyclical patterns of behaviour 1981-2018 
The evidence suggests that evolution of the regulation and supervision of NBFEs falls into the four 
distinct periods identified in Chapter 2. Many cases have resulted in judicial intervention over many 
years. The dates attributed in Table 3.25 are the first date of intervention by administration or court 
referral, not the subsequent dates of the cases as reported. Table 3.26 illustrates its cyclical nature and 
pinpoints the commencement of each period. New cases also recur within these cycles. The peak in 
1990 is a direct result of the regulatory environment through the 1980s (Deregulation and 
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Entrepreneurship), its weaknesses exposed by the ASX correction of 1987 and the subsequent 
recession in Australia. From 2001 onwards, incidents of litigation increase as a result of a developing 
and more informed investment community and the advent of class actions (Disquiet). Some of these 
are attributable to the introduction of the Managed Investments Act in 1998. It significantly changed 
the nature of Australian collective investment scheme regulation. It facilitated the growth of the 
NBFE sector without providing for proper policy implementation. Regulatory and private litigation 
become prevalent from 2008 onwards as a direct (Reaction) to the manifest systemic failures in 
Australian regulation and supervision. As in 1990, the GFC in 2008/9 exposed those underlying 
failures, and provided cover to those seeking excuses. Subsequent years continue judicial intervention 
as cases are finalised, but do not of themselves provide more than tactical responses to specific legal 
and commercial issues (Statutes). Therefore, without substantive law reform, this historical analysis 
predicts that failures will continue to be exposed by a future macroeconomic event. 
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TABLE 3.26 Cyclical failure 
 
  







































3.11 Different Peaks: different outcomes 
The primary regulators are ASIC, APRA, and the ROC, previously the responsibility of the Fair Work 
Commission. Other regulators include the RBA, the ASX, the ACCC, State and NZ authorities. ASIC 
is involved with 100% of the sample, and of itself directly regulated 81.23% of them; ASIC and 
APRA together (Twin Peaks) regulated 11.08% of the sample. ASIC and the ROC) regulated a further 
2.15% of the sample (Triple Peaks). Despite the constant public criticism of ASIC, the data and the 
cases from which it is derived show ASIC to have been an active regulator. It was the plaintiff in 
64.32% of the litigated cases.11 This implies that ASIC is not resource constrained. The deficiencies 
in desired outcomes therefore should be attributable to other causes.  
These differences are explained by the different mandates and postures of each regulator. It is 
tempting, but erroneous to infer that ex ante supervision provides a better investor outcome than ex 
post market conduct regulation. ASIC’s responsibility nationwide extends broadly to more than 2 
million entities and much of their commercial activity. ASIC has the broadest mandate of any 
comparable regulator. APRA has a far fewer number of entities to supervise. Nonetheless, egregious 
behaviour has occurred in its supervised entities and within its different statutory constructs. 
TABLE 3.27 Scope of regulator activity in the NBFE sector 
 
3.12 Is lawlessness endemic in Australian financial services and financial products markets? 
Unlicensed unlawful provision of financial services, financial products, and financial advice and 
unlawful unregistered MIS account for 14.23% of the incidences of systemic failure (Table 3.24) and 
35.96% of all incidences in the sample (Table 3.22). Some of these incidences relate to the same case. 
                                                                  
11 See below App 3. 
REGULATOR
ASIC/ASC/CAC 264 81.23%









These are both top quartile prevalence behaviours over the period of the sample unprevented either 
by law enforcement or disciplines imposed by the investing public based on sound, unconflicted 
financial advice. Caveat emptor trumps fiduciary principles and statute. To illustrate: 
The schemes are generally designed so that all the investors ever receive are the pieces of paper 
constituting the agreements ... promoters design increasingly more sophisticated schemes in attempts 
to circumvent the laws.12 
Recognising that: 
It would have been folly on the part of the legislature to attempt to define or limit what interests should 
be protected or how: to do so would have been to ignore the sad reality that the ingenuity of fraudsters 
[is] inexhaustible, their snares for the gullible pitiless and of infinite variety …13 
Folly indeed. As is the poacher becoming gamekeeper in 1998 subsuming fiduciary law beneath well-
intended but poorly implemented statute, as the judicial responses analysed in Chapter 4 illustrate. 
Warning bells were ignored. 
Malfeasance and egregious behaviour is not restricted to MIS: it occurs in funds controlled by 
registered organisations. ASIC’s good intentions have been subverted by those ignorant of fiduciary 
obligations. Workers Entitlement Funds are MIS, exempted on an annual basis from Part 5C of the 
Corporations Act.14 These have been the subject of media disclosure and analysis by Heydon. There 
is a dearth of independent reliable empirical data which could be remedied by the Hayne Royal 
Commission with reform enforced by ASIC and the ROC. 
3.13 The Wallis Legacy: Disclosure, Financial Advice and Financial Literacy 
Implementation failures in these three Wallis principles are directly attributable for 25.84% of the 
incidences of systemic failure (Table 3.24). They are indirectly attributable to another 32.34%, being 
a total of 58.18% of systemic incidences (Table 3.24). This is failure of law on a massive scale. It 
                                                                  
12 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW); Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 
[37] (Murphy J). 
13 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 836 [17] 
(Barrett J) citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss Securities Ltd [2002] 
NSWSC 684 (Palmer J). 
14 ASIC, ASIC Class Order: Employee Redundancy Funds: relief, CO 02/314 (2014); extended by ASIC 
Instrument: Corporations (Employee Relief) 2015/1150 (December 2015). ASIC has fashioned a new 
legislative instrument [CO 02/314] — ASIC Corporations (Employee Redundancy Funds Relief) Instrument 
2015/1150 — to extend relief to 1 October 2018. 
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fails to recognise that investors are (forcibly) financial consumers,15 not suppliers of capital. ‘Products 
[that] have been designed to be attractive to sell rather than meeting the needs of consumers’.16 
It explains community perceptions of ASIC and the frustrations with ASIC uncovered in the 
qualitative research but without their comprehension of ASIC being trapped in an ex post restrictive 
mandate. This empirical data cries out for reform of that mandate. The Managed Investments Act 
facilitated dramatic growth in the availability of collective investment opportunities but deficiencies 
in its implementation have contributed to large investor losses. Disclosure is not sufficient; financial 
advice has been conflicted and deficient, undisciplined by the necessary financial literacy of 
consumers unable to provide informed consent. Reliance on ‘[d]isclosure assumes that the capacities 
of financial consumers and retail investors are universal and rational, when research is showing that 
this is not the case’.17 Chapter 4 analyses how egregious behaviour, quantified here, has been able to 
develop. 
                                                                  
15 See, eg, Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer’ 29 Companies and 
Securities Law Journal 327, 328. 
16 Ben Butler, ‘Can a change of guard fix ASIC’s image?’, The Weekend Australian Business (Sydney), 22–
23 September 2018, 29 quoting Peter Kell, retiring ASIC Commissioner. 
17 Kingsford Smith, above n 15, 330. 
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CHAPTER 4: A TRAVERSE OF THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 1981-2018 
The Australian Enigma 
  
Most Australian collective investment non-bank financial entities (NBFEs), superannuation and 
managed investment schemes (MIS), are trusts. Other jurisdictions also use trust structures for 
collective investment. In Germany, whilst described as trusts, they are structured as companies. 
Australia is a global outlier in the use of trusts as large commercially operating investment vehicles 
and in the manner of their deployment. This is an enigma. Directors must comprehend the various 
statutes that govern these vehicles as well as the applicable general law. There are many instances 
where directors assume trustee liability, often inadvertently. This chapter analyses the various 
overlays of director and trustee duty and explains the interwoven statutory and fiduciary conundrum. 
It describes the evolution of director and trustee duties, the evolution and meaning of the best interest 
duty, the failures of that duty by fiduciaries, and the use of trusts as surrogate companies. It analyses 
the case law arising from the circumstances leading to Bitter Harvest and the unhealthy culture 
unearthed and amplified in the Heydon Royal Commission. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The cases and the empirical analysis demonstrate how directing minds manifest in undesirable 
corporate behaviour. Malfeasance has been common in Australian NBFEs. Between 2000 and 2010, 
there were 1972 court cases involving breaches by directors and officers of the Corporations Act.1 
Unhealthy culture can rarely be changed by statute: powerful statutory intervention can ameliorate, 
but not cure. Cultural change is generated by other social powers. These can be reflected in an 
uncompromised fiduciary duty of economic loyalty driving proper practices in the investment chain 
for the benefit of investors and other beneficiaries. ‘The fiduciary obligation is a demanding standard 
of propriety in conduct that is unequalled elsewhere in the law’,2 requiring ‘complete loyalty to the 
service of another’s interests’.3 Fiduciary duty supports desirable cultural change. It provides a 
framework for standards of behaviour, for enforcement and for restitution. It is the Damoclean Sword 
over the heads of malfeasors.  
                                                                  
1 Lisa Barnes, ‘The Albatross around the neck of company directors ― A journey through case law, 
legislation, and corporate governance’ (2013) 12(1) The Journal of Law and Financial Management 3. 
2 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 478, 479 citing Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 
[16] (Millett LJ). 
3 Ibid 481, citing P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Carswell, 1989) 1, 27. 
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Those that have profited from the absence of uncompromised loyalties are those that resist legislative 
interventions and are organised with a plethora of industry associations and paid lobbyists. 
Intermediaries in the investment chain often have conflicts of interest and profit from them. To prefer 
client interest over their own may mean loss of profit. It may mean declining business if there is a 
conflict of interest.  
This chapter discusses the evolution of director duties and of trustee duties and the connections 
between them. It explains the Australian enigma - trusts as commercial enterprises and surrogate 
companies - and how present law focussed on contractual rights and statutory compliance fails to 
protect and nurture investor expectations. It analyses the many interpretations of best interest and 
offers the basis for reform and legal clarity. It describes the failures of fiduciaries to provide 
competent, unconflicted financial advice, the absence of effective disclosure, client and investor lack 
of financial literacy, and inability to provide informed consent. It illustrates how these failures 
generate an unhealthy culture which affects Australian financial advice and financial products 
markets to this day. 
The cases refine the law applying to each of the Wallis principles financial advice, disclosure and 
financial literacy. However, these cases, many of them useful, are piecemeal, primarily tactical and 
always after the fact (ex post). Rarely do they strike at the heart of the fundamental reason for systemic 
failure, namely statutory subsuming and deficient enforcement of fiduciary principles of loyalty in 
the investment chain.  
They do strike directly at a major reason for systemic failure, namely statutory complexity and 
uncertainty. Complexity and sheer volume of detail provide cover for creeping corruption (in UK 
terminology, creative compliance or regulatory arbitrage). Legal analyses of similar issues in like 
jurisdictions together with revelations from Australian case law provides a sound rationale for more 
stringency in policy sufficient to deter director and trustee malfeasance.  
A first theme from 1981-2018 has seen an increase in the number and size of statutes, often provoking 
judicial frustration and negative comment.4 Empirical analysis demonstrates that legislation (the ‘Age 
of Statutes’)5 has not prevented manifestation of systemic problems or reduced their cyclical 
recurrence. Instead, it has created a large compliance industry with attendant direct and indirect costs. 
These costs are ultimately borne by beneficiaries and investors. They also manifest in market 
consolidation in attempts to capture economies of scale in an attempt to reduce unit costs to those 
                                                                  
4 See, eg, ch 1, fn 38. 
5 Mark Leeming, ‘Equity: Ageless in the “Age of Statutes”’ (2015) 9(2) Journal of Equity 108. 
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investors and beneficiaries. Regulatory intervention into the superannuation sector requiring 
consolidation is an example. Statutory evolution has been and remains politically contested reducing 
its effectiveness as lobby groups pursue their particular interests.  
A second theme is the role of equitable principles including fiduciary duties. As Donald accurately 
points out, misuse of the adjective fiduciary by politicians and lobby groups has resulted in a 
mismatch of community expectations and the reality of fiduciary law in the Australian financial 
sector.6 Principles based general law has often provided the basis for the resolution of many specific 
cases in this chapter and in the empirical analysis. ‘Each of statute and equity influences the other 
[although] there is no judicial power to sunset some statutes as there is in the common law.7 In the 
meantime, 
It is ironic, then that those same political processes that are privileging these nobler qualities [of 
fiduciaries] are in fact de-coupling the regulatory regimes from the general law antecedents in which 
those qualities were initially expressed. Political processes are ensuring that what the law expects of 
Mason J’s quintessential fiduciaries, or at least those whose activities encroach on areas of public 
policy, are regulated by multi-layered, highly specific, bespoke regulatory regimes that largely eclipse 
the proscriptions and prescriptions of the general law.8 
Accretive legislative change is not enough. Whilst ‘we now live in an age of statutes and not of the 
common law,’9 statutes have not eliminated systemic failures and their cyclical manifestations. 
‘[C]omplying merely with the regulatory requirements may well leave the investment bank in breach 
of the fiduciary obligation’.10 In other words, compliance with the statute may expose a director to 
breaches of the general or case law on fiduciary obligations.11 Corruption rooted in cultural mores12 
requires a rethink of assumptions of robustness in statutory construction’,13 and the adoption of 
‘principles drawn from the law of trusts and from fiduciary law…’14 The statutes seek to manage 
                                                                  
6 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142 [1]. 
7 Leeming, above n 5. 
8 Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’, above n 6, 142 [2]. 
9 Paul Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’ (2010) 38 FLR 350. 
10 Tuch, above n 2, 515. 
11 In financial advice, see, eg, Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Fiduciary Obligations, financial 
advisers and FOFA’ (2014) 32 Companies and Securities Law Journal 527; Simone Degeling and Jessica 
Hudson ‘Equitable money remedies against financial advisers who give “advice about advice”’ (2015) 33 
Companies and Securities Law Journal 166. 
12 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report 
(December 2015) (Commissioner Heydon) [‘Heydon’]. 
13 Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’, above n 9, 336. 
14 Ibid 335. 
153 
whereas the solution is excision. Andrew Tuch concludes: ‘These problems are at the core of the 
structure of the financial markets’.15  
As Heydon points out, unhealthy culture can spread across regulatory jurisdictions, especially in a 
consolidating and vertically integrating NBFE sector, not restricted to or originating from registered 
organisations. It recurs in every segment of the NBFE sector. Excision means that ‘all payments by 
employers to a relevant union or officials of that union be outlawed’.16 For the NBFE sector in 
aggregate, this remedy should be extended to related party transactions, whether or not Chinese Walls 
are in place.  
Cultural change to ensure Australians have ‘reasonable expectations’17 of the observance of fiduciary 
obligations and principles is a generational task. That economic loyalty, already enshrined in the 
general law but subsumed by statute, should require reinforcement is a sad reflection on the efficacy 
of the legislature. It is a public policy issue to enforce effective disclosure, require conflicts avoidance 
and balance information and vulnerability asymmetries between provider and client.18  
International practice in like jurisdictions provides useful guidance. Presently in Australia, to the 
extent fiduciary principles are understood at all, respect for their principles is not widespread. 
Previously, in Canada, ‘[c]alls for holding such advisers to a fiduciary standard were simply 
ignored...’19 Fiduciary principles are often ignored being subservient to adherence to specific statutory 
provisions which focus on process, legal rights and interests rather than value outcomes. So directors 
can be honest but in breach of the law, and conversely, ‘act without bad faith yet not in good faith’:20 
compliance with the letter of the law but not honouring its spirit or community expectation. Presently, 
there is a public policy question as to whether statutory regulation ‘adequately protects those to whom 
the general law would grant protection, if enforced, afforded by the fiduciary relationship’.21 
The politicisation of policy direction is clouded by antiquated ideas of the modern corporation and 
the modern trust. Much is made of the historic distinctions between a company (narrowly defined as 
shareholder owners) and trusts (narrowly defined as trustee-members). Superannuation entities are 
                                                                  
15 Tuch, above n 2, 516. 
16 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report, above n 
12, ch 4, rec 41, 60–67 (Commissioner Heydon). 
17 Tuch, above n 2, 483. 
18 Ibid 505. 
19 Saul Schwartz, ‘The Canadian Task Force on Financial Literacy: Consulting without listening’ [2011] 51 
Canadian Business Law Journal 359. 
20 Timothy Marcus Clark and FAI General Insurance Company Limited v The State of South Australia and 
State Bank of South Australia [1994] SASC 5210 [2] (Bollen J). 
21 Tuch, above n 2, 514. 
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now large, growing complex financial businesses, often with direct and related party commercial 
activities, increasingly international in scope akin to large commercial trading trusts, becoming 
conglomerate-like. Likewise, the concept of a company is much developed from its antiquarian 
origins resulting in ‘a more interventionist court.’22  
Vested interest and resistance to change using spurious argument clouds reform. The lessons of other 
jurisdictions where there are governance models which do give effect to the interests of all 
stakeholders have been ignored or lost in Lilliputian conflicts. 
                                                                  
22 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157 [2027] 
(Drummond AJA) [‘Bell’].The impacts of corporate decision making on a wider range of interests than 
shareholders are now being given more recognition … it serves to explain why modern company courts have 
become more interventionist, in reviewing the activities of directors than was traditionally the case: at [2051] 
(Drummond AJA).  
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2. THE EVOLUTION OF DIRECTOR AND TRUSTEE DUTIES 
2.1 Directors, officers and trustees: multiple roles, duties and responsibilities 
NBFE directors and trustees are drawn from the community. Many have limited understanding of 
their duties.23 There is no profession of director in Australia nor formal training requirement. 
Directors of companies and trustees personally or as directors of a corporate trustee are fiduciaries. 
A fiduciary must act personally although modern law distinguishes between a director’s duty and a 
trustee’s duty. But trusts are commonly used as surrogate companies and superannuation entities in 
Australian NBFE markets requiring director comprehension of trust law, several statutes and their 
interaction. Statutory complexity and uncertain application of fiduciary principles not only provides 
for malfeasance opportunities. It also generates traps for well-meaning and honest directors and 
trustees reliant on external and internal advice. These traps are sometimes unknown, misunderstood, 
or wilfully ignored. Here is an explanation of them. 
In a consolidating NBFE market, directors have multiple roles. These are becoming more widespread 
and in some cases conflict. ‘[A]ll of these are bound to the investor-beneficiaries by a web of fiduciary 
relationships both orthodox as well as unusual’.24 Corporate form and structure are subservient to 
actions and context. Context includes ‘undertakings, vulnerability to another’s power or vulnerability 
necessitating reliance, and reasonable expectation.’25 Corporate law and theory now robustly 
recognise stakeholders, being an onion ring of interests and interest groups circling the traditional 
preoccupation of the board—the shareholders. The need to ensure protection of those interests: 
‘[e]xplains why modern company courts have become more interventionist. [They are prepared to 
review] the activities of directors [more] than was traditionally the case’.26 In Australia the legal 
impacts of corporate decision-making are now recognised in a wider range of interests than 
shareholders, but the ‘[e]xpansion of the range of interests to which corporate management must have 
regard in its decision-making has not gone as far in Australia as it has in the UK’.27 Or in other 
jurisdictions. 
Directors sometimes act with self-interest with blatant breaches of their fiduciary duties. 
                                                                  
23 See above ch 1, s 14. 
24 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [58] (Finn J). 
25 Ibid [72] (Finn J). 
26 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157 [2051] 
(Drummond AJA). 
27 Ibid [2050] (Drummond AJA). 
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A dealing by a trustee or by a company director, in breach of the fiduciary obligation not to act where 
there is a conflict between the fiduciary duty and another duty or self-interest, is a common breach of 
fiduciary duty. The subject of the prohibited dealing may be trust property or company property.28  
For instance, a director’s participation or voting in a board meeting where there is a material personal 
interest is a breach of the director’s fiduciary duty, and the Corporations Act.29 It is difficult to 
determine a ‘precise formula that will determine the extent of detail that is called for when a director 
declares his interest or the nature of his interest’.30 Disclosure declarations must make colleagues 
‘fully informed of the real state of things’.31 ‘If it is material to their judgment that they should know 
not merely he has an interest, but what it is and how far it goes, then he must see to it that they are 
informed’.32 
The role and duties of trustees in trusts are well settled in law. A trust can only operate through a 
trustee, corporate or personal with the trustee holding the trust property for the beneficiaries. Trustees 
have ‘an irreducible core of obligations’.33 These beneficiaries can be unitholders in a unit trust or 
investors in a managed investment scheme. Trusts are governed by State Trustee Acts (in Australia) 
but the Corporations Act also regulates MIS, which are a specific type of trust. The directors of the 
responsible entity (RE) are directors of a corporate trustee as well as directors of a company. Directors 
of the corporate trustee have fiduciary obligations to the company, but best interests obligations to 
the members of the MIS. The trust deed and constitution creating and operating the MIS define 
responsibilities, but not to the exclusion of general law or the Corporations Act. Potentially dangerous 
contradictions arise for those directors in some MIS exacerbated where there are multiple MIS and 
where superannuation entities are included in the corporate group, sometimes investing in related 
party MIS. 
Superannuation schemes are usually trusts established by trust deed with a corporate trustee. The trust 
deed is a document that imposes specific trustee obligations on the trustees. Typically: 
the deed or other instrument establishing the scheme is a trust deed or imposes trustee obligations on 
the persons in charge of the scheme … The trustee must not only comply with the provisions of the 
                                                                  
28 Justice David J S Jackson, ‘The First Limb of Barnes v Addy: A taxonomy in tatters’ (Speech delivered at 
the W A Lee Equity Lecture, Banco Court, QE11 Courts of Law, 27 November 2014) 29. 
29 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 195(1). 
30 ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 [225] (Murphy J). 
31 Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd [1952] 3 DLR 1. 
32 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 [938] (Rares), 
quoting Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (1873) LR 6 HL 205. 
33 Rankine v Rankine [1998] QSC 48 (de Jersey J). 
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relevant trust deed or other instrument, but is subject to common law principles of trust law. The 
centre-piece of trust law is the fiduciary obligation. …34 
So the trustee may have a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiary. Where this exists, director’s 
responsibilities are not only to the trustee company but also to the beneficiary.35 It reflects the modern 
statutory duty of the superannuation trustee.36 This statutory intervention resulting in a direct 
fiduciary nexus between the director of the corporate trustee and the beneficiary of the trust is a recent 
evolution of the law and ‘operates as if the directors were party to the governing rules’.37 The statute 
departs from the general law of trusts and imposes a positive duty to ‘“promote” the financial 
interests’38 of the beneficiary (being different from their best interest). This may require the trustee 
to invest trust funds in a superannuation product administered by another trustee.39 Previously, for 
non-superannuation entities, this nexus only arose in ‘special circumstances creating a direct fiduciary 
relationship between a director and a beneficiary’.40 It arises from director’s conduct in exercising 
their powers causing their company to commit a breach of trust. It opens directors of trustee 
companies to accessorial general law liability if that person has not ‘at the least’ obtained ‘informed 
consent’41 and if that person has ‘knowingly or recklessly assisted in or procured a breach of trust or 
of a fiduciary duty by the trustee.’42 For directors of corporate trustees (usually companies) of 
superannuation entities, ‘the direct liability of the directors of corporate trustees of superannuation 
entities is not limited to that which can arise under their common law duties’.43 
The trustee must adhere to and ‘rigidly’44 carry out the terms of the trust deed which overrides all 
other duties. In MIS or other trusts where the beneficiaries are investors, adequate disclosure of risk 
                                                                  
34 VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2006] AATA 710 [318] (S A Forgie V-P and B H 
Pascoe); citing Bartlett v Barclays Bank Co Ltd [1980] Ch 515–534 (Brightman J). 
35 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52(A), 52(A)(6), 29VN(b). 
36 Ibid s 52(2). 
37 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52A(2)(6). See especially Pamela F Hanrahan, 
‘Directors’ liability in superannuation trustee companies’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 3 [111B]; 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52A(2) covenants quoted in Donald, ‘Regulating for 
fiduciary qualities of conduct’, above n 6, 142 [1]. 
38 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 29VN. 
39 Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’, above n 6, 142 [1]. 
40 Hanrahan, ‘Directors’ liability in superannuation trustee companies’, above n 37, 204. 
41 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [81] (Finn J). 
42 Ibid [82] (Finn J). 
43 Hanrahan, ‘Directors’ liability in superannuation trustee companies’, above n 37, [111]. 
44 Pikos Holdings (Northern Territory) Pty Ltd v Territory Homes Pty Ltd [1997] NTSC 30 (Kearney J). 
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involved in the investment must be made.45 The trustee must implement the terms of the trust deed, 
exercised personally. Delegation authorities, are provided for in statute46 and general law, subject to 
the terms of the trust deed, which must be specific. The trustee, including REs, are liable for the 
delegatees’ acts and omissions, even if they are ultra vires.47 A trustee or director cannot fetter their 
exercise of power and cannot act on the instructions of another person.48  
A trustee is bound to invest trust funds in order to earn income for the beneficiaries and it is not safely 
preserved if not invested.49 Trust deeds can contain specific instructions in respect of investment 
powers. Trustees must act in accordance with the deed even if the deed authorises investments which 
otherwise may not be allowable. Otherwise, in the absence of directions, investment powers are 
governed by the State Trustee Acts.50 A trustee can be in breach of duty by failing to act when it 
should have done so. There is a positive obligation to protect or promote trust assets, and it is not 
acceptable for a trustee to be passive in its management of the trust. 
General law and statutory interventions impose further duties. Statutory interventions include the 
Corporations Act.51 These sections specify that an RE holds scheme property in trust for scheme 
members and that the RE directors duties to the company are overridden by their duties to the scheme 
members. Limitations on directors’ (of the RE) indemnity out of (registered) MIS property may result 
in a ‘much more extensive direct liability under Ch 5C of the Corporations Act than for a director of 
a superannuation trust company under the [Superannuation Industry (Supervision)] SIS Act’.52 The 
SIS Act53 codifies trustee and director fiduciary duties to beneficiaries using familiar language of the 
general law. The Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act did not include such provisions and does 
not provide statutory enforcement of fiduciary principles, although 2016 reform aligns the directors’ 
and officers’ duties of registered organisations with those of companies.54 Further nuances in director 
                                                                  
45 McMahon Clarke, , ‘Guidelines for Trustees and Responsible Entities: Duties Liabilities and Safeguards’ 
(Monograph, 14 August 2014) <http://www.mcmahonclarke.com/cmsAdmin/uploads/trustee_guideline.pdf> 
8. 
46 See, eg, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 s 52(A)(4). 
47 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601FB. 
48 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 ss 52(2)(h), 58. This latter section was originally 
introduced as the Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Service Providers and Other Governance 
Measures) Act 2013 (Cth). Directors of non-superannuation corporate trustees are subject to the general law 
having a fiduciary duty not to fetter discretion, and the governing documents of the company. See, eg, 
Davidson v Smith (1989) 15 ACLR 732 at 734 (Ipp J). 
49 Adamson v Reid (1880) 6 VLR (Eq) 164; Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26. 
50 McMahon Clarke, above n 45, 25. 
51 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FC(2), 601FC(3). 
52 Hanrahan, ‘Directors’ liability in superannuation trustee companies’, above n 37, [111B]. 
53 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52 (2), 52(8), 29VN. 
54 Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act 2016 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum. 
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direct liability including interpretations of deceptive and misleading conduct arise from the differing 
definitions of financial products and financial services in the Corporations Act55 and the ASIC Act.56 
Previously, under the general law directors were acknowledged to have accepted a trust and therefore 
accurately to be described as trustees:57  
the duties of a director are derived from, although not identical with, the duties of a trustee to the cestui 
que trust and the duties of an agent to the principal to the extent to which those duties arose out of the 
fiduciary aspect of the relationship of principal and agent … when, in relation to those duties, reference 
was made, not to ‘negligence’ in the common law sense, but to imprudence of such a nature as to 
constitute a breach of trust … and] references to a directors duties at law were to be regarded as 
references under the general – non-statutory – law as opposed to those imposed on directors by 
statute.58  
The general law continued the evolution of the distinction between the responsibilities of trustees and 
directors, ‘impossible to describe the duties of directors in general terms, whether by way of analogy 
or otherwise.’59  
Modern law attempts to differentiate between trustee duty and directors’ duty arising as a result of 
their differing functions. The directors’ role requires an exhibition of entrepreneurship. Directors are 
entitled to take reasonable risks. The trustee role requires restraint. ‘While the duty of a trustee is to 
exercise a degree of restraint and conservatism in investment judgments, the duty of a director [of a 
company which is not a trustee] may be to display entrepreneurial flair and accept commercial risks 
to produce a sufficient return on capital invested’.60  
Underlying the distinction today is, probably, not merely an historical assumption about the separate 
purposes of companies and trusts, but also a generalisation about the different risks that persons who 
invest their assets in companies on the one hand and trusts on the other are considered likely to have 
assumed … [w]here the trustee is itself a company the requirements of care and caution are in no way 
                                                                  
55 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 764A(1)(g). 
56 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12BAA(7)(f). 
57 Masonic and General Life Insurance Co v Sharpe [1892] 1 Ch 154; Re Newcastle-upon-Tyne Marine 
Insurance Co, Re Ex parte Brown (1854) 19 Beav 97. 
58 Railway and General Lights Improvement Co, Re (Marzetti’s case) (1880) 28 WR 54. 
59 City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd, Re [1925] Ch 407 [1924] All ER 485. 
60 Daniels v Anderson (1995) NSWCA (Clarke JA, Sheller JA, and Powell JA) 13 ACLC 614; NSWLR 438. 
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diminished. And here, unlike companies in general, these requirements have a flow on effect into the 
duties and liabilities of the directors of such a company.61 
2.2 Standards of care 
Duties of care and diligence are not statutorily restricted to s 180(1) of the Corporations Act. The 
Corporations Act has two provisions relating to standards of care required of directors of an RE.62 
For directors of MIS, s 601FD(i)(b) extends s 180(1). An RE is a corporate trustee and ‘the standard 
of care for an officer under s 601FD(1)(b) is higher than the corresponding duty under s 180(1) … 
scheme members [being] particularly vulnerable to potential conflicts of interest’.63 So directors of 
REs owe their duty of care to scheme members in addition to their company, in contrast to other 
directors. There is no business judgment defence under s 601FD. Similarly, directors of 
superannuation entity corporate trustees owe their duty to fund beneficiaries as well as to the 
corporate trustee, being the introduction of a statutory prescriptive fiduciary duty.64  
Standards of care expected of trustee companies and their directors, their fiduciary obligations, and 
accessorial liability have evolved. Directors can assume trustee liability,65 but not always so ― it 
depends on context: ‘the duties of trusteeship of the company can give form and direction to the 
common law and statutory duties of care imposed on directors, where the directors themselves have 
caused their company’s breach of trust.’66 The trustee must meet a higher standard than the ordinary 
prudent person test. Directors can be more risk seeking than a trustee, whose duty includes not just 
the generation of trust income but also the preservation of trust capital.  
That the director of a corporate trustee be a director of a related entity can concurrently be the same 
person managing the same underlying assets is one of many conundrums leading to uncertainty in 
                                                                  
61 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [47] (Finn J). 
62 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180(1), 601FD(1)(b). 
63 Trilogy Funds Management Limited v Sullivan (No 2) [2015] FCA 1452 [211] (Wigney J) quoting Murphy 
J: (a) … the relevant director will be the director of the RE acting as trustee (and usually holding itself out 
and being paid as a professional trustee; and (b) the scheme members will be vulnerable to: (i) conflicts of 
interest between the RE’s interest in obtaining fees and the interests of the members, and/or (ii) conflicts 
between the RE’s interest in obtaining fees and its duty to act in the members’ best interest and give their 
interests priority, ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) 
(in liquidation) (Controllers appointed) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 [526], [543]. 
64 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(8). 
65 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [77]–[79], [82], [287] (Finn J). Finn did not wish ‘to reignite 
the arid debate on whether directors are trustees’: at 48. 
66 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [48] (Finn J). 
161 
NBFE governance. This applies to defining appropriate standards in due diligence investigations 
where there is not necessarily an objective test. What constitutes acceptable due diligence can be 
subjective, with the only arbiter being the court. Whilst trustees may engage third party professional 
advisers in due diligence investigations, their advice is meaningless in a subjective environment. 
There are also different standards required depending on the type of trustee. Nowadays, directors of 
professional trust companies, including REs are expected to demonstrate a greater level of expertise 
and standards of care than non-professional trustees. ‘[A] professional corporate trustee is liable for 
a breach of trust if loss is caused to the trust fund because it neglects to exercise the special care and 
skill which it professes to have’.67 This evolution of a higher standard emulates US and Canadian 
law.68 The former standard of care evolved a century ago when trust corporations were not used for 
commerce:  
during a period when trust corporations were not used for the trading and investment purposes that are 
now commonplace [in Australia] today. There is, in my view, a substantial question now to be 
answered as to whether a higher standard is not to be exacted for at least professional and corporate 
trustees which hold themselves out as having a special or particular knowledge, skill and experience. 
…69 I consider that the standard of care applicable where a corporation is a professional trustee, 
holding itself out to the public and being paid as such, will often be a more exacting standard…70  
The responsibilities of these entities are not diminished by the comparative responsibilities of other 
types of trustee,71 which do not ‘conduct trust businesses or render professional trust services’72 for a 
fee. 
2.3 Prioritisation versus prohibition  
Trustee standards are based on prohibition, not prioritisation, as is presently the case under the 
Corporations Act. This is one reason why the application of fiduciary duties and trustee standards 
across the NBFE sector becomes so important. Under trust law, the no-conflict and no-profit rules 
prohibit: (i) the entering into any agreement in which personal interest or the possibility of personal 
interest conflicts with the duty to the trust; and (ii) the obtaining of personal profit or advantage by 
                                                                  
67 Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No 1) [1980] 1 Ch 515 [534] (Brightman J). 
68 Fales v Canada Permanent Trust Co (1977) 2 SCR 302 (Canada). 
69 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [50] (Finn J). 
70 ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 1,342 (Murphy J) [‘Prime Trust’]. 
71 Fouche v The Superannuation Fund Board [1952] HCA 1 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ). 
72 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [54] (Finn J). 
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virtue of being a trustee.73 It matters not that the trustee acted honestly and in the beneficiaries best 
interest, or that the profit would not have been made but for ‘the skill and judgment of the trustee.’74 
It follows therefore, that trust deeds are extremely important documents in the NBFE investment 
sector and they determine whether or not a related party can contract in a capacity other than in its 
capacity as trustee of a trust.  
2.4 Related party transactions and conflicts of interest 
Related parties and conflicts of interest are common in MIS. The empirical analysis suggests that 
related party transactions have predictive veracity to conflicts of interest, failures in disclosure, 
dishonesty and breaches of statutory and fiduciary duties. These can lead directly to unjust 
enrichment. Jones v Invion75 demonstrated how director’s breaches of their statutory and fiduciary 
duties76 entitled their ASX listed company to statutory77 and equitable compensation.  
The directors acting ‘in concert’78 did not confine themselves to improper board procedures, but were 
also aware of shareholder disquiet about corporate governance and their likely rejection of approval 
for remuneration in the form of performance rights. For these directors, a corporate governance 
standard which relied upon unminuted oral agreement several years previously whereby ‘any of them, 
acting alone, could exercise the authority of the Board’79 was sufficient. There could be ‘no 
suggestion that the non-executive directors were fully informed’.80 In fact, they were incorrectly 
informed. 
Recusal from a meeting is common practice in Australia where there are related parties and conflicts 
of interest. Jones v Invion makes a mockery of such practices. Recusal and mere disclosure are not 
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the first respondent, to vary the termination provisions of the contracts or consultancy agreement of another 
of them … [and] did not tell the full board of the changes. … This “unjust enrichment” was [stated to be]: 
the “conventional” way of transacting such business within the company … the directors by-passed the 
Board because they surmised the Board would not agree. Consistently, they did not disclose to the Board 
what they had done. … The [appellant] directors were patently obliged to inform their fellow [non-
executive] directors of those matters, especially where the solvency of the [first respondent] was in doubt, 
the contingent liability was so substantial, and the [appellants] were themselves the potential beneficiaries’.  
76 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) ss 180, 181, 182. 
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sufficient.81 ‘[C]ould hardly be considered arms-length … It rather suggests the contrary, that it was 
a collegial or corporate or complicit endeavour’.82  
Dishonest behaviour may in some circumstances have an honest explanation. Relief from liability 
requires a positive finding of honesty, not available to these Invion directors. These directors ‘owed 
fiduciary duties to the company of which they were directors, to avoid conflict of duty and interest 
and not to take advantage of their position to secure a personal benefit.83 They did not exercise 
reasonable care and diligence,84 or act in good faith,85 and used their ‘position to gain personal 
advantage’.86 
In Trilogy v Sullivan:87 
This is a tale of a rapacious Gold Coast property developer with grandiose plans, a compliant and 
obliging valuer who lacked independence, and a responsible entity of a managed investment scheme 
the officers of which appeared unable or unwilling to say ‘no’ to the developer, or to exercise 
appropriate care and diligence… [T]he scheme and its members were left significantly out of pocket.88 
Some directors ‘well knew that the proposal was not supported by any remotely acceptable “as is” 
valuation…’89 
Another Gold Coast related party case, Managed Investments:90 
The insouciant attitude of the defendants to this misuse of money intended to be used for the PIF’s 
investors beggars belief.91 [T]hose controlling responsible entities … must act with honesty and 
competence and remember at all times that they are dealing with other people’s money.92 
In a consolidating NBFE market with a limited supply of knowledgeable directors, trustees, and 
professional advisers, it is inevitable that their fiduciary duties be compromised by conflicts of 
                                                                  
81 Fitzsimmons v The Queen (199) 23 ACSR 355 cited in Rosemary Langford, The Bona Fide Fiduciary 
Loyalty of Australian Company Directors (PhD Thesis, Faculty of Law Monash University, 2013) 314 
[3.7.4]. 
82 Jones v Invion Ltd [2015] QCA 100 [57] (McMurdo P and Philippides JA and Peter Lyons J). 
83 Ibid. 
84 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 180. 
85 Ibid s 181. 
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87 Trilogy Funds Management Limited v Sullivan (No 2) [2015] FCA 1452 (Wigney J). 
88 Ibid [1] (Wigney J). 
89 Ibid [612] (Wigney J). 
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interest, actual or potential.93 Commercial practice has been to establish Chinese Walls. If they serve 
a useful or proper purpose, their scope is necessarily limited by the permeable nature of walls, 
originally designed to quarantine information from persons within one organisation. Where the proper 
exercise of fiduciary duty extends to decisions about fellow directors and trustees, including litigation, 
Chinese Walls are unlikely to suffice.94 
In Australia, many public offer superannuation entities (industry funds) have representative directors 
from employers and employees. Originally with equal representation,95 now subject to contested 
legislative change, these appointments do lead to conflicts of interest. There are no differences in the 
SIS Act in relation to responsibilities as directors of the trustee notwithstanding differences in the 
manner of the appointments.96 This conflict appears to be an integral part of the SIS legislation.  
The potential for conflict by virtue of their appointment alone does not mean that there is a conflict of 
the sort that means a director is in breach of a fiduciary duty. There must be something more that 
shows that there is in fact a conflict of duty between the interests of the directors of a trustee of a fund. 
This must be determined by reference to the circumstances and not by references to a formula or 
recitation of principle.97 
Conflicts of interest may be ameliorated,98 but only in circumstances specifically to the appointment 
as representative director.99 Naively, ‘[a] further safeguard to the protection of member’s interests is 
to rely on a well-informed membership with the right to participate in managing the affairs of their 
fund’.100 
2.5 Inconsistency and uncertainty in fiduciary law for Australian directors 
The quality of decision making of directors, officers and their entities in the investment chain is 
fundamental to the success of Australian NBFE regulation. Directors and officers are status based 
                                                                  
93 Nuncio D’Angelo, ‘Private equity investing by financial institutions: Navigating hidden reefs in 
treacherous waters’ (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 325. 
94 Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd, in the matter of Provident Capital Ltd 
(receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) [2013] FCA 1461 (Rares J). 
95 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 89. 
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fiduciaries, but their fiduciary responsibilities are confused and uncertain under present Australian 
law. A fiduciary duty is ‘properly confined to those duties which are particular to fiduciaries’,101 
breaches of which result in restorative equitable remedy. ‘The distinguishing feature of a fiduciary is 
the obligation of [single minded] loyalty’,102 resting on trust and confidence between fiduciary and 
another, in this case investors and beneficiaries of NBFEs which they direct. It is this context that 
isolates fiduciary duty from other duties of fiduciaries including the duty of care.  
Fiduciaries concurrently exercise fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties. Contractual and other non-
fiduciary duties may co-exist with fiduciary duties. They are always exercised to the benefit of the 
beneficiary.103 So, the sum of the duties exercised by a fiduciary are not the same as fiduciary duties. 
Whilst financial advisers have general law fiduciary duty to act in their clients’ interest, this is not the 
same as their best interest.104 Nor is it the same as the statutory overriding formulation relying on 
process rather than outcome.105 
Acting in a positive way in satisfaction of the best interests duty is contested as non-fiduciary in 
character (unlike the US and Canada),106 despite the obligation of fiduciary loyalty which ‘underlies 
and unifies other fiduciary duties’.107 As Finn opines: 
The scope, even the independent existence of, this duty are matters of contest in private law … [with] 
no uniformly agreed and accepted understanding of what the description ‘fiduciary powers’ signifies 
in private law.108 
Recent judicial opinion suggests otherwise:109  
                                                                  
101 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 16 (Millet J) cited in Rosemary Teele Langford 
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107 Langford, The Bona Fide Fiduciary Loyalty of Australian Company Directors, above n 81, 314 [1.1]. 
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109 Babcock & Brown DIF 111 Global Co-Investment Fund, LP v Babcock & Brown International Pty 
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Positive, prescriptive duties may arise as a consequence of their being ‘no decision of which I am 
aware binding on this court to hold that the fiduciary duties of directors to their companies are so 
limited’110 [to proscriptive duties]. It is a matter of opinion as to what the law is.111 
Confusion reigns in the articulation of these principles in the terminology used by the legislature and 
subsequently in the media where fiduciary duty and best interest duty continue to be used 
interchangeably without distinguishing between proscriptive and prescriptive duties. This arises from 
recent context specific judicial interventions which should have limited holistic application to 
fiduciary duty in other broader contexts. It results in Australia becoming a legal outlier in fiduciary 
law setting its jurisprudence apart from most comparative jurisdictions by significantly narrowing the 
definition and operation of fiduciary duty, relying on statutes which, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, have 
manifestly failed those that they purportedly serve. 
This recent Australian jurisprudence seeks to restrict fiduciary duties to proscription, being neither in 
a position of conflict of interest nor profit from their fiduciary position. ‘[J]udicial thinking about the 
content of fiduciary duties has changed significantly over the last decade … [being to] confine the 
fiduciary component of the overall relationship to a number of specific duties’.112 Proscription 
requires restraint whereas prescription requires action (for obligatory duties) and positive actions for 
discretionary duties.113 
But the proscriptive nature of general law fiduciary duty is not a unanimous view:114 ‘the law of this 
country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the interests of the 
person to whom the duty is owed’,115 with Kirby J dissenting. 
A clear distinction between proscriptive and prescriptive duties may exist in some cases, but many 
situations could potentially be classified as involving duties of either kind … most but not necessarily 
all, fiduciary duties are proscriptive. However, it is dangerous to treat it as a talisman: it does not 
identify the reason for the existence (and hence the nature) of fiduciary duties.116 
                                                                  
110 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq)(No3) [2012] WASCA 157 [1961] 
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These reasons include the requirement to act (or not to omit to act) in the best interest (or interest) of 
the company (however interpreted)117 and to exercise duties of care. Often these duties require 
positive actions, sometimes discretionary, both in commission and prevention of omission which may 
not be fiduciary of themselves.  
It cannot be said that equity does not lay down prescriptive rules … [:] the prescriptive duty to act in 
the best interests of the company is imposed on directors because of equity, not some aspect of 
‘company law’ which is outside of equity.118 
The process of discharging of the fiduciary duties, whether proscriptive or prescriptive, is distinct 
from the nature of the fiduciary duty of itself.119 Positive duties to provide information and obtain 
informed consent is fiduciary120 also originate in contract and statute. Some opine that fiduciary duties 
do not extend to disclosure of information for informed consent purposes or the transfer of a profit 
making opportunity to the client. These are non-fiduciary duties governed elsewhere in the law and 
in accordance with specific facts.121 Others, ‘disclosure is now often said to operate as part of a 
defence to breach of duty’.122 ‘However even Finn accepts that duties of disclosure can properly exist 
in fiduciary law where fiduciary loyalty is an issue’.123 Disclosure is practically manifested in investor 
offer documents: the fiduciary status of the offeror assumes some importance affecting their 
content.124 
A promoter of an investment is a fiduciary.125 Positive duties to honestly inform attach to those who 
‘owe fiduciary obligations because they are “promoters”’.126 Promoter is not a defined legal term: the 
same persons can also be the RE, investment manager, or other NBFE. A fiduciary relationship can 
originate in such contracts: accordingly, ‘whether a party is subject to fiduciary relationships is 
determined by construing the contract as a whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances known 
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to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction’.127 It depends on the facts and the scheme 
documents in individual cases.  
[W]hether a fiduciary relationship exists in a particular case, and if so, the scope of that fiduciary 
relationship, are matters which depend critically on the particular circumstances of the case.128 … The 
characteristics which define a fiduciary relationship cannot be exhaustively defined.129 … Whether a 
fiduciary relationship has come into existence does not depend upon the motivation or desire of one 
party to establish a relationship of trust or confidence. What matters is whether there is a relationship 
involving the requisite undertaking, determined as a matter of objective characterisation, rather than 
having regard to the subjective expectations of the parties.130 
Australian courts have previously resisted extension of fiduciary obligations ‘to be used for creating 
new forms of civil wrong [being an] ‘unsatisfactory development of the law of fiduciary 
obligation’.131 ‘It is questionable in my view whether this heralded development in our law is a 
desirable or necessary one [in the trust company context]’132 However, elimination of systemic 
deficiencies in Australia’s financial advice sector will require such extensions of fiduciary obligation. 
Judicial opinion where fiduciary obligation has been limited to strict proscriptions is contextually 
narrow and should not limit non-contextual cases to those narrow confines. There are precedents in 
Australian case law based on contract,133 vulnerability and reliance,134 reasonable expectation,135 and 
in the extension of trustee director statutory fiduciary liability to Australian superannuation entity 
members personally.136  
This uncertainty in the law has many ramifications for NBFEs, their directors, officers, and third 
parties associated with them,137 investors and beneficiaries. The preferred view (which is the position 
in comparative jurisdictions) is that the contextual judicial determinations ‘do not apply to the [non-
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contextual] status-based fiduciary relationships such as that between director and company’.138 This 
is a fundamental point of law striking directly at the mismatch between community expectations and 
market practice of those in the investment chain: Chapter 6 illustrates its importance.139 ‘It is a duty 
of fundamental importance’,140 being an essential part of undivided loyalty. 
Scholarly research concludes: 
The existing state of Australian law in its approach to fiduciary duties lacks clarity and cohesion, 
particularly as concerns directors. Implementation of the proposals in this thesis would bring certainty 
and consistency … it paves the way for the rethinking of modern fiduciary theory’.141 
This, and Langford’s other proposals for ‘extensive international analysis … [and for] corporate 
governance … organised and categorised around fiduciary duties’142 are entirely consistent with the 
analysis of this author.143  
Indeed, if both authors are correct in their analysis, HCA determination supported by reformed 
Corporations Act (following the SIS Act) to resolve the confusion and set Australia on the 
harmonisation path with international fiduciary standards is required. It would reinforce the power of 
fiduciary law to the benefit of investors and beneficiaries so manifestly poorly served, as Chapter 3 
demonstrates, by existing statutes. Fiduciary law should not be ‘mere polyfilla’ to support inconsistent 
and incomplete statutes: ‘clear recognition of the fiduciary nature [of the best interest] and more 
expansive operation of the duty’144 is essential. As she opines, the best interest duty is ‘the central 
fiduciary duty of directors, which operates as a catch-all duty. …’145 Qualitative research by this 
author implies considerable informed community support. The present proscriptive/prescriptive 
typology is not useful to that community. 
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Neither is it consistent with international trends or with comparative jurisdictions: Australian 
directors should note the ‘unsatisfactory development of the law of fiduciary obligation in Canada 
and the US’,146 leading to the creation of ‘new forms of civil wrong’.147  
Lack of harmonisation of the law results in different obligations and liabilities in different 
jurisdictions in certain asset allocation decisions. As Ali insightfully notes, there is a conflict between 
modern portfolio theory and its reliance upon diversification to optimise performance, and the legal 
responsibilities of Australian fiduciaries which are similar but not the same as fiduciaries elsewhere. 
These include fund of fund investments (commonly used in alternate asset classes like hedge funds 
and private equity). ‘The position in Australia regarding the delegation of trust powers (including 
investment powers) by fiduciaries … is in an unsatisfactory state.’148 There is confusion. The general 
law on fiduciary delegations differs from the Corporations Act, SIS Act, Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act and some comparative jurisdictions where the NBFE operates. A director of an 
RE may delegate investment power if it is prudent and the MIS constitution provides for it. A director 
of the corporate trustee of a superannuation entity may similarly delegate (but not abdicate) the 
investment power provided that there is ongoing and diligent monitoring of the delegatee. But the 
general law only permits delegation in ‘cases of necessity’.149 ‘There is a real risk that a 
superannuation trustee, by committing trust funds to a Fund of Hedge Funds, will be considered to 
be in breach of its general law obligation to exercise trust powers personally.’150  
The Global Fiduciary Standard is highly prescriptive requiring positive actions.151 Similarly, the UN 
Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century Program concludes: ‘failing to consider all long-term investment 
value drivers, including ESG issues, is a failure of fiduciary duty’.152 Necessarily, this implies positive 
actions. Australia may not have a choice. 
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2.6 The confluence of director and trustee duties: when does a director assume trustee or 
additional fiduciary liability? 
Every NBFE director should ask this question: there is not a simple answer. In Australian NBFEs, 
especially vertically integrated businesses, the answer is more often than directors may realise. 
Directors of corporate trustees of APRA regulated superannuation entities, of REs of unregistered or 
insolvent MIS, where there is a transfer of property by a fiduciary, cross-border asset allocation 
decisions, or where there are international business operations particularly involving US or Canadian 
entities may each find themselves subject to Australian trust law or fiduciary law of other 
jurisdictions. Directors of Australian resident foreign NBFEs and of Australian Government Owned 
Entities (GOEs) have additional legal overlays.153 
A trustee and a fiduciary have, distinctly, a duty to act ‘in the interests (or best interests) of their 
respective beneficiaries’ [where there is a fiduciary relationship].154 ‘The scope, even the independent 
existence of, this duty are matters of contest in private law … [with] no uniformly agreed and accepted 
understanding of what the description ‘fiduciary powers’ signifies in private law.155 
The courts look at the context or the matrix of circumstances to identify the intentions of the parties. 
An express trust can exist if it is intended,156 and the express term trust is used, or, if intention is not 
explicit, it can be imputed.157 Many trusts are implied, inferred, or imputed based on the parties’ 
intent.158 ‘[T]he courts will recognize the existence of a trust when it appears from the language of 
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the parties, construed in its context, including the matrix of circumstances, that the parties so 
intended.’159 Arguments for implied intention ‘can be ‘“finely balanced’” … and raise “cautionary 
concern” about the certainty of that intention’.160 
A director’s fiduciary duty is not the same as the trustee duty, despite common provenance as 
fiduciaries. Breach of trustee duty exists separately in the general law and statute. Whilst there are 
‘numerous differences between the functions of a trustee and those of a director’…161, there is 
nevertheless a degree of equivalence between the relationship of trustee and beneficiary and that of 
director and corporation not found in other fiduciary relationships’.162 However, ‘the duty of a 
director in equity to use reasonable care has developed a less onerous standard than that applied to a 
trustee’.163 Exercise of trustee power for ‘the proper purposes rule is not identical to the fiduciary best 
interest duty,164 which only applies to fiduciaries.165 Equitable fiduciary duties have been codified 
using language of the general law in the SIS Act, but subsumed piecemeal in the Corporations Act.  
Directors need to be particularly careful as to context to avoid becoming a putative trustee. Remedial 
constructive trusts are a feature of the Australian landscape operating concurrently with statutory 
remedies.166 ‘[T]here is still the potential for contrasting views in relatively settled areas of the law.’167 
‘The established rule that in order to constitute a trust the intention to do so must be clear and that it 
must also be clear what property is subject to the trust and reasonably certain who are the 
beneficiaries.’168 Usefully as to the nature of inquiry a director should make:  
Unless there is something in the circumstances of the case to indicate otherwise, a person who has ‘the 
custody and administration of property on behalf of others’ or who has ‘received, as and for the 
beneficial property of another, something which he has to hold, apply or account for specifically for 
his benefit’ is a trustee in the ordinary sense.169  
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One hallmark of a trustee is to not mix other money with their own. A person is bound to keep the 
money in a separate account if they are a trustee, and they are trustees if bound to keep the money in 
a separate account.170 Whether or not there is a constructive trust, or whether monies, separate or 
conjoined are in the nature of prepayments is a matter of judgment.171 ‘To require that a defendant 
must actually appreciate that the relevant facts constitute a trust in law would favour the legally 
ignorant over the legally aware, when the facts and knowledge are otherwise identical’.172  
Subsequent conduct may also evidence the existence of a trust.173  
It may seem surprising that there might be uncertainty about whether there is a trust…174 By the use 
possibly of unguarded language, a person may create a trust …175 it is not enough for a court to consider 
that the implied term expresses what would have been reasonable for the parties to agree to. It must 
be satisfied that it is what the contract actually means.176 Contractual obligations were sufficient…177  
Thus, factual knowledge as to the contractual obligations is sufficient to establish liability, a lesser 
test than under trust law. For directors of corporate trustees of superannuation entities, there is a: 
complex and multi-layered mix of general law and statutory regulation178 including general trust law, 
the Corporations Act, SIS Act [and Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act]. The SIS Act has 
evolved to direct trustee-director responsibility to the beneficiary, consistent with general law 
principles. These have been (previously for the most part) ‘accessorial in character’[,]179  
but that is not now the statutory position. This complex mix of duties may extend to officers, 
employees and agents of the corporate trustee.  
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2.7 Director and trustee liabilities for failures of fiduciary duty by others  
‘It was not necessary to know the “precise involvement” of Mr Cramer in the group’s affairs in order 
to suspect that neither he nor anyone else had the right to use Barlow Clowes’ money for speculative 
investments of their own’.180 
A director can be responsible for the unknown breaches of fiduciary duty of other directors, advisers 
and contracting parties to those directors or the company. Barnes v Addy181 (first and second limbs) 
liability can lead to serious consequences including the voiding of the directors’ insurance policy. ‘A 
breach of trust or a breach of fiduciary duty is at the heart of Barnes v Addy principles’.182 Liabilities 
may extend to third parties,183 who can become constructive trustees under the first limb.184 Knowing 
receipt of property means any one of the Baden categories of knowledge.185 Commercially, it may 
not be the director or trustee who is the real target, but a well-funded third party who permits their 
activities.186 
Second limb director or trustee liability for breaches of fiduciary duties of fellow directors has three 
elements. These are: there must be dishonest and fraudulent breach of duty by the trustee or fiduciary 
(breach without dishonesty and fraud will not suffice); the trustee or fiduciary must have known of 
the dishonest breach of trust or fiduciary duty; and the trustee or fiduciary must have assisted in the 
dishonest breach of trust or fiduciary duty. 
The concepts of knowledge and assistance or knowing assistance are heavily nuanced and can be 
fertile ground for a claim against a director, trustee, or other fiduciary using Barnes v Addy as 
authority. Knowledge is held to be:187 actual knowledge; or, wilful ignorance; or, failing to make 
enquiry; or circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person, or 
failure to recognise an impropriety that would have been apparent to an ordinary person with those 
standards; or knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable person on 
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enquiry. These Baden categories do not require actual knowledge but can be triggered by constructive 
knowledge, meaning context and the degree of enquiry. There does not need to be ‘“a guiding mind 
or minds”… that is, an identified person or persons of sufficient authority to bind their bank who 
were involved in committing the bank … and who had actual knowledge of the director’s breach of 
duty’.188 The scope of 
constructive knowledge is broad and can include: ought to have known; shut their eyes; failure to 
enquire; inference based on known facts; ignoring of warning signals; and buying of time. Indeed, 
knowing assistance: ‘only has to show that the fiduciaries conduct has passed quite a low threshold 
before it can be categorised as involving a dishonest and fraudulent design’.189  
‘Whether the accessory acted dishonestly or with lack of probity is to be judged by objective 
standards’.190 ‘Again, one might justifiably question whether even the trained legal mind is capable 
of making such fine distinctions’.191 
In Imobiliari, knowledge was further refined and nuanced:192 intent; actual knowledge; recklessness, 
meaning a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the property was subject to 
a trust and was received pursuant to a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty or a misapplication of trust 
property; negligence; strict liability. The present position is that the minimum knowledge requirement 
is the test of recklessness.193 But, 
I think this area of the law would be much improved if all the various categories were abolished and 
replaced with the simple rule that knowing receipt will be established where the plaintiff shows that 
the defendant acted recklessly … in receiving trust property that was misapplied or transferred in 
breach of trust or fiduciary duty.194 
Fiduciaries cannot ‘standby’,195 and professional advisers cannot participate in improper practices.196 
‘[T]he morally obtuse cannot escape by failure to recognise an impropriety that would have been 
apparent to an ordinary person applying the standards of such persons’.197 This settles the law in 
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Australia as to the second limb. However, ‘it is impossible to say with any confidence just what the 
law in Australia as to knowledge (and notice as to first limb liability) is’.198 
So directors may assume trustee-type liabilities as a result of becoming constructive trustees.199 This 
can arise from ‘knowledge or suspicion on his part of an improper or dishonest design in the 
transaction’.200 Where there is a remedial constructive trust or institutional constructive trust, then the 
trustees have ‘to account as defaulting fiduciaries would have been obliged to account’.201 
Declarations of constructive trust result in ‘introducing equitable doctrine into the field of commerce 
… in appropriate cases it is necessary to allow equitable doctrine to penetrate commercial 
transactions.’202 It is ‘inappropriate to artificially constrict the concept of fiduciary relationship of that 
would deny equity’s ability to do justice in appropriate cases’.203 ‘There are various interesting 
questions regarding the nature of a constructive trust and when it can be said to arise’.204 ‘The law of 
constructive trusts in this country [Australia] is ‘ill-defined’ (for my part, I would call it a mess)’.205 
There must be trust property: a cause of dispute in many NBFE cases. The law is not only restricted 
to trust property. First limb liability can extend to the receipt of other forms of property including 
‘dispositions of company property made by a director in breach of his fiduciary duties to the 
company,’206 not necessarily subject to any trust. Barnes v Addy liability is not ‘confined to trustees 
in the strict sense of the term’.207 Improper transfers of property by company officers to a third party 
who has knowledge of that misapplication are constructive trustees.208 This is an evolution of the 
general law to other fiduciaries and ‘in particular to company directors’.209  
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The property need not be tangible, but can include chose in action including intellectual property, 
patents, copyright,210 confidential information,211 and enforceable contractual rights.212 The nature of 
chose in action has also expanded and now include rights arising under contract and the benefits 
therefrom.213 ‘The release of confidential information is a breach of trust by the trustee. The release 
contravened the Cbus trust deed … and … was a result of officers of the trustee having procured a 
breach of trust.’214 This release of trust information was also a breach of contract and the Privacy 
Act.215 Whilst the Heydon Royal Commission did not directly invoke Barnes v Addy general law 
liability, 
[t]he responses of Cbus and the CFMEU have involved wilful blindness. They have involved massive 
mendacity to the point of perjury … Cbus has made almost ‘grovelling acknowledgments’ that the 
executives were at fault. But those acknowledgments took a long time to emerge.216  
2.8 Failure to inquire: fiduciaries looking the other way 
Opes Prime217 and a related entity, Leveraged Capital Pty Ltd entered into Securities Lending 
Agreements (SLAs) with their respective clients.218 This was one of many cases involving conduct 
by so-called margin lenders where title to the underlying assets passed to the funding banks, often 
without the knowledge of the investors, many of whom were longstanding clients.219 Imobiliari Pty 
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Ltd v Opes Prime220 sought to make ‘the banks legally liable for the allegedly misleading conduct 
engaged in by Opes in connection with share lending transactions entered into with investors’.221 
Banks being knowingly concerned that Opes made misleading representation to investors that they 
retained the beneficial interests in the loaned shares could result in equitable222 and statutory 
liability.223 However, the ‘elements of an express trust (intent, object of the trust, and beneficiary) 
were absent’.224 
Knowledge, being heavily nuanced and ‘not explicitly settled by the High Court’,225 is nonetheless to 
be applied in this case as ‘knowledge of facts that would put an honest and reasonable person on notice 
(but not merely inquiry) of a real and not remote risk that the transfer was in breach of trust or fiduciary 
duty or involved the misapplication of trust property’ …226 However, what that formulation means is 
debatable.227  
In this, and other similar cases, there were regular commercial interactions between the funding banks 
(wholesalers) and the intermediaries, like Opes, which were the packagers or retailers of these 
financial products. Formulated legally,  
at best, the allegations would establish that the banks had knowledge of circumstances that would have 
put an honest and diligent person on inquiry. Or, to put it another way, the banks were negligent in 
failing to keep aware of what Opes was up to …228 It is not an overly speculative leap from the 
proposition that the banks ‘should have made due diligence inquiries’ to the conclusion that, perhaps, 
the banks did make such inquiries from which they would have found out through readily available 
materials … what Opes was representing to investors …229 The rejection of a duty of inquiry is 
effectively the rejection of a negligence standard …230  
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It should be expected that a diligent bank officer, and their risk committees, based on freely available 
public information and regular commercial interaction, would have known about the ultimate 
destination of their funds and the terms on which they were being deployed. A diligent financial 
institution should have studied the AMSLA, being very complicated commercial documents. Looking 
the other way should not excuse liability. Neither should overt conflicts of interest between NBFE 
director obligations to their clients and contractual obligations to the banks. 
Rosenberg231 is other evidence that the banks looked the other way in publicly acknowledged 
commercial arrangements between Opes and ASX listed Tricom Group.232 ‘Mr Rosenberg believed 
that Opes would, in turn, have on-lent many of these securities to its financiers’.233 Opes’ financial 
difficulties damaged Tricom and its clients, resulting in a ‘need to take whatever action he could to 
recover the securities as soon as possible’.234 ‘Was Mr Rosenberg devious?’235 No. He was in honest 
pursuit of his client’s economic interests. 
Directors cannot turn a blind eye to their fiduciary duties: Elliott and Plymin.236 ‘It is the directors 
who have a duty to oversee the whole management of the company. Only they should owe the duty 
to prevent insolvent trading…’237 Individual directors have that duty personally.238 There is no 
distinction between the duties non-executive and executive directors,239 affirming other authorities. 
‘[I]nactivity or the failure to “attempt” to prevent the company from trading or incurring the debt will 
be sufficient to constitute a failure to prevent the company from incurring the debt…’240 The Santow 
principles,241 were applied to a director who ‘turned a blind eye to the details of Water Wheel’s 
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liquidity crisis in the hope that “something would turn up” to rescue the company and his own 
associated financial interests’.242 
2.9 Directors’ and trustees’ reliance on others 
Daniels v Anderson243 and VBN v APRA244 (in the superannuation context) evolved the law. A director 
of a NBFE asserts competencies in addition to professional skills sets. It is these implied or overt 
assertions that investors rely upon in disclosure documents. ‘It turns on the natural expectations and 
reliance placed by shareholders on the experience and skill of a particular director [being] a common 
law duty to take reasonable care owed severally by persons who are fiduciary agents…’245 The 
underlying distinction between what directors actually know and what they needed or ought to have 
known is the basis upon which non-executive directors have sought to excuse themselves. In modern 
practice, this is not sufficient. All directors can be liable for negligence and, if so, are tortfeasors.246 
Considerations of commercial complexity, board diversity, and the need for entrepreneurship can be 
lost in the responses to disclosure where investments have performed poorly or failed. This is no 
justification for ignorance or failure to inquire.  
If one feels that he has not had sufficient business experience to qualify him to perform the duties of 
a director, he should either acquire the knowledge by inquiry, or refuse to act. … The sentinel asleep 
at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect. …247 Directors are charged 
with keeping abreast of the bank’s business and exercising reasonable supervision and control over 
the activities of the bank … A director may not rely on the judgment of others. … Certainly, when an 
investment poses an obvious risk, a director cannot rely blindly on the judgment of others …248 a 
director’s duty to exercise due care, skill and diligence in overseeing the affairs of the bank cannot be 
met solely by relying on other persons.249  
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Whilst a US case, these same standards apply to directors in Australia.250  
In Vines (the GIO case), directors and senior executives also engaged and relied upon prominent third 
party advisers.251 Statutory liability rested with the target company, its directors, and some expert 
advisers. These statutory liabilities were based on belief in the reasonableness of the truth and 
adequacy of the disclosures, without an ‘express requirement to make reasonable enquiries or conduct 
due diligence’,252 other than for misleading statements.253 Nonetheless, ‘general law standards of care 
and diligence of company directors and officers are relevant and highly persuasive … to the 
interpretation of the statutory standard’.254 ‘I would not be justified in … setting the standard of care 
at a lower and less demanding level than the general law’.255 
In Healey (the Centro case), directors are ‘entitled to seek assistance in carrying out their 
responsibilities and may rely on others,’256 including declarations by the CEO or CFO.257 This 
reliance is limited so as ‘not to detract from the responsibilities otherwise imposed upon directors’.258 
Responsibility for the financial report and the directors’ report rests with the directors. Directors must 
take ‘all reasonable steps’259 to comply with the declaration requirements and compliance with the 
financial records and financial reporting requirements. It is not sufficient to delegate these duties to 
others ‘since directors are part of the process themselves by undertaking the task of approving and 
adopting the financial statements and reports’.260  
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What should directors actually do? What does all reasonable steps mean in practice? It means an 
objective analysis of each case: ‘the standard requires, at a minimum, that directors take a diligent 
and intelligent interest in the information either available to them or which they might appropriately 
demand from the executives or other employees and agents of the company’.261 Whilst this standard 
is derived from consideration of insolvency cases, the law is replete with references to the adjective 
reasonable. 
‘These duties do not mean that directors must reach every decision on the basis of their own 
knowledge, expertise and skills’.262 Directors must reasonably inform themselves as to the matter 
upon which they must make a judgment. This inevitably requires reliance on others (including 
employees, fellow directors in committee or otherwise, professional advisers): care needs to be taken 
to meet the statutory test of such reliance263 to ensure that statutory duty264 in respect of the standard 
of care are met together with equivalent duties in common law and equity.265 The reliance must be 
made in good faith and after making an independent assessment of the information or advice and the 
directors reliance is reasonable ‘unless the contrary is proved’.266 These tests require the application 
of time and financial resources which relate directly to the directors contract of engagement. They 
are cumulative tests, and failure to comply may render ineffective a defence under the business 
judgment rule.267  
2.10 Business judgment of directors and officers in disclosure cases 
Australia’s regulatory environment relies heavily on disclosure: to capital markets, investors, and for 
sound corporate governance. Disclosure is often a matter of business judgment. It is extremely 
dangerous for directors to rely on other directors, management, and advisers in matters of disclosure. 
Disclosure can be matters of historic facts, embellished or ignored; it can be assessments of the future, 
an uncertain and risky proposition, subject to manipulation. A determination whether ‘the impugned 
conduct is found to be a mere error of judgment’268 becomes enormously important since it does not 
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trigger contravention of the Act.269 ‘In the period between the introduction of the business judgment 
rule in 2000 and the case of ASIC v Rich in 2009 … [it] had not successfully been invoked.’270  
Judicial interpretation of the BJR illustrates director conflicts between entrepreneurship and bondage. 
There is no consistency of application. The Corporations Act s 180(3) defines business judgment 
broadly including relevant matters of commission and omission. Directors cannot look the other way 
or remain in unminuted silence and achieve BJR protection. Broad statutory definition is not 
consistent with a safe harbour. Conversely, ‘what is intended as a safe harbour for honest business 
decisions that turn out badly … does not imply lesser standards in making an informed decision’.271 
Additionally, judicial opinion countenances an overlay of duty of care standards which ‘reflect[s] 
contemporary community expectations’.272  
‘[I]t is not achieving the purpose of protecting the authority of directors in the discharge of their 
duties, nor has it led to legal clarity regarding director liability’.273 The tensions occur in disclosure 
and reliance upon others assisting in those disclosures.274 
‘Ambiguous’, ‘confusing’, and ‘opaque’, … [i]f the drafting of the BJR is decidedly ‘confusing’ from 
the perspective of a Supreme Court Justice, it has no doubt been unable to provide certainty to the 
directors who seek to rely on it …275 [T]here was no protection of the authority of directors in 
exercising their judgment to rely upon management and experts.276 
Storm Financial non-executive directors were insufficiently knowledgeable of the Storm client base 
to make informed assessments of the Storm business model on its clients including the reasonableness 
of the advice given: 
Australian company legislation since 1958 has clearly recognised a public character to the duty in s 
180(1) ... [and] plainly continues to treat a contravention of s 180(1) as both a public and private 
wrong. …277 This ‘public duty [may] exist[s] independently … [and] is owed to the public at large. 
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…’278 It is a ‘question of high level theory’279 cognisant of broader directors’ duties ‘expressed 
generally’280 and ‘harm to any of the interests of the corporation’,281 including its reputation. 
[C]assimatis’ duty to consider Storm’s interests when managing the corporation does not require a 
narrow construction of Storm’s interests limited only to the interests of its shareholders … Storm’s 
interests should not be construed narrowly.282 
These judicial sentiments reflect community expectations of their business leaders and their 
assumptions of fiduciary protections. Both remain unmet and are statutorily unresolved. 
Healey identifies several deficiencies requiring statutory remedy. It also illustrates the inter-
relationship between s 180 and corresponding registered MIS s 601FD283 provision where there is no 
safe harbour protection. Errors of judgment can readily occur where the availability, volume, 
timeliness, and volatility of board papers is not properly controlled by the board. ‘The complexity 
and volume of information cannot be an excuse for failing to read and understand the financial 
statements’.284 The agenda for this board meeting, the accounts for which were signed only two days 
after management had completed them, ‘were still being considered by the auditor and were subject 
to changes’.285 The versions of the accounts available to the directors were volatile in content, 
available without appropriate time for proper consideration, and then only in a location which may 
not be a suitable environment for diligent study. 
The non-executive directors had not been given sufficient time to review the final accounts prior to 
the meetings …286 It is clear that: (a) drafting and consideration of the full financial statements of CPL 
continued up to and after the accounts were signed … and (b) there are differences between the notes 
in the full financial statements of CPL as compared with the CPL concise financial statements.287 
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These procedural failures led to ‘[e]rrors were so obvious that it can readily be inferred that it was 
negligent for the directors to have failed to detect them’.288 ‘[I]n my opinion it is analogous to a fraud 
case by reason of the very serious allegations that have been made against each of the directors.’289  
Each director failed: 
[T]o take the following steps that a reasonable person would have taken if they were in the director’s 
position.290 ‘Each … director failed to make enquiries of management …291 This was not ‘mere 
technical oversight’,292 but the errors in the financial statements were so obvious that breach of the 
standard of due care and diligence is the inescapable conclusion to be drawn by the court …293 More 
than a mere ‘going through the paces’ is required for directors.294 
There were foreseeable consequences arising from misclassification of liabilities and failure to 
disclose corporate guarantees likely to lead to a loss of confidence. ‘[T]he role of a director is 
significant as their actions may have a profound effect on the community’;295 ‘in determining liability 
of a defendant as company chairman, is to articulate and apply a standard of care that reflects 
contemporary community expectations’.296 Informed decisions were impossible, not mere mistakes, 
breaching s 180(1), eliminating recourse to s 180(2) and providing statutory, fiduciary and tortious 
grounds for breach of business judgment. 
Similarly, in Hellicar where conflicting judicial inference was required to interpret directors’ 
unminuted silence: 
Some directors breached their duties by ‘voting in favour of the resolution without either asking for a 
copy of the announcement or knowing its terms, or by failing to abstain from voting in favour of 
approval of the announcement’ …297  
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Directors were in breach of duty of care,298 enlivening s 180(2) without the benefit of its provisions. 
A defence based on false records, of whatever provenance opens directors to significant criminal 
penalties and reputational discredit.299 
Fortescue Metals provides insight into the commercial realities of disclosing cross-border 
transactions involving different business cultures, common in NBFEs. For unlisted NBFE securities 
disclosure is governed by contract and statute, not on a continuous disclosure basis required by ASX. 
These disclosures can be opaque, if not misleading. ASX obligations point more broadly to disclosure 
policy for NBFEs. Whether Framework Agreements were contracts or an agreement to agree affects 
their continuous disclosure requirement. ‘Those trading in Fortescue Metals300 securities had been 
seriously misinformed about the affairs of the company’.301 Even if, ‘by reason of serendipity, 
shareholders made a gain’302 that does not permit directors to ignore their continuous disclosure 
obligations. 
When does an agreement to agree or agreements to negotiate where there are no legally enforceable 
obligations require continuous disclosure and to what extent in exercising judgment, is a director able 
to rely on the statutory business judgment provision?303 Would ‘an ordinary and reasonable person, 
being a member of the investing public’304 believe that the publicly announced agreements be binding 
in material sense?  
The decision not to disclose the true effect of the ‘Framework Agreements’ cannot be described as 
‘business judgment’ at all. A decision not to make accurate disclosure of a major contract is not a 
decision related to the ‘business operations’ of the corporation. Rather, it is a decision related to 
compliance with the requirements of the Act305 … It can reasonably be inferred that he [Forrest] knew 
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the directors were acutely conscious of the sufficiency question. Minutes of the board meeting were later 
claimed by the directors to be a false record of that meeting. To find that the minutes of a company listed on 
the ASX were false in so important a respect was a serious matter legally and commercially. It is 
fundamental to the running of so large and important an organisation as JHIL. …The meeting in question 
“may have been the most significant in the company’s history”. … The announcement made to the ASX was 
subject to change, but the changes made by others, despite their protestation, was “not significant” and “did 
not alter the fundamental meaning of what was said”’. 
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of the disparity between these terms and FMG’s representations about them306 … It is not an intention 
lightly to be attributed to the legislature that a director of a company might lawfully decide, as a matter 
of business judgment that a corporation under his or her control should not comply with a requirement 
of the Act.307  
‘This Australian business judgment provision does ‘not authorise conduct which involves the 
contravention of a specific provision of the Act … especially where the Act provides a specific ground 
of defence in relation to that provision’.308 The non-disclosure of the Framework Agreements may 
have resulted in pecuniary penalty to FMG, enlivening breach of the statutory duty of care. The High 
Court disagreed, finding no breach of s 180(1) so no failure of disclosure that constituted a business 
judgment for the purposes of s 180(2).309 
In Adler, directors were found to have made no business judgment or failed to satisfy s 180(2) or had 
a personal interest,310 thereby having no business judgment defence. They, separately, ‘went well 
beyond a mere error of judgment’ … ‘committ[ed] a serious breach of s 180’ … and indulged in 
‘conduct of the utmost folly’.311 Howard,312 a related case:  
By failing to act in the interests of the corporation, preferring his own interests … he abused the trust 
that had been placed in him. He acted out of greed. … At a time when [he] should have exhibited 
character, he had none.313 
In Rich, contravention of directors statutory duties of care and diligence were divided into two classes: 
‘corporation/schemes’ and ‘financial services’.314 A series of cases illustrating the tension created by 
‘statutory compromise between two competing policy objectives…’315 resulted in judicial concern 
that ‘the placement of the onus of proof on the director ensures that the elements of the directors 
decision – contrary to the very purposes of a business judgment rule – are subject to judicial 
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scrutiny’.316 This is contrary to the legislative intent and US ALI practice. There must also be proof 
of ‘rational belief’317 in the best interests of the company. 
Having a rational belief is a different test from what constitutes objective best interest required in s 
181. To some extent, s 180(2) is inconsistent with a directors’ duty to act objectively in the best 
interest of the company, not just a belief, rational or not. It conflicts with the objective standard for 
REs of MIS in s 601FD, and is more akin to the belief (not rational belief) standard applying to 
registered organisations, themselves companies. Similarly, the broad statutory definition of business 
judgment is silent on director silence. Subjectivity is overlain with judicial interpretation of 
inconsistent and evolutionary community expectations. The authors’ qualitative research suggests 
those expectations may have fiduciary rather than duty of care origins. Consequently, despite 
legislative intent, the BJR, judicially emasculated, applies if at all, on subjective bases, with the onus 
of proof on the director: in many cases impeded by directors’ self-immolation. And then only when 
the company is not an RE or corporate trustee. 
2.11 The only Certainty is Uncertainty 
In Kinghorn,318 a finding of corrupt conduct depended upon his essentially passive role in failing to 
disclose information.  
[It] depended upon such non-disclosure constituting an offence … involving conduct of a director or 
other officer of a corporation which is recklessly or intentionally dishonest, and failing to exercise the 
powers and discharge the duties of a director in good faith and for a proper purpose …319 the 
Commission has some interest in having an appellate court resolve the proper construction of s 184(1) 
of the Corporations Act…320 
Can a director engage deliberately in a conduct knowing that it was not in the best interests of the 
company? Can the aversion of a personal loss or detriment constitute the gaining of an advantage? Is 
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a ‘“failure to exercise powers” a separate head of criminality, and ‘acting in good faith for the best 
interests of the corporation’ a separate head of duty’?321  
For conduct to be dishonest means ‘dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people’.322  
to observe the proscriptive obligations imposed on fiduciaries, it may be necessary for a fiduciary to 
perform some positive act. But that does not mean that there is a prescriptive element to the fiduciary 
duty. It means that, to avoid a conflict of interest (or avoid profiting at the expense of the beneficiary), 
it is necessary for the fiduciary to take some positive step.323  
Kinghorn and VBN are insightful for those NBFE directors dealing with regulatory authorities. There 
can be considerable uncertainty and risk. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 
published an adverse report on alleged corrupt conduct by directors which ‘was not made according 
to law and is a nullity’.324 ‘The plaintiffs were denied natural justice because they were unable to 
respond to the cases against them’.325 The State (NSW) struck back:326 ‘The amendment was to 
operate retrospectively, with the consequence that the legal basis upon which the Commission had 
conceded that its appeal with respect to Mr Kinghorn must be dismissed was no longer the law’.327  
2.12 Equitable compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty 
The principles of causation for equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty are clear. There 
must be ‘criteria which supply an adequate or sufficient connection between the equitable 
compensation claimed and the breach of fiduciary duty’.328 ‘What constitutes adequate or sufficient 
connection is not predetermined or formulaic’.329 In breaches of trust where a trustee is dealing with 
trust property, the law has evolved further and there are ‘stringent tests to the selection of those events 
preceding the loss which are to be taken as causing the loss’.330 Compensation payable for ‘breaches 
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of fiduciary duty is assessed based on loss at the time of the trial with the full benefit of hindsight’.331 
Trustees may also be required to compensate for foregone usage of money. The ‘general principle is 
that where a trustee has, through his breach of trust, occasioned loss to the trust estate then he is liable 
to make good that loss, together with interest’.332 
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3. EVOLUTION AND MEANING OF THE BEST INTEREST DUTY 
3.1 Statutory and general law: variance as to the interpretation of the best interest duty 
Best interest is a commonly used and misunderstood phrase interpreted differently in the law, media, 
legislature and throughout the NBFE investment chain. For investors, best interest can be confused 
with oft-misguided concepts of undivided loyalty to their own economic interests, sometimes 
conflated with Messianic leadership.  
Directors and trustees apply the phrase without understanding its differing interpretations, sometime 
glibly; others give it lip service. Honesty alone is not a sufficient discharge of trustee duty: there must 
also be objective process. That process differs with varying interpretations of best interest. For 
example, best interest in Australian investment decisions conflicts with modern portfolio theory. Best 
interest in financial advice varies with adviser and recipient. The law is complex, often uncertain, and 
lags comparative jurisdictions. 
There are multiple and differing interpretations of best interest in the Corporations Act,333 SIS Act,334 
and the Fair Work (Registered Organisations Act).335 General law interpretations, fiduciary or 
otherwise add to the confusion. The Corporations Act336 requires directors to act in good faith in the 
best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose. There is no qualification as to belief, as 
there was in the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act337 until amended in December 2016 still 
echoed in the rational belief requirement in Corporation Act BJR s 180(2).338 
The Corporations Act has the higher standard fiduciary duty of good faith: it requires objective 
evidence that directors act in in the company’s best interest.339 However, directors can be in breach 
of fiduciary duty, having acted honestly and in the belief that the act is in the company’s interests 
unless they can demonstrate an objective standard. Further, ‘“interests of the company” and “best 
interests” of the company’ are not necessarily the same, but could be’.340 Superannuation entity 
trustees are subject to the same general law obligations as those in a traditional trust, traditionally the 
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interests of the members rather than their best interest.341 The SIS Act now extends this definition of 
best interest for MySuper default funds to best (long term) financial interest.342 In MIS, 
[t]he meaning of the phrase ‘best interests of the members …343 has not previously been the subject of 
judicial consideration and accordingly I have given it special attention’. …344 The ‘best interests of the 
members’ is determined by the particular context in which a specific trust operates. … The scheme 
constitution governs the trustee in the exercise of the powers and duties, subject to relevant equitable 
principles and statutory provisions. … Where, as here, the trust deed forms part of a contractual 
agreement it is all of the more sacrosanct because the law of contract is added to the law of trusts. …345 
Directors should heed the general law further since it is difficult to discern the outer boundaries of the 
best interests duty and ‘the statute alone does not make clear where the boundary lies’ and it is 
appropriate to consider the meaning of the term under general law.346  
Best interests in their statutory formulations347 are not defined. As Donald has identified, general law 
phraseology of variable interpretation was applied in the statutes. This uncertainty is compounded by 
the more recent extension of superannuation covenants to directors of their corporate trustees 
personally, hence the need of trustee directors to pay homage to the boundaries of the general law. 
‘[T]he case law directly interpreting and applying the relevant provisions is scant’.348 An important 
distinction between the duties of a superannuation entity trustee and an RE MIS directors duty is that 
trustees are ‘required to engage with the issues they face, and not merely to ensure they have a pre-
defined process has been followed accurately, or in the vernacular, that all the boxes have been 
ticked’.349 This is not necessarily so for directors of an RE. ‘While the RE model emphasises the 
importance of compliance arrangements, that is quite different from performance and it is worth 
examining whether an independent trustee (or other) model would provide greater oversight and be 
better at resolving inherent conflicts of interest’.350 This would return Australia to pre-1998 
regulation.  
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The heritage of the best interest duty lies in equity. This means a fiduciary duty to give undivided 
loyalty to the beneficiaries and ‘trustees must do the best they can for the beneficiaries and not merely 
avoid harming them’.351 Meaning: ‘a combination of the established duties’352 rather than ‘a distinct 
and separate duty … not an obligation to act in a way which the trustee honestly considered to be in 
their interests, but a positive obligation to act in what are, objectively, their interests’.353 However, 
the best interest duty is ‘relevant to the exercise of a dispositive trust or power but not to its 
existence’.354 The trustees’ duty of undivided loyalty is ‘the most fundamental duty of a trustee’.355 
‘The duty of loyalty is, then, the fruit of the courts’ efforts to regulate the behaviour of trustees when 
their duties as trustees require them to act in ways that may or do conflict with their own personal 
interests’.356 Hence, the best interests duty 
is an ‘umbrella’ duty which embraces a large number of individual, well recognised duties357 which is 
in addition to other trustee duties and includes ‘pursuit of the best possible authorised end or outcome 
for the trust as a whole but also the observance of proper procedures and processes in decision 
making’.358  
So whilst a trustee may not actually achieve the best possible outcome for the beneficiaries, the trustee 
must act objectively, not just honestly, in striving to achieve that result. Trustees’ duties may only be 
impugned where there are later and adverse consequences for the beneficiaries.359 In Prime Trust, the 
directors were held to have acted honestly in their belief constitutional amendments were valid,360 
and had not breached the Corporations Act,361 despite ‘the controlling operative and directive minds 
in respect of the process…’362  
The obligations of trustees outside this statutory context [Corporations Act] would not authorise a 
trustee to act in accordance with a purportedly amended trust deed if it was invalidly amended … [the 
RE] caused the constitution to be amended … [and] paid trust money to itself upon the basis that the 
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amendments were effective. At no stage was member approval for the amendments to the constitution 
sought.363 
Prime Trust is an exemplar of the Corporations Act subsuming trust law, facilitating box-ticking 
value shifting conduct in defiance of the spirit of the general law, arguably acting against the best 
interest of the members. Such value extraction by related parties strikes at the heart of investor 
confidence and the veracity of all Australian MIS.  
There is considerable subjectivity defining the interests of the company and the exercise of power for 
a proper purpose. It is ‘the directors who make business decisions and courts have traditionally not 
pronounced on the commercial justification for those decisions’.364 However, whether or not the 
directors have complied with the law will be determined objectively. ‘The issue is as to the director’s 
state of mind’.365 The best interest duty requires standards of conduct which underpin the role of a 
fiduciary who are required ‘to do the job you were asked to do (and only that job) but also to do it 
properly’.366 Meaning: proper procedural elements in trustee decisions are as important as the 
achievement of the best outcomes for the beneficiaries based on the knowledge of the time, not in 
hindsight.367 
With court widening of interested stakeholder groups, ‘whether the “best interests” of the company 
as a whole reflect those of the shareholders in the light of the corporate objects, or those of the 
creditors which will prevail in the context of insolvency…’368 ‘The court must consider the interests 
of the company as a whole’.369 This includes the assessment of whether a directors ‘state of mind’ in 
a conflict of interest situation warrants examination,370 and the ‘prospects of success of the action’.371 
It might be that it is not in the 
best interests of the company where the directors decide that that is the case and all of the directors 
who have participated in that decision acted in good faith and for a proper purpose, did not have a 
material interest in the decision, properly informed themselves about the subject matter of the decision 
to the extent they reasonably believed was appropriate and rationally believed that the decision was in 
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the best interest of the company. A belief is a rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable 
person in the position of the directors would hold.372  
The statutory best interest duty of financial advisers to their client is different to that of directors of 
the corporate trustee of a MIS. It is different again for directors of registered organisations 
(traditionally a lesser test) and for directors of trustees of superannuation entities where there is 
statutory personal liability to the beneficiary. Community expectations of best interest which prima 
facie confer fiduciary status may be different again. Custodians, depending on their contractual 
arrangements, may or may not have a best interest duty. Comparative jurisdictions have other 
interpretations of best interest. Industry consolidation and vertical integration (especially involving 
financial advice, wealth management, corporate advice, securities broking, investment managers, and 
custodians) further complicate the duties of directors and trustees and deepen the expectations chasm 
between them and their clients, beneficiaries and investors, particularly where those persons may be 
vulnerable. 
3.2 Is best interest a fiduciary duty? 
The best interest duty, in its differing manifestations,373 has its heritage in equity and can only be 
properly exercised in general law by fiduciaries adopting the undivided loyalty standard. Ipso facto, 
those exercising best interest duties are exerting fiduciary powers. Context indicates that the best 
interest duty as applied by fiduciaries can indeed be fiduciary in character despite statutory and some 
general law constraints.  
Fiduciaries may be status based (directors, trustees, agents) or contractors (financial planners in 
general law). Status based fiduciaries are subjected to positive statutory extensions of their duty 
conferring nexus between fiduciary and beneficiary (in APRA regulated superannuation) and member 
(in MIS). These statutory best interest provisions accorded fiduciaries are positive, prescriptive and 
sometimes discretionary. They operate concurrently with proscriptive no-conflict, no-profit without 
informed consent rules under statute and general law and with non-fiduciary duties including duty of 
care. Nonetheless, the statutory duties are essentially ‘fiduciary’.374 
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Some statutory intervention (and contract) has corrupted and subsumed the application of that 
fiduciary standard, particularly in MIS and retail financial advice. Where there is no statutory remedy 
for best interest failure, unregistered MIS for example, resolution is usually provided in equity. 
3.3 Best interest in investment strategy 
As Donald notes, performance and appropriateness are both important objective criteria where there 
is no statutory definition of ‘investment strategy’.375 ‘Courts are unlikely to be sympathetic towards 
trustees whose lack of diligence or care exposes their trust to uncompensated risks’.376 Risk is the 
corollary of return: prudence is not the absence of risk. These risks include valuation information 
from investment vehicles devoid of transparency (eg hedge and private equity funds, funds of funds). 
‘Direct investment by trustees into such [alternative] investments raises the “due diligence” bar very 
high indeed’377 with a ‘dramatic increase in the work required prior to and after investment to satisfy 
(and be seen to satisfy) the trustees’ duty of care’378 Trustees of Australian superannuation entities 
must follow the prudent superannuation trustee standard in each discrete investment decision. That it 
may not result in optimal investment portfolio performance for the fund by the standards of modern 
portfolio theory is not relevant to the decision, resulting in further uncertainty.379 For NBFEs with 
operations in the US, Canada, and the UK, this is not the case.380 Their law has evolved so that 
‘prospective investments should be considered not in isolation from other investments, but rather in 
the context of the overall risk level of the fiduciary’s investment portfolio.’381 
In the absence of a statutory definition of investment strategy,382 ‘those responsible for the 
management of investment portfolios, such as trustees and their agents, are acutely worried that their 
actions will be judged with the benefit of hindsight or without regard for the portfolio context’.383 
‘Due diligence’ is subjective and can ‘connote different things to different people’.384 Given the 
complexity of modern superannuation funds, many MIS, and the self-immolation in Australia’s 
corporate governance there is generally not the skills sets available at board level without 
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considerable reliance upon third party advisers. ‘Trustees need to ensure that the terms of reference, 
taken together, address the issues comprehensively’.385 For completeness, given the temptations of 
hindsight and the asymmetry of fiduciary duties, independent review of the advice, both for accuracy 
and efficacy as understood in trust law would be prudent despite the additional costs.  
Best interests of the trust are not necessarily the same as best interests of specific beneficiaries and 
the best interest duty allows trustees to not perform an action.386 Best interest relies upon the purposes 
of the trust and what benefits were intended to be conferred on the trusts’ beneficiaries.387 It may 
mean ‘best financial interest’,388 in which case choice of investment options (rather than default 
options) in superannuation products may expose trustee directors to claim arising from poor 
investment choices by the beneficiary.389 Trustee selection of asset allocation choices therefore needs 
to be carefully considered and external political and societal pressures for particular asset classes 
ignored. Best financial interest may mean long term financial interest requiring trustee responsibility 
for asset liquidity, beneficiary longetivity, and other market-linked risks. 
For trustees administering MySuper products, there are additional requirements. These include a 
prescriptive duty to ‘promote the financial interests of the beneficiaries’,390 and ‘determine on an 
annual basis whether the beneficiaries are disadvantaged in comparison to beneficiaries of other funds 
holding a My Super product.391 Trustees need to contemplate whether to advise beneficiaries to 
transfer to competing funds, a substantial extension of their statutory best interest duty. The extension 
of statutory superannuation corporate trustee director liability to the members personally392 adds 
considerably to the risk associated with being a director of a superannuation corporate trustee.  
‘The relationship between statutory provisions and the general law … is much more problematic ... 
likely to tax the cognitive powers of its subjects just as surely as they impose a cost burden on 
them’.393  
What ‘the interests’ of aggrieved persons may be and how they ought to be protected are 
matters incapable of categorisation or of precise definition. Indeed, it would have been folly 
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on the part of the legislature to attempt to define or limit what interests should be protected or 
how: to do so would have been to ignore the sad reality that the ingenuity of fraudsters is 
inexhaustible, their snares for the gullible pitiless and of infinite variety, and the eagerness of 
the foolish to be parted from their money irrepressible.394 
A ‘bitter pill’.395 But nonetheless restored directors to the status the directors had as if APRA had 
never made its disqualification decision. VBN v APRA disquieted directors and trustees: the operation 
of the statutory best interest covenants396 undermined their putative general law duty.397 
The Directors had relied on the legal and actuarial advice they had received. No action had 
been taken against the professional advisers who had proferred that advice … and yet the 
Trustee and its Directors were said to be derelict in performing their roles. … 398 Whilst 
professional advice is essential … the Trustees obligation goes beyond simply seeking, 
accepting and following professional advice. The SIS Act and Regulations clearly require 
those Directors and so the Trustee, to use their own acumen, knowledge and judgment in 
weighing all relevant factors including professional advice.399  
Meaning, a trustee director following professional investment advice can still be in breach of the 
statutory covenants. Statutory liability is strictly personal. A trustee can, as with companies that are 
not trustees, make specific delegations to a committee of directors, or a director, but the trustee duty 
remains with the entity as a whole.400 
3.4 Best interest in financial and investment advice 
This discussion of interests, however defined, does not address the systemic problem of the gap 
between customer or investor expectations and market practices in financial services advice or 
financial products selling. Reasonable expectations of financial advice and its implementation may 
give rise to an equitable fiduciary relationship in personalised financial advice,401 but is facts 
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specific.402 ‘The precise content of that obligation is in every case, including that of each financial 
services firm, particular to the nature of the undertaking from which the fiduciary obligation 
springs’.403 It may spring from the initial contact with a putative client ‘advice about advice’, before 
providing the statutorily controlled404 ‘substantive advice’.405  
Much rests upon the Wallis inspired principles of disclosure and client ability to properly provide 
informed consent, both of which are subjective tests. 
Mere disclosure of this information may not be enough to establish the level of fully informed consent 
that equity requires. The client must understand the impact of what is being disclosed in its position 
and its relationship with the financial services firm, and must give its consent (express or implied) to 
the existence of that conflict or collateral advantage … the firm has the onus of proving that it obtained 
the client’s fully informed consent to its obtaining any benefit, or acting when it had a conflict in, that 
relationship. The burden in equity is high, particularly where the client is unsophisticated.406 
This echoes but is a different and lesser obligation than the German civil law doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo being positive ex ante action requiring client comprehension which cannot be contracted 
away. Australian informed consent law is not a positive fiduciary duty ― ‘the existence of an 
informed consent goes to negate what otherwise would be a breach of [fiduciary] duty.’407 The 
fiduciary must be in receipt of or obtain informed consent, but the obtaining of it is not a fiduciary 
duty. That process will depend on context, often in contract.408 
Many of these issues would disappear if the financial planning industry were separated into those that 
provide professional advice and those that sell financial products.409  
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A bank may be expected to act in its own interests in ensuring the security of its position as lender to 
its customer, but it may have created in the customer the expectation that nevertheless it will advise in 
the customer’s interests as to the wisdom of a proposed investment. This may be the case where the 
customer may fairly take it that to a significant extent his interest is consistent with that of the bank in 
financing the customer for a prudent business venture. In such a way, the bank may become a fiduciary 
and occupy the position of what Brennan J has called an investment adviser.410 
There has been a common expectation by financial products investors seeking financial advice that 
there is a relationship based in fiduciary principles. Part of the mismatch in expectations has been 
poor financial literacy and misunderstanding of the law, but part is innate trust assumed by investors 
in professional persons with whom they deal.  
Where a bank gives a customer advice upon financial affairs, then in addition to any contractual rights 
the customer may have, the relationship between the parties may be such as to found either, or both, a 
common law duty of care and a fiduciary duty.411  
‘Generally, the degree of care required under a contractual obligation to exercise reasonable skill and 
care is different from the reasonable prudence that a person in a fiduciary position must exercise’.412 
Many banks (often through their controlled entities) provide advice on investments. ‘A person 
offering personal advice to a retail client ‘must act in the best interests of the client in relation to the 
advice’413 The  
duty is to furnish the client with all the relevant knowledge which the adviser possesses, concealing 
nothing that might reasonably be regarded as relevant to the making of the investment decision’ and 
‘to give the best advice which the adviser could give if he did not have but a third party did have a 
financial interest in the investment to be offered, to reveal fully the adviser’s financial interest, and to 
obtain for the client the best terms which the client would obtain from a third party if the adviser were 
to exercise due diligence on behalf of his client in such a transaction.414  
This applies in other NBFEs.  
Normally, the relationship between a stockbroker and his client will be one of a fiduciary nature and 
such as to place on the broker an obligation to make the client a full and accurate disclosure of the 
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broker’s own interest in the transaction. … The duty arises when, and because, a relationship of 
confidence exists between the parties.415  
Variance from these duties requires the fiduciary to obtain fully informed consent from their client. 
‘What is required for a fully informed consent is a question of fact in all of the circumstances of each 
case and there is no precise formula which will determine in all cases if fully informed consent has 
been given’.416 
‘The duties and obligations that Australian financial services firms owe to their clients derive from a 
complex set of rules and principles arising in common law (particularly contract and tort), equity 
(including fiduciary principles) and statute’.417 Whilst financial services businesses are not recognised 
as status-based fiduciaries, and financial planners have no statutory fiduciary duty, the obligations 
are specific to the context in which financial services are provided and the contracts under which they 
are provided. 
Where both the equitable and statutory obligations apply, the statutory duties do not displace the 
equitable principles … [and] may well impose different (and more onerous) obligations on financial 
services firms than the statutory duties…418  
The statutory best interest duty in financial advice is prescriptive,419 including seven measures, and 
requires an appropriateness test for retail clients.420 These are ‘highly relevant to the Court’s 
assessment of compliance with the best interest duty’.421 They add to concepts of fiduciary duty in 
the same case, perhaps even subsuming them.422 ‘It is likely to be many years before the courts can 
interpret the content of the duty … will take many years and many cases before it is clear how the 
best interest duty operates423 … and greatly complicates the existing regime of protections’.424 ‘There 
does not appear to be any detailed consideration of the provisions that are the subject of this 
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proceeding’,425 whilst applying Santow principles for breaches of them.426 Whilst the origin of the 
best interest duty is in equity and is fiduciary-like, the statutory duty in retail financial advice is 
prescriptive and procedural. It may act to reduce or eliminate client equitable remedies.  
[T]he statutory best interest provision is a long way from what equity understands the ‘best interest’ 
concept to mean, on even the narrowest view of that understanding. … The statutory best interest 
obligation is expressed as a series of steps to be undertaken, not as an obligation to prefer the client’s 
interest over the firm’s or to avoid the situations of conflict or collateral damage that fiduciary law 
proscribes … [and is] a significant departure from the best interest obligations that apply in equity to 
financial advisers.427 
It is process driven, not outcome driven, provides a safe haven for advisers,428 does not fulfil its 
original policy objectives of statutory fiduciary duty and therefore does not meet community 
expectations of what the law should mean. These include fiduciary obligations of undivided loyalty 
of financial and corporate advisers to their clients, and restorative remedies for breach. It further 
entrenches the doctrine of prioritisation over prohibition. ‘[I]t may operate to limit existing duties of 
financial advisers … apparently contrary to the intention of the post-GFC reforms’.429 Subsequent 
testing in 2017 provides the proof: 100% of advisers in the sample relied on the statutory safe harbour 
provision. 75% of those advisers claiming reliance on it did not comply with their statutory best 
interest duty with 10% leaving their client in a worse financial position.430 This is damning evidence 
of the subsuming of general law fiduciary obligation by compromised statute. 
Expectations of fiduciary obligation create a false sense of security which is not met in practice. They 
arise from the politicisation of the debate: it is a sop, reflected in parliamentary commentary of the 
time. Accretive statutory change has bizarre results: 
the new law applies to some financial services firms who are not fiduciaries with respect to the giving 
of that advice at general law. However, because of the narrow definition of retail client, many financial 
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advisers who are fiduciaries (for example, the advisers in Wingecarribee and Bathurst[431]) are not 
subject to the new law.432 
Further complication is added by the statutory distinction between liabilities to the employer resulting 
from their representatives and Authorised Representatives for whom ‘there is no equivalent 
provision’,433 these definitional problems stemming in part from s 9 of the Corporations Act.434  
Statutory reform has materially evolved the nature of regulation of financial products and financial 
services that largely subsume general law principles even as they employ similar language. ‘We live 
in the ‘Age of Statutes’.435 Insightfully, the intrusion of statute ‘is all too evident in both the FoFA 
and Stronger Super reforms. It is manifest in the sheer number of provisions that have been required 
to achieve a small number of easily articulated objectives’.436 ‘The provisions relating to the 
prohibition of certain types of “conflicted remuneration” are particularly Byzantine’.437 
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4. FAILURES OF BEST INTEREST DUTY BY FIDUCIARIES 
4.1 Financial advice 
4.1.1 Fiduciary duty to wholesale clients with retail financial literacy competencies 
‘Abandon all hope, ye who enter here’.438 Wingecarribee Shire Council and other Australian local 
authorities, ‘Wingecarribee’439 and their compatriots in the UK and the US passed through these gates 
of hell. They suffered losses arising out of their acquisition of synthetic440 collateralised debt 
obligations (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS), collectively (Dante Notes).441  
‘These products took hundreds of closely typed legally dense pages to document’.442 ‘A professional, 
in Grange’s position, does not discharge any duty of disclosure or adequately explain a complex 
transaction merely by giving its client a copy of voluminous documentation and inviting the client to 
look at it, unaided by the professional…’443 Grange, on inquiry was ‘hardly candid’ about its 
remuneration, and its answers were ‘calculated to mislead and deceive’.444  
I do not accept Grange’s characterisation of its mere references in its selling materials to other 
documents that contained the full terms and conditions, including risk disclosures, as an attempt to 
provide the Councils, as clients, any substantive assistance to understand the underlying issues that 
may have affected the Councils’ investment decision-making. These documents were of a ‘byzantine’, 
or as Lord Mance said ‘purgatorial’ complexity.445… Grange had an obligation to make a full and 
accurate disclosure of its interest in the transaction and all that Grange knew with respect to the 
product, concealing nothing that might conceivably be regarded as relevant to the making of the 
investment decision.446 
None of the Councils had officers with any significant experience in financial products of this 
complexity. The Councils may have statutory typology of wholesale investors, but decision makers, 
                                                                  
438 Allen Mandelbaum (trans), The divine comedy of Dante Alighieri: Inferno (Bantam Books, 1980). 
439 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 (Rares J). 
440 Synthetic means the arranging bank does not incur credit exposure.  
441 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11. These products were sold by Lehman 
Bros Australia Ltd (Grange Securities Ltd) as adviser. Other advisers selling similar financial products 
included ABN Amro, Westpac, ANZ, Macquarie Financial Services, Local Government Financial Services, 
and Commonwealth Bank: Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] 
FCA 1028 [1109] (Rares J). 
442 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 [3] (Rares J). 
443 Ibid [340] (Rares J). 
444 Ibid [945] (Rares J). 
445 Ibid [118] (Rares J); citing Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2012]1 AC (UK) 383 429 [138]. 
446 Ibid [728] (Rares J) citing Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd [1986] HCA 25. 
205 
drawn from the community, had retail financial literacy competencies.447 The Dante Notes were also 
the subject of litigation in the UK and the US. In the UK, the noteholders were given priority to 
collateral.448 In the US the result was the opposite, with the issuer having priority.449 The result being:  
[A]s a result of certain conflicting claims and on-going legal proceedings, no distributions can be made 
to the holders of the Notes at this time …450 It will be some time before the United States Courts decide 
whether to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom…451 
‘This legal uncertainty’452 compounded the decision of the trustee to not make a distribution of 
collateral to the noteholders. The FCA approved a settlement for the Councils in December 2015. 
The central feature of these legal relationships was a contract, the terms of which did not qualify the 
fiduciary character of the relationship, equity superimposing fiduciary obligations as an incidence of 
the relationship. ‘Indeed, the equitable remedies for a failure to discharge a fiduciary obligation may 
be greater than those available in the contract’.453 Pointing to the need for statutory reform: 
Grange had engaged in deceptive and misleading conduct contrary to what is now a plethora of 
pointlessly technical and befuddling statutory provisions scattered over many Acts in defined 
situations. The repealed, simple and comprehensive s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) that 
prohibited corporations engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce has been 
done away with by a morass of dense, difficult to understand legislation. Those Acts, that now deal 
with misleading and deceptive conduct, apply differently depending on distinctions such as whether 
the alleged misleading conduct is in relation to a ‘financial product or a financial service’,454 or 
‘financial services’.455 Those apparently simple terms are nothing of the sort. A ‘financial product’ is 
defined in mind-boggling detail in 7 pages of small type456 while a ‘financial service’ takes another 6 
pages to be defined.457 The ASIC Act only takes about 4 pages to define ‘financial service’.458 
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Obviously, there are differences in what each of these Acts and definitions cover – but why? The cost 
to the community, business, the parties, and their lawyers, and the time for courts to work out which 
law applies have no rational or legal justification.459 
Quite so: the Ascent into Uncertainty which continues: ‘the application of the provisions defining 
financial products and financial services in this [Corporations Act] and other acts is often the cause 
of unnecessary distraction and confusion…’460 
Wingecarribee also pointed to another statutory reform need; there is no prudential supervision of 
Australian NBFEs other than insurance and superannuation entities.461 Grange could not meet its 
obligations to the Councils. 
Dante notes, on Grange’s admission, were 
suitable only for financial institutions and highly sophisticated professional investors who are capable 
of understanding … and who can absorb a substantial or total loss of principal. The Term Sheet is not 
intended for distribution to, or use by, private customers … such as the Councils.462 
What is the distinction between a financial product seller and the provision of financial product 
advice?463 This question arises constantly in NBFE financial product and financial advice markets for 
all typologies of investors. Peer professional opinion on this distinction is neither universal nor 
consistent.464 A redefinition of Corporations Act investor typology is needed. 
                                                                  
459 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 Summary 3 
(Rares J). 
460 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Davidof [2017] FCA 658 [4] (Lee J). 
461 Grange was undercapitalised and unable to operate a secondary market for its clients. The Councils were 
deprived of liquidity in these investments. Grange did not inform its clients of this problem. Undisclosed, 
Grange controlled the secondary market and certain related party fee structures from which it was able to 
derive margins. The result, as Rares J noted in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia 
Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028, the products were ‘risky, illiquid, and if sold, might realise far less than their 
face value, but also that Grange was conscious that the trust its uninformed Council clients had placed in it 
was being used to Grange’s advantage’. 
462 Ibid [339]–[340] (Rares J). 
463 Lesa Bransgrove, ‘Case Note: Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) 
[2012] FCA 1028’ (2013) 24 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 52 [65]. 
464 Ibid citing Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5O(1) which ‘excluded liability for negligence for acting in a 
manner that at the relevant time was widely accepted by peer professional opinion as competent practice’. 
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Bathurst465 was a similar case, being a triumph of promotion over the prudent investment of public 
funds. ‘Rembrandt was a grotesquely complicated product’466 Their Honours opined: 
LGFS had a lengthy history of interactions with the NSW Councils and wanted them to feel ‘a strong 
relationship’ with it. …467 Its ‘corporate strategy was to develop a relationship of trust and confidence’ 
and become ‘their trusted adviser’ …468 LGFS knew that the Councils were ‘peculiarly vulnerable’469 
arising from limited internal financial literacy in respect of these products and ‘the high degree of 
trust’470 known to be placed in LGFS by the Councils … LGFS expected and intended that, in making 
a decision to invest, the Councils would rely on LGFS advice… 471 and did not want the [C]ouncil 
officers to get advice from anyone else about the product.472  
LGFS ‘was in a fiduciary relationship with each Council and, in its dealings with the Councils, LGFS 
breached its fiduciary obligations to avoid conflicts of interest in respect of the notes, or to disclose 
and obtain fully informed consent to such conflicts’.473 LGFS was no mere salesman: factually it 
acted in a fiduciary capacity. 
S&P’s assignment of a AAA rating was ‘misleading and deceptive and involved the publication of 
information or statements false in material particulars and otherwise involved negligent 
misrepresentations to the class of potential investors in Australia’.474 ABN Amro was: 
                                                                  
465 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
466 These notes were sold by ABN Amro to Local Government Financial Services (LGFS) which in turn 
marketed these notes to 13 local government authorities in New South Wales. See ABN Amro Bank NV v 
Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 [1082] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
467 ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 [1021] Reasons for judgment 
(Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
468 Ibid [1022] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
469 Ibid [1030] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon) JJ. 
470 Ibid [1030] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
471 Ibid [1030] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
472 Ibid [1052] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
473 Ibid [13] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
474 Ibid [12] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ noted in ABN Amro Bank 
NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 [563]–[577] that ‘S&P’s rating of the Rembrandt notes 
was unreasonable, unjustified, and misleading (and ABN Amro knew that to be so). … For there to be a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in making a statement or giving advice: the speaker must realise, or ought to have 
realised, that the recipient of the information or advice intends to act on that information or advice … the 
circumstances must be such that it is reasonable in all of the circumstances for the recipient to seek, or to 
accept, and to rely upon the utterance of the speaker. Criteria include ‘relative position of the parties as 
regards knowledge (actual or potential) and relevant capacity to form or exercise judgment’. Proof of these 
various (and not exhaustive) criteria ‘establishes an assumption of responsibility, or known reliance (or the 
converse, vulnerability) sufficient for a duty to be imposed. It is immaterial whether the information is 
requested or volunteered. “It is not necessary that the person making the statement know the identity of the 
persons who may rely on it and suffer loss” and it can be to “an identifiable class of people”’… The 
complexity of the appeals proceedings by ABN Amro included the pursuit of ‘each allegation of error [by the 
primary judge] with undiscriminating vigour’. This found no judicial favour. Ibid at [4]. 
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knowingly concerned in S&P’s contraventions of the various statutory provisions proscribing such 
misleading and deceptive conduct, and also itself engaged in conduct that was misleading and 
deceptive and published information or false in material particulars and otherwise involved negligent 
misrepresentations.475 
Further, 
‘ABN Amro breached its contract [with LGFS]’;476 LGFS ‘breache[d] its AFSL’.477 LGFS was 
‘entitled to earn a substantial fee or commission on the sale of Rembrandt Notes to the Council[s]’,478 
and was ‘under a mandate with ABN Amro to assist in the promotion of the product’.479 
In circumstances similar to Wingecarribee, claims of misleading and deceptive conduct as statutory 
contraventions 480 were complicated by the international operations of ABN Amro and S&P. The 
conduct that is misleading or deceptive must be ‘in this jurisdiction’.481 Some of the conduct was not, 
but the relevant conduct was the distribution of rating information in Australia with the approval of 
S&P. This questions the extraterritorial application of Australian law, and responses in other 
jurisdictions provide insight into a commonly occurring problem for Australian regulators. 
4.1.2 Failures of expectations of fiduciaries in financial advice: contracting out  
Unlike Wingecarribee and Bathurst, where fiduciary relationships existed, Citigroup482 demonstrated 
it is possible in Australia to contract out of fiduciary responsibility: it can be extinguished. 
[C]laims of conflict of interest and duty and breach of s 912A(1)(aa) depended on the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship … the claims failed because the letter of engagement under which Toll retained 
Citigroup as its adviser specifically excluded the existence of such a relationship. The Court held that 
the law does not prevent an investment bank from contracting out of a fiduciary capacity; whether it 
should be able to do so is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.483 
                                                                  
475 Ibid [12] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Ibid [1082] (Jacobson, Gilmour and Gordon JJ). 
479 Ibid. 
480 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) ss 1041E, 1041H; Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (Cth) s 12DA. 
481 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 1041H. 
482 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Limited (ACN 113 114832)(No 4) [2007] FCA 963 (Jacobsen J). 
483 Ibid [7] (Jacobsen J). 
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Claims of misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct484 failed for similar reasons. 
Thus, equitable remediation applied in Wingecarribbee and Bathurst could not be achieved. 
The ‘relationship between the client and the investment bank engaged to advise on a takeover is 
fiduciary in character’,485 but ‘investment banks have developed contractual techniques to modify or 
displace fiduciary obligations’.486  
The critical matter in the end is the role that the alleged fiduciary has, or should be taken to have, in 
the relationship. It must so implicate that party in the other’s affairs or so align him with the protection 
or advancement of that other’s interest that foundation exists for the ‘fiduciary expectation’.487 
‘Should be taken to have’ is the key to the mismatch between community expectation and practice, 
not satisfactorily addressed by the Australian legislature or in the trust statutes. The states’ Trust(s) 
and Trustees Acts do not prevent the exclusion of fiduciary duties. Drake488 is a modern MIS example 
where ‘[f]iduciary duties are shaped, and can be modified by the trust instrument or an underlying 
contract’.489  
4.2 Financial literacy 
4.2.1 The problem of messianic leadership 
Some investors confuse entrepreneurship with false hope. These hopes are based on trust in 
individuals or self-appointed Messianic figures believing their own vision. Good ideas confused with 
true entrepreneurship. Are these people entrepreneurs or does ‘an obsessive pursuit of a sincerely held 
belief’490 damage the interests of trusting investors? Donovan491 was a company was controlled by 
such a Messiah. He had ‘a lack of understanding of the proper role of a company director and the 
duty of diligence owed by a director to the company’.492 Such situations are not uncommon. Despite 
                                                                  
484 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 1043H; Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) 
ss 12DA, 12CA. 
485 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Limited (ACN 113 114832)(No 4) [2007] FCA 963 [265] Jacobsen J 
citing Tuch, above n 2. 
486 Ibid [267] (Jacobsen J). 
487 Ibid [274] (Jacobsen J) citing Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’, above n 3. 
488 ASIC v Drake (No 2) [2016] FCA 155 (Edelman J). 
489 Ibid [354] (Edelman J). 
490 ASC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 609 (Cooper J). 
491 Ibid. See also ASIC, Scams and Swindlers: investment disasters and how to avoid them: true stories from 
ASIC (Centre for Professional Development, Thomson Professional Information Asia Pacific Pty Limited, 
1998) 83. Donovan had the characteristics of a Ponzi scheme whereby new investors were constantly needed 
to fund obligations to existing investors. There was little end-use sales revenue and cash generated from sale 
of capital items were brought to revenue account. 
492 ASC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 607 (Cooper J). 
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written warnings from this author and others,493 including solvency and directors duties, the directors 
continued to breach their obligations.  
The course of conduct embarked upon and persevered in, despite the advice given, carried a real risk 
of loss or damage, affecting the purchasers of growerships, the company itself, and the creditors. 
Objectively, no person in the position of the respondents [directors], with the knowledge the first 
respondent had and which the second respondent should have had, acting reasonably and exercising 
care and diligence, would have continued selling growerships and quotas … Absent a commercial 
market, to continue to sell growerships and quota was conduct in the breach of the duty of care …494 
Corporations Law … was a protective provision designed to protect the public and to prevent a 
corporate structure being used by individuals in a manner contrary to proper commercial standards.495 
This statutory duty of care affirmed court decisions by imposing an objective standard. It inserted 
‘the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person in like position as an officer of a corporation 
would exercise in the corporation’s circumstances’.496 
The Messiah was described thus: 
The material provided by the first respondent as to his attitude to these proceedings and the failure of 
Good Life is a matter of serious concern …497 These statements indicate that the first respondent does 
not accept any responsibility for what has occurred …498 The respondent has shown no contrition or 
remorse …499 in disregard of contrary expert advice…500  
4.2.2 Hope over reason: In the eye of the Storm 
Effective financial advice requires financial literacy to comprehend it, including in the application of 
borrowed funds. Cassimatis501 ‘litigation was very large scale and was aggressively fought,’502 
despite Storm Financial inflicting considerable economic damage to individuals and communities in 
which it operated. This included an ‘unprincipled submission’503 which, if accepted, 
                                                                  
493 Ibid 593 (Cooper J). 
494 Corporations Law s 232(4). 
495 ASC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 583 (Cooper J); Corporations Law s 1317EA(3)(a). 
496 Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (Cth) s 232(4). 
497 ASC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 603 (Cooper J). 
498 Ibid 604 (Cooper J). 
499 Ibid 608 (Cooper J). 
500 Ibid 609 (Cooper J). 
501 ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023 (Edelman J). 
502 Ibid [838] (Edelman J). 
503 Ibid [504] (Edelman J). 
211 
would mean that directors could act in a manner which was intended, and known, to be in serious 
breach of the [Corporations Act] yet not in breach of their duty of care and diligence for so long as 
they are the sole shareholders and the company is solvent. That proposition cannot be accepted.504  
Directors cannot authorise or ratify a breach of their statutory duty505 even if they can contract out of 
fiduciary law.  
Their role and responsibilities in Storm were so significant, and the contraventions were sufficiently 
serious … [t]hey were responsible for establishing the Storm model which provided for double gearing 
of thousands of clients …506 The Cassimatis each contravened s 180(1) of the Corporations Act by 
exercising their powers in a way which caused or ‘permitted’ (by omission to prevent) inappropriate 
advice given to the relevant investors.507  
Richards508 was one Storm investor successful in a class action contested by the ASIC509 and 
illustrates the practical difficulties of ex post statutory remedies.510 ‘A substantial wrong has 
occurred’ which, at the risk of ‘re-enlivening an extraordinarily difficult class action’511 requires 
correction.  
Similarly, Wealthsure v Selig512 involved unsophisticated retail investors borrowing money to finance 
small scale property developments by related parties. One of many cases, as in Cassimatis, involving 
retail investors investing monies into financial products on financial advice represented in disclosure 
documents using aggressive leverage with recourse to personal assets. Some are Ponzi Schemes, 
dependent on future investments to meet commitments to earlier investments.513 Others have Ponzi 
characteristics reliant on hope over reason for their investment outcomes. In, Wealthsure v Selig 
amongst the portfolio of related party investments, at least one relied on a prospectus where the 
company was insolvent at the time of issue.514  
                                                                  
504 Ibid [506] (Edelman J). 
505 ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd [2011] FCAFC 19 (Keane CJ). 
506 ASIC v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023 [824] (Edelman J). 
507 Ibid [833] (Edelman J). 
508 ASIC v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89 (Jacobsen, Middleton, & Gordon JJ). 
509 Richards v Macquarie Bank Limited (No 4) [2013] FCA 438 (Jacobsen, Middleton, & Gordon JJ). 
510 See especially Michael Legg, ‘A Comparison of Regulatory Enforcement, Class Actions and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Compensating Financial Consumers’ (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 311. 
511 ASIC v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89 [59] (Jacobsen, Middleton, & Gordon JJ). 
512 Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig [2014] FCAFC 64 (Mansfield, Besanko, and White JJ); Selig v Wealthsure Pty 
Ltd [2013] FCA 348 (Mansfield, Besanko, and White JJ). 
513 Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig [2014] FCAFC 64 [179] Mansfield, (Besanko, and White JJ). 
514 Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 348 [1196] (Mansfield, Besanko, and White JJ). 
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Selling financial products to unsophisticated retail investors is fraught with risk for the promoter, 
financial adviser and investor. This includes loss of the investments, proportionate liability, and costs 
incurred by investors as a consequence.515 Misfeasance by the investment promoters and financial 
advisers does not preclude an apportionable claim on the investors.516 Investors may not have 
exercised due care (albeit innocently) and be partly liable for losses arising from contributory 
negligence. Wealthsure v Selig identified acts of contributory negligence included ‘profligate lifestyle 
and excessive living expenses, excessive borrowings, reckless statements to financiers, borrowings 
when aware dividends would not meet interest payments or borrowings’.517  
4.3 Unhealthy culture 
Unhealthy corporate culture recently identified by Heydon and Hayne is not a new phenomenon in 
Australia. 
4.3.1 ‘Promiscuous lending’ in the Age of Entrepreneurship  
Bell518 reflected its times: 
‘Promiscuous lending’, espoused in ‘the 1980’s were a period of turmoil for [the] banking in Australia 
as the environment changed from a highly regulated to a deregulated one which included, for the first 
time, competition from foreign banks from about 1985 … corporate lending boomed, fuelled by a 
combination of bank competition and asset inflation in asset values.519 
                                                                  
515 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) pt 7.10, div 2A, ss 1041I(1B),1041L, 1041M, 1041N; Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth). French CJ Kiefel, 
Bell, Gageler, and Keane JJ noted in Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 18 [52] that ‘[t]hese provisions 
were a result of a CLERP reform designed to prevent the “deep pocket syndrome” whereby professional 
service providers became the targets of negligent actions as much because they are insured and have the 
capacity to pay large damages awards as because they are culpable whereas the primary wrongdoers were 
often the enterprises to whom professional services were rendered. It limits the liability of professional 
defendants to the extent each defendant was responsible for that loss. The objective of these reforms [in 
2003] was a nationally consistent model of proportionate liability for economic loss or property damage.’ 
516 Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig [2014] FCAFC 64 [11] (Mansfield, Besanko, and White JJ). 
517 Ibid [93] (Mansfield, Besanko, and White JJ). 
518 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No3) [2012] WASCA 157 (Lee AJA, 
Drummond AJA and Carr AJA); The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No9) [2008] 
WASC 239 (Owen J). 
519 Drummond AJA in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No3) [2012] WASCA 
157 [1812]–[1853] noted that ‘[t]he practice of bank lending on a negative pledge basis only left the banks in 
a much weaker position than they would have been in had they followed the traditional practice of taking 
security. Negative pledge lending became more prevalent in the 1980’s and gained added impetus with the 
emergence of the State banks as more active corporate lenders and the entry of [new] foreign bank licences 
in 1985 … Negative pledge lending and pricing became two of the main marketing tools used against the 
entrenched major [Australian] trading banks … A very dangerous and volatile situation had been created 
which set the time-bomb ticking and it was only a matter of time of[f] when it would explode. That time was 
the collapse of the ASX in October 2007. Westpac Banking Corporation lent “in excess of 25% of the bank’s 
capital.” The banks ‘repeatedly sacrificed prudential controls in their lending to Bell. Issuance of 
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Bell illustrates the devastation inflicted by unhealthy culture, collapsing with indebtedness to 
syndicates of 20 banks. 30 years later, the 2018 Hayne Royal Commission into the Australian 
financial system arises as a result of public pressure in response to alleged unhealthy cultures. The 
Bell banking syndicate sought to transfer company property to it ‘in a situation of acknowledged 
insolvency’520 leading to two decades of litigation. These were dealings between experienced people 
who were ‘neither gullible nor unintelligent’.521 The banks ‘had not acted in good faith.522 
This ‘case cannot be characterised as involving ordinary or minor breaches of fiduciary duty.523 
the directors of both the Australian and UK Bell companies committed breaches of their fiduciary 
duties to their companies that were sufficiently serious to show that they engaged in dishonest and 
fraudulent designs within the special meaning I think that expression has in this context. The 
knowledge that the banks had of these breaches, which I consider was sufficient for the purposes of 
the case of these respondents based on the first limb of Barnes v Addy, also suffices to show the 
requisite knowledge on their part of the directors’ designs …524 The banks were knowing recipients of 
the disposition of property effected by the Transactions.525  
They ‘became “institutional constructive trustees” at the outset of the Transactions and subject to the 
in personam liabilities attached to that trust’,526 meaning responsibility to account as if they were the 
defaulting fiduciary.527 
The breaches of general law fiduciary duties arose from concentrating on the interests of Bell as a 
whole, not its individual companies. The Australian directors should have taken into account the 
interests of each individual Bell company. The UK directors should have ‘obtain[ed] reliable financial 
                                                                  
unsubordinated bonds resulted in creation of new interest bearing debt, but to retain negative pledge lending 
ratios, the bond securities were treated as equity with bank consent’.  
520 Ibid [4] (Lee AJA, Drummond AJA and Carr AJA). 
521 Ibid [479] (Lee AJA). 
522 Namely, knowledge of the inability of the Bell debtor companies to pay their debts to the Banks and that 
the execution of the [t]ransactions prejudiced all other creditors, present or future, of Bell group companies. 
… Bell had Australian and UK resident directors. Directors were alleged to have breached their general law 
fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the companies. Ibid [587] Lee AJA; Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 
120. 
523 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq)(No3) [2012] WASCA 157, [2430]–[2431] 
(Drummond AJA). 
524 Ibid [2432] (Drummond AJA). 
525 Ibid [1096] (Lee AJA). 
526 Ibid [1214] (Lee AJA). 
527 Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296 (Finn, Stone, Perram 
JJ). 
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information to verify the assurances they got [from Australian directors] about the solvency’528 of 
Bell.  
4.3.2 Unconscionable lending to retail investors 
Unconscionable lending is the cousin of promiscuous lending. Australian Lending Centre529 describes 
broking ‘loans to people who believe themselves to have difficulties in obtaining finance from 
traditional sources’530 included: Mr McIlwraith (brain damaged), Mr Mrs Polimeni (production 
worker), Ms James (Centrelink and family benefits), Mr Mrs Alptekin (unemployed as a result of 
injury), and Mr Hinds (pensioner). A common element was that loans did not proceed and/or 
declarations were made that credit was for business purposes when palpably this was not the case. 
Unconscionable or misleading conduct is proscribed in relation to financial services531 or in 
connection with the supply or possible supply of financial services.532 ‘The products involved [being 
credit products] include those which presently exist but also those which will in the future exist’.533 
Arranging for a person to apply for, or acquire, a financial product will be ‘dealing’ in the financial 
product and … will be the provision of a financial service’.534 Or ‘a service that is otherwise supplied 
in relation to a financial product.’535 This extends to requirements to pay for a contractual right536 
including prepayments made to secure a promotional offer. 
Contraventions of ‘credit legislation’.537 include misleading loan applications ‘representing that a 
person had sought a loan which was wholly or predominantly for business or investment purposes 
when that person had sought a loan which was for personal, household, or domestic purposes’.538 
  
                                                                  
528 Each company in a group is a separate legal entity; the directors of each subsidiary owe a duty to act in 
the best interests of their subsidiary and are not entitled to sacrifice the interests of that subsidiary for the 
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5. THE AUSTRALIAN ENIGMA: TRUSTS AS SURROGATE COMPANIES 
Australia is a global outlier in the use of trusts for commercial investment purposes. Not only are 
NBFE directors uncertain of the scope and extent of their fiduciary duties, these vary since MIS and 
superannuation entities are trusts and subject to general trust law. Statutory compliance (box-ticking) 
is insufficient with investor and beneficiary remedy for malfeasance often found in the general law.  
5.1 MIS as commercial trusts 
Collective investment schemes which predated the Managed Investments Act539 did not specifically 
require that the management company be a trustee. The obligations of the management (and other 
operational companies) were contractual and entrepreneurial. By contrast, the trustee (whose role is 
to protect investors) was a separate entity requiring Ministerial approval. In 1987, there was ‘no 
statutory intention to treat a management company as a fiduciary’.540 By 2017 there was statutory 
trustee responsibility placed on the RE, albeit constrained by contract.541 For collective investment 
schemes of the earlier generation, it is necessary to establish the existence of a trustee and beneficiary 
relationship between the management companies and their covenant holders.  
Many of the failures in the NBFE sector result in financial stress and insolvency, especially in REs 
and MIS.542 Trusts were not originally used as the large commercial trading enterprises seen today. 
MIS are corporatised trusts acting as surrogate companies. ‘What is noteworthy is the scale of use in 
modern Australia,’543 particularly since 1981. ‘The nearest modern manifestation of the 
unincorporated joint stock company is … the managed investment scheme.’544 Some superannuation 
entities are evolving into multi-country funds managers, assuming investment bank risk, and are 
related parties of one or more MIS. 
A trust cannot become insolvent, although the trustee and RE can. The law has not evolved to deal 
with these modern commercial situations, although the SLE545 proposal, not enacted, was an attempt 
to do so.  
                                                                  
539 Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth) Now pt 5C of the Corporations Act (Cth). 
540 Australian Government Takeovers Panel, Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Prescribed 
Interests, (Discussion Paper No 6, 1987) 104. 
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It is more than passing strange that, in an advanced economy with a sophisticated legal system and a 
highly developed regime for regulating business enterprises conducted under an incorporated entity, 
the work of regulating enterprises conducted under a trust is largely left to an ancient body of law that 
is patently inadequate, inappropriate and inefficient for the task.546  
Statutory prudence standards are not specified as previously and are not tests of perfection.547 Trustee 
prudence standards are shaped by the nature and purpose of the trust.548 ‘Older cases … suggest[s] a 
duty abstracted from the terms of the trust instrument and the nature of the trust business’.549 The 
modern use of trusts as investment vehicles for Australian NBFEs with substantial commercial 
activity mitigates against historical authorities as to preservation of capital and toward: 
more venturesome fiduciary investment policies [in the] prudent management of others’ properties … 
[requiring] sound and careful fiduciary behaviour (including ‘risk management’) in carrying out 
programs that deliberately involve the taking of higher risk in the pursuit of greater return.550 
The prudent person test [in the US] ‘was, and is, intended to be flexible … and changes with economic 
conditions and contemporary thinking’.551 As with the statutory duty of care, ‘this exercise is 
“forward looking” to what a reasonable person would have done, and the judgment of reasonableness 
is not amenable to exact calculation’.552 Changing standards require unchanging principles: these 
principles are necessarily fiduciary in nature. 
Registered MIS are regulated by the Corporations Act. It imposes obligations on the trustee (RE) 
directors. These obligations do not extend to unregistered MIS or to collective investment schemes 
that are not registered MIS. ‘There is a point where company law ends and trust law takes over’,553 
not a distinction always recognised by directors, especially those involved in unregistered and/or 
insolvent MIS. ‘Much of the regulation of corporatized trusts is still left to the general law of trusts’.554 
The Corporations Act ‘leaves much of the supervision and gap-filling to the general law of trusts’,555 
amply demonstrated by the cases where schemes are wound up on just and equitable grounds. ‘It is 
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now commonplace for voluntary administrators, receivers and/or liquidators of companies that are 
trustees to seek guidance or imprimatur from the court before taking various actions for fear of 
committing (or permitting the company to commit) a breach of trust leading to an unindemnified 
personal liability’.556 
Much of the evolution of present law is derived from judicial review: 
The law, not only statutory, but also judge-made, has, I think, moved beyond the deference once shown 
by courts to the judgments of company directors … even when involving judgments on matters of 
business management.557 
Corporations Act provisions relating to corporate insolvency, including administration, receivership, 
and liquidation do not relate to trusts and MIS. Winding up provisions558 relate only to registered 
MIS, not unregistered schemes, being excluded offers. Modern MIS are often leveraged with multiple 
layers of debt. MIS investors also are indebted with recourse to personal assets some from related 
parties of the RE. These related party conflicts of interest are one of the systemic causes of distress 
in the Australian NBFE sector unremedied by statutory intervention.  
Previous law reform proposals proposed: ‘[t]his trust relationship should exist in all collective 
investment schemes, even those based on contract’559 the intention being to create a layer of fiduciary 
protection for MIS members. This is the position for investors in actively managed Singaporean 
collective investment schemes. Most MIS, being collective investment schemes are required to adopt 
accounting principles and practices applying to trusts.  
A RE’s powers in relation to the disposition of scheme property are determined by the terms of the 
scheme constitution in light of such enhancements or constraints are provided by statute and, subject 
to statute, the general law relating to trusts to the extent that it is applicable.560  
In Wellington Capital, the constitution did not confer the power on the RE for it to act as it did. 
Present Australian trust law,561 not applied in this case ‘is only enlivened where the relevant 
beneficiary is entitled to a particular share of the trust property and notice of the intended 
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appropriation has been given to other beneficiaries’.562 However, ‘absent the consent of beneficiaries, 
it is not open to a trustee simply to transfer the trust property to the beneficiaries’.563 This 
demonstrates the constraining power of the Constitution of the MIS and the Corporations Act. The 
RE has a duty to act honestly,564 a duty of care and diligence,565 and a duty to act in the best interests 
of the members of the MIS.566 In addition to this statutory best interest duty, the RE has a statutory 
fiduciary duty to hold scheme property on trust for scheme members.567 ‘[W]ide powers of the RE to 
deal with scheme property must be approached through the prism of trust law’.568 The general 
principle of trust law applying to REs depends on the purposes of the statutory trust, the various 
provisions of the Corporations Act, the MIS Constitution, and is a function of its office.569 It has the 
characteristics of a commercial trust,570 analogous to public unit trusts.571 
Can monies subscribed as MIS application monies be used to fund the liabilities of the RE of the 
MIS? ‘The answer to the question … is no,572 but the answer to that question is not straightforward’.573 
In Treecorp, two registered MIS574 had a common RE which had agreed to act ‘as trustee of the 
[f]unds’575 as ‘bare trustee’.576 ‘That section declares in unequivocal terms that the responsible entity 
of a registered managed investment scheme “holds scheme property on trust for scheme 
members”’.577 Where an RE becomes insolvent, is replaced, or where the scheme property is subject 
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to claim by way of charge or otherwise, compromises the intent of trust and statute. Statutory duties 
of the directors of the RE578 are ‘essentially fiduciary’.579 
The scope of the s 601FD duties must be considered in the light of the vulnerabilities inherent in the 
position of the members as beneficiaries of a trust and (as will often be the case) the fact that the RE 
holds itself out to the public and is paid as a professional trustee.580 
5.2 Custodians as trustees 
A custodian, often assumed to hold assets in trust for beneficiaries is subject to a lesser standard of 
care than an RE. There is a distinction between a managing trustee and a custodian trustee,581 being 
a statutory invention.582 ‘It is apparent that the duties of a custodian trustee differ substantially from 
those of an ordinary trustee’.583 A custodian trustee has ‘a lesser role than an ordinary trustee’.584 ‘If 
the trust instrument or the general law gives the trustee power to do … it is not for the custodian 
trustee to consider whether it should be done’.585 The distinction is nuanced further by the custodial 
trustee having responsibilities in excess of a bare trustee. The distinction is ‘perhaps a fine one, but it 
is a real one’.586 These distinctions are not likely to be understood by the investing public or some 
directors. Custodians are not always fiduciaries: they can be contractors. 
The deteriorating economic conditions revealed what should, I suspect, always have been apparent, 
had anyone cared to think about it: the invidious position of the Public Trustee who had legal 
ownership on behalf of others and wide-ranging corresponding obligations at law, but little or no 
control over, and not much information about, the way the funds were run. …587 When the Public 
Trustee assumed legal title of property which in equity belonged to the members of the [11] managed 
investment schemes of which Opus was responsible entity, the Public Trustee held the property on 
trust for the members of the managed investment schemes as beneficiaries … notwithstanding the fact 
that Opus was also a trustee with different functions.588  
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Termination of a custody agreement with a responsible entity does not change the position of the 
custodian trustee whilst it retains the legal title to the property of the MIS. This is problematic in 
Australia and particularly where there are foreign shareholders which may require shareholder 
approval for the variation of legal ownership. 
5.3 Can economic value outcomes be legal interests?  
For an investor there can be a very important difference between their legal rights and the value 
outcome of their investment. Investor and beneficiary expectations include the optimisation of their 
value outcomes, the trustee obligation. What they typically attain in MIS are contractual and statutory 
rights. Many MIS do not confer the beneficial economic rights that might be expected or assumed by 
unitholders, either in the period prior to the Managed Investments Act or subsequently. Contractual 
rights have often not extended to proprietary rights in land, buildings, plant, trees, or in some cases, 
products manufactured using those assets.589 Unit holders had a contractual right to some defined 
proportion of the economic benefit or profit arising from the scheme. What they had in practice were 
one or more choses in action.590 Even where there were security interests, this does not import the 
creation of a trust.591 Prior to the Managed Investments Act, these rights were held by the trustee.592 
Since then, the RE or its appointed custodian. 
The distinction between the economic interests held beneficially by a trustee in general law (or after 
1998 an RE and its appointed custodian) and its contractual obligations is an important one. The 
existence of one trust can highlight the significance of the absence of any such provisions with other 
corporate elements in a collective investment scheme.593 Korda v AET determined whether the 
proceeds of sale of timber produced from trees in a forestry MIS and the proceeds of sale of the land 
used to grow the trees were held on trust for investors in the MIS. 
The provision in the Trust Deed of an express trust only of the sale proceeds in the hands of AET… 
did not deflect finding that a trust existed and that ‘so strong were the assurances (express and implied) 
in the prospectus – that the investors would have a secure interest in and entitlement to the sale 
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proceeds – that the parties to the investment contract must have intended those assurances to override 
any inconsistent provisions’ in the formal documents.594  
This VSCA judgment was not a unanimous view: on successful HCA appeal neither of the 
management companies in this collective investment scheme was held to be a trustee of the timber 
sale proceeds,595 despite prospectus language designed to assuage concerns of investor risk. 
[P]rospective investors were: 
invited to acquire an interest in a pine plantation … using language that was simple and unambiguous, 
representing that an investor who purchased a covenant would acquire a beneficial interest in the 
land.596  
There are many other examples of the conflict between community expectations of economic gain 
and legal result.597 In United Tree Farmers, the promoters ‘have evolved a scheme involving the 
invitation to investment in a venture’.598 It had the result that 
the investors could not be said to have a right to participate in, or an interest in the assets of, the 
scheme. … The individual investors did not obtain any ‘interest’ in the scheme offered and the 
agreements do not create a profit a prendre; … all that was given was individual and discrete 
contractual rights of occupation … Harvesting was not part of the service offered or acquired.599  
By inference, 
the companies propounding the scheme, despite the formal disavowal of this, were aware that this 
expectation was likely to be created; acted in some instances so as to positively to encourage it; and 
                                                                  
594 Ibid [47] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler, and Keane JJ) citing Korda v Australian Executor Trustees 
(SA) Ltd [2014] VSCA 65 [40]. 
595 Ibid [96] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler, and Keane JJ). 
596 Ibid [129] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler, and Keane JJ). Factors in support of this judicial 
conclusion that the management companies were not trustees included: ‘lack of separation of unit holder 
funds from management company funds, lack of express provision in the management contracts, the trust 
deed for the trusteeship of the proceeds having an express provision, and consistency with the then statutory 
framework regulating collective investments of this era’ at [129]. 
597 See, eg, ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed)(in 
liquidation)(Controllers appointed) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1,342 (Murphy J); Australian Securities Commission 
v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] 
FCA 1663 [382] (Finn J); ASIC v United Tree Farmers Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 479 (Finn J); ASIC v ABC Fund 
Managers Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 383 (Warren J); ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 
943 (Austin J); Rubicon Asset Management Limited [2009] NSWSC 1068 (McDougall J); ASIC v Wellington 
Capital Limited [2012] FCA 1140 (Jagot J); ASIC v Letten (No 7) [2010] FCA 1231 (Gordon J); Stacks 
Managed Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 753 (White J); ASIC v ABC Fund Managers Ltd (No 2) [2001] 
VSC 383 (Warren J); ASIC v Chase Capital Management Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 27 (Owen J). 
598 Australian Securities Commission v United Tree Farmers Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 479 (Finn J). 
599 Ibid. 
222 
on the balance of probabilities intended that it (i.e. harvesting, manufacturing and marketing of 
product) be created in any event.600 [I]t extended to a right to participate in the ‘profits’ of the 
scheme.601  
United Tree Farmers predated the Managed Investments Act which intended collective investment 
schemes be trusts and, subject to that Act, remedies be available as a constructive trust with the RE 
as trustee. That was palpably not the case a decade later: in Palandri Limited,602 investors in six 
related party registered MIS had ‘competing entitlements to the same vineyard’.603 The six MIS were 
separated into land and property, grape growing, wine production, and distribution MIS, each with a 
common and conflicted RE. Each MIS had overlapping but different investors. 
Wellington Capital604 illustrates the incongruity between statutory and contractual compliance versus 
economic interest. The powers of an RE are determined by the constitution of the MIS operated by it 
and any other duty not inconsistent with the statute.605 The MIS unit holders became members of a 
successor company on distribution of trust property in specie. ASIC attempted but failed to prevent 
this outcome, but judicial review606 held that the RE did indeed act in breach of the Constitution. The 
broad power of the Constitution was constrained by specific circumstances for an in specie 
distribution. This ultimately resulted in a loss of the right of indemnity from trust fund assets by the 
RE.607 ‘The frequency and nature of the contravention cannot justify a departure from the express 
words of the Constitution’.608 The RE, if it breaches the constitution loses its right to indemnity unless 
it ‘obtains the consent of the unit holders’.609 
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For directors of NBFEs, these legal uncertainties, overlaid with beneficiary and investor expectations 
of value outcomes rather than rights, are problematic. ‘There is no implied or deemed limitation of 
personal liability for a trustee…’610 [under Australian trust law]. Funds management entities and their 
directors are fiduciaries, although some ‘major investment banks have indicated publicly their belief 
that they operate unconstrained by fiduciary obligations’.611 Where MIS are contractual rather than 
express trusts, that does not exclude the application of fiduciary principles, and a court may treat the 
relationship ‘as fiduciary under established principles of equity.’612 There is a tension between 
statutory prioritisation and fiduciary prohibitions, the result being whether an investment bank or 
funds manager ‘is obliged by fiduciary principles to avoid positions of conflict…’,613 or not. Fiduciary 
relationships can be created by reasonable expectation where the client relies on the advice 
proferred.614 Presently in Australia, that relationship can be avoided by contract.615 
A purported amendment to the constitution in Prime Trust616 which changed value but does not of 
itself change the legal rights of investors did not require investor approval, merely compliant 
lodgement with ASIC, its assumed validity relied upon by investors,617 and later challenged by 
ASIC.618 This uncertainty in the Prime Trust MIS documentation presented opportunities for the 
directors to engage in conduct compliant with the Corporations Act. The drafting of ‘[s]ection 
601GC(1)(b) [Corporations Act] does not have “a rule-like quality” which [could] be easily identified 
and applied’.619 The constitution was altered to the considerable financial benefit of the RE and 
ultimately its shareholders. This was particularly so for a director with manifest conflicts of interest 
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arising from related party transactions.620 The board demonstrated an ‘obvious lack of care in dealing 
with these important issues’.621  
‘Disquieted’, ‘alarm bells’, ‘well short of careful, cautious or prudent’, particularly in circumstances 
of ‘manifest conflicts of interest, lack of unequivocal legal advice, judicial direction, or members 
approval’ 622 make an important case for law reform. ‘“Blind Freddy” would have recognised these 
conflicts…’623  
This MIS was not managed in accordance with its unamended constitution. The directors subverted 
investor economic interests. 
The distinction between rights and value recurs in MIS. It is not well understood by investors.624 The 
test can be subjective and requires an RE to have regard to judicial opinion as well as the statute.625 
The right to have a MIS administered in accordance with its existing scheme Constitution is: 
fundamentally the most important right of membership. Without it, all other rights of membership, as 
well as the continuance, success, and security of the scheme would be at the whim of the RE.626  
Meaning, judicial review results in value outcomes being rights provided that those value interests 
are expressed in the MIS constitution. This includes the right to have the issue price of new securities 
determined in accordance with an existing MIS constitution.627 Prime Trust investors were indeed at 
the whim of the RE on statutory procedural grounds and through lack of value being an undefined 
legal interest in the constitution. However, whether value outcomes are rights for the purposes of 
statutory interpretation is determined on a case by case basis and leads to considerable risk for 
investors: all rests on disclosure in the offer documentation. ‘Interest, in relation to a “financial or 
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business undertaking or scheme” were so general and all-embracing that it was impossible to say that 
it necessarily excluded particular transactions that appeared covered by the general words’.628  
5.4 The problem of industry consolidation and vertical integration in the investment chain 
Commonality of ownership business models, or vertical integration are common in NBFEs and 
banking. The incestuous nature of Australian NBFEs has a long history. In AS Nominees629  
[d]irectors have demonstrated little appreciation both of their own responsibilities as directors and of 
the trusteeship obligations of their companies … trust funds have been invested recklessly and 
improvidently often in cases of blatant conflicts of interest or of partiality … in one instance fraud of 
some magnitude has been perpetrated … shrouding much of this has been deficient and defective 
record keeping…630 
AS Nominees has elements found in the later evolution of the NBFE sector. It provides insight into 
the systemic and cyclical problems of that sector where there is no ‘general rule under which an 
investment manager owes fiduciary duties, or any duties, to the beneficiaries of a superannuation fund 
for which it provides investment management services’.631 Duties are prescribed by contract and 
agency. The SIS Act632 had not yet come into force and the ‘legal principle will be on the law of trusts 
and fiduciary obligation more so than on company law’.633 AS Nominees involved ten related parties, 
bound together in a predictably bewildering way’634 in a combination of trustee (including 
superannuation) and non-trustee entities and required the need to view what are essentially trust law 
problems through the prism of corporations law.635 Common bank accounts, boards, board meetings, 
absence of minutes or other documentation, and fees charged to investors by these related entities 
resulted in … complex breaches of trust … It has committed - and allowed - expropriation. The 
                                                                  
628 Australian Softwood Forests Pty Ltd v A-G (NSW) Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49. 
This case referred to the statutory predecessor of managed investment schemes illustrating that a return to the 
prescribed interest system may not be a panacea. 
629 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 (Finn J). 
630 Ibid [8] (Finn J). 
631 The Law Commission (United Kingdom), Fiduciary Law in Australia: A paper by Clayton Utz 
(Consultation Paper 215, 2014) app C [8.1]. 
632 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). The legislation took effect in the 1994–5 
Australian financial year. 
633 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [10] (Finn J). 
634 Ibid [4] (Finn J). 
635 Ibid Decision (Finn J). 
226 
directors are accessories in this …636 The raw material for a successful fraud claim [common law] is 
here and in some quantity.637 
Misconduct recurred within AS Nominees:  
Imprudent investment … the boards acted in undue haste and with little deliberation. Impropriety more 
often than not has been associated with imprudence; an undeveloped sense of trusteeship … they have 
not understood the difference between the entrepreneurial action allowed companies and the caution 
required of trustees; conflict of interest and partiality [where directors] have not understood or felt 
inhibited by, their own and their companies fiduciary responsibilities; and misleading conduct.638 
Westpoint639 was a conglomerate of a ‘large number of companies’,640 ‘referred to as “mezzanine 
companies”’.641 There were ‘193 companies, persons, trusts, or entities’.642 Westpoint acted as trustee 
for a number of real property trusts and as RE for two separate MIS which invested in real property,643 
These companies:  
borrowed money from members of the public and on-lent that money to companies within the 
Westpoint group of companies. The mezzanine companies are beneficiaries of guarantees the company 
[Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd or ‘Westpoint’] for the repayment of those loans…644  
Loans were made by retail investors in the form of promissory notes,645 unregulated by ASIC, to 
entities controlled by Westpoint as both principal and agent. Corporate ownership of the companies: 
was not reflective of the manner in which the group operated. In each instance, Westpoint Corporation 
had control over the administrative and operational affairs of, and operated, a particular business asset 
as though it owned it … the affairs [of the 193 entities] were closely intertwined.646  
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The company was ‘hopelessly insolvent’.647 Its collapse ‘resulted in many actions’648 requiring the 
analysis of ‘3,464 boxes of hardcopy documents … 1.8 million items of mail, 252,000 Word 
documents, 152,000 spreadsheets and 8,000 presentations’.649  
Trio Capital was a conglomerate of related party entities one of which was found to have been the 
‘genesis’650 of subsequent dishonest conduct. Trio was also the corporate trustee of APRA regulated 
public offer superannuation funds and RE of legitimate third party MIS.  
‘The Crown accepts, as do I, that prior to his involvement with the Trio Capital Group, he was a man 
of good character’651 with ‘a satisfactory history of past employment’.652 However, subsequently from 
November 2005 onwards, Richard ‘did not disclose to, and took steps to actively conceal from, Trio 
or investors … the existence of the interrelated network of companies and investment funds and his 
personal financial advantage from the activities of the Trio Capital Group’.653 [He]:  
did engage in dishonest conduct in relation to financial services and knowing the conduct to be 
dishonest …654; and did make statements which were materially misleading, and known by him to be 
materially misleading, that were likely to induce persons in Australia to acquire financial products. 
...655 Conduct involved false representations to trustees of third party funds.656 
Culpability extended to its auditors.657 ‘[I]n the area of white collar crimes many offenders are in a 
like position, namely that the crime is their first offence, they are otherwise of good character…’658  
Deterrence can: 
                                                                  
647 ASIC v Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd (ACN 009 395 751) [2005] WAD 395 [9] (Siopis J). 
648 Carey v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2008] FCA 963 [1] (Finkelstein J). 
649 ASIC; In the matter of Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd CAN 009 395 751 (Receivers and Managers 
Appointed) (In Liquidation) v Read [2007] FCA 709 [4]–[8] (French J). 
650 R v Shawn Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 [29] (Garling J). 
651 Ibid [116] (Garling J). 
652 Ibid [113] (Garling J). 
653 Garling J in ibid [41], [21]–[65] noted ‘[d]eceptions included international financing devices to meet 
redemption requests which disguised inability to meet redemptions, inflated asset valuations, 
misrepresentations to Trio and ASF investors, and “materially misleading statements in a Product Disclosure 
Statement … aware that these statements were like[ly] to induce Australians to apply for financial products, 
namely units in ASF”. …His “conduct involved a gross breach of trust in knowingly acting contrary to the 
interests of corporations of which he was a director and officer which were entitled to have his complete 
attention, amounting to ‘systemic deception’”’. 
654 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 1041G(1). 
655 Ibid s 1041E(1); R v Shawn Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 [21]–[23] (Garling J). 
656 R v Shawn Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 [53] (Garling J). 
657 Ibid [40] (Garling J). 
658 Ibid [118] (Garling J). 
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‘[M]ark out plainly to others who might be minded to breach their professional or related obligations 
that such conduct will generally merit, in appropriate cases, condign punishment’.659 
5.5 The differences between unregistered and registered MIS 
Most investors are probably unaware of the differences between registered and unregistered MIS. 
One important difference concerns the distribution of assets of the MIS in the event of a winding up. 
There is no statutory scheme comparable to the winding up of a registered MIS or company.660 ‘[I]f 
a person operates managed investment scheme … that is required to be registered unless it is 
registered,661 ASIC and certain others may apply to the court to have the scheme wound up’.662 ‘The 
nature of the winding up process depends on what it is that is being wound up. Thus, the winding up 
of a trust is quite a different thing from the winding up of a company, in terms of such matters as the 
rights of scheme creditors and investors’.663 The liquidator of a MIS is not the same as the liquidator 
of a company, although the functional objectives are similar. For unregistered MIS, there is no 
statutory method of winding up, as there is for a registered MIS,664 and the court is empowered to 
make ‘any orders that it considers appropriate for winding up the scheme’.665 ‘[T]he court’s general 
equitable jurisdiction is … a much clearer source of power…’.666 Court winding up procedures 
include ‘any orders it considers appropriate for the winding up of the scheme’;667 an application from 
the ‘controller of the property of a corporation’;668 and an application from the trustee.669  
Where the scheme is a trust, what is envisaged by the winding up of the scheme is the realisation of 
its property, the payment by the responsible entity of liabilities incurred on behalf of the scheme, or 
the retention by it of funds with which to meet its liabilities, the ascertainment of the members’ 
entitlements, and the distribution of the trust assets to the members in accordance with their 
                                                                  
659 R v Rivkin [2002] NSWSC 1182 (Whealy J). 
660 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 [16] (Austin J). 
661 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601ED(5). 
662 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 [16] (Austin J); Corporations Act 
2001(Cth) s 601EE(2). 
663 Re Stacks Managed Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 753; ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] 
NSWSC 943 [16] (Austin J). 
664 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601NF(2). 
665 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 [16] (Austin J); Corporations Act 
2001(Cth) s 601EE(2). 
666 ASIC v Commercial Nominees [2002] NSWSC 576 [11] (Barrett J). 
667 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601EE(1). 
668 Ibid s 424(1). 
669 Trustee Act 1925 s 63. 
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entitlements ...670 The court cannot671 … authorise a distribution of surplus assets of an unregistered 
scheme otherwise than to those entitled to the assets in proportion to their entitlements 672 
Just and equitable winding up orders also apply to registered MIS under different provisions of the 
Corporations Act,673 to be applied in winding up including when the MIS is insolvent. Rubicon was 
the RE for five insolvent MIS. It was itself insolvent and could not perform its RE functions to wind 
up the five schemes. Thus ‘the Court’s powers to give directions…674 are enlivened’.675 These powers 
are considerably different to the powers accorded for unregistered MIS,676 powers described as ‘very 
broad and without restriction’; ‘very wide and unqualified’; and ‘to make “any orders” that the Court 
‘considers appropriate for the winding up of the scheme’.677 The MIS constitution governs winding 
up of a registered MIS, with the Court having the power to give directions,678 which can include 
access to RE assets diminishing their availability to other third parties.679 
5.6 Insolvent Managed Investment Schemes 
Insolvent REs are problematic: Rubicon Asset Management.680 In Australia, there is no prudential 
supervision of MIS or their RE. Their limited capitalisation leads directly to financial inability to 
wind up their MIS. Solvent REs are required to use their own funds to wind up MIS for which they 
are RE as provided for in the MIS constitution. Insolvent REs ‘should continue to perform their 
functions so far as they could’.681 ‘the appointment of an [RE] will not cease simply because it is 
under external administration’.682 Changing an RE is not automatic, is time consuming and costly. A 
change only takes effect ‘when ASIC’s records are altered to record another company as the’ [RE].683 
ASIC and MIS members may apply to the court for the appointment of a temporary RE, but the new 
(if temporary) RE assumes the liabilities of the former RE which may include recourse to its assets 
in the event of a shortfall in the assets of the MIS, subject to its constitution, and prior contractual 
arrangements with the former RE. Breach of fiduciary duty by the directors of the RE may result in 
                                                                  
670 Re Stacks Managed Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 753 [42] (White J). 
671 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601EE(2). 
672 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 [26] (Austin J). 
673 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601NF. 
674 Ibid s 601NF(2). 
675 Rubicon Asset Management Limited [2009] NSWSC 1068 [39] (McDougall J). 
676 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601EE(2). 
677 Rubicon Asset Management Limited [2009] NSWSC 1068 [49]–[50] (McDougall J). 
678 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601NF(2). 
679 Rubicon Asset Management Limited [2009] NSWSC 1068 [57]–[63] (McDougall J). 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid [39] (McDougall J). 
682 Ibid [9] McDougall J; Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601FH. 
683 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 601FJ div 2, pt 5C.2. 
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a remedial constructive trust. Unless the RE holds sufficient own prudential capital684 in trust for the 
MIS, or as an asset of the MIS, then recourse is to directors.685  
5.7 Unregistered Managed Investment Schemes: caveat emptor 
Australia has a long history of allowing unregistered MIS. Many occur in vertically integrated 
conglomerates which include superannuation funds. ‘It is astounding …’686 ‘the transactions were a 
sham687 to elicit a taxation advantage.688 ABC Fund Managers689 managed 22 trusts involved in a 
round robin of lending and investment transactions that were typically completed within a single day 
at the end of each financial year over a number of years ...690 These ‘daylight credit facilities’ had no 
prospectus, no ASIC registrations as RE691, and no records as to where the over [A]$100 million 
went.692 
Misconduct in the management of the companies, misconduct in the management of the 22 trusts, 
and the misleading of investors resulted in winding up of the companies on just and equitable grounds.  
[T]here has been misconduct and mismanagement of the trust business to such a degree that it is 
inappropriate for the defendant companies to be permitted to continue to solicit, manage, and handle 
investors’ money.693  
Many unregistered MIS promoted in Australia have had foreign connections. In Chase Capital 
Management694 investors in the Chase and Leadenhall Schemes were unitholders in unregistered MIS. 
Their foreign parents (Turks and Caicos Islands) were not registered in Australia as foreign 
companies. Neither were prospectus provisions adhered to and none of the entities involved held an 
AFSL. ‘All that the word “scheme” requires is that there be some programme, or plan of action’.695 
It is not a defined term. These schemes required registration.696 Consequently, winding up provisions 
                                                                  
684 A different capital reserve to statutory NTA which is a measure of financial standing and a condition of its 
AFSL. 
685 Rubicon Asset Management Limited [2009] NSWSC 1068 [36] (McDougall J). 
686 ASIC v ABC Fund Managers Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 383 [96] (Warren J). 
687 Ibid [135] (Warren J). 
688 Ibid [125] (Warren J).  
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid [2] (Warren J). 
691 Under the transitional rules of the Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth). 
692 ASIC v ABC Fund Managers Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 383 [20] (Warren J); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 
286. 
693 ASIC v ABC Fund Managers Ltd (No 2) [2001] VSC 383 [125] (Warren J). 
694 ASIC v Chase Capital Management Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 27 (Owen J). 
695 Ibid [57] (Owen J). 
696 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601ED. 
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have ‘been enlivened’697 on just and equitable grounds and in the public interest. Similarly, the 
promoter managers of the schemes were ‘placed in liquidation on the grounds that it is just and 
equitable to do so.’698 
Warning Bells! Had more insight applied, Tasman Investment Management699 should have provoked 
disquiet. The thwarted triumph of equity over incomplete statute. Tasman Investment Management 
exposed dangers from related party transactions, poor documentation, and failure of fit and proper 
testing. Had resources been applied to fiduciary investigations it may have prevented Trio. Fiduciary 
duties of the related parties were not explored for lack of funds despite ‘many facts suggestive of 
related party transactions and other interested self-dealings of a serious kind, prima facie justifying 
further investigation’.700 
The evidence as to whether the investors provided their money on the faith of [various documents] is 
very skimpy …701 The documents provide a clouded picture of legal relationships …702 The documents 
left doubt as to whether the investments by 75 investors were equity or debt and into which entity, the 
scheme or its RE, or a trust established for the purpose. [Ultimately], ‘any intended trust was not 
formally constituted’ …703 There is a reasonable basis for concluding the investors retained the 
beneficial ownership of the funds they subscribed … 704 These funds were mixed with other funds in 
a common pool controlled by the recipient, one of the related party defendants, who should have 
received them in trust, ‘to hold on terms which have not wholly divested the investors of their interest 
in the funds’ …705, in proportion to their contributions.706  
Australian law ‘allows each beneficiary to assert a charge over the amount remaining in the account 
and any assets that can be identified as having been acquired, after the mixing, by the use of funds 
taken from that account’.707 So these investors held equitable charges over the monies in the account 
and the acquired properties, proportionately. Being an unregistered MIS, their remedy was in equity 
― judicial review enforced the investor rights accordingly. 
                                                                  
697 ASIC v Chase Capital Management Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 27 [73] (Owen J). 
698 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 461(1)(k). 
699 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 (Austin J). 
700 Ibid [62] (Austin J). 
701 Ibid [48] (Austin J). 
702 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management Ltd [2004] NSWSC 651 (Barrett J). 
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704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid citing Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) [1974] Ch 269, 290. 
706 ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 [53] (Austin J) citing Re British Red Cross 
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Avestra Asset Management708 demonstrated ‘a significantly deficient corporate culture which enabled 
Avestra to act with a systematic and serious disregard of its fiduciary and regulatory obligations’.709 
A sole registered MIS had undisclosed related party transactions with a number of unregistered MIS 
and offshore investment entities. ‘Generally, the conduct of Avestra was not in the best interests of 
scheme members, and appears to have been undertaken for the purpose of avoiding its statutory 
obligations and regulatory oversight’.710  
The prohibition on registered MIS investing in unregistered MIS was removed in 2007 to allow 
investment diversification and international investment by MIS.711 This statutory liberalisation 
facilitated related party and round robin transactions, conflicts of interest, failures in disclosure, and 
financial benefits by Avestra and others (eg Trio’s Astarra Strategic Fund)712 inclined to malfeasance. 
There is further lack of statutory clarity as to who are related parties713 of an RE of a registered MIS 
and hence whether there is a financial benefit,714 despite broad legislative intention.715 
  
                                                                  
708 ASIC v Avestra Asset Management Limited (In Liquidation) [2017] FCA 497 (Beach J). 
709 Ibid [251] (Beach J). 
710 Ibid [11] (Beach J). 
711 Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Act 2007 (Cth) sch 1 [66] cited in 
ASIC v Avestra Asset Management Limited (In Liquidation) [2017] FCA 497 [12] (Beach J). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
There is considerably more judicial review of NBFE entities regulated under the Corporations Act 
than under the SIS Act or Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act (as amended 2016). This is partly 
explained by the greatly differing number of entities regulated by each statute. 
The differing approaches to regulation are influential: trust based, codified using the language of the 
general law ex ante supervision versus ex post statute based market conduct law, its effectiveness 
compromised and diminished by accretive statutory additions. This traverse identifies the weaknesses 
in Australian market conduct and supervision law. It explains how judicial interventions have sought 
to provide legal solutions often based in trust general law. 
Australia is not unique in dealing with the problems addressed in this traverse: comparative analysis 
demonstrates how those comparative jurisdictions have addressed similar problems. 
234 
CHAPTER 5: INSIGHTS FROM COMPARATIVE JURISDICTIONS  
The regulation of Non-Bank Financial Entities in Singapore, Germany (and European Union), 
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses how comparable jurisdictions regulate non-bank financial entities (NBFEs), the 
extent and importance of fiduciary duties, related party transactions, financial advice, disclosure, 
financial literacy, corporate governance, director and trustee training and accreditation. The 
regulation of NBFEs is subject to political and economic policy objectives of individual countries. 
Underlying economic, strategic, and political environments influence the development of the local 
law. Whilst foreign statutory evolution and jurisprudence may not necessarily be easily transposed to 
Australia, there are important legal and regulatory developments in other jurisdictions that could and 
should influence Australian policy, despite variances in their NBFE regulatory architecture. The 
objective of this chapter is to identify and analyse insights from other jurisdictions which are 
applicable to the future development of Australian law. 
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2. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Singapore 
Singapore regulation of NBFEs stems from strategic policy development since 1945 and 
independence from Malaysia in 1965. Singapore follows Australian, English and other (British) 
Commonwealth practice with its own overlays. Singapore government policy is to become a world 
financial centre. It uses its legal framework as a strategic tool.  
Capital markets regulation in Singapore is the responsibility of Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), Singapore Police Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), and the Approved Exchanges1 on 
which securities are traded.2 Three exchanges3 are non-government entities but undertake market 
supervisory functions. 
MAS is the single reserve bank, financial markets supervisor, regulator, and market conduct regulator. 
Its role includes the pursuit of financial stability, prudential standards, and Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing objectives. MAS controls market entry by licencing participants. 
Its culture is disclosure based, consultative, and business supportive including the sharing of 
supervisory and regulatory objectives, both prescriptive and principles based.  
MAS has six oversight functions (regulation, authorisation, supervision, surveillance, enforcement, 
and resolution). It facilitates policy objectives in corporate governance, market discipline, and 
consumer education. MAS is consultative and pre-emptive, but also ex post resolver and facilitator. 
MAS provides for a consumer safety net,4 but it does not: ‘protect consumers from the risk that their 
investments will not deliver anticipated returns’.5  
MAS’ policy acknowledges that not all financial product and financial services transactions can be 
prescriptively policed. ‘To do so would require such a high level of prescriptive detail that, even if it 
was possible, would be stifling to industry innovation and initiative’.6 This highlights policy 
difference between compliance and industry development cultures: 
                                                                  
1 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), Capital Markets Enforcement (MAS Monograph, 5 January 
2016). 
2 Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289, 2016) s 8(1). 
3 Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited, Singapore Exchange Derivatives Trading Limited, and 
ICE Futures Singapore Pte Ltd. 
4 MAS, Objectives and Principles of Financial Supervision in Singapore (MAS Monograph 1, April 2004, 
revised September 2015) s 5 [1]–[2]. 
5 Ibid s 3 [16] Objective 6. 
6 MAS, Tenets of effective regulation (MAS Monograph 3, June 2010 rev September 2015) s 3 [29]. 
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A well-regulated and supervised financial sector is not an end in itself …7 MAS seeks to establish 
sound regulation of a high standard that allows well-managed risk taking and innovation, and which 
emphasises the stable and sustainable development of the financial services sector.8 
MAS emphasises consistency with international standards, shared responsibility, flexibility, costs and 
benefits, transparency and clarity of regulation. A consistent and sound legal system means that 
‘institutions have certainty and predictability as to their legal obligations’.9 This is a major theme 
underlying Singapore policy. A consistent and effective legal system reduces ‘frequent and sudden 
changes that cause uncertainty and disruption to business and market practices’.10 
The reward of consistent regulation and a competent legal system should reduce productivity sapping 
ambiguities. There should be ‘no question of a breakdown in the flow of information between separate 
parties, nor is there ambiguity about who has responsibility for what.11  
Singapore’s Single Peak model separates its statutory dual role of supervisor and industry capital 
markets promoter. MAS has an internal separation of supervision (MAS Banking and Insurance 
Group) and financial centre development, market conduct and investors (MAS Capital Markets 
Group), functionally similar to Australia’s original Twin Peaks model.  
Public policy recognises that consumer protection and punishment are compatriots. ‘[T]he court 
concluded that the objective of the disqualification regime was not punitive, but was essentially 
protective in nature’.12 The primary objective of enforcement is to foster superior professional 
conduct and to ‘achieve effective deterrence’.13 This is achieved by periodic enforcement actions, 
                                                                  
7 MAS, Objectives and Principles of Financial Supervision in Singapore, above n 4, s 2[5]. 
8 MAS, Tenets of effective regulation, above n 6, Executive Summary. 
9 Ibid Tenet 6. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Andrew Campbell, ‘Insolvent Banks and the Financial Sector Safety net – Lessons from the Northern 
Rock Crisis’ (2008) 20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 316, 337. 
12 Pearlie Koh, ‘Punishment and Protection – The disqualification of directors in Singapore’ [2013] 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 447, 448 citing Ong Chow Hong [2011] 3 SLR 1093 (HC) and 
Madhavan Peter [2012] 4 SLR 613 (HC). 
13 MAS, Capital Markets Enforcement, above n 1, s 1 [10]. 
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many of them civil penalties for deceptive conduct and securities market rigging14 fraud,15 and insider 
trading.16 
MAS supervises ‘licensed banks and merchant banks, finance companies, insurance companies and 
brokers, capital market intermediaries, and financial advisers’.17 NBFEs in Singapore include 
trustee18 and fund management companies,19 subject to statutory licencing regimes. Trustee 
companies (Singapore or foreign) are required to have at least two resident managers, each of which 
must hold acceptable tertiary or professional qualifications one of whom must have at least five years 
of relevant working experience as a component of fit and proper testing.20 Directors of Collective 
Investment Schemes (CIS) fit and proper requirements mirror those for trustee companies, but there 
are additional relevant experience and examination criteria.21 Fair dealing principles are explicit in 
organisational culture. 
Fund management companies are licensed (LFMC) and hold a capital markets services licence (CMS) 
or registered (RFMC).22 LFMC are distinguished by type of investor (in Australia retail or 
professional). RFMC is limited to the number of qualified investors (including limited liability 
partnership [LLP] structures) and value of assets under management limits. Licensing requirements 
are broad and include any person (gatekeepers) offering advice, research, portfolio influence, have 
non-public knowledge or access to the portfolio, named or referred to in offer documents or marketing 
material. The practical effect is to achieve quality assurance of the investment chain similar to the 
fiduciary proposals in the UK. RFMC asset under management limits (S$250 million) can be 
problematic as asset values grow and fund managers may require LFMC status. To some extent, the 
                                                                  
14 Chua Li Hoon Matilda v Public Prosecutor [2009] 116 (HC); Public Prosecutor v Lee Siew Ngan [2010] 
100 (DC); Tan Chong Koay v Monetary Authority of Singapore [2011] 36 (CA); Public Prosecutor v Franco 
Guiseppe [2011] 184 (DC). 
15 Public Prosecutor v Loo Kiah Heng [2010] 434 (DC). 
16 <http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Enforcement-Actions.aspx>. See also Public Prosecutor 
v Ng Chee Kheong [1999] 204 (HC); Lew Chee Fai Kevin v Monetary Authority of Singapore [2012] 12 
(CA). 
17 MAS, MAS framework for impact and risk assessment of financial institutions (MAS Monograph 2, April 
2007 rev September 2015). 
18 Trust Companies Act (Singapore, Act 11 of 2005).  
19 Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289). See Guidelines on licensing, registration, and conduct of 
business for fund management companies (SFA No 04-G05 7, August 2012). 
20 Trust Companies Act (Singapore, Act 11 of 2005) s 74. See Guidelines on standards of conduct for 
licensed trust companies (TCA No G03, 22 December 2005). 
21 Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289). See Guidelines on licensing, registration, and conduct of 
business for fund management companies (SFA No 04-G05 app 1 Minimum Competency Requirements, 
August 2012). 
22 Ibid s 321. See Guidelines on licensing, registration, and conduct of business for fund management 
companies (SFA No 04-G05, 7 August 2012). 
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practical effect for RFMC licencing in Singapore echoes the 2012 SLE proposal for Australian 
managed investment schemes (MIS) responsible entity (RE) companies,23 being to limit investor risk 
by restricting the operations of the RFMC. 
Singapore NBFEs have greater barriers to entry than Australia. There must be a Singapore 
incorporated company with a permanent physical presence.24 The major differences from Australia 
are prudential supervision, capital adequacy, fit and proper criteria, minimum funds under 
management25 and an independent, non-related party custodian. Capital adequacy requires consistent 
minimum Base Capital26 and Risk-based Capital.27  
Prudential regulation includes separation of financial and non-financial businesses of banks (unlike 
Australia) to prevent contagion and differentiation of liquidity and prudential capital. Prudential 
regulation of Singapore Real Estate Investment Trusts (S-REITs) is designed to prevent undue 
leverage enabling these CIS to service their debt without asset liquidations. The implementation of a 
Code of Best Practice harmonises Singaporean CIS with international standards (including 
Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities [UCITS] compliance) and 
Singapore listed companies. Money lending is regulated separately with reform designed to improve 
respectability.28 NBFEs regulated by MAS are excluded.29 
Superannuation in Singapore is largely government mandated and administered since 1955 by the 
Central Provident Fund Board (CPFB).30 Contributions to the member accounts vary with age and 
other factors up to 32.5% of income. Initially a retirement scheme, it has evolved into a broad social 
security system including for medical expenses,31 education,32 life insurance,33 family assistance,34 
housing,35 and securities investments. To some extent the CPFB fills the role of Industry Default 
Funds and Workers Entitlement MIS in Australia. It differs in that the individual member can make 
                                                                  
23 Australian Government, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC), Managed Investment 
Schemes (Report, 2012). 
24 Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289). See Guidelines on licensing, registration, and conduct of 
business for fund management companies (SFA No 04-G05 3.1, 7 August 2012. 
25 S$1.0 billion for retail CIS. 
26 S$1.0 million for CIS for retail investment. 
27 120% of operational risk exposure. 
28 Moneylenders Act (Singapore No 31 of 2008) s 2. 
29 Sandra Annette Booysen, ‘The New Moneylenders Act 2008’ (2009) 21 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 394. 
30 Central Provident Fund Act (Singapore Cap 36 rev 2001). 
31 Ibid s 16 and pt VI. 
32 Ibid s 22. 
33 Ibid pt V. 
34 Ibid ss 18–19. 
35 Ibid s 15. 
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the investment decisions. Home ownership in Singapore is largely financed through the recycling of 
CPF monies into mortgages for the fund members who have one of the highest rates of home 
ownership in the world. It is used as an economic development tool, initially to venture finance 
industries, and a nascent government bond market. ‘Carefully timed measures have been introduced 
to allow this increasingly large amount of forced savings to be productively employed to finance the 
nation’s development’.36 
CPFB members are allowed to borrow from their savings accounts for productive investment 
purposes.37 CPFB savings are the largest single pool of investible funds in Singapore and represent 
some 70% of the Singapore government bond market.38 Members may elect for the CPFB to invest 
their monies.39 These trust like functions ‘do[es] not fit with the traditional concept of trust law’.40 
Singapore balances state paternalism with individual responsibility: there are limits on contributions 
to non-CPFB schemes. They exist primarily as corporate pension schemes and the Academic Staff 
Provident Board for public universities. There is some dissatisfaction with the CPF.41 It manifests as 
coercion over investment policy, complexity,42 transparency, and succession.43 Some dissent is 
attributable to financial literacy failures. In practice, CPFB investments by the member are subject to 
CPFB approval.44 Consequently, members are not required to remedy losses. This presents moral 
hazard. Will individuals make investment decisions sensibly and rationally? The tension between 
paternalism and cognitive ability can have severe retirement consequences: 
At the bottom of resistance to institutional assistance in decision-making is the conviction that 
individuals should be permitted to simply choose a course of action, no matter how inferior that 
course of action is for that agent.45 
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Development Bank, Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A study of Financial Markets: Volume 3 — Sound  
Practices (Asian Development Bank, 2000) 55, 57. 
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Coopers’ libertarian paternalism in Australia echoes Singapore ‘soft’ paternalist practice: ‘default 
rules that would enrol people automatically in savings plan … while allowing people to opt out should 
they decide against joining’.46 Singapore’s system is more flexible and transparent than Australia 
where members are not able to access their funds; those in Australian MySuper default funds have 
no power to determine investments, seek a trustee’s reasons for decisions, or apply the funds for non-
retirement purposes except in extreme circumstances. 
2.2 Germany and the EU 
Modern German law was given statutory form as the Basic Law47 in 1949. Germany has a civil law 
system, the only two sources of law being statute (Gesetz) and custom (Gewohnheitsrecht).48 Custom 
is not identical to Australian common law and ’German law does not recognise the binding force of 
precedent’,49 although it can be influential in certain circumstances. ‘[T]he judge finds the law, and 
does not make it.’50 Civil law developed from Roman principles based traditions (Corpus Juris 
Civilis).51 Historical traumas influence the German regulatory system. ‘The post-war German 
political economy and corporate governance regime stood in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal 
American model.’52 Differences included diffusion of power in corporate governance, bank 
shareholdings in German companies, bank financing of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(Mittelstand), and the development of large pension funds. NBFEs did not evolve as in other 
jurisdictions. Libertarian paternalism was traditional German practice. Law reform in 2004 facilitated 
finance capitalism by transforming German governance from a stakeholder interest to a shareholder 
interest posture.53 
German company law traditionally rests in statute. Non-statutory comply-or-explain doctrine 
regulation is recent.54 The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) is voluntary and even for 
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listed companies applies on a comply-or-explain basis,55 designed to improve disclosure.56 The 
primary statutes are the Civil Code57 and the Commercial Code.58 For NBFEs59 these are 
supplemented by the Stock Corporation Act,60 Securities Trading Act,61 Banking Supervision Act,62 
Investment Modernisation Act,63 and Stock Exchange Act.64 German law has ‘one unified system of 
law in which there was and is neither need nor room for a separate system of equity’.65 Equitable 
principles are inherent in every judicial decision. Directors consequently must ‘observe the spirit, as 
well as the letter, of German law …’66 German doctrine reflects anglosphere fiduciary concepts but 
stem, other than contracted duties, from the duty of care, applied differently to Australian law. 
German standards of fiduciary duty and duty of care are higher ‘to prevent third parties being misled 
…’67 
Regulation and supervisory models for prudential, market conduct, and financial stability oversight 
functions vary across the EU and the European Economic Area states outside of the EU. Like 
Singapore, most adopt an integrated or functional model rather than three-pillar or twin peaks 
models.68 
All forms of supervision are present in all states, whether they are based on one or several supervisors 
… there appear to be at least fifty-four different financial supervisors in the wider European area, 
including Switzerland ... in Germany, although most supervision is exercised at the federal level, 
considerable parts of supervisory competence are still in the hands of the local state.69 
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State (Länder) responsibility is primarily transactional, concerning securities exchanges.70 Multiple 
regulators and supervisors leads to regulatory competition, or treaty shopping, being the antithesis of 
harmonisation. Germany has a single integrated prudential and market conduct regulator, BaFin.71 
BaFin is not the functional equivalent of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC). Its mandate is to ‘supervise undesirable developments’72 which ‘may adversely affect the 
orderly conduct of trading with financial instruments or which may result in serious disadvantages 
for the capital market’.73 The Bundesbank retains monetary policy independence and some oversight 
functions. BaFin does not apply criminal sanction, being limited to civil remedies for regulatory 
infringements. Criminal cases are conducted by the public prosecutor for directors’ bribery74 and 
corporate malfeasance cases.75 Contracts are required to be notarised and lodged with the commercial 
court (Handelsgericht) to be legally effective. 
2.2.1 Harmonisation 
As in Australia: 
The 1990’s witnessed the rise of large, vertically integrated financial empires. …76 This 
triggered a host of regulatory responses at the domestic level, but also mobilised new efforts 
to improve the global governance of financial markets.77 
[A]n efficient Single Market should have a harmonised set of core rules … greater consistency and 
cooperation of supervision and implementation of harmonised principles’,78 whilst maintaining the 
status quo in the separation of monetary policy and capital markets regulation. Harmonisation is 
problematic in multi-country, multi-functional, multi-legal entity related party NBFEs (eg Lehman). 
It poses challenges in regulation, supervision and resolution79 without a common cross-border 
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regulatory framework80 designed for consistency in enforcement and supervision.81 ‘In many 
jurisdictions, the individual components of a financial group will be subject to different authorities 
and legal proceedings’.82 As in Australia, political tensions influence policy: 
Harmonisation is no longer simply a functional device for removing obstacles and addressing 
market failures … Harmonisation is the device through which centralised [re-]regulation is 
imposed on the EC market-place … having transformative ambitions reflecting, inter alia, the 
legislature’s objective to influence and indeed drive market behaviour and build and equity 
culture through regulation.83 
German authorities sought to rectify these deficiencies for those 1.7% of institutions of ‘systemic 
importance’ in 2008/9.84 Stabilisation statutes did not apply to NBFEs (being most German financial 
institutions).85 Harmonisation initiatives continued requiring that the newly constituted Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) advice be generally binding but that national regulators 
including BaFin could deviate from it if they give ‘full reasons for their decision’.86 Four Framework 
Directives govern financial services (including credit ratings agencies), financial products, market 
abuse (Market Abuse Directive [EU] or MAD), prospectus issuance, misuse of financial instruments 
(Markets in Financial Instruments Directive [EU] or MiFID), and transparency. The Framework 
Directives impose sanctions, but do not provide precision.87 The result is ‘a certain complexity, albeit 
a uniform one’.88 They provide limited guidance on the civil liability of securities issuers for adequate 
disclosure. CESR was superseded by the European Securities and Markets Authority (EMSA) in 
2011. It has cross-border regulatory and supervisory powers, judicially confirmed.89 They do not 
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subsume national responsibilities other than credit reporting agencies90 which are regulated without 
national intermediation.91 
BaFin does have wide ranging principles based powers,92 based on concepts of ‘natural politeness’.93 
This regulatory model is culturally specific to Germany. It follows enlightened post-war legal 
concepts designed to promote a civil society, redolent of MAS’ objectives in Singapore. In Australia, 
Hanrahan and Kingsford Smith94 insightfully favour a similar approach over its box-ticking 
regulatory culture. Germany ‘has realised that a lot can be gained by employing principle-based 
regulation’.95 Case law is comparatively limited. Civil liability exists in tort and statute96 for false 
information where proof of causality exists.  
Similarity with Singapore extends to practical assessment of what is possible: 
Financial supervisors cannot be expected to reduce the probability of financial intermediaries’ 
excessive risk taking to zero, nor can they start enforcement actions every time they are alerted about 
a possible compliance issue.97 
Germany is not unique in wanting control over capital markets regulation or complexities of cross-
border harmonisation. An internationally competitive economy requires regulatory competition. 
Supervisory effectiveness requires closeness to those entities supervised leading, as in Singapore, to 
a state of predictability and veracity on which all stakeholders have certainty and the ability to 
contribute by way of public consultation. Proximity can lead to regulatory capture, a consequence of 
more regulation by way of compliance leading to propensity for lobbying and capture.98 Australian 
examples are reform of registered organisations and superannuation trustee governance.99 
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Whilst law matters, it is problematic to assume that government regulation can drive market 
behaviour. In practice intertwined European and national jurisdiction mix of soft law through self-
regulation, co-regulation, and government regulation, disciplined by the primacy of civil law 
principles and the statutory powers of minority shareholders produces results: ‘Firms begin to avail 
themselves of corporate governance principles codes, guidelines and laws, thereby leaving the “box-
ticking” phase behind’.100 This is a salutary lesson for present Australian practice where the primacy 
of its Corporations Act results in box-ticking, facilitating creeping corruption in MIS and other 
NBFEs. 
2.3 United Kingdom 
Since 2013, financial services and financial products market conduct and prudential regulation has 
followed the Australian Twin Peaks model.101 The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is the 
equivalent of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has some equivalence with ASIC. In part, this dichotomy is similar to Australia’s 
Twin Peaks model, but it does not have an equivalent interface with the UK industrial system.  
A UK distinctive feature is ‘there is no statutory duty imposed on investment advisers in the UK to 
act in the best interest of their clients’,102 this duty being subsumed into FCA regulatory guidance 
with statutory support from the Financial Services and Markets Act.103 Investor typology is also 
distinctive. Neither is there similarity between codified UK directors’ duties and their Australian 
counterparts. Discomfort with statutory accretion in the UK has Australian echoes, leading to analysis 
of the proper role of fiduciary law. Despite a shared legal provenance, the UK framework is different, 
distinctive, and overlaid with EU regulation. 
2.4 Canada 
Regulation of financial services and financial products is implemented in Canada through Self-
Regulatory Organisations (SRO).104 These have statutory force governed and audited by the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA). Other NBFEs have their own SROs: securities dealing by the 
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Investment Industry Regulatory Organisation of Canada (IIROC), insurance by Managing General 
Agencies (MGA), and collective investments by The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada 
(MFDA). These are also governed by the CSA. SROs derive their obligations from multiple sources 
including the common law. 
Canada retains a federal system of securities regulation confirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court.105 
Nonetheless, cooperative federalism and precedent in trade, commerce and prudential regulatory 
powers, have resulted in a modicum of provincial opt-in arrangements.106 Each province and territory 
‘imposes statutory duties on investment advis[e]rs,107 and other fiduciaries.108 Federal National 
Instruments, including for retail advice,109 are administered by the CSA establishing broad principles 
with implementation delegated to the IIROC and MFDA. These SROs ‘provide complementary, 
comprehensive and particularised rules, guidance and enforcement of these principles’.110 The 
MFDA, being the industry SRO for collective investment schemes (in Canada, mutual funds), 
imposes fiduciary duties on investment managers. Business conduct rules111 for retail investment 
advice are similar to Singapore and extend to ‘[E]ach partner, director, officer, supervisor, registered 
representative, investment representative, and employee...’112  
Prudential supervision in Canada rests upon cultural differences in banking regulatory policy. These 
are credited with efficacy of Canadian macro-prudential regulation, eliminating the need for federal 
interventions seen in the US and the UK. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
(OSFI) is a federal agency operating ex ante to ‘work informally with regulated parties, ultimately 
rendering it unnecessary to take formal enforcement action’,113 and ‘almost universally view[ed] to 
be an effective regulator’.114 Transparency in regulation is a normative organisational objective, but 
the Canadian experience demonstrates otherwise in relation to regulation of its banking and 
superannuation experience. Other than formal regulations, ‘there is no prescribed process, no 
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mandated public consultation, no necessary stakeholder input or cost benefit analyses required with 
regard to the formulation of either policy statements or guidelines.’115  
OSFI’s insulated and opaque structure provides certain benefits that enhance its efficacy. In particular, 
it is able to regulate unhampered by political lobbying, partisan politics, and majoritarian preferences. 
OSFI operates in a ‘black box’, keeping information about its policy and enforcement confidential. 
With its informational advantage, it is able to undermine the possibility that banks will collude or rent-
seek. Our conclusions [support] regarding the value of opacity but against generally held views about 
the benefits of transparency in regulatory bodies.116 
Notably, Canada applies a different definition of Twin Peaks to that in Australia. Canadian Twin 
Peaks refers to OSFI and the Bank of Canada. Distinctiveness in Canadian law administered by OSFI 
extends to prudential and other financial system regulation including some NBFEs.117 Australia’s 
Twin Peaks model (and the Reserve Bank) with its separation of macro- and micro-regulation is not 
equivalent to the Canadian model in structure or culture. 
2.5 United States 
Federal and State law regulates US NBFEs. US federal regulation distinguishes between broker 
dealers regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),118 an SRO, and financial 
advisers regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),119 these categories not being 
mutually exclusive. ‘[B]oth investment advisers and broker-dealers provid[e] investment advice on 
both a sporadic and ongoing basis resulting in retail investor confusion.’120 The SEC is empowered 
to identify ‘any gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps … in the protection of retail customers’.121 As in 
Australia, regulation distinguishes between retail and professional investors.  
The US has been ‘debating or clarifying concepts that have been developed by Canada…’122 
including statutory and common law fiduciary standards. As in Australia, this debate is politicised, 
dependent upon the political influence of the SEC and the appointment of its commissioners. 
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Generally, the SEC relies upon contractual relationship, but the statutory and common law standards 
are lower than those now required in Canada ‘and are otherwise abstract and unclear.’123 
Of the US states, Delaware is influential since the majority of public companies are incorporated 
there. Each state in varying degrees regulate some (not all) parts of the investment chain.124  
2.5.1 Complexity and compliance 
Confusion and uncertainty extends to US superannuation funds, the majority of which in the private 
sector are defined contribution plans.125 US private superannuation accounts are trusts.126 Those 
persons with fiduciary status (courts exempt employer sponsors as fiduciaries when they act as 
settlors)127 have prudence and disclosure obligations which extend beyond statutory requirements, 
reflecting trust principles. 
Statutory control is primarily exercised through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA).128 ‘In contrast with securities law, ERISA decentralises civil enforcement [even] amongst 
regulatory agencies’, being the Department of Labour Employee Benefits Security Administration 
(EBSA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).129 
The SEC also polices fraud in US superannuation.130 
Unanimity among academic commentators is rare. However, on one point there does not seem to be 
any dissent: U.S. pension law is extraordinarily complex.131 
Australian echoes of complicated compliance based cultures reflect the US experience of ‘conflicted 
actors [as] plan intermediaries and service providers.’132 At least in the US, all regulators adopt an ex 
ante posture. 
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Agency problems abound and the trillions of dollars [c USD 23 trillion in 2016] held in pension plans 
are an enticing target for intermediaries and service providers who are opportunistic, desperate, or just 
plain greedy.133  
As in Australia, legal uncertainty is aided by lack of harmonisation in legal definition: 
Financial wrongdoing is not a defined term in US superannuation law. Financial intermediaries are 
fiduciaries. ERISA expressly authorises the employer to use an ‘officer, employee, agent or other 
representative’ as a fiduciary, thereby inviting the conflicts of interest that so trouble the law of benefit 
denials.134 
Decentralisation of regulation leads to disparate enforcement, including enforcement of fiduciary 
standards.135 It opens the door to multiple points of political and lobbyist influence. Every 
organisation has a different culture. Culture determines its enforcement priorities. In the US, there is 
no over-riding values set between US regulators of private pensions despite their sharing ‘some of 
the same motivations and constraints.’136 
Corporate malfeasance more generally has been subjected to statutory intervention (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act), particularly disclosure, governance and SEC enforcement enhancement.137 ‘[A] competition 
among legislators to show who could be the toughest on corporate crime.’138 Unlike Australian 
product disclosure statements, US financial products offer documents are required to have a 
comprehensive Management Discussion and Analysis chapter. This typically is more insightful than 
what passes for disclosure in Australia. Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the usage of plain English. Taft-
Hartley139 criminalises payments by employers to labour organisations (with certain permissible 
benefits), a problematic issue in Australia now rectified by the passage of the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Amendment Act in 2016. Each of these standards would benefit Australian financial 
products consumers. Disclosures require executive certification as to factual content and to the 
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processes of issuance of the disclosure.140 Notably, whistleblower standards141 are higher than 
presently apply in Australia. However, the use of ‘inconsistent language has produced conflicting 
decisions within the federal judiciary’.142 The SEC interpretation, allowing whistleblowers to report 
directly to it or through their employers, conflicts with judicial interpretation,143 which requires direct 
SEC reporting.144 
2.5.2 Limitations of statutes: criminogenic organisations 
These statutory interventions have not prevented ‘[t]he Rise of Criminogenic Organisations’.145 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance and enforcement standards, like the Australian Corporations Act does 
not change the values and ethics of organisations. It merely encourages box ticking by those with 
executive responsibility for disclosure. US scholarly research mirrors Hanrahan and Kingsford Smith 
in Australia demonstrating the difference between compliance based cultures and values based 
cultures and how ‘assumptions of rationality in economic theory are contradicted by experimental 
evidence’.146 
This is important behavioural economics research with global multi-cultural implications147 now 
finding its way into Canadian regulation of financial products and services, but receiving only limited 
scholarly attention in Australia. It provides the theoretical basis for the imposition and extension of 
fiduciary principles to those sectors being one solution to the manifest conflicts of interest that occur 
in financial products and services. In the US, after Sarbanes-Oxley, there was: 
an outbreak of high-level, large-scale white-collar crime. Each illegal act was no doubt surrounded by 
a broad penumbra of unethical conduct, yet in each case the core actions all involved a failure to 
respect the law.148 
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These failures in ethics and the cultural values that engender criminogenic organisations are systemic 
in the US and have global impact. Credit rating agencies (CRA) are fundamental to the NBFE (and 
banking) system worldwide. Their actions have resulted in very large investor losses globally and in 
multi-jurisdictional litigation, including Australia,149 Germany,150 Austria,151 and the US.152 Many of 
these losses can be attributed to rated structured finance products sold to retail, professional and 
institutional investors. These rated products included Credit Default Swaps (CDS). CDS are a form 
of insurance where the issuer of the CDS assumes credit risk. They have not been prudentially 
regulated.153 Prima facie, as important gatekeepers, CRAs should be subject to liability.  
Failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction. Without the 
high ratings issued by credit rating agencies, the mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis 
could not have been marketed and sold in such vast numbers.154  
The Dodd-Frank Act155 provides for administrative monitoring through the Office of Credit Rating.156 
However,  
empirical evidence suggests that, if pre-crisis, ‘[t]he story of the credit rating agencies is a story of 
colossal failure’ due to systemic misreporting of creditworthiness by CRA’s and the Dodd-Frank Act 
has only made matters worse by further reducing ratings informative content.157 
This suggests failures in disclosure facilitated by compromised statute and failures in the value system 
of these gatekeepers. ‘[C]orporate governance in CRA’s needs to be viewed as a problem, rather than 
                                                                  
149 See especially Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 
(Rares J); ABN Amro Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65 (Jacobson, Gilmour and 
Gordon JJ). 
150 Luigi Guiso, ‘Trust and Risk Aversion in the Aftermath of the Great Recession’ (2012) 13 European 
Business Organisation Law Journal 195, 209. 
151 Susanne Kalss, ‘Civil Law Protection of Investors in Austria ― A Situation Report from Amidst a Wave 
of Investor Law Suits’ (2012) 13 European Business Organisation Law Review 211, 212. 
152 California Public Employees’ Retirement System v Moody’s Investor Services, Inc case number A134912 
(Cal Ct App, 2014). 
153 Benjamin B Saunders, ‘Should Credit Default Swap Issuers be subject to prudential regulation?’ (2010) 
10(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 427. 
154 Symposium, ‘American University Business Law Review Symposium: Law, Finance and Legitimacy 
after Financial Reform’ (2011) 1 American University Business Law Review 1 citing Brooksley Born, 
‘Financial Reform and the Causes of the Financial Crisis’ (2011) 1(1) American University Business Law 
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as a solution’.158 The European Financial Stability Board (EUFSB) goes well beyond US practice: 
introducing duties of skill and care and fiduciary duties of fund managers: 
Fund managers purchasing securities must be able to demonstrate that they understand both the 
security and the underlying assets. The law could provide that simply relying on an investment-grade 
rating will not suffice to discharge the fiduciary obligation of prudence. This would reduce demand 
for complex products that virtually no one understands, making them virtually unsaleable and therefore 
reducing the incentives of investment banks to develop them.159 
The US has not followed this course. That regulators should need to suggest fund managers actually 
comprehend the securities purchased for their clients speaks loudly of the gap between community 
expectations and market practices. It also supports the need for reform of the underlying principles in 
regulation. Statutory compliance achieves lesser outcomes than fiduciary responsibility. 
There is ‘no simple fix’.160 Independent, non-partisan ex ante supervision within an institutional 
framework which eliminates too big to fail moral suasion arguments is a starting point. The US 
(banks) has followed the opposite statutory course,161 although there are more recent, un-enacted, 
calls for a return to the status quo ante162 which separated commercial and investment banking 
systemic risks. Previous statutory reform163 designed to reduce systemic risk in the financial system 
(bank and NBFE) including diminishing proprietary trading and their conflicts of interest (the Volcker 
Rule)164 has not reduced ‘market failure that endangers the economy’.165 Rather than prohibition, 
political compromise resulted in a statutory limitation of 3.0% of bank tier 1 capital to be applied to 
proprietary trading.  
The ‘enormous complexity’166 of the Dodd-Franks Act has echoes in Australia’s Corporations Act in 
two other respects. First: 
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The Act continues to rely on the old regulatory principles and assumptions despite the dramatic change 
in the financial sectors since that era [1930s New Deal]. The regulatory philosophy of the Act is still 
focussed on form rather than function.167 
Second: 
The application of the Volcker rule will depend on how the regulators interpret it since the concept of 
proprietary trading is vague and imprecise. After all, the basic expectation of the rule of law is that the 
rules are clear and intelligible and important issues should not be left to the whim of the legislators.168 
The Dodd-Frank Act resembled the Australian Corporate Law Economic Reform Program process, 
being a ‘matrix of 243 legislative amendments, additions and broad prescriptions for corresponding 
rules to be promulgated over a 24 month period.’169 Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank attempted to 
rectify the manifestation of systemic problems with statute. However, ‘[t]here is now a concerted 
effort by some large financial institutions and their trade associations to prevent full implementation 
and enforcement.’170 This effort manifests in proposed reform to Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank171 
the outcome of which is uncertain, but intended to repeal the Volcker Rule and reform the SEC under 
the guise of capital markets deregulation to promote ‘hope and opportunity’.172 The fractured nature 
of the US statutory framework and its enforcement still provides for firms to ‘[s]elect amongst 
supervisors, leading to a regulatory race to the bottom’.173 ‘The literature on comparative financial 
supervision and enforcement places the US as both a global leader and a global outlier’.174 
Unlike Canada and Australia, SEC commissioners are blatantly political appointments. A strength of 
the Canadian system is the separation of direct political influence from regulation. It is not clear that 
Australia has this separation. This author’s qualitative research suggests otherwise, although heavily 
nuanced compared with the overt politicisation of the SEC. Inference also suggests that some 
superannuation trustee capital allocations do not meet the statutory sole purpose test. These 
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allocations include related party investments, sponsorships, advertising, and social policy purposes.175 
As in the US, protection arising from related party political campaign contributions and regulatory 
capture in a contested statutory environment can make enforcement problematic.176  
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3. FIDUCIARY AND CIVIL LAW FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Singapore 
3.1.1 Fiduciary and Non-Fiduciary Duties of Fiduciaries  
Traditionally, Singapore follows a strict proscriptive fiduciary tradition with courts not wishing to 
‘second guess’177 the actions of directors.178 Usually, ‘the fiduciary will owe the principal non-
fiduciary duties, which do not affect and are not affected by the fiduciary duties owed’.179 As in other 
jurisdictions, the non-fiduciary duties will depend on factual context. Legal responsibility will depend 
on the cause and may include breaches of fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties.180 Disclosure problems 
of Singaporean directors arise from statutory ability to: ‘sanction transactions involving interested 
directors where those directors abstained from voting’.181 
The disclosure principle: ‘removes the proscription so that no [fiduciary] breach ever arises in the 
first place’,182 being a narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty. More recently, enhanced standards of 
care required of Singapore company directors result in objective criteria including: ‘non-delegable 
duty of supervision’,183 following English184 and Australian cases.185 However: ‘Whilst our company 
law mirrors that in England in many aspects, there nevertheless remain sufficient differences to 
warrant careful and contextual application’.186 
3.1.2 Duty of care 
Singapore, like Australia now has ‘three general duties of care …’ resulting in ‘… a relatively simple 
matter [becoming] gratuitously complex.’187 In Singapore, the: ‘interests of the company is not just 
profit maximisation. Neither is it profit maximisation by any means’.188 
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Value, increasingly in the corporate world cannot be just about pecuniary outcomes … to nurture and 
sustain corporate value, the roles of values and norms are surprisingly under-estimated,189  
requiring an evolution beyond statutory compliance outcomes to values based on fiduciary and 
equitable principles. Fiduciary duties can extend to the best interest of the company and the exercise 
of that power for a proper purpose.190 Nonetheless, 
The duty to act for proper purposes is seldom applied and this not well developed in Singapore … a 
dearth of authority in Singapore applying the duty to act for proper purposes.’191 ‘The duty to act bona 
fide in the interests of the company – appears to be applied more frequently in the Singapore courts.192 
Complexity extends to a directors’ duty of care and: ‘how [a] duty of care can be found to exist 
between defendants and claimants who do not have contractual or other legal connection’.193 The 
Singapore duty of care test, and negligence claims arising from its breach, relies heavily on the 
presence of proximity. ‘[P]roximity has substance that is capable of being defined and capable of 
being expressed in terms of legal principles’,194 proximity being ‘simply another concept co-equal in 
operation to assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance.’195 
In Singapore, ‘The duties of care of directors developed in equity, statute, and common law’.196 
Statutory intervention in Singapore197 carries criminal penalties and is not a reformulation of equitable 
or common law provisions.198 Equitable duty of care may be fiduciary with, ‘consequences for 
causation, remoteness [proximity], limitation and proprietary remedies’.199 These consequences are 
ill-determined in equity, may result in director tortfeasance, but do carry statutory criminal penalty. 
These ‘concentrate the mind’200 but lead to tensions between crime control as a strategy in economic 
                                                                  
189 Eugene K B Tan, ‘Corporate social responsibility as corporate soft law: mainstreaming ethical and 
responsible conduct in corporate governance’ (2013) 31 Singapore Law Review 227, 240. 
190 DM Divers Technics Pte Ltd v Tee Chin Hock [2004] 4 SLR 424. 
191 Lee Suite Lin Joyce, ‘Making a case for the duty to act for proper purposes’ [2014] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 79. 
192 Ibid 95. 
193 A L R Joseph, ‘Establishing a duty of care: Singapore’s single, two stage test’ (2008) 20 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 251, 253. 
194 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR 100 [80] (Chan 
CJ). 
195 Joseph, above n 193, 268. 
196 Farrar, ‘Directors duties of care’, above n 187. 
197 Companies Act (Singapore Cap 50, 2006 [rev ed]) s 157. 
198 Farrar, ‘Directors duties of care’, above n 187, 746. 
199 Ibid 750. 
200 Timothy Liau, ‘Is criminalising directorial negligence a good idea?’ (2014) 14(1) Journal of Corporate 
Legal Studies 175, 205. 
257 
development and Singapore’s version of liberal capitalism. Director’s duties ‘should transit to a civil 
penalty regime …’201 already extant in securities regulation. 
3.1.3 Business Judgment Doctrine 
There is a recurring theme between ‘the importance of judicial restraint in order to facilitate 
entrepreneurship202… [and the] ordinary norms of commercial morality … [which] must be 
observed’.203 This is reflected in the difference between business judgment doctrine (as a policy) and 
a statutory business judgment rule. Statutory restraint in business judgment and reliance upon general 
law norms distinguishes Singapore from other jurisdictions where there are statutory business 
judgment rules of varying efficacy. Singapore has not codified business judgment’ relying on 
common law and equitable principles requiring due care. It does follow business judgment doctrine 
for economic competitiveness, but without a statutory rule governing judicial review: ‘broad 
economic policy, built upon economic freedom and the encouragement of informed risk taking’.204 
The missing statutory rule is the legal implementation of the doctrine. If implemented, Singapore, in 
its international harmonisation objectives, should look to the US Delaware or ALI formulations, the 
latter theoretically reflected in the Australian jurisdiction,205 its compromised statute emasculated 
judicially. 
3.1.4 Best interest 
Singapore law on insider trading has evolved from its fiduciary traditions,206 following Malaysian 
law,207 itself following Australia and Ghana.208 Statutory intervention209 relies on notions of 
‘information parity’210 and supplants fiduciary traditions themselves reliant on ‘information 
connectedness’.211 Given Singapore’s penchant for the licensing of all elements of the financial 
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services and products infrastructure (the gatekeepers), what constitutes information which cannot be 
used for private purposes is broad. It extends to chance findings as well as information gatherers. All 
elements of the investment chain need to ensure broad disclosure prior to any private use of 
information.212 Particular caution is required in cases of Chinese Walls.213 Statutory intervention214 
eliminated previous law requiring intention to use the information.215 
As in Australia, defining best interest has been problematic with a ‘large number of oppression 
actions’.216 These are often in family companies with different corporate governance arrangements 
from entities organised on agency principles, some of which are now structured as statutory business 
trusts. Family companies are often run more informally than listed public companies. Nonetheless, 
informal disclosure is ‘unsustainable in law’.217 
3.2 Germany and the EU 
3.2.1 Civil law in Germany: the equity-like counterweight  
A separate legal principle, (equitable as it would be interpreted in Australian law): untreue,218 literally 
disloyalty or unfaithfulness, governs intent. This doctrine has both subjective (Guter Glaube) and 
objective (Treu und Glauben) elements. ‘Subjective good faith typically designates a state of mind 
… [o]bjective good faith identifies a specific standard of conduct …’219 These duties have 
proscriptive and prescriptive elements:  
The proscriptive dimension partially coincides with the scope of [UK] fiduciary duties … [t]he 
prescriptive dimension engenders onuses different and ulterior to those previously imposed by 
performance obligations at common law and this imports an even more pronounced recast of the legal 
sphere of agents.220 
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Untreue duties extend to third parties, being ‘a specific obligation to take care of third parties’ 
pecuniary interests’.221 Exposure to ex post judicial review under this doctrine results in Germany 
being the ‘closest to a pure liability model among the main jurisdictions …’222 and can have criminal 
consequences.223 Liability can be limited under business judgment rules, but only if a decision was 
based on adequate information which ‘requires both a thorough search for information and its 
sufficient control’.224 Reliance on third party information is not sufficient.225 Recklessness, acting in 
bad faith, is a breach of the untreue duty with statutory consequences.226 
The cogency of German civil doctrine has ‘progressively permeated the private law sphere of the EU 
legal order, appearing with increasing frequency in legislation, jurisprudence and soft law’.227 There 
is considerable German legal history of statutory protection of the economic interests of minority 
shareholders in related or controlled entities (Konzernrecht). This is emulated in EU law.228 
Germany enforces ex post prohibitions on directors and controlling shareholders duty of loyalty with 
ex post compensation of individually harmful transactions, the penalty being exposure for criminal 
breaches of trust.229 BaFin and the courts may interpret case facts differently, with different penalties. 
It can result in the statutory provision for loss of shareholder rights, unknown in Australian or English 
law. This loss of rights, including ownership, dividend, and voting ‘occurs by act of law’.230 A court 
can order the divestiture of property and rights separately from criminal liability pursuant to the 
untreue fairness principle. Individual and minority shareholders are able to seek divestiture. ‘[T]he 
forfeiture of rights is a draconian enforcement measure as it renders any investment futile’.231  
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Additional contract law fiduciary protection, culpa in contrahendo, has a statutory ‘very detailed level 
of codification’.232 
The provided information is meant to enable the client to make a self-dependent investment decision. 
The duties of the investment firm are not only confined to the provision of information though. In fact 
the investment firm has to investigate whether the specific financial instrument or the investment 
service fits the respective client.233 
The investors do in fact not consume the information, but only the confidence,234 [leading to] 
dependence and … the deliberate influence exercised by the issuer on the investor … is a legal 
relationship and a violation of same out of culpa in contrahendo …235  
So, German law differs substantively from Australian law. Confidence is the essence of trust. Culpa 
in contrahendo doctrine is contractual duty of disclosure in the interests of fair dealing. The parties 
are ‘bound to disclose matters as are clearly of importance for the other party’s decision ...’236 
extending legal obligation beyond contract and codified in statute.237 
For investors, does ‘the client ha[ve] the necessary knowledge and experience to understand …’[?]238 
It is contract law recognising a duty to negotiate with care and ensure that the counterparty has the 
required information to conduct the negotiation sufficient not to cause that party detriment should 
they enter into a contract. Each party has a duty of disclosure to the other even if the counterparty 
cannot access that information themselves. Failure leads to restoration of the status quo ante similar 
to equitable remedy. Culpa in contrahendo is to ensure symmetry of knowledge, competence, 
enforcement of loyalty and trust. 
Statutory protection239 extends beyond the contracting parties to third parties where there is a loyalty 
or influential relationship.240 German courts have ‘stretched the concept of a contract’:241 
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The emphasis of the judgments has drifted away from the contract … and placed more and more on 
the professional duties of the expert and the high degree of trust and reliance which is normally 
attributed by the public at large to expert opinions … the basis of the liability of experts flows directly 
from their professional status and not from some kind of contractual bond …242 
In Germany, misleading disclosures in offer documents, false representations, negligent asset 
valuations and breaches of trust can lead to remedy under the culpa in contrahendo doctrine.243 Banks 
and others acting in a fiduciary capacity are ‘obliged to explore the customer’s profile’ and to disclose 
conflicts of interest.244 This ‘far-reaching and groundbreaking’245 decision [Deutsche Bank] means:  
[i]t is the duty of the advising bank to present all suitable alternatives to a client to ensure that the latter 
can make an informed decision. Therefore the bank must know the customer’s individual objectives 
and willingness to take risks, and cannot derive these merely from the client’s knowledge concerning 
one specific product.246 
If Australian NBFE directors were subject to these civil law untreue and culpa in contrahendo 
fiduciary doctrines (in their proscriptive and prescriptive formulations), supreme rather than 
subordinate, they would be less likely to hide behind statutory and contractual box-ticking. For 
Australian investors, it would extend duties of advisers beyond present statute with a personal conduct 
obligation to explain, fully disclose, deal fairly and positively pursue their economic interests. The 
law matters: in Germany it facilitated the maturity of its private banking sector, yet to be emulated in 
Australia. 
3.2.2 Fiduciaries in Germany: differences between common and civil law jurisdictions 
Formulation of directors’ duties varies across the EU.247 There is no intra-EU harmonisation. 
Common law jurisdictions are trust law based and, until recently in the UK, uncodified.248 ‘Fiduciary 
duties in Germany are only ever creatures of contract’.249 
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Civil law jurisdictions are less familiar with the concept of the trustee; they have not developed a clear 
distinction between trust and agency. Rather, they generally assume that certain principles of good 
faith and honesty underlie all contractual or commercial relationships.250 
Transfer of governance systems from common law to civil jurisdictions may ‘fundamentally 
misunderstand the underlying concepts of German law’.251 Fiduciary relationships arise from agency 
and contract rather than trust law of common law jurisdictions. The German Civil Code does not 
prescribe fiduciary standards of care.252 The contract defines the fiduciary standards applied to the 
commercial relationship, not trust law. 
Germany has moved towards ‘specific and express duties’,253 and has statutory duty for directors and 
fiduciaries to avoid conflicts of interest.254 
The differences between common law and civil law … seems to have lost much of its relevance as 
corporate law reforms benefit from mutual learning and legal concepts are diffused internationally 
even without harmonisation efforts at European level.255 
Diffusion of German civil law concepts could benefit Australia. Diffusion already occurs in Australia 
between ASIC and APRA, providing transposed solutions to similar problems. A striking example of 
this type of international coordination and interaction is the dispersion of the US business judgment 
rule in the EU.256 
Delaware case law nudges corporations into subjecting RPT’s [Related Party Transactions] to 
procedural safeguards: the more rigorously these safeguards are complied with, in form as well as 
substance, the less the judges will be inclined to rule for the plaintiffs by finding that its terms 
themselves are substantially unfair.257 
German and Australian jurisdictions both impose duties of skill and care, and of fidelity, but applied 
and enforced differently. In ’Germany, private enforcement of the duty of care is very low’.258 The 
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statutory duty of care,259 being that of a conscientious and diligent manager is enforced by public 
authorities based on an objective standard of ‘a prudent businessman with the knowledge and 
expertise that can reasonably be expected of a person in a comparable situation’,260 with the director 
bearing the burden of proof. This reversal of proof also applies to protections afforded by statutory 
and judicial interpretations261 of business judgment rules despite Germany following Delaware 
interpretations of that doctrine. The tests of reasonable belief and best interest recur in statute 262 and 
in general law. There is a ‘general dearth of case law, courts accept a degree of managerial discretion 
and acknowledge that directors must be allowed to take risks inherent in economic activity’.263 
Nonetheless, German courts may second guess and intrude on commercial decisions of directors. 
‘there is a borderline between the violation of the duty of care and loyalty on the one hand and 
entrepreneurial faults in the conduct of the company on the other hand’.264 
Modern European law incorporates the trust,265 with common features and common sources of law. 
There is an analogy with English trust law, not necessarily exact.266 Trust (Treuhand) property 
similarly held by a trustee (Treuhänder) in a fiduciary capacity. Trust property is vested with 
‘unrestricted and exclusive ownership with its inherent illimitable power of disposition.’267 The 
beneficiary’s (settlor) ownership is secured by contract regulated under the German Civil Code with 
the trustee to determine the disposition of the trust property. ‘[E]quitable ownership can[not] subsist 
in the settlor side … with the legal ownership of the trustee [being] alien to German law.’268 Many 
German NBFEs described as trusts are used for pooled investment under agency principles and for 
investment mandates. These contracts are fundamental to the rights of the beneficiaries who cannot 
rely on English equitable principles in seeking remedy. Claims are limited to damages in contract 
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against the trustee269 since there is no beneficiary equitable interest. German trust law does not apply 
in cases where the verb trust is used in commerce rather than as strict legal interpretation. 
3.3 United Kingdom 
3.3.1 Statutory discomfort 
Lack of statutory financial advice best interest obligation led to analysis of the extent of general law 
fiduciary duties and to whom these duties are applied, the objective being to ‘address uncertainties 
and misunderstandings on the part of trustees and their advisors’.270 
Amongst the questions being asked was whether fiduciary duties apply to all those in the ‘investment 
chain’ and how far must fiduciaries focus exclusively on maximising financial return to the exclusion 
of other factors.271 
UK analysis illustrates the discomfort with incremental statutory reform ‘due to difficulties in 
defining fiduciary duties, which difficulties would multiply with statutory reform and result in new 
uncertainties and possible unintended consequences’.272 This is important policy analysis relevant to 
Australia. Statutory interventions in Australia are encouraged by vengeful community demand for its 
expectations to be better met. Sober UK reflections of this conundrum provide some insight: 
Fiduciary duties are difficult to define and inherently flexible. We think that is one of their essential 
characteristics: they form the background to other more definite rules, allowing the courts to intervene 
where the interests of justice require it … [I]f there is a need for greater certainty in some areas, we 
think it would be better to enact specific duties rather than attempt to codify an area of law which has 
always depended on the facts of the case.273 
Consequently, the direction of UK regulatory policy is toward embedding ‘legal duties in an industry 
structure which provides the expertise and resources for good governance.’274 This is similar theory 
underpinning the Canadian SRO model. Australia would be wise to contemplate it. 
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3.3.2 Creative compliance 
The UK experienced systemic economy-wide regulatory failure in 2008. ‘[T]here was an inadequate 
focus on the analysis of systemic risk and the sustainability of business models.’275 ‘[R]isk has 
materialised in an extreme form without triggering a significant set of [conflict of interest] rules 
intended to mitigate risk.’276 ‘[S]ince 2009, UK banks have paid almost £35 billion in fines and 
redress costs, roughly equivalent to the private capital they have raised in the same period.’277 
Globally, redress and costs are USD275 billion … since 2008 [which] translates into more than USD5 
trillion of reduced lending capacity to the real economy’.278 This is an economic loss multiplier effect 
of approximately 18 times, much of it attributed to ‘unmanaged conflicts of interest.’279 These data 
do not account for concurrent economic losses in the NBFE sector which have now been quantified 
in Australia.280 
Market failure arguments are used to support regulatory interventions without ‘considering how it 
might be resolved through techniques other than [further] regulatory intervention’.281 There are 
already more than 100 conflict of interest provisions in the FCA Handbook.282 The ‘progress of 
regulatory reform in the UK has been relatively slow’,283 partly, as in Australia, a result of political 
disagreements. Traditionally ‘light touch’284 (a caricature) and general law focussed, 
the new model of supervision is designed to deliver a more intrusive and direct regulatory style than 
the FSA [now FCA] previously adopted and requires a ‘braver’ approach to decision-making by 
supervisors … in favour of a more overt and aggressive philosophy of ‘credible deterrence’.285 
Some UK institutions, and foreign ones operating inside the UK had been undertaking bank-like 
activities without being prudentially regulated. Hedge funds, private equity funds, mutual funds and 
various forms of special investment vehicles, collectively constituting the shadow banking sector 
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engaged in regulatory arbitrage.286 As in Australia where many non-prudentially regulated MIS 
failed, regulation followed legal form rather than economic substance. The Turner Review287 led to 
‘intensive supervision … of the sustainability of business models, skills sets of directors [rather than 
probity considerations alone], and enhanced prudential regulation’288 of NBFEs. Turner ‘questioned 
how effective market discipline had been…’289 favouring compliance based regulation. As in other 
jurisdictions, market failure is used as an excuse for government intervention, ‘more invasive 
regulation and supervision’,290 evidenced in Australia by the constant growth in the size and 
complexity of its Corporations Act. However, 
it is socio-technical factors such as human behaviour, corporate culture and organisational structure 
that are the underlying … causes of all disaster and crises.291  
Ashby is critical of the Turner market discipline failure thesis. Germany insulated itself from post-
2004 subversion of its traditions with its two tier board structure and civil law doctrines. 
They [Turner] fail to explain why regulators did not deal with a clear case of ‘creative compliance’ – 
the growth of the shadow banking sector. Moreover, they do not seem to realise that more 
costly/prescriptive regulation is only going to make the problem worse.292 
Creative compliance (alternatively regulatory arbitrage) is the result: ‘the use of legal loopholes in 
order to allow the legitimate circumvention of criminal/civil laws and regulations.’293 In Australia, 
there are similar echoes of creeping corruption where narrowly defined statutory rights subvert the 
economic interests of investors and beneficiaries. 
It [creative compliance] is essentially the practice of using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and 
to do so with impunity.294 
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The UK, partly from political pressure is moving toward prescriptive intensive supervision, despite 
the fact ‘[t]hat our regulators have been part of the problem’.295 That this may stifle innovation and 
growth appears immaterial. 
The Turner Review … virtually ignor[es] the key underlying behavioural issues that lead us to the 
mess that many western economies are now in. Moreover they show a lack of faith in market forces 
that is at odds with the prevailing theory and practice in this area.296 
Whilst: 
no single reform will provide the solution, [reform] must emphasise the central role of trust in financial 
intermediation [and] restore relationships of trust and confidence in the investment chain, underpinned 
by the application of fiduciary standards of care by all those who manage or advise on the investments 
of others.297 
3.3.3. The veracity of the investment chain 
The UK, like Australia, has determined not to codify fiduciary duties, despite compelling advice to 
the contrary.298 Regulatory policy debate between financial and behavioural economists, and those 
preferring statutory intervention continues in the UK. It resists the German thesis of investors as 
consumers providing for their own future rather than the traditional view of investors as capital 
suppliers in an efficient market. 
Regulatory policy has given little attention to issues of market structure and the nature and 
effectiveness of competition, instead developing detailed and often prescriptive rules governing 
market conduct, with substantial cost and limited success. … We look forward to a future of less 
intrusive and more effective regulation … and to the creation of trust relationships which can give 
savers and companies confidence that equity investment chain meets their needs and serves their 
interests.299 
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There is recognition that ‘hard law is not enough’,300 and that [r]egulators cannot police every market 
practice … nor can they dictate a firm’s culture.’301 Australia contemplates both. The UK solution 
includes Canadian style SRO typology ‘to raise expectations and norms.’302 
Mass consumption of financial products and services implies vulnerability. Vulnerability implies the 
application of fiduciary obligation. Trust in the investment chain is only as ‘strong as the trust in the 
weakest link of that investment chain’.303 In the UK, despite Turner inspired supervision of business 
models, directors’ skills sets and investor outcomes, compliance based regulation does not achieve 
the same ‘standards implied by fiduciary duty’.304 Fiduciary relationships can be found at every point 
in the investment chain where there is discretion or advice. This stems from the economic interest of 
investors and pension beneficiaries to whom various intermediaries in the investment chain provide 
services. The beneficiary must have confidence in the agent. This principle has often been subsumed 
by caveat emptor in financial products selling and, as in Australia, leads to the ignorance of or 
ignoring of fiduciary obligation. There is considerable uncertainty in the investment chain as to who 
is a fiduciary and to whom the fiduciary owes duty. 
Regulatory authorities at the EU and domestic level should apply fiduciary standards to all 
relationships in the investment chain which involve discretion over the investments of others, or 
advice on investment decisions. These obligations should be independent of the classification of the 
client, and should not be capable of being contractually overridden.305 
The intent is to re-establish trust, confidence and respect, lost in several decades of often anonymous 
or poorly informed financial product selling, despite similar analysis and conclusions from 2001.306 
This outcome is unlikely to be achieved with prescriptive administrative regulation. The economic 
interests of investors and beneficiaries supported by holistic fiduciary standards in the investment 
chain is a different proposition from compliance with regulation. As in Australia, it leads to a different 
result: creative compliance, creeping corruption, and regulatory arbitrage. It also leads to different 
approaches to conflicts of interest. Identifying, disclosing and managing conflicts of interest in a 
complex investment chain controlled by multiple intermediaries must be compatible with the concept 
of a fiduciary having stewardship of others’ property. 
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3.3.4 The unresolved UK fiduciary debate 
The need for reform was accepted by the UK authorities, but did not extend to the adoption of 
statutory fiduciary duties of those in the investment chain.307 Rather, best interest is interpreted as 
best long term interest consistent with the Companies Act.308 It ‘enshrines …”enlightened shareholder 
value”’309 and ‘generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour’.310 For superannuation entities, 
best interest, as in Australia, means best financial interest, being consistent with the sole purpose 
test.311 These standards incorporate concepts of stewardship312 into the governance and practice of 
UK NBFEs some of which are required to report or publicly disclose compliance.313 Whilst 
administrative, voluntary (except for listed companies) and resting in the duty of care, it implies the 
application of fiduciary principles to participants in the investment chain rather than an explicit 
statutory fiduciary duty. It also implies an extension of those fiduciary principles from proscription 
to positive duties. As in the Australian FoFA reforms for retail financial advice, this is at variance 
with general law interpretation of fiduciary duty. ‘Some stakeholders argue[d] that stewardship 
should be “an explicit part of fiduciary duty”’.314 The present position is a voluntary adoption of the 
Stewardship Code with explanations required for non-adoption (as in Germany).315 Fiduciary duties 
may arise in contractual relationships.316 Importantly for Australian NBFEs, particularly for common 
enterprise MIS: 
Even where the relationship is contractual (as it normally will be), the matter is too important to be 
left entirely to the agreement of the parties and the interpretation of that agreement … A too casual 
failure to recognise the requirements of a fiduciary position, and sometimes a short sighted assumption 
that all relevant duties are prescribed in contract, can be and has been responsible for serious 
misbehaviour in the financial markets and elsewhere, as shown by many litigated cases in the last 
quarter-century.317 
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This analysis is central to some systemic causes of NBFE failure in Australia and the UK. Its partner 
is subsuming fiduciary obligation by statutory compliance. It led to calls by Kay and Myners for all 
financial intermediaries in the investment chain to be fiduciaries and eliminate the possibility of 
contracting out of those fiduciary obligations. They also propose that duties should be owed to the 
end client, and not to the proximal intermediary.318 Their views underscore the expectations gap 
between financial intermediary and their clients in the community. ‘[T]he term “fiduciary duty” 
means different things to lawyers and non-lawyers. Even lawyers use the term in different ways.’319 
‘Plaintiffs and their advisers have discovered the apparent advantage of alleging breach of trust or 
fiduciary duty, … inappropriate references to these concepts which are often scattered throughout the 
pleadings with complete abandon’.320 
I think Kay is absolutely right in emphasising this issue of fiduciary responsibility … We need to place 
great clarity around the concept of the intermediary – the adviser – acting wholly and unquestionably 
in the best interest of the client. At the moment, we know that is not the case. The test is one of fairness 
and disclosure, and Kay himself makes the point that in, for instance, the area of what he calls ‘stock 
lending’, disclosure is inadequate … There needs to be clarity about fiduciary responsibility, backed 
by a tough regulatory regime that says: if you misbehave, you are out – and for good. For the life of 
me, I cannot understand why the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has not got on with 
the process of getting the Law Commission to work on the Kay recommendation.321 
‘Equity’s place in the law of commerce, long resisted by commercial lawyers, can no longer be 
denied.’322 This applies particularly to the application of ‘fiduciary duty and constructive trust’323 in 
commercial relationships. Fiduciary duties in superannuation NBFEs are well established in UK law. 
Some UK superannuation schemes are trust based rather than contract based. UK contract based 
schemes are regulated by the FCA; trust based schemes are subject to trust law administered by The 
Pensions Regulator (TPR).324  
There are many examples of positive duties in the FCA Handbook which echo fiduciary duties, but 
they do not raise standards to fiduciary level. Whilst:  
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The FCA has stressed the need to stay clear of a more intrusive approach towards firm’s management 
of regulated duties, such as conflicts of interest,325 the FCA Handbook is now too large to fit in a hand. 
In fact it is no longer a printed book [printed copies can be obtained], but a complex database, which 
may appear daunting to outsiders … [i]t is however central to the way UK financial markets work.326  
‘We have not been asked to review the FCA Handbook. That is a mammoth undertaking…’327 
Presently, the FCA Handbook also incorporates EU policy and directives, including MiFID2.  
Given the centrality of trust and confidence by the vulnerable in those that advise them, why, despite 
scholarly advice to the contrary the principles of which were accepted,328 is the UK reluctant to 
embrace statutory fiduciary obligation on financial advisers and financial product sellers? 
A first argument: ‘[t]he principles set out in the Kay Review are so far removed from the courts’ 
interpretation of fiduciary duties…’329 Why, as generally in Australia, are the economic interests of 
investors and beneficiaries subsumed by processes of statutory compliance? Canada, Singapore, and 
Germany in differing degrees have embarked on a different journey, partly because they are cognisant 
of behavioural economics research.  
As in Australia, judicial tradition in the UK interpretation of fiduciary duties rests upon historical 
doctrines, not modern empirical behavioural economics research. ‘The greater the degree of trust, 
vulnerability, power and confidence reposed in the fiduciary, the more likely that a reasonable person 
would have such an expectation.’330 Expectations of fiduciary status may not attract judicial 
support.331 Who is categorised as a fiduciary therefore is of paramount importance to the community. 
This is the second argument. Historically, ‘this is a “notoriously intractable” problem332 … [a] vague 
protean ethical standard embodied by the fiduciary obligation’333 … [I]t is not easy to attempt to 
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define the circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist.’334 Tests include 
degree of mutual trust, confidence, and reliance.335  
‘The existence of a fiduciary relationship does not in itself determine the content of the duties owed 
by a fiduciary to their principal.’336 Nor does it interfere with the non-fiduciary duties of a fiduciary.337 
Proscriptive UK338 (and Australian)339 judicial tradition resting upon notions of informed consent and 
best interest (in the UK meaning best long term interest and for the purposes the trust was created, 
but not necessarily best financial interest)340 do not meet community expectations. Regulation has 
many prescriptive duties, but these do not have fiduciary status in the UK. 
A third argument rejecting statutory fiduciary duty was expressed as: ‘[e]quity’s flexibility is 
important in ensuring that the law retains sufficient suppleness to cope with the social developments 
which the court is asked to sit in judgment.’341 Prohibition on contracting out of equitable obligations 
would apply to contract based pensions where: ‘a member has a legitimate expectation that the 
provider will act in the member’s best interest. In many cases, the contract terms will mean that such 
an expectation will not be legitimate…’342 Australian echoes are to be found in its NBFEs, 
particularly common enterprise MIS. Common elements include failures in disclosure, fees, 
information asymmetry, financial literacy, and advice. Like the conflicted RE model in Australia, 
UK: 
[W]orkplace D[irect] C[ontribution] pensions do not always operate in the best interest of savers. 
Although these problems apply to both trust-based and contract-based schemes, they are particularly 
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acute in contract-based schemes which do not have the equivalent of the trustee board to represent the 
needs of scheme members.343 
Most of these commercial relationships are contractual, with traditional reluctance to interfere in 
arms-length contracting parties.344 Nonetheless, judicial tradition conflicts with administrative 
practice. ‘[T]he obligation to act in the best interest of clients may not be contractually overridden.’345 
Such practice recognises the importance of fiduciary obligation to be more than a set of default rules 
or ‘legal polyfilla’346 where all else fails. 
Fiduciary duties are traditionally owed to whomever has the immediate economic interest.347 
However, investment chains can be long and include many participants. Reform proposals are for the 
duty to be extended to the end investor (with investor classification irrelevant), rather than the 
intermediary. The fourth argument denies this proposal other than in specific circumstances,348 with 
‘courts appear[ing] reluctant to impose such duties.’349 A fifth argument rests upon the uncertainty in 
the general law of fiduciaries and the practical inability of the vulnerable to mount equitable 
challenges to malfeasance.  
So reform to increase accountability in financial services and financial products regulation rests upon 
these tenets: increasing the breadth of fiduciary obligation to all elements of the investment chain; 
increasing its depth by eliminating contracting-out powers and by making the end investor a party to 
the obligation; introducing prescriptive duties; and reducing general law uncertainty by statutory 
intervention. These principles are not contested, despite judicial reticence and tradition. The means 
to achieve them however is ‘through regulation rather than law reform,’350 as in Singapore. 
Behavioural economics in financial literacy suggests that specific interventions improve results. 
There is a tendency to confuse principles based regulation, including reliance on fiduciary obligations, 
with light touch regulation: ‘a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have 
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no principles’.351 This is not the case: the proposed extension of fiduciary responsibility may act as 
Damoclean Sword over prospective malfeasors, and is certainly not ‘light touch’. 
3.3.5 Directors as fiduciaries 
Reluctance to embrace statutory fiduciary duty in the investment chain also extended to the 
codification of fiduciary and common law duties of company directors and officers.352 It attempts to 
codify case law ‘which spans over one hundred and fifty years. A central concern is whether the 
statutory language adequately encapsulates the nature of the fiduciary relationship’.353 It purports to 
replace general law354 whilst relying on it for statutory meaning and remedy.355 Differing drafting 
typology and the omission of the adjectives loyalty356 and fiduciary make for legal complexity in 
conflicts of interest and related party situations. 
[D]espite the aim of ‘the code’ being to increase accessibility, transparency and comprehensibility … 
[w]hat has been done does not satisfy those criteria, and leaves directors in a somewhat confused 
position.357  
That confusion, as with fiduciary duty in the investment chain, leads to ‘an incomplete picture of the 
law, particularly in relation to remedies’.358 Codification of directors and officers duties, including 
their fiduciary duties, is incomplete: a ‘patchwork’.359 Duties are codified but ‘there is a total reliance 
on the general law remedies for a breach, or potential breach, of the “general duties” … being curious 
and puzzling’.360 Directors of NBFEs may have parallel and competing fiduciary duties to clients and 
others. Codification of directors’ fiduciary duties has widened the traditional responsibility to the 
company alone.361 As in Canada, UK directors are required to ‘have regard’362 to a wide range of 
factors in their exercise of duties and strive for long term economic value increments. They must also 
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be cognisant of political pressures manifested as corporate social responsibility with its interventions 
from international institutions 363 and modernisation of UK statutes designed to broaden responsibility 
and extend the reach of the statute.364 
Codification and mandatory widening results in the UK being ‘the only jurisdiction in which the 
legislature adopted a directive approach, mandating directors to have regard to a range of matters in 
promoting “the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole”’.365 Furthermore:  
The UK Companies Act is the only one which expressly provides that the statutory principles in 
relation to directors’ statutory duties, even though based on common law rules and equitable 
principles, ‘have effect in place of those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company 
by a director’.366 
This legislative response arises partly from political pressure wrought by unmet community 
expectations of director behaviour. ‘It is fair to say that courts and legislators have, overall, tended to 
follow and respond to heightened societal expectations over time.’367 Notably, whilst duties are 
codified, remedies are not, relying on traditionalist judicial interpretation of general law, the result 
being ‘distinctly pluralist in objective, but avowedly traditionalist in substance.’368 
Additional nuances arise in general conflict of interest provisions369 which are treated differently from 
director’s dealings with their company.370 General duties are implicitly fiduciary (apart from the duty 
of skill, care and diligence),371 but couched as ‘fiduciary obligations’.372 Public companies (plc) are 
also subject to the ‘[N]on-legally binding, but hugely important, UK Corporate Governance Code 
…’373 which has the force of the UK Listing Rules. UK NBFEs are also subject to the voluntary UK 
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Stewardship Code which operates on a ‘comply-or-explain basis …’374 Despite the objectives of 
corporate law reform,375 directors duties in the UK are thus partly subjective, and as with those 
involved in the NBFE investment chain, reliant upon the general law. ‘“[T]he code” as it stands is a 
halfway house.’376 Doubtless, Kay and Myners would agree. UK government policy is not to ‘impose 
impractical and onerous requirements which stifle entrepreneurial activity’.377 Statutory intent 378 and 
strict judicial interpretation379 may have the opposite result. With limited exceptions,380 ‘[t]he 
authorities relating to directors’ accountability not only do not support the scope of business exception 
in relation to the “no profit” rule, they are contrary to it.’381 This is the subject of debate and legal 
clarification in the UK.382 ‘[T]here are a number of uncertainties which have not been addressed by 
the statute and which remain to be resolved … it is for the court to build a more coherent doctrine 
using the statutory framework’.383 This includes interpretation of conflicts of interest from 
misappropriation of corporate opportunity,384 traditionally requiring the informed consent of the 
beneficiary or entrustor. 
3.4 Canada 
3.4.1 The distinctive nature of Canadian fiduciary law 
Fiduciary traditions in Canada differ markedly from those in Australia, UK and Singapore in scope 
and responsibility. The Canadian regulatory system has much to offer Australia in its quest for reform 
of NBFE regulation. Canada ‘has led the way in the common law world in extending fiduciary 
obligations and remedies’,385 to eliminate vague assertion of fiduciary expectations by the community 
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not met in practice. That phenomenon is not restricted to Australia: ‘[f]iduciary law everywhere has 
eluded a sound theory of liability’.386  
While inequality, dependence, and vulnerability are now routinely identified as qualities of fiduciary 
relationships that justify fiduciary duties, their meaning and salience have not been consistently stated 
or properly explained.387  
In Canada and elsewhere there were implicit community fiduciary assumptions.388 These have 
subsequently been given definition in Canada, requiring the existence of discretionary power of the 
fiduciary which can affect the legal position of the beneficiary.389  
Cases have not yet determined whether acts of omission (for instance, not providing a client the 
universe of investment options), is an abuse of discretionary power, although there is no results based 
liability derived from a positive obligation.390 There are echoes in recent Australian superannuation 
trust law.391 Community expectations of fiduciary obligation, now enshrined in Canadian law, are 
based on ‘the reasonable expectations of one person that another would act in his [practical] interests. 
This entails that a beneficiary may establish a fiduciary relationship unilaterally’, provided there is a 
reasonable basis.392 Discretionary power and practical interests are interrelated including matters of 
access, influence, and authority. This is where Canadian and Australian jurisprudence diverges (with 
the exception of Australian superannuation trustee duties).393 The Canadian model is ’admirably 
capacious’,394 in Australia restricted to proscriptive economic interests,395 not without criticism.396 
‘Nothing in the nature of fiduciary power suggests that it may be exercised only in relation to 
proprietary or economic interests’.397 Conversely, from a community expectations perspective, 
‘[f]eelings of exploitation feed naturally into fiduciary law’s rhetoric of betrayal.’398 Practical 
interests in Canada are expansive and include natural and artificial persons interests and objectives, 
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physical and mental health, and decisions in relation to legal rights, property, and liabilities. These 
typologies do not draw upon the arbitrary distinctions applied in Australia, which ‘[p]ay[s] 
insufficient regard to the central concept of fiduciary obligations: the wrongful pursuit of self-interest 
or rival interests’.399  
Best interest of a Canadian company has been subject of judicial review.400 BCE Inc, (and its prior 
authority):401  
stands for the proposition that a fiduciary duty is a ‘broad, contextual concept’ not limited to short 
term profit or share value but relates to the long term interests of the corporation. The content of this 
duty varies with the situation at hand.402  
This bears similarity with German best interest duties, directors in both jurisdictions having director 
business judgment protections. In Canada, ‘[t]here is no fiduciary duty to any particular group of 
these sets of stakeholders…’403 but directors have discretion to consider them.404 ‘The fiduciary duty 
is indeterminate: there are no “corporate best interests” to look out for, but rather a range of competing 
stakeholder interests’.405 There is a ‘may/must consider ambiguity’406 in directors’ obligations.  
Canada has also led the way in respect of fiduciary obligations of directors: ‘The fiduciary duty of 
the directors to the corporation is a broad contextual concept … it looks to the long-term interests of 
the corporation.’407 This broad conceptualisation of fiduciary obligations is prescriptive and extends 
to: 
the ‘fair treatment’ [of stakeholders]. There are no absolute rules408 … a fiduciary duty to ensure that 
the corporation meets its statutory objectives,409 and a fiduciary duty to ensure that the corporation is 
a ‘good corporate citizen’.410  
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This is a substantial expansion of fiduciary duties as traditionally understood, being both prescriptive 
and subjective with undeterminable consequences for directors and trustees. Fiduciary standards are 
designed to mitigate malfeasance reducing power imbalances resulting from asymmetries of 
knowledge and comprehension. They align interests by recognising the fallibility of investor decision 
making.  
The implications of extension of Canadian fiduciary obligations to Australian NBFE governance may 
explain why that territory is so highly contested. Fiduciary duty in Canada is highly distinctive and 
provides leadership to those in Australia who see fiduciary law as an underpinning of an 
entrepreneurial wealth creating society. 
3.5 United States 
3.5.1 Absence of a uniform fiduciary standard 
‘[T]heir [the proposed SEC] version of the uniform fiduciary standard could also be understood quite 
differently by various parties.’411 As in Australia, community expectation and industry practice can 
be different. 
How to determine, in a positive way, when a person is acting in the best interest of a client is a murky 
question, to assume that practitioners merely fulfil the strict letter of their legal obligations does not 
reflect the experiences of many consumers of financial services. Rather, the questions are not new and 
the problems posed by the ambiguity over proper definition of best interests and the troubles caused 
by the disclosure mandate that is not meaningful or helpful to an investor are only exacerbated by an 
expansion of a murky standard.412 
Some Canadian standards are applied in US judicial interpretations of its statute,413 but without the 
holistic regime. US unregistered hedge and private equity funds are not subject to statutory control 
under the Investment Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act,414 an important distinction for 
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retail investors and their portfolio advisers. Some advisers have demonstrably not understood the 
nature of the underlying securities.415 
US States have different interpretations of fiduciary duty. As a general proposition, broader than those 
in Australia: Delaware classifies duty of care and good faith as fiduciary alongside loyalty. Some 
require a surety bond to underwrite the obligations of the fiduciary.  
Imposition of strict fiduciary standards in some states does not adversely impact financial service 
providers. Empirical research finds 
no statistical difference between the two groups416 in the percentage of lower-income and high-wealth 
clients, the ability to provide a broad range of [financial] products including those that provide 
commission compensation, the ability to provide tailored advice, and the cost of compliance.417 
This is important research for Australia where lobby groups decry high regulatory standards as anti-
entrepreneurial. Fiduciary law impacts more than those directly party to the fiduciary relationship. 
Meeting community expectations is a matter of public interest and can be an outcome of fiduciary 
law and breaches of it in those relationships.418  
3.5.2 Common law tradition 
Fiduciary obligation has long been recognised in US equity courts.419 Differently from recent 
Australian interpretation, US fiduciary duty combines loyalty (a negative posture and minimum 
standard), care (a positive posture to promote the aims of the principal) and good faith.420 In the US, 
‘fiduciary obligation currently operates in the context of common law and federal and state statutes 
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but the courts have the final say’,421 there being no agreed source or content of fiduciary law. ‘Some 
have looked to State common law doctrines, such as agency, while others have not’.422 
US common law fiduciary tradition rests upon personal qualities of conscientious, scrupulous and 
fastidious behaviours.423 The quality of:  
not honesty alone but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive is then the standard of behaviour. 
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity 
has been the attitude of the courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty 
… only thus has the conduct of fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.424 
Meinhard, an appeal case, ‘continue[s] to shape the modern debate’.425 It is an absolutist view of 
fiduciary obligation, not always suited to modern commerce. It is doctrinal suggesting that contracting 
out of fiduciary duty can be voided in equity. More recent US state law places more emphasis on 
contract.426 This is not a unanimous view in the US, some suggesting that trust and self-renouncing 
fairness relieve participants from monitoring each other, an aspirational standard.427 
3.5.3 Fiduciary self-regulation 
Reliance on common law and lack of a statutory uniform standard has not prevented and may have 
induced a code of self-regulation consistent with ISO 9000 Quality Management System standards. 
This culminates in a ‘periodic table of global fiduciary practices’.428 This Global Fiduciary Standard, 
in stark contrast to Australian statutes, recognises that ‘procedural prudence alone does not complete 
a fiduciary’s obligations’.429 It notes that 
the vast majority of the world’s liquid wealth is in the hands of investment fiduciaries and the success 
or failure of investment fiduciaries can have a material impact on the fiscal health of any country430 … 
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earning trust is not simply a matter of recent, superior performance, dazzling presentations, or personal 
relationships: it is a matter of organisational integrity and process driven by prudent practices.431  
The Global Fiduciary Standard is an attempt to quality assure the investment chain. It encompasses 
all those statutorily recognised in Federal and State law.432 It provides a managerial basis for 
international harmonisation and application of fiduciary principles in the governance of NBFEs. 
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4. THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL ADVICE 
4.1 Regulation of Financial Advice in Singapore 
Admirable policy did not prevent individual malfeasance within the Singapore subsidiaries of Barings 
plc in 1995,433 leading to the demise of that bank and its sale to ING for £1.00.434 Neither has MAS 
prevented (together with other agencies), major criminal breaches of trust or a prevalence of fraud on 
Singapore’s larger companies.435 ‘All too often, the current regulatory regime [2009] suffers massive 
failings and fraud, ruining numerous sundry investors and causing untold suffering [...]’.436 In the 
securitisation sector, ‘losses were largely borne by investors’.437 
Losses included, as in other jurisdictions, those arising from debenture issuance.438 In Australia, these 
were sold to unknowledgeable wholesale investors, not retail investors as statutorily defined. These 
products were sold to retail investors439 in Singapore (7 800 investors invested SGD508 million),440 
and Hong Kong (29 000 investors).441 The complexity and length of the disclosure documents tested 
even financially literate institutional investors. ‘Worse, the true, substantive nature of the instruments 
was concealed under hundreds of pages of technical disclosures in order to maximise sales’.442 Agents 
of the product distribution system (banks, stockbrokers, advisers, finance companies): ‘did not know 
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what they were selling’.443 MAS’ interpretation of these products suitability ultimately resulted in 
compensation for retail investors.444 
Financial advice is regulated.445 As in Australia, there is no statutory fiduciary obligation to the client. 
There are ameliorating regulations not found in Australia. Financial advisers are subject to stringent 
tertiary examination and work experience criteria relevant to the financial products and services they 
provide.446 Financial advisers (and senior management) are required to: ‘conduct a comprehensive 
due diligence exercise in order to determine the suitability of a new product before selling it’.447 
Suitability regulation became more onerous in 2011,448 requiring a financial adviser to perform: ‘three 
categories of due diligence – product due diligence, client due diligence, and … systems due 
diligence’,449 For retail investors, this is effectively a knowledge test. An adviser must assess: ‘the 
information possessed by him concerning the investment objectives, financial situation and particular 
needs of the person’,450 clarified by a suitability test. Suitability is not a defined term and can be 
interpreted as: ‘“most suitable” or “not unsuitable”’,451 the Singapore preference being for not 
unsuitable influenced by assessments of risk toleration by the investor. This is a: ‘comparative risk’452 
approach requiring executive director participation: 
every member of the senior management [of the financial adviser] must (a) personally satisfy himself 
that the new product is suitable for the targeted client; and (b) [have] personally approved the sale or 
marketing of the new product to the targeted client.453 
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The personal accountability of these onerous statutory requirements cannot be delegated and are not 
consistent with director company law responsibility454 or with other statutory provisions.455 
Consequently, there is: ‘genuine doubt’,456 as to the practicality of this regulation. 
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) principles govern financial 
intermediaries.457 MAS may exempt advisers from these requirements when dealing with High Net 
Worth Individuals (HNWI).458 HNWI advisers may also insert non-reliance clauses into client 
agreements. This shields them from claims for negligence, breach of representation, fiduciary and 
contractual duties.459 Advisers are under statutory duties not to make false or misleading statements 
with the intent to deceive, to disclose any matter germane to the statement,460 and not to make 
recommendations without reasonable basis.461 There are no express statutory civil liabilities for these 
offences, but the statutory standards may be useful in general law claims,462 unless there is a non-
reliance clause.463 
4.2 Regulation of Financial Advice in Germany and the EU 
German law provides insights into the future for Australian investors and regulators. For demographic 
reasons, German investors are now treated as major consumers of financial products and services for 
self-sufficiency. In Australia, with the exception of consumer credit and superannuation default funds, 
investors are often treated as capital providers rather than consumers.464 Australia has yet to withdraw 
from financing public welfare.  
Traditionally, German regulation was not market oriented. ‘[C]onsumer protection should be a 
fundamental political and legal priority for national and [EU] Community legislators; such protection 
cannot be left to the automatic operation of single market mechanisms’.465 The German NBFE capital 
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market opportunities for retail investors during this period, including for D-REITS was limited. 
German investors often invested in NBFEs domiciled in other jurisdictions.  
Policy reversed in 2004466 to emphasise: ‘choice, competition, and the lessening of regulatory burdens 
in developing an EU concept of retail protection’,467 the twin pillars468 of EU retail investor strategy. 
This ‘represents a bold attempt to build a pan-EU retail investor culture, relying on the transformative 
effects of law’.469 It was a fundamental policy change. In essence emulating Australian Wallis reform 
policy.470  
The MiFID reforms reflected: ‘an international policy concern with individual financial literacy and 
independence, with promoting greater diversity in personal savings mechanisms to support personal 
pension provision…’471 Financial advice became ‘increasingly important’,472 ‘emerging strongly as 
a key market gateway and distribution channel’.473 These reforms, part of the EU Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) were intended to create a pan-EU capital market, with retail investors serving as 
capital providers. This was the antithesis of post-war paternalism. It emulated US (and Australian) 
market concepts: ‘the “trusting” retail investor is the heart and soul of the huge US market and should 
be supported’.474 There is no consistent underlying theory,475 and as in Australia, ongoing debate 
between proponents of lighter regulation (efficient markets) and more regulation (paternalism), based 
in behavioural economics.476 German reform, as in other EU countries, followed the Lamfalussy 
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process of delegated legal implementation,477 other than distance marketing (online marketing) where 
member state discretion is eliminated.478 
EU law reform of retail investor capital markets was estimated to increase EU GDP by ‘between 0.5 
and 0.7% [pa].’479 Most of this investment is in NBFEs structured as collective investment schemes 
(CIS), estimated to be in excess of 4 trillion euros and 40 per cent of EU GDP.480 Law reform led to 
c 40 000 UCITS481 compliant funds available for investment482 (CIS and mutual funds).  
The liberalisation of the capital markets led directly to: 
a wave of investor lawsuits of hitherto unimaginable proportions [which] shed a clear light on the 
mistakes on the part of issuers and advisory companies, and on the bad performance of the investment 
products.483 
Some financial products which typically should not have been issued as UCITS compliant included 
Lehman Brothers securities. Loss of trust and falls in risk tolerance are ‘unlikely to be short-lived … 
likely to be enduring and will be very slow to recover’.484 In Austria and Germany, often involving 
Lehman Brothers securities, ‘more than 11,000 proceedings485 … more than 22,500 claims have been 
asserted’.486 Within the EU, prospectuses can be issued in English for any national jurisdiction and 
consent to its issuance provided by any national authority. Approval for the issuance of the Lehman 
Brothers securities was given by the Irish Securities Authority, with only a notification to the national 
(Austrian) Financial Markets Authority (Finanzmarktaufsicht). Many of these compensation claims 
related to alleged liability of representations made in marketing collateral.  
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A best interest requirement inevitably requires an assessment of suitability for specific client advice 
and, as in other jurisdictions, know-your-client processes. Under the MiFID business conduct regime, 
there is a distinction between suitability and appropriateness, depending on context including 
investor/adviser asymmetries, the tests being proactive and individualised,487 and which test the 
efficacy of the disclosure requirements. MiFID implementation into German law required legislative 
amendment488 for businesses providing ‘investment services on a commercial basis’.489 For the first 
time, distinctions were made between professional and retail advisory clients. As in Australia, local 
authorities were categorised as professional investors (constitutionally disputed)490 even if their 
investment competencies were of retail standard.  
Agency or mandate agreements (Geschäftsbesorgnung) can have contractual fiduciary obligations 
regulated by the Civil Code.491  
Whoever is obliged to undertake independent economic activity in third-party interest in promoting 
and protecting the economic interests of his contractual partner, he has by virtue of his decision-
making power given to him and the discretion he is to exercise a particular relationship of trust and … 
special loyalty.492 
The MiFID regime, designed to be preventive, is supported in German speaking countries by 
substantive civil law and commercial practices fiduciary law applied ex post with injunctive and 
compensatory remedies.  
The informed investor decision [culpa in contrahendo] is the end of European securities regulation in 
two senses: it is the objective and the boundary of regulation. Once retail investors take investment 
decisions, these decisions are not further questioned by the law,493 
provided client best interest requirement has been honoured in accordance with their fiduciary 
relationship.494  
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4.3 Regulation of Financial Advice in the United Kingdom 
There is a distinction between independent advice and restricted advice but it does not directly follow 
the US typology of broker-dealers and investment advisers or the Australian typology of general or 
specific advice. Two distinguishing features are between fiduciaries providing investment advice and 
product sellers, traditionally commission based with ‘no statutory duty imposed on investment 
advisers in the UK to act in the best interest of their clients’.495 FCA regulatory guidance also includes 
conflicts of interest and know your client rules.496 Statutory support of FCA regulatory guidance497 
‘allow[s] actions to be brought for breaches of the FCA Principles for Business, including the 
requirement that a “firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly”’.498 
4.4 Regulation of Financial Advice in Canada 
The provision of financial advice and wealth management services by SROs in Canada is distinctive 
and provides important reform insights. There is no safe harbour defence for the adviser as there is in 
Australia.  
The Canadian Client Relationship Model (CRM) model provides useful and consistent insight for 
Australia in its search for what best interest means to a client in practice. CRM is enforced through 
SROs. It includes Canadian statutory and common law duty of care standards. Disclosure, misleading 
conduct, disclosure of material conflicts of interest,499 reasonable prudence, recklessness and 
obligation to investigate,500 lying,501 overstating asset values,502 excessive undisclosed leverage503 are 
automatically included in the duty of care in the CRM.504 It includes fiduciary and non-fiduciary 
relationships ‘with respect to all matters applicable to so called “best interest” standards.’505 
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Canada has a principles-based interpretation of the nature and scope of fiduciary obligations in 
financial advice. Traditional typologies based on the status of relationships or of facts have become 
considerably extended through the adoption of its CRM. 
4.5 Regulation of Financial Advice in the United States  
US consumers of financial products and services have suffered greatly from avoidable systemic 
failures in the country’s regulatory systems. Some 9.5 million families lost their homes, ‘nearly USD 
11 trillion in household wealth has vanished, with retirement accounts and life savings swept 
away.’506 Much of this was inflicted by the ‘shadow banking’ system (US NBFEs).  
Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the 
nations[‘] financial markets. Policymakers and regulators failed in their responsibilities to protect the 
public… 507 
Investment advisers are fiduciaries who owe their retail clients a duty of care and must act in their 
client’s best interest. A broker dealer is subject to a lower suitability standard for their personalised 
advice, which is a lesser standard than Canadian SROs apply and a lesser standard than for Australian 
superannuation trustees. Best interest means the best option for the client.508 Suitability is not a 
fiduciary standard. Standards become more complex for pension investments where all financial 
intermediaries advising on tax advantaged retirement funds have fiduciary responsibilities from 
2017.509 ‘These divergent standards are not necessarily evident to the average investor’,510 who may 
not be aware of the differing duties arising under the regulatory infrastructure and differing financial 
incentives in client relationships.  
The need for trusted financial intermediaries who cannot abuse asymmetry of technical knowledge 
led the SEC to propose a ‘uniform fiduciary standard’,511 based on contested judicial definition of 
investment advisers as fiduciaries,512 and reflecting community expectations of how a financial 
adviser should behave, no matter what the regulatory overlay, and the investor protection intent of 
the US Congress. This standard is to be ‘no less stringent than the standard applicable to investment 
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advisers … when providing personalised investment advice about securities’.513 Some opine that 
‘standards should be based on analogous trust law concepts’,514 and trust law should ‘inform the best 
interest standard’,515 being in the entrustor’s sole interest.516 
4.5.1 Best interest 
Best interest duties in the US, as in Australia are: 
highly ambiguous,517 leaving significant practical questions unanswered, and investment advisers and 
their clients left to ‘divine, if not guess, the application in everyday business life of basic fiduciary 
obligations, such as the duty to provide impartial advice.518 
This ambiguity consumes 66 000 words.519 Duties of financial advisers, however termed, in the US, 
are not necessarily fiduciary in nature and should only apply ‘where there is a broad delegation of 
power to manage another’s property...’520 Describing non-fiduciary duties as part of the uniform 
fiduciary standard has only served ambiguity and those that prosper from it. In Canada, these operate 
concurrently within the Client Relationship Model which provides for the alignment of fiduciary duty 
with the client engagement contract. In the US, a client engagement contract is mandatory with an 
alignment of fiduciary duty with the scope of engagement.521 
Further legal uncertainty in financial services provision and advice is likely, including proposed 
statutory reform or repeal.522 
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5. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Empirical analysis523 attributes systemic failure in Australian NBFE regulation to director 
malfeasance associated with related party transactions. In some professions, but not NBFEs, Australia 
prohibits RPTs: for example a medical practitioner in general practice cannot own a radiology or 
pathology business. RPTs occur globally.524 RPTs can be an effective mechanism, shrouded in 
legitimacy, to ‘divert value from a corporation’.525 Different jurisdictions have addressed this issue 
in different ways. More broadly:  
Conflicts of interest where there are not related party transactions, but which have similar outcomes, 
are categorised as ‘tunnelling’, being the ‘transfer of resources out of a company [or other entity] to 
its controlling shareholder … [by] dominant shareholders and managers.526  
Examples include situations where the company is not a related party but lead to a change of control. 
Related party law and associated accounting standards527 require proximity between the parties. 
Tunnelling does not. Neither do value transfers, only resource or asset transfers or the transfer of legal 
rights. 
Laxity in regulation and enforcement of anti-tunnelling provisions has traditionally been common 
around the world. This is tantamount to an implicit legalisation of pecuniary private benefits 
extraction. No disclosure regime can be expected to succeed in forcing dominant shareholders to 
confess how much they are stealing from their controlled company.528 
Can RPTs be in the best interest of the company? How is this to be disclosed, analysed and legally 
enforced? Transactional disclosure of itself is not sufficient to determine best interest even under a 
common definition of best interest, as in Germany, unlike Australia with its multiple definitions. 
Statutory disclosure requires materiality directly related to that transaction. Transactional statutory 
disclosure does not require disclosure of long term strategic intent. This laxity in regulation via RPTs 
and tunnelling leads directly to creeping corruption. It arises from the distinction between value and 
interests or rights as statutorily or contractually determined without regard to fiduciary or other 
equitable principles. 
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Related party transactions are regulated using a number of legal tools, of varying efficacy and depend 
on the efficiency of enforcement. Prohibition of some transactions, including related party loans and 
loan guarantees would be effective in some Australian creeping corruption cases, but may not be in 
the best interest of the company when the related party is the only willing participant. Selective 
prohibitions including ‘loans to related parties such as directors and executives have traditionally 
been more common in Europe and gained traction in the US and China in the first half of the 
2000’s,’529 may be more pragmatic than a total prohibition. The reverse requires prohibition in 
Australia: loans by a related party to the company which are known to change control and shift value. 
Shareholder approval for a specific transaction easily leads to transfer of value and loss of control 
since only specific transactional approval is required, not its long term value impact approval. 
5.1 Singapore 
Directors entering into sham contracts and unauthorised payments even if for the purported benefit 
of the company are not in the interests of the company. Neither are diversion of funds from the 
company to a director,530 a related party of a director,531 or appropriation of commercial opportunities 
by a director.532 Directors are required to make full disclosure to their fellow directors and to the 
extent there may be a breach by a fiduciary, are required to obtain ‘informed consent’.533 Informed 
consent includes all of a company’s shareholders.534 Such breaches of fiduciary duty constituting 
breaches of trust may result in the director becoming a constructive trustee535 and, ‘no period of 
limitation shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust “in respect of any fraud or fraudulent 
breach of trust”’.536 Fiduciary responsibility extends to senior employees.537 Singapore has a: ‘strict 
and clear approach towards fiduciaries who must account for profits made without permission from 
the company… ’538 Ultimately, all rests on disclosure uncertainties. 
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5.2 Germany and the EU 
Conflicts of interest and fidelity are regulated under civil law fiduciary-like principles of untreue and 
culpa in contrahendo as well as statute. Fiduciary obligations ‘can be relied on where the [statutory] 
rules of on directors’ duties do not address a particular conflict’.539 These include conflicts of 
economic interest derived from related party transactions and wrongful exploitation of corporate 
opportunity. Australian statutes subsume general law fiduciary principles, proscribe fiduciary 
obligations, and strictly limit the definition of a fiduciary. This is not so in Germany with its civil law 
obligations. Statutory interpretation of loyalty is narrowly defined to mean actual, not potential 
competition ‘within the scope of the company’s business’.540 German law balances this narrow 
statutory definition with ‘an unwritten duty of loyalty’541 applied where the statute does not. Judicial 
innovation evolves the law although ‘authoritative case law is rare’.542 
To Australian eyes, traditionally limited statutory intervention may seem odd. It is the primacy of 
fiduciary-intent obligation and the two-tier corporate governance system that ensures Australian-style 
prescriptive statutory interventions are not required in Germany. The governance system diffuses 
decision making power,543 enabling more supervision of related party transactions. 
Most EU jurisdictions have procedural rules governing the disclosure of related party transactions. 
These are statutorily narrowly applied in Germany by the Stock Corporation Act specifically to a 
director entering into related party transactions where that director is both beneficiary and decision 
maker.544 There is a statutory duty of care but no duty to avoid conflicts of interest.545 In other 
jurisdictions, reliance on procedure includes ‘a majority of the minority’,546 and/or independent 
director exercising business judgment,547 or ‘expert opinion’,548 approval. All are problematic since 
all rely on the company directors to provide the necessary information. Limited financial resources 
provided to directors to assess materiality in its context and complex disclosure documentation 
‘naturally favour opacity’.549 Proposed EU harmonisation of related party transactions regulation is 
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likely only to favour laxness since the differing jurisdictions operate very differently. Director 
independence in Germany is something of a compromise: ‘a substantial and not merely temporary 
conflict of interests’,550 including controlling shareholder related parties. ‘There is no universal 
definition of “independence”’.551 German law ‘only vaguely requires the supervisory board to include 
“what it considers an adequate number of independent members”’.552 
EC regulation of CRAs has moved from its voluntary comply-or-explain mode to registration and 
supervision, nationally based, given their central role in the financial system and their contribution to 
its systemic failure globally.553 One objective is to remove conflicts of interest between adviser to the 
rated entity and publisher of the credit quality of client securities.554 This conflict has been evident in 
Australian NBFEs where the supposedly independent research house has a related party investment 
manager which it recommends. 
5.3 United Kingdom 
Fiduciary obligation is the mirror of community expectation of those that advise them or manage their 
funds. As in the EU, the UK has adopted a number of approaches to the regulation of related party 
transactions with some confusion. ‘[M]uch of this confusion arises because of ignorance of the 
complex history of this area of the law and the principles and policies underpinning that law.’555 
Fiduciaries (directors and trustees) should not be ‘held accountable through the unreasonable and 
inequitable application of equitable principles.’556 Traditional judicial interpretation557 conflicts with 
present statutory formulation,558 requiring ‘a more precise analysis of whether there is a real conflict 
as opposed to a real possible conflict before finding the director in breach of duty.’559 In contrast the 
UK has long eliminated fiduciary general law as the basis for insider trading enforcement.560 
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EU regulation of related party transactions, recognising they may have potential value, has not 
pursued the prohibition philosophy, and provides for business judgment. The UK has also introduced 
subjectivity, rather than the strict traditional judicial approach,561 by widening director statutory 
responsibility to company long term success. The ‘[c]orporate benefit doctrine has not been 
developed in English law. This is another example of the uncertainty created by these reform, and the 
complex and confused policies which lie behind them’.562 Disclosure, including the nature of the 
related party interest not just its existence, and prior fully informed consent of the disinterested 
members of the company form the basis of modern UK related party transaction governance.563  
Corporate opportunity is a problem for investment managers, especially in portfolio based venture, 
private equity and hedge funds. Their underlying investment base will normally have common 
directors, under the UK statute, of potentially competing investees. The UK judicial typology of strict 
(inflexible) which categorises anything of economic value as the company’s opportunity, or flexible 
(fact and context based) interpretations of corporate opportunity has not been resolved by statute. 
Rather, it emulates strict judicial tradition, it being ‘immaterial whether the company could take 
advantage of the proper, information, or opportunity’.564 There is a reasonableness test,565 but this is 
constrained without judicial guidance,566 previously applying different phraseology.567 Could 
requiring no overt action by the company, is different from would which does require a positive 
action. The UK statute can stifle NBFE entrepreneurship without meeting its legislative objective of 
simplifying the law. It is harsh: in any event its codification requires judicial interpretation who also 
have a statutory duty to apply previously existing general law. That interpretation will define the 
veracity and legislative future of s 175(4)(b). 
5.4 Canada 
Canadian conflict of interest regulation extends beyond Australian proscriptive tradition requiring 
consideration of whether a conflict may be ‘expect[ed] to arise between the firm including each 
individual acting on behalf of the firm and its client’.568 Disclosure of itself is not sufficient. There 
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must be a proactive business system of identifying conflicts of interest with prospective clients by the 
firm and participants in it, ‘consistent with the best interests of the client’.569 ‘T]he exercise of 
business judgment influenced only by the best interest of the client…570 Canadian investment advisers 
do not have business judgment protections accorded directors of Canadian companies. 
5.5 United States 
The US fair value approach Australia has been adopted in Australia. Of itself this is problematic and 
ignores the fiduciary obligation of not serving more than one master and obtaining the ‘best bargain 
possible.’571 Independent experts are not necessarily truly independent (financially or otherwise), 
competent to advise on value creation through corporate strategy, and focus on short term 
transactional analysis. 
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6. DISCLOSURE  
6.1 Singapore 
Singapore included consumer protection provisions for all financial products in 2009.572 Suitability 
cannot be a mere assessment of individual circumstances where: ‘there is no authority to suggest the 
law should be more generous to retail investors’.573 The sale of some of these products to retail 
investors where:  
[C]ontractual documentation … consists of more than 500 pages … make it easier to understand why 
senior banking figures … had little understanding of this market and of the risks their institutions were 
undertaking.574 This observation is alarming for retail investors.575 
Singapore’s response was to require a Pricing Statement and Product Highlights Sheet as a 
supplement to the Base Prospectus. ‘Does suitable documentation exist at all’?576 More accurately, 
can suitable documentation exist at all for retail investors? Would these recurring multi-jurisdictional 
disclosure problems be resolved by merit based or prohibition based regulation? ‘In fact, disclosure 
alone has never been enough in the case of unit trusts that are regulated as collective investment 
schemes ...’577 
Disclosure is meant to: ‘encourage[s] innovation and facilitate[s] the development of a more 
sophisticated body of consumers’,578 since disclosure is, ‘meaningless if consumers do not know how 
to make use of disclosed information in making financial decisions’.579 Objective disclosure is 
measured by a ‘reasonable investor’580 standard. Retail investor protection relies on ‘fair dealing’.581 
These investor protections are not the same as those in Australia. In addition, for debentures issued 
by collective investment schemes (CIS), a trustee is required for the duration of the debenture.582  
                                                                  
572 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading Act) (Singapore, Cap 52A, 2009 rev ed). Financial product suitability 
for Australian retail investors lags such stringency except eligibility for consumer credit. See, eg, Gail 
Pearson, ‘Reading Suitability against Fitness for Purpose ― the Evolution of a Rule’ [2010] 1 Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 129, 146.  
573 Chao-Hung, above n 439, 326. 
574 UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 585 [2]. 
575 Chao-Hung, above n 439, 322. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Tjio, ‘Challenges to Singapore from the Global Financial Crisis’, above n 437, 176. 
578 MAS, Objectives and Principles of Financial Supervision in Singapore, above n 4, Principle 9 [4.15]. 
579 Ibid Principle 10 [4.16]. 
580 Securities and Futures Act (Singapore, cap 289) s 243. 
581 Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Singapore, Cap 52A rev ed, Act 15 of 2008). 
582 Tjio, ‘Challenges to Singapore from the Global Financial Crisis’, above n 437, 174. 
299 
Singapore requires MAS approval for a collective investment scheme and its trustee, a higher standard 
than the registration requirement in Australia. Cultural factors are also different: 
although a disclosure-based philosophy was embraced by the state, the lack of private enforcement, 
and perhaps cultural apathy towards transparency, alongside a pool of relatively unsophisticated, 
elderly investors, made this a dangerous mix.583 
Singapore does not follow comparable IOSCO principles on investor protection.584 Despite personal 
suitability obligations, there is still emphasis on caveat emptor to encourage investors to become 
financially literate. Otherwise, Singapore investors rely on statutory interventions, and fiduciary 
relationships, if any. Other differences include the source of disclosure provisions. Singapore, albeit 
with departure,585 follows prevailing English law, whereas Australia follows the US and its reliance 
on unconscionability in trading.586 There is no precise definition of unconscionability and a: ‘high 
threshold in establishing a strong prima facie case of unconscionable conduct’.587 
There are cultural reasons for the ‘lack of private enforcement, despite statutory rights of action. 
Statutory intervention into misleading disclosures in securities offer documentation has a long 
legacy588 including in Singapore,589 now with enhanced investor statutory protection. 
More than that, the interaction between the mandatory disclosure regime and the statutory right to 
damages for misleading prospectuses results in investors having a legally enforceable right to an 
increased range of information.590 
This intervention extended the previous general law provisions by requiring disclosure of all material 
facts required by an investor to make an informed decision. Consistency with other elements of 
Singapore law is achieved by the extension of potential liability to all ‘intermediaries who have 
critical responsibility as “gatekeepers” of securities offerings…’591 reflecting UK fiduciary proposals 
and German civil law practice. 
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Whilst these provisions refer specifically to securities offered pursuant to a prospectus for SGX listing 
purposes, they extend to NBFE securities.592 There were ‘at least five different entities associated 
with Lehman Brothers group involved with Minibond Series 9, enabling Lehman Brothers to earn 
various fees’.593 However: ‘Investors’ compensatory rights are strongest where there is an offer of 
securities requiring preparation of a prospectus’.594 
Singapore statutory intervention has not followed the UK or Australia which now do not require 
contractual rescission by the investor.595 Singapore requires only proof of the inaccuracy of a 
statement, not that it was fraudulent or negligent, or that it was intended the investor rely on the 
statement and did so, a lesser test than in general law. Professional advisers are not presently regarded 
as intermediaries for the purposes of disclosure liability, as they are in the US.596 ‘The current 
regulatory framework in Singapore does not provide the necessary incentives for lawyers to make all 
of the relevant inquiries advising on their clients’ disclosure documents’.597 Verification practice is 
the responsibility of the issuer rather than professional advisers. There have been a: ‘recent spate of 
scandals relating to outright fraud and disclosure failures ...’598 in Singapore listed company 
prospectuses.  
There is a lack of objective due diligence standards which lawyers are expected to meet when they are 
advising on public disclosure documents.599 There is a similar lack of objective standards of due 
diligence … for … other non-prospectus disclosure documents.600 
For unlisted NBFEs, failures in disclosure are more difficult to identify. Documentation complexity 
and lack of standards or adviser liability in due diligence add risk to Singapore NBFE investments. 
6.2 Germany and the EU 
Specific EU disclosure reforms include extension of the MiFID advice and distribution regime to 
other financial products (Packaged Retail Investment Products). Standardised Key Investor 
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Information Documents extended UCITS compliance to other financial products, limitations on 
product selling without financial advice, restrictions on conflicted remuneration (MiFID 11/MiFIR 
from January 2018),601 ex ante product intervention powers, ex post product prohibition powers, and 
collective redress (ie Representative or Class Actions). ‘[R]egulators in Europe are practically falling 
over themselves to demonstrate their commitment to protecting the humble retail investor’.602 These 
are all recognitions of the limits of efficient markets disciplinary mechanisms, but importantly, the 
essential contribution of financial products ‘to daily life as a consequence of government withdrawal 
from welfare’.603  
It resulted in disclosure documents based on UCITS standards, being ‘a highly regulated, supervised, 
and transparent savings vehicle’.604 These standards are regulated by a series of EU directives from 
2001.605 Disclosure standards are supported by MiFID regulation of conduct standards in the 
relationship between investor, product issuer and financial adviser, based on best interest of the 
investor.606 The [MiFID] conduct of business regime: 
Catches services from those with minimal intermediation – classically execution-only broking – to 
those involving a high degree of loss of control by investors and large degrees of investment firm 
discretion and investor risk, such as portfolio management.607 
The scope of the MiFID regime includes general and specific financial advice, investment research, 
marketing and advertising materials with disclosure underpinning investor protection and investor 
choice of financial product. Disclosure must be in a ‘comprehensible form’.608 Disclosure 
‘standardisation and greater comparability’609 reflect the intent of UCITS disclosure documents. 
UCITS was designed as a means of passporting financial products between jurisdictions including 
Singapore and Hong Kong (not Australia). Reform of passporting610 in 2013 applies to the marketing 
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of non-EU financial products inside the EU with different regulations applying to EU and non-EU 
fund managers and funds.611 Thus, as in Australia, political pressures on regulators’ ‘pro-market, 
deregulatory preferences … give way to “stronger” and “stricter” regulation’.612 
Disclosure includes breach of fiduciary obligation by the non-disclosure of conflicts of interest or of 
remuneration. In Germany, this may result in advisory contract rescission613 and breach of statute.614 
Collective redress mechanisms as a result of judicial overload led to the development of model case 
procedures designed to: 
[i]mprove individual investor protection by facilitating the enforcement of individual claims, to 
facilitate the enforcement of capital markets regulation, and to reduce the burden on the judicial 
system,615 
with redress (including damages) for misleading, inaccurate or incomplete capital markets 
disclosures. German and Austrian courts, unlike Australia:616 
interpret the concept of prospectus liability to as to include promotional statements and brochures, and 
thus acknowledges that general prospectus liability under civil law also extends to these materials, 
even though they may be separate from the actual prospectus,617 
although no ‘concrete rules exist as to the required contents and presentation of the advertising 
materials.’618 
The German model case procedures differ from those elsewhere in the EU and retain significant 
individual rights with only a ‘partial collectivisation of claims’619 and includes opt-out procedures. 
German civil law provides additional avenues for investor protection should the MiFID regime fail 
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in its ex ante preventive objectives. Liability is personal requiring ‘conscious awareness’620 of persons 
making untrue representations or omitting material facts relevant to investment decisions. Consumer 
protection through disclosure applies to both financial markets law (disclosure to markets) and 
company law (disclosure to shareholders), resulting in more than one set of disclosure rules.621 
Corporate governance based on soft-law codes adds further complexity to disclosure with lack of 
harmonisation in enforcement. This lack of harmonisation extends to cross-border investment activity 
with Brexit adding to the complexity.622 
Disclosure is a commonly applied regulatory tool globally, but it has its limitations, being ‘neither 
effective nor efficient’.623 A common complaint is the complexity of disclosure documents, reducing 
the ability of the stakeholder to understand and use the disclosed information. Is disclosure a lazy 
tool, or the easiest solution for policy makers? ‘[O]ne cannot entirely rule out the suspicion that 
legislators have chosen disclosure because they themselves do not fully understand the consequences 
of the mechanisms...’624 
In the EU, there is now the ‘eclipse of the empowered investor and the emergence of the consumer’.625 
Reforms which recognise the ‘limits of disclosure, where relied on, is outcomes-based’ ... ’on ex ante 
and ex post product intervention – not on further responsibilising [sic] the investor through 
disclosure’.626 Unlike Australia, with the exception of consumer credit and industry superannuation 
default funds,  
the emergence of a precautionary, ex ante approach to retail markets is one of the most striking themes 
of the current generation of reforms, particularly with respect to product design-related intervention, 
but also as regards product distribution…627 
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Australia is not unique in suffering from systemic creeping corruption arising from disclosure 
limitations. ‘Schaeffler’s scheme was carefully and skilfully crafted in order to avoid any formal 
violation of the law, straddling the thin line between legal and illegal’.628  
[O]nly a fraction of the facts comprising Schaeffler’s strategy was disclosed to the public and/or 
regulators. Consequently, only a fraction of the facts can be assessed by the capital markets. What can 
we do about it? 629 
Can complete disclosure of economic interest be enforced where there is no legal obligation to do so? 
Where there is no interest in it by the parties concerned? ‘It is necessary to shift legislator’s attention 
from ex post enforcement to [an] ex ante self-regulatory regime’.630 
6.3 United Kingdom 
Market based regulatory systems rely heavily on disclosure, including disclosure of conflicts of 
interest. ‘Such disclosure is worse than useless if it is not comprehensive’.631  
The belief that the best approach to information asymmetry is the provision of additional data … [is] 
acceptable if accompanied by full, even if largely incomprehensible, disclosure.632  
It leads to documentation complexities which hide the narrative required to make sound investment 
decisions. ‘The addition of successive layers of oversight and accountability through disclosure not 
only adds to cost but also dilutes trust and judgment…’633 ‘Two dimensions of disclosure have been 
particularly problematic,’634 including investor protection and market integrity. For these investors, 
it may be ‘information asymmetry problems exceed[s] the bounds that can realistically be remedied 
by disclosure.’635 Market integrity and transparency is regulated through the disclosure of short 
positions,636 with the power to regulate ‘on financial stability grounds’.637 
Best interest and general law fiduciary obligations of investment intermediaries rely on disclosure of 
conflicts of interest and the concept of informed consent. They ignore the concept of stewardship 
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espoused, unsuccessfully to date in its fiduciary sense, in the UK. Stewardship requires that 
information ‘should as far as possible be tailored to the needs of users.’638 Verbiage and boilerplate 
text which populate Australian offer documents and financial advice may provide data, but it is not 
useful information usable by the financial consumer. US offer documents management discussion 
sections provide more usable information. 
Data is not information, information is not knowledge, knowledge is not understanding, understanding 
is not wisdom.639 
Disclosure has become an end in itself, reflecting regulation of market behaviour through process 
rather than the primacy of the investor or beneficiary reliant upon trusted financial intermediaries. A 
‘distinctive feature[s] of the UK’s regulations … requiring an unusually rigorous insistence on 
accurate self-labelling’640 are product based, not client based. Regulation is seen ‘through the eyes of 
the industry rather than its customers’641 with penalties for ‘market abuse rather than customer 
abuse’.642 Disclosure is at best an imperfect tool in a consumer market structure with considerable 
information asymmetries and permissible conflicts of interest. What financial consumers need is trust 
generated by long term ‘deeper’643 relationships. This is the European tradition, albeit subverted (as 
in the UK) since 2004 by the advent of product selling and transactional relationships. The banning 
of commissions paid to financial advisers is a first step644 to rectifying loss of trust by radical changes 
to culture and behaviour. The Heydon Royal Commission identified Australian echoes: ‘culture and 
taint’645 requiring excision. 
6.4 United States 
Debate in the US, has centred on fiduciary characteristics of the client relationship and, in the 
alternate, standards of client disclosure preferred by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA). As in Australia since Wallis, disclosure has been the historical basis of US 
securities laws. ‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
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policeman’.646 For retail investors with limited time and limited financial literacy, it is an imperfect 
tool despite its historical provenance. 
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7. FINANCIAL LITERACY 
7.1 Singapore 
Reliance on disclosure in financial products and financial services requires financial literacy 
competencies from consumers. Financial literacy is taught under the well-regarded MoneySENSE 
national financial education program.647 Launched in 2003, it provides games and workshops for 
secondary students possibly extended to primary school students. MoneySENSE research shows that 
sound money habits have crystallised as young as age seven. Tutors involved in financial education 
receive training so that they can deliver the program effectively. 
7.2 Germany and the EU 
Law reform was designed to unlock retail investor savings relying on their financial literacy (but 
without formal investor education) and on advice. This required financial products ‘easily understood 
by the ’average retail investor…’648  
Disclosure and best interest policy has not been sufficient to prevent ‘serious signs of some form of 
market failure’.649 This reflects the paternalist view that investors should not be trusted with their own 
money despite, 
new evidence suggesting that retail investors are less irrational than frequently assumed, the more 
traditional characterization of the erratic and undesirable investor, vividly described as the ‘weak animal 
that must sadly but necessarily be culled out of the investing herd to improve the species’.650 
Some individual investors do exhibit traits leading to losses, or may fail to distinguish between 
fiduciary and broker relationships.651 This is not the same as market failure. Paternalist remedies may 
not therefore be relevant. ‘Regulatory failure linked to the investor empowerment model is closely 
implicated’.652 There is a link between paternalism and the lack of development of financial literacy 
to make informed decisions, although ‘“Learning by doing” may be hard or even impossible…’.653 
Australia echoes these distinctions with its policy conflicts on superannuation regulation. All 
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jurisdictions should be cautious of confusing paternalism, however libertarian, with regulation 
designed for efficient capital markets, one component being financial literacy. 
Government interference in the subprime market created the seeds of destruction and, at least in some 
countries such as Germany, it were in particular banks with politicians on their boards, such as the 
Landesbanken [State Banks], who took the worst gambles.654 
Scholarly research has ‘exposed simmering tensions between the advocates of paternalism and the 
investor empowerment camp.’655 If paternalism is not the answer to retail investor protection as 
consumers, are the tools available to those investors: disclosure, suitability/appropriateness assessed 
by advisers, and investor education, of themselves, sufficient? There is no clear answer in EU 
regulation or statute. There is a legal answer in the widespread application of the German untreue and 
culpa in contrahendo doctrines supported by ‘micro-protection’656 of investors under consumer 
protection regulations. These reforms recognise that: 
While financial literacy remains a recurring theme of policy debate recognition now seems to be growing 
that literacy is, at best, a very long term solution and can play only a supporting role in protecting 
investors.657 
This conclusion applies also in Australia. However, there has not yet been evolution of the law (other 
than consumer credit and industry superannuation default funds) to reflect investors as consumers 
rather than capital providers. Neither is there an adequate separation of financial products issuers 
associated with discretionary investment from those that issue financial products essential for welfare. 
In Australia, these are often intermingled (eg MIS, superannuation entities, and financial advisers in 
the same corporate group) with some superannuation entities assuming investment bank risk. 
7.3 United Kingdom 
Fundamental to the discipline of any market based regulatory system operating in a general law 
framework is financial literacy and consumer comprehension of financial services and financial 
products. UK research into financial literacy is extensive.658 The then Financial Services Authority 
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(precursor to FCA and PRA) recognised the need for ‘collaboration among the public, private, and 
non-profit sectors,’659 including the free Money Advice Service. Importantly: 
Improving financial capability [of consumers] is complimentary to, and not a substitute for, firms 
treating their customers fairly – and there are some firms which still have not embedded this principle 
into their management culture and which now need to do so.660 
UK empirical research mirrors other jurisdictions: financial literacy is an imperfect tool for market 
discipline. ‘[R]igorous, credible policy evaluation showing the incremental impact of financial 
capability work is hard to find’.661 Financial capability research of important population cohorts 
(school age children, young people not in education, tertiary students, employees, new parents) found 
‘insufficient robust evidence’662 to make ‘plausible estimates of the proportion of people likely to 
respond to types of financial capability initiatives by making changes in their behaviour, and the 
extent of any changes they make to their personal finances.’663 Achieving widespread behavioural 
change (as ASIC has recognised in Australia) ‘will be a long process’.664  
psychological rather than informational differences may explain much of the variation in financial 
capability … people’s financial behaviour may primarily depend on their intrinsic psychological 
attributes rather than information or skills or how they choose to deploy them.665 
Behavioural economics research suggests that the use of peer group norms and ‘active intervention 
by a counsellor and/or individualised advice, rather than passive information or education’666 are the 
most promising forms of incrementing financial literacy and its application. The Canadian SRO 
model provides the infrastructure to achieve such a result. The present Australian financial literacy 
strategies do not. 
Given the long lead times to develop market disciplinary competencies by financial consumers, 
fiduciary principles must therefore bear the heavy burden of protection of the vulnerable through 
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market conduct discipline and enforcement. This is especially so since financial services and financial 
products have become consumer purchases. Investors as consumers is recognised policy in Germany. 
Previously, most financial products and services were accessed by limited numbers of sophisticated 
investors. Nowadays, most of the population, much of which does not have financial literacy 
competencies, relies on third party products and services providers to plan and access retirement 
funds. This population is particularly vulnerable and requires fiduciary protections. Successful 
financial intermediation depends on trust and confidence: ‘taken together, rather than separately, they 
imply a financial world different from our recent experience’.667 
7.4 Canada 
Canada does not only rely on Responsive Regulation. As in other jurisdictions, market mechanisms 
are sought to provide discipline to financial advisers through financial literacy. ‘[I]t is time to replace 
antiseptic education with castigation and terror’.668 Canadian attempts to improve financial services 
consumer literacy have been highly politicised ‘[d]riven by the twin desires to avoid any increased 
regulation of the financial services industry and to avoid the debate that surrounds the efficacy of 
financial education’.669 ‘[4]9.5% of adult Canadians struggle with simple tasks involving math and 
numbers and 42% of adult Canadians struggle with reading’.670 The proposed Canadian model,671 
whilst meritorious in acknowledging the importance of behavioural economics rather than statutory 
compliance ‘clearly privileges the expansion of financial education as the preferred method to 
improve financial literacy’,672 with design and delivery by governments. ‘Despite [the] seeming 
abundance of programs (and a statutory obligation on the part of many governments to provide such 
education), no strong consensus exists about the general effectiveness of the financial education 
programs’.673  
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Financial education does not automatically lead to financial literacy and the ability to make rational 
informed decisions about complex financial products, especially when government is ‘the major 
driving force’.674 
There is a ‘dizzying array’675 of government agencies involved in financial literacy education. 
Canada’s emphasis on self-regulation and financial literacy education developed avoidance of 
conflicts of interest by advisers who have no business judgment rule to rely on. Previously, ‘Calls for 
holding such advisers to a fiduciary standard were simply ignored...’676 The delivery of education and 
disclosure of information, even with responsibility to ensure ‘that it is fully understood by Canadians 
at “teachable moments”’677 is not the same as financial literacy. It is still a lesser obligation than the 
German culpa in contrahendo standard. This latter standard would motivate cultural change in 
financial products and services providers rather than reliance on ‘[d]isclosure (assisted by financial 
literacy education) as the primary consumer protection model…’678 Calls from the libertarian 
paternalists for restrictions on the availability of financial products (often from Canadian trades 
unions) can be resisted with decision making responsibility remaining with the individual.  
7.5 United States 
‘Positive outcomes for some US financial literacy programs have been attributed more to the advice 
provided than to simple education’.679 
Many of the seemingly successful financial education courses studied to date may actually owe their 
success not due to the direct content of the information conveyed but due to their collateral 
consequences, such as individual counsel[l]ing with an instructor…,680 
being ‘teachable moments’. 
Disclosure alone determines issuer document content and for whom financial products can be 
marketed. Fiduciary standards determine how and to whom financial products can be sold. Disclosure 
assumes financial literacy and the investor’s ability to make a rational informed choice and change 
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their behaviours. Financial education can have a ‘positive but modest impact’.681 As in Canadian 
financial literacy scholarship: 
the availability of data does not always lead to effective communication and knowledge; understanding 
and intention do not necessarily lead to a desired action; and … contextual nuances can shape 
behaviour and alter choices.682 
The US has a Federal Financial Literacy and Education Commission. Controversially deemed 
insufficient,683 mandatory financial education for debtors684 is presently enforced by the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) a quasi-autonomous agency within the Federal Reserve System. 
Reform proposals,685 yet to be enacted, move the CFPB out of the Federal Reserve into an 
independent congressionally funded consumer protection agency. The CFPB has: 
unprecedented authority over financial institutions and main street businesses. The CFPB director will 
have vast rule-making, supervisory, investigative and enforcement powers and the authority to regulate 
any person or business that offers or sells a ‘financial product or service’. This authority will extend 
to not just traditional financial institutions, but also potentially thousands of entrepreneurs and small 
businesses.686 
In the US, financial literacy education has become an easier pathway than financial services reform. 
‘Education is a winning strategy’687 politically, but lacks empirical support.688 Nonetheless forcible 
conscription arising from: 
the attitude of denial that has taken hold in the US – the near unshakeable belief that financial literacy 
and education is the low-cost panacea to consumer financial distress,689 
partly explains the superiority of financial services regulation in Canada.  
The US model is more akin to Australian regulation. Compliance rather than self-regulation, with 
financial literacy education as the sop to more insightful solutions to systemic problems. It is no 
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coincidence that the outcomes – cyclical manifestations of systemic failures – arise in both 
jurisdictions. Similarly the reluctance to embrace holistic fiduciary standards and obligations sets the 
US, Australia and the UK apart from the Canadian and German models. 
314 
8. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
8.1 Germany and the EU 
8.1.1 Corporate Governance in German NBFEs 
There is considerable disharmony in Australia surrounding the governance of some NBFEs. 
Important trustee reform attempts690 in governance of superannuation entities remains contested and 
unresolved. These entities form significant proportions of the Australian capital market, some operate 
globally, and some assume investment bank risk. Conflict and confusion arises from the different 
roles of representative stakeholders and board level competencies required to supervise management. 
Rational reform has been delayed by the politicisation of these sectors.  
Balancing stakeholder interests with supervision of management competencies has long been a 
feature of the German corporate governance environment for listed public companies (and other 
entities). Because of the size, complexity, and economic importance of NBFEs, ‘it can be expected 
that the rules applicable to listed companies will sooner or later become a measurement for standards 
of conduct to be re-imposed on unlisted companies by case law or by rulings of financial 
authorities.’691 This has already occurred in Belgium, Finland and Switzerland.692  
The two tier board structure, originally to diffuse power for shareholder and public interest 
protections, separates stakeholder supervision from management control. The board has two 
elements: Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) and Management Board (Vorstand).  
It is a substantial insight of the European Commission to make sure, that the management function 
will be submitted to an effective and sufficiently independent oversight function … this requires the 
presence on the supervisory board of a sufficient number of committed non-executive or supervisory 
directors, who, in addition to not performing management duties in the company or its group, are 
independent, i.e. free from any material conflict of interest.693 
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This insight has not applied in Australia since 1998 when prescribed interests (predating the Managed 
Investments Act)694 separated trustee and investment management. 
The supervisory board appoints, removes, and supervises (but does not control) the management 
board ensuring it has the needed skills sets to perform its duties, and is the guardian of the shareholder 
and employee interests.695 The ‘advantage of the German system is the clear division of function’.696 
The management board ‘is in charge of the company according to its own business judgment and 
represents the company in its business dealings and in litigation’.697 The supervisory board approves 
defined types of transactions. Approval rights include the contract for the engagement of the auditor. 
These ‘approval rights play an important role and are sometimes used to substantially extend the 
powers of the supervisory board’.698 The supervisory board ‘is increasingly performing active 
advisory, support, and co-decision making functions’.699 In the event of a proposed sale of an entity 
by the supervisory board, it is the management board that has the responsibility to provide due 
diligence information to a potential purchaser. The management board has that legal power, but it 
must ‘balance the interests between the disclosure and protection of information for the interest of 
the company’.700 This is the two-tier model at work, separating the interests of the shareholders 
(represented by the supervisory board) from the interests of the company where the disclosure of 
confidential information could harm the company and ultimately its shareholders. 
The supervisory board is historically ‘responsible for bringing actions of the company against 
members of the management board’701 Shareholders also have the right of derivative action ‘against 
acts of the management board which, through valid and binding relationships with third parties, 
infringe upon the rights of the shareholders’ meeting,702 thus extending ‘shareholder rights to vote on 
fundamental corporate transactions’703 Since 2004, shareholders have been able to bring an action 
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against both boards.704 These actions are constrained by business judgment doctrine and the different 
legal foundation of fiduciary duty in Germany. The cases reserve ‘the most important key 
decisions’705 to the shareholders. Supervisory board statutory responsibilities706 have been judicially 
interpreted:  
This control does not only relate to completed issues, but also points of principles of the future business 
policy; is not limited to a review of legality, but must include the management’s expediency and thrift. 
Monitoring functions understood in this regard can only be effectively exercised by regular discussions 
with the management board and its ongoing consultancy; therefore, counselling is the leading 
instrument of a future-oriented management supervision.707 
German statutory provisions are extensively supported by soft law designed to promote ‘a culture of 
open discussion in managerial and supervisory bodies’.708 This includes the extra-judicial GCGC,709 
the OECD Ad-Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, and institutional activism.710 The corporate 
governance code ‘strengthened the strategic role of the supervisory board’,711 now given statutory 
force,712 and updated annually. Since 2012, companies have to explain their reasons for 
noncompliance.713 
The GCGC as general law provides guidance on limiting potential conflicts of interest of supervisory 
board membership in the exercise of its power to limit management board deviations from best 
interest of the enterprise and to ensure that:  
supervisory board members in addition to not performing management duties in the company, not to 
have any other significant relationship (significant shareholder, employee, other) with the company.714  
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These evolving policies had ‘significant majority’715 support. Compare Australian NBFEs plagued 
with abhorrent and egregious related parties and conflicts of economic interest.  
There is an ‘ongoing discussion on the legal nature of the Code … particularly in Germany,’716 being 
a balance of soft law and statute. There is no pan-EU standard: ‘a mix of different types of regulation 
on corporate governance exists, and the dividing line between self-regulation and state regulation is 
a sliding one’.717 The increasing trend to soft law provides companies with flexibility and is reflected 
in German company law. Entrepreneurial companies benefit from this flexibility including 
compliance and executive time costs reductions.718 With flexibility comes responsibility. Directors 
of listed and unlisted companies may be liable for not meeting comply-or-explain provisions of the 
GCGC or merely for not acting in accordance with a specific governance rule.719 Modern German 
legal practice places responsibility for management supervision with the individual directors of the 
supervisory board and provides them with ‘sufficient power to focus the managers’ minds in the right 
direction’.720 ‘Promoting entrepreneurship is high on the agenda … and reflected in a number of 
company law [reform] initiatives’.721 Whilst partly a response to corporate mobility, treaty shopping 
or ‘regulatory arbitrage’ around the EU, it is also a recognition that ‘regulatory burdens generally 
have a negative effect on entrepreneurship.’722 
8.1.2 Fit and proper: profession of director in Germany 
Supervisory Board appointments are often recommended by management and approved by 
shareholders. ‘[T]he definition of “adequacy” by the management board does not necessarily 
correspond with the shareholders’ definition of “adequacy”’.723 Previous criticism of adequacy 
removed historical co-determination provisions and to excessive risk taking exposed by the GFC. 
‘directors sometimes showed serious deficits in understanding the business they were supposed to 
control, and remained passive in addressing structural problems’.724 The German model for listed 
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public company governance previously applied the principal of ‘codetermination’ (now removed) 
with representatives of employees (directly or trades union representation) and capital (traditionally 
shareholders and banks).725 Co-determination did not apply to unlisted entities. These include unlisted 
public companies (AG), private companies (Gmbh) and limited partnerships (KG). A supervisory 
board is voluntary for a Gmbh and unlisted AG (a KG does not have a supervisory board).  
Qualifications for supervisory board membership include diversity of knowledge, judgment, and 
experience.726 German and EU law requires directors of German entities to have ‘required knowledge, 
abilities, and expert experience to properly complete their tasks [although the German statutory 
requirement is for the] supervisory board as a whole to have this level of knowledge’.727 Unlike 
Australia, which has virtually no mandatory qualification standards for directors (albeit enhanced for 
trustees), ‘being the chairman of a supervisory board would become a profession in its own right’,728 
with other board members being professionalised. Supervisory board members rely on information 
provided by the management board. Information flow has been enhanced with ‘mandatory 
participation of auditors in the supervisory board’s deliberations on the annual financial statements 
and reports, as well as the essential results of its audit …’729 Board members are able to ‘request 
additional information from the management board that goes beyond [its] regular reporting duties.’730 
The responsibility for having the required information rests with the supervisory board member. 
Similarly, responsibility for convening board meetings rests with each individual member so that they 
are able ‘to do something on their own in order to detect and prevent corporate malfeasance’.731 
8.1.3 Best interest duty in Germany 
Directors have statutory and general law best interest duty (Unternehmeninteresse), described as 
‘contentious, contested, indefinable, vague, dazzling but dubious’.732 The best interest duty is binding 
on each board. It is defined as ‘the obligation to take care of the enterprises’ [Unternehmen] continued 
existence and to ensure its durable profitability in a long term perspective’:  
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Best interests of the enterprise includes all stakeholders including minorities, creditors, employees, 
public interest and is not limited to shareholder interests. …733 It is designed to ‘preclude the 
dominance of any specific group interests’ and reduce the overall level of conflict by ensuring the 
common interest prevails.734  
This broad best interest contrasts with Australia’s several separate interpretations.  
8.1.4 Empirical results of German corporate governance 
The efficacy of governance determines long term empirical performance. This is nuanced as 
efficiency in Germany. Empirical research on the German two-tier board system dates from 1998.735 
Performance disclosure is publicly contested in Australia including in public advertising by 
superannuation industry associations, requiring regulatory intervention. ‘Since 2002, [German] 
company law requires both boards of listed German corporations to declare their conformity to the 
German Corporate Governance Code’.736 Empirical analysis demonstrates that: 
The degree of compliance with the Code is consistently value-relevant information for the capital 
market … Firms with a higher compliance are priced at an average premium … consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are capital market pressures (or at least incentives), suggesting a broad adoption 
of the Code...737 
The average share price premium of €3.23 on a median of €29.17 and mean of €35.05 is significant. 
Unitary board models have not shown similar results.738 If replicated in Australia, it implies foregone 
value to Australian NBFE securities holders and beneficiaries as a result of less optimal corporate 
governance practices. Later research (sample size 292 UK and German insurers and reinsurers) 
confirms these findings. There is, 
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a positive and significant estimate for the effect of corporate governance factor on opportunity asset 
risk, product risk, and financial risk … a positive relationship exists between corporate governance 
and risk taking in all three risk categories’[compensation, monitoring, blockholders].739 
Corporate governance significantly affects risk taking in insurance companies with corporate 
governance and compensation being the primary factors in German entities. ‘[C]ompanies with 
increased monitoring (i.e. more independent board members and more board meetings) exhibit lower 
risk. For these companies, stricter monitoring of executives thus limits the opportunities for excessive 
risk taking’.740  
a higher level of compliance significantly increases shareholder value ... [we] conclude that the GCGC 
rules are meaningful to the market and that executives ought to pursue full compliance with the 
recommendations of the Code.741 
This analysis of 2 379 German companies is robust, GCGC compliance associated with their higher 
market valuation.742 
8.1.5 Market discipline: minority shareholder rights in German NBFEs  
Statutory vagueness and the encouragement of entrepreneurship is balanced by minority shareholder 
statutory protections. These include remedies for groups of shareholders,743 shareholder equality,744 
validity of shareholder resolutions,745 and compulsory purchase of minority shareholdings by the 
company with court approved pricing.746 Any shareholder owning more than one share or more than 
1% of the issued capital can challenge the management and supervisory boards by derivative action. 
In German courts, ‘refusal to grant permission is the exception if the other requirements of the law 
are satisfied’.747 ‘[M]inority shareholder suits have been greatly facilitated’.748 There is a considerable 
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body of litigation by derivative or direct suit instigated by minority shareholders in German 
companies.749  
8.2 United Kingdom: The Profession of Director 
UK company directors (and Australian directors deciphering differing interpretations of best interest) 
especially for those in the investment chain, need comprehension of the UK general law (and EU 
Directives). This is particularly so for those that engage in related party transactions. Comprehending 
the Companies Act alone does not suffice, although it does reinforce the proscriptive fiduciary 
tradition.750 The UK relies heavily on private enforcement mechanisms for breaches of duty including 
derivative actions.751 This reliance is regarded as ‘ineffective’752 and is being reviewed, as it was in 
Australia,753 as result of community discontent with standards of corporate behaviour. The Australian 
model of public enforcement (since 1958)754 is proposed but ‘unlikely to be adopted in the UK.’755 
Corporate governance failures have been cited as a cause of systemic failure in its financial system. 
The fact that different banks operating in the same geography, in the same financial and market 
environment and under the same regulatory arrangements generated such massively different 
outcomes can only be fully explained in terms of differences in the way they were run. Within the 
regulatory framework that is set, how banks are run is a matter for their boards, that is, of corporate 
governance.756 
The Walker Review ‘identified weaknesses in particular in … the expertise of non-executive directors 
… and inadequate capability of major investing institutions to protect the interests of those for whom 
they act’.757 There was ‘widespread failure on the part of boards of directors, and in particular 
independent non-executive directors, to understand and control the risks that were undertaken by their 
companies.’758 These weaknesses are not restricted to banks. In the UK, as in Australia, the shadow 
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banks - NBFEs-play a major role in the financial system, but were not subject to the same prudential 
capital and liquidity regulation. This is now being imposed from the EU (particularly hedge funds 
and credit rating agencies)759 the UK having a ‘clear interest in ensuring that those markets remain 
centred in London.’760 ‘[I]t cannot readily support forms of regulation that threaten its competitive 
position’.761  
The Senior Management Regime (SMR) extends required competencies to executive and non-
executive directors, senior management and their delegations. It includes those who have personal or 
corporate responsibility for failures in regulated firms. The SMR extends control of the ‘entry into 
the relevant function and its performance’,762 to unregulated counterparties of regulated entities and 
to their service providers.763 Its Australian equivalent (BEAR) presently only applies to ADIs. 
Singapore has a similar regime, although it is more extensive. Regulated entities to which SMR 
applies are required to ‘set out for us simply and clearly-and not using a dictionary of legalese-what 
their responsibilities are764 … the intent being to clearly identify ‘who is in charge.’765 Responsibility 
includes organisational culture and governance. [I]t is extremely hard, if not impossible, to either 
prescribe or supervise [organisational culture]’.766 Governance extends to mandatory templates for 
employment references (to prevent recycling of individuals with poor conduct records) and deferral 
of performance based remuneration for up to ten years (as in the EU).767 The SMR regime will extend 
to all UK financial institutions, foreign institutions operating in the UK from 2018, and Australian 
ADIs in 2018. 
How do UK directors and trustees understand and manage their obligations where enforcement of 
incomplete and widening statutory codification requires reliance on general law, fiduciary principles 
are judicially interpreted traditionally rather than follow economic policy, and where there is 
increasing adoption of soft regulation, involuntary in practice? 
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9. NBFE ARCHITECTURES 
9.1 NBFEs in Singapore 
9.1.1 The evolution of trust law 
Singapore trust law remains the English law of 1973 overlaid by Singapore trust law-related 
legislation since then.768 Many Singapore NBFEs are large publicly traded commercial trusts, as in 
Australia and Canada. Presently, ‘Singapore trust law provides an adequate legal framework for 
wealth management in Singapore and for protecting the interests of the parties to any Singapore or 
foreign trusts’.769 ‘[T]oday’s trust … has evolved into a management device for holding a portfolio 
of complex financial assets770… [which] requires skilled and active management on the part of 
trustees’.771  
Risks for trustees are ameliorated by statute elsewhere772 to prevent trustee flight, but not in Singapore 
or Australia. In Singapore, it is uncertain if UK general law applies.773 There is no authoritative 
Australian leadership,774 merely an agreement in obiter that: ‘the irreducible core of obligations owed 
to beneficiaries only included the duty to “perform the trusts honestly” and to perform “in good faith” 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries’.775 
Uncertainty also applies to constructive trusts.776 Constructive trusts frequently are used as relief for 
a plethora of alleged breaches of trust, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct, breaches of fiduciary 
duty,777 and breaches of confidence, leading to unjust enrichment. Yet, ‘there is a tendency to conflate 
the constructive trust in a proprietary sense with a duty to account as constructive trustee’.778  
                                                                  
768 Business Trusts Act (Singapore, Act 30 of 2004); The Trustees (Amendment) Act 2004 (Singapore) Act 45 
of 2004. 
769 Chan Sek Keong, ‘Trusts and the rule of law in Singapore’ (2013) 25 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
365, 374. 
770 A S Butler, ‘Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Powers of Trustees: The New Zealand Experience’ 
(1995) 7(1) Bond Law Review 119. 
771 Emma Ford, ‘Trustee investment and modern portfolio theory’ (1996) 10(4) Trust Law International 102. 
772 Trustees Act 2000 (UK) ch 29; Uniform Trust Code 2000 (US) amend 2005. 
773 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 (CA); Chia Huai Yuan, ‘Trustee exemption clauses & the modern day 
investment trust’ (2013) 31 Singapore Law Review 199-202. 
774 Reader v Fried [2001] VSC 495 (Pagone J).  
775 Ibid [13] (Pagone J). 
776 Tang Hang Wu, ‘The Constructive Trust in Singapore ― Five Persistent Puzzles’ (2010) 22 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 136. 
777 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324. 
778 Wu, above n 776, 137. 
324 
Remedial constructive trusts are recognised in some jurisdictions779 including the US and Canada, 
but not in others including the UK,780 being ‘a matter of strict law[,] not discretion’.781 
The Singapore approach, on the other hand, seems to be more ambivalent with regard to the possibility 
of a remedial constructive trust,782 although there can be constructive trust liability arising from 
knowing receipt of property held by a fiduciary.783 
This ambivalence stems from the distinction between accessorial liability784 and dishonest 
assistance.785 Barnes v Addy distinction being: ‘a mere dicta in which he appeared not to strain the 
doctrine of trusts beyond its proper limits. This is increasingly being recognised both academically786 
and judicially’.787 
The Singapore courts ‘readily accept English and Privy Council cases as stating the applicable law 
with respect to the equitable liability of third parties to breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty’.788 
They also look to Australian cases.789 There is the beginnings of a distinct Singapore equitable 
jurisprudence: ‘The Baden scale790 has fallen into disfavour in Singapore’.791 Establishing a 
Singapore specific legal system with independence from English or other jurisdictions with an 
equitable heritage reflects modern Singaporean society792 balancing deterrence with efficient 
worldwide commerce.793 
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The law of equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty: ‘has been in an unsettled state for 
some years’.794 Singapore follows a strict interpretation of the Brickenden795 rule:  
A fiduciary who is in one of the well-established categories of fiduciaries and who commits a culpable 
breach of his core duties of honesty and fidelity is liable to pay equitable compensation even if the 
object of those duties is unable to prove a but-for causation.796 
This is different from the interpretation in Australia,797 (or England) where proof of causation is 
required.798 In Singapore, whether breaches of duty by a fiduciary are innocent or culpable799 can 
render the fiduciary at risk without reliance upon a defence of causation. 
Singapore relies on other (British) Commonwealth jurisdictions in its interpretation of trust law. It 
may follow English law by default, but there are trust circumstances relating to disclosure of 
information where: ‘the issue has neither been decided nor explored’,800 in Singapore. There is 
uncertainty in the law. Application of Australian law is problematic where ‘there remains no HCA 
decision relating to the beneficiaries’ rights to trust information and documents’.801 In Singapore, 
‘there are no hard and fast rules as to what information a trustee can, or cannot, be compelled to 
disclose’.802 
9.1.2 Commercial trusts 
Singapore law recognises and enforces trusts established under the law of any lawful jurisdiction. It 
also provides trust law recognition of S-REITs organised as CIS. Business Trusts may invest actively 
in real property. Statutory control over CIS securities offers, licensing, and authorisation,803 and CIS 
trustees804 demonstrates the differences between investment manager and trustee. This is different to 
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Australian law but as in Australia, there has been confusion as to the clarity of manager and trustee 
fiduciary duties and their co-existence.  
Singapore Business Trusts (typically special purpose vehicles for property development) regulation 
partly follows the Australian MIS RE model (directors of the Australian corporate trustee owe 
fiduciary duty to it, and a best interest duty to unit holders), and is similar to the Australia SLE 
proposal.805 It also has similarity with Australian superannuation entity trustees whose fiduciary duty 
is also owed to the beneficiaries ‘to [ensure] that fiduciary responsibility towards unitholders of a 
business trust is clearly placed on a single entity’,806 being the trustee-manager. This is not the case 
for CIS (real property or securities), resulting in Business Trust unit holders having more fiduciary 
protection than those in CIS which retains the traditional split trustee-manager model. In Singapore, 
the distinction in regulation is whether the trust is an active or managed one. This distinction was to 
facilitate cross-border investment.807 Unitholders in registered actively managed business trusts enjoy 
limited liability as if the entity were a company. This is not necessarily the case in Australia.808 
9.1.2 Limited Liability Partnerships  
LLPs are used globally (Australia excepted) as the preferred corporate structure for hedge fund and 
private equity investing. Singapore809 draws from the US (Delaware) and UK: ‘a modern company 
law and regulatory framework for Singapore which accords with global standards and which will 
promote a competitive economy’.810 
LLPs typically have a general partner (supervisor) and limited partners (investors). The general 
partner is normally a company. Singapore law is a hybrid of Delaware partnership law with the 
benefits of limited liability for the partners and UK company law (the preferred UK LLP legal basis). 
Singapore LLP law provides for: ‘complete shield protection [of general partners] … accordingly 
protected for tortious as well as commercial contractual obligations in the course of business’,811 with 
the benefits of perpetuity afforded as if the LLP were a company. 
                                                                  
805 Australian Government, CAMAC, above n 23.  
806 Lee Suet Fern, ‘Real Estate Investment Trusts in Singapore ― Recent Legal and Regulatory 
Developments and the Case for Corporatisation’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 36, 57. 
807 Ibid 65. 
808 Nuncio d’Angelo, Commercial Trusts (LexisNexis Butterworths Australia, 2014) 149 [3.98]. 
809 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005 (Singapore). 
810 Yeo Hwee Ying, ‘Nature and Liability Shield of Limited Liability Partnerships in Singapore’ (2007) 19 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 409. 
811 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005 (Singapore) s 8; ibid 415. 
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Singapore follows Australia,812 asserting partnership fiduciary duty, with creation of an institutional 
constructive trust over property belonging to a partnership. The test is: ‘a corporate opportunity which 
there was a “real or substantial possibility” of the partnership pursuing, having regard to its existing 
business activities and its stated aspirations’.813 Presently, there is no definitive Singapore fiduciary 
law on this point.814 
9.2 NBFEs in Germany 
The D-REIT was introduced in 2007.815 D-REITs follow the legal intent of other jurisdictions, 
including Australia particularly in respect of taxation, but are not trusts in the German or common 
law context. They are companies (Aktiengeselleschäften) with their shares listed on a European 
securities trading market and normally subject to German statutes. 
The German equivalent of the LLP, used widely around the world (not Australia) is GmbH & Co KG. 
This is a combination of a private company not able to offer its shares to the public (Gesellschaft mit 
Beschänkter Haftung) and a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft). The KG owns the assets 
and the GmbH participates as the general partner, usually with identical shareholders.816 LLP 
structures confer tax pass-through as in a traditional partnership but with limited liability conferred 
by the company as general partner. 
Alternative investment funds partiality for: 
self-regulation measures and industry co-regulation are likely to be more effective, given the 
complexity and range of activities pursued by private equity funds, than direct regulatory 
intervention.817 
They attracted considerable public criticism (Heuschrecken).818 New pan-EU regulation (Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive)819 replaced earlier self-regulation of hedge and private equity 
                                                                  
812 Guy Neale v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1097. 
813 Pearlie Koh, ‘Agency and Partnership Law’ (2014) 15 Singapore Academy of Law Journal Annual 
Review of Singapore Cases 39, 45 [3.18] 
814 Ibid 46 [3.22]. 
815 Constantin M Lachner and Rafael von Heppe, ‘The Introduction of Real Estate Investment Trusts [REITs] 
in Germany’ (2007) 8 German Law Journal 133. 
816 Susanne Kalss, ‘The Austrian GmbH & Co. KG’ (2007) 8 European Business Organisation Law Review 
93. 
817 McCahery and Vermuelen, ‘Private Equity and Hedge Fund Activism’, above n 100, 537. 
818 Locusts [author’s trans]. 
819 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) 
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 [2011] 61/8. 
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funds820 favoured by the industry. This Directive applies to ‘all EU-based fund managers managing 
EU and non-EU alternative investment funds, to non-EU funds managers managing EU funds, and to 
non-EU funds managers marketing EU or non-EU based funds within the EU’. Custodians 
(depositary) duty includes the ‘monitoring of cash flows’.821 (Australian custodians do not have this 
responsibility). Other requirements include limitations on leverage, minimum capitalisation of the 
fund manager, and disclosure of portfolio interests.822  
9.3 NBFEs in Canada 
Collective investments in Canada, like Australian MIS, are often structured as trusts with their units 
publicly quoted. These trusts follow international typology including C-REITs, Infrastructure Trusts, 
Energy Trusts, and Business Trusts. Their corporate governance is controlled by both federal823 and 
provincial corporations law, being a choice of 14 jurisdictions. They are also subject to trust law 
administered federally and by the Canadian provinces. ‘[N]ear uniformity has been achieved across 
the jurisdictions’ corporate codes’.824 Uniformity is not necessarily achieved in the construction of 
private trusts including those with publicly traded securities. So Canadian jurisdictions provide 
unique insight into ‘What choices would corporations make it given unfettered freedom to choose 
their governing law?825 Australian law assumes the central importance of market consistency. 
Canadian empirical analysis of 4675 trust deed provisions of 187 listed unit trusts demonstrates 
otherwise. ‘Canadian corporate law follows the normative prescription that the law ought to provide 
the rules that parties want.’826 
On some dimensions DOT’s [individual declarations of trust] mimic the CBCA [Business 
Corporations Act, Canada], but on other important dimensions, particularly remedial ones, they depart 
significantly from the CBCA.827 
                                                                  
820 Corporate Governance Guidelines for the Management of Privately Held Companies (European Venture 
Capital Association, 2005), cited in McCahery and Vermuelen, ‘Private Equity and Hedge Fund Activism’, 
above n 100, 561. 
821 Ferran, above n 609, 401. 
822 Jennifer Payne, ‘Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe’ (2011) 12 European Business Organisation 
Law Review 559, 579. 
823 Business Corporations Act 1985 (Canada). 
824 Anita I Anand and Edward M Iacobucci, ‘An Empirical Examination of the Governance Choices of 
Income Trusts’ (2011) 8(1) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 147, 154. 
825 Ibid citing Douglas J Cummings and Jeffery G MacIntosh, ‘The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in 
Shaping Canadian Corporate Law’ (2000) 20 International Review of Law and Economics 141. 
826 Ibid 149.  
827 Ibid. 
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Canadian collective investment schemes structured as trusts are not necessarily governed by corporate 
statutes (although their corporate trustee is). Trust law principles apply, but ‘the notion that [private 
parties can contract out of default trust law obligations (including their fiduciary duties) has taken 
hold in common law jurisdictions, including Canada’.828 As in Australia a Canadian trust can have a 
corporate trustee with differing standards of duty between a trustee and a director appointed under 
the Business Corporations Act. In the analysis, 63% of the sample had a corporate trustee and 71% 
did not follow trustee independence requirements.829 Trust standards are more onerous than the statute 
and are similar to Australian superannuation trust law, requiring the care, diligence, and skill of a 
reasonably prudent trustee.830 Other standards of trustee behaviour are considerably lower than the 
corporate statute, including poison pill provisions in trust deeds, compulsory buy backs at fair market 
value of issued units, and unit holder rights of derivative action, although this has attracted judicial 
attention.831 
The evidence is that a significant number of firms opt out of mandatory corporate rules when allowed 
the choice. This is inconsistent with the market consistency hypothesis.832 
Neither is it consistent with German Corporate Governance Code research. It is consistent with the 
Law Matters thesis833 where jurisprudence underpins a competitive economy and the presumption 
that the law can facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, regulate and control.834 In 
contrast, Australia has market consistency.  
9.4 Trusts as commercial entities in the United States 
Unlike Australia or the UK (where it is rare for a trust to operate as a commercial trading entity), 
American trust law has evolved alongside corporations law, ‘resulting in a degree of alignment 
between company and trust law.’835 A ‘common ancestry’836 from the English Joint Stock company 
                                                                  
828 Ibid 148 citing Anthony Duggan, ‘Solicitors’ Conflict of Interest and the Wider Fiduciary Question’ 
(2007) 45 Canadian Journal of Business Law 414. See also Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corp 
[1984] 156 CLR [72] (Mason, Gibbs, Dawson JJ). 
829 Ibid 156. 
830 Ibid 157. 
831 Silber v DDJ High Yield Fund (2006) 20 BLR (4th series) 134. 
832 Anand and Iacobucci, above n 824, 161. 
833 Brian R Cheffins, 'Corporate Law and ownership structure: A Darwinian Link?' (2002) 25(2) University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 346 [2] citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (Macmillan, 1932). 
834 Justice Michael Kirby, 'The company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Tasmanian Division, Hobart, 1998). 
835 Nuncio D’Angelo, ‘The CAMAC Report on managed investment schemes: Another opportunity missed?’ 
(2012) 23 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 253, 265. 
836 Ibid 266. 
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(in effect a unit trust) but a different evolutionary path in the US. In the US, functional purpose has 
primacy over legal form resulting in a commonality of equitable and statutory formulations. This 





CHAPTER 6: A REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE FOR 21st CENTURY AUSTRALIA: 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Empowering the financial consumer 
 
1. THEMES IN LAW REFORM  
Chapters 2–5 address the research questions. This chapter is directed at remedying the primary causes 
of systemic failure in Australian law identified in answering those questions. It sets out four strategic 
reform themes supported by specific tactical interventions. This thesis addresses deficiencies in the 
law and proposes strategic re-order of Australia’s regulatory architecture. Both typologies are 
required for effective implementation: statutory amendment alone will not suffice. The qualitative 
research suggest that some stakeholder support would be forthcoming. 
Australia has arguably benefited from its market based regulatory system and progressed toward its 
first objective of an entrepreneurial wealth creating society competing with its global peers, the 
second objective, being financial stability and risk mitigation, has for many people been an abject 
disaster.1 These proposed reforms balance entrepreneurial market conduct with investor and 
beneficiary risk mitigation. 
It is a system-wide view. It is doctrinal, requiring absolute obedience to the spirit of the law to reflect 
community expectation of fiduciary trust and loyalty. It removes incentives for malfeasance and 
improves incentives for lifting standards rather than reliance on proscriptive and prescriptive box-
ticking compliance alone. Reform is designed to enhance financial sector performance for financial 
consumers and applies to all elements in the investment chain, including its regulators. 
1.1 Four strategic themes 
The four strategic reform themes are: Re-establishing trust in the investment chain through fiduciary 
obligation; Related party transactions and conflicts of interest; Architecture for implementation at the 
financial consumer level ― financial planning and wealth management as a profession; and Market 
conduct regulation for the 21st century. 
                                                                  
1 See above ch 1 s 6.  
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1.2 Tactical support 
Within each reform theme tactical support to remedy failures in disclosure, develop Australia as a 
world financial centre, and NBFE governance are essential for successful implementation. 
1.3 Investors and beneficiaries as financial consumers 
This reform strategy is designed to be financial consumer-centric, not supplier or regulator centric. 
Financially independent retirement for Australians is a pipe-dream if that focus is compromised. 
Consumer empowerment through improved financial literacy and destruction of power imbalances in 
the investment chain requires oversight outside of existing supervisory structures. ‘An informed, 
expertly staffed and independent institution evaluating financial regulations and regulatory actions 
from the public’s point of view’.2 This will allow different views to be heard, not subsumed by 
existing vested and politicised interests who will regroup and dilute proposed reforms that affect those 
interests.3 A specific purpose Reference Group with direct senior ministerial access is required. 
Australian reform has not resolved the underlying systemic causes of market conduct failure 
identified and quantified in this thesis. Implementation will take ‘significant time for construction, 
debate, refinement and implementation’.4 The qualitative research5 conducted in Melbourne, Sydney 
and Brisbane is insightful and proposes strategies consistent with jurisdictions that have better dealt 
with their own systemic failures. The top decile sources of failure identified by interviewees are: 
related party transactions, conflicts of interest, accretive statutory tinkering, intrusion of black letter 
law on trust principles, and box-ticking regulation by the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC). Extended to the top quartile, this list adds: financial planning not being a 
profession, self-interest and lack of probity, ineffective leadership at ASIC, Australia’s uncompetitive 
financial landscape, smart lawyer manipulation of complex black letter law, lack of unqualified best 
interest duty of financial planners, boards needing more independent minds, and flawed financial 
literacy of advisers. 
Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) is ‘a tragedy’, a ‘means of [financial] product distribution’. ASIC 
‘needs a big shake-up with high calibre people’, is subject to ‘cronyism’ with ‘idealogy over-riding 
                                                                  
2 Stijn Claessens and Laura Kodres, ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some 
uncomfortable questions’ (Working Paper No 14/46, International Monetary Fund, March 2014) 26 citing 
James Barth, Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine, Guardians of Finance (MIT Press, 2012). 
3 See, eg, M Scott Donald, ‘Super needs a better regulator, not more rules’ 6 November 2014 Australian 
Financial Review (Sydney) Editorial & Opinion, 55. 
4 Ibid 30. 
5 See above ch 3 tab 3.20; app 1. 
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facts’, ‘just doesn’t get it’, and ‘powerless to act against known malfeasors’. These are personal views 
of the interviewees, but top decile and quartile samples provide holistic support for such excoriating 
criticism. As does the empirical analysis quantifying investor losses and their causes. The Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Fair Work Commission (FWC), perhaps because of 
their much smaller stakeholder groups, were not subjected to such invective despite widespread 
concerns of political influence and accountability. 
Suggested solutions6 include overwhelming support for a better culture, extension of fiduciary 
obligation to all parts of the investment chain, financial planners as educators, university standard 
training for directors and trustees, reform of ASIC’s operations, Canadian style Self-Regulatory 
Organisation (SRO) architecture, and an independent arbiter to reduce reliance on the courts.7 
Resolution also includes emulation of models and standards from other jurisdictions which 
themselves have dealt with similar systemic failures. There are examples where professional and 
industry associations are quasi-regulators working from the bottom up, educative and consultative, 
thereby reducing inexhaustible demands for market conduct services from the central regulator, 
making for more effective ‘Responsive Regulation’.8 Scholarly research has demonstrated the 
difference between compliance based cultures and values based cultures and how ‘assumptions of 
rationality in economic theory are contradicted by experimental evidence’.9 This is important 
behavioural economics research with global multi-jurisdictional implications10 but receiving only 
limited scholarly attention in Australia.  
The basis of necessary infrastructure exists in Australia today. Ipso facto, ASIC can become ex ante 
and supervisory rather than ex post and reactive, its present posture impractical even with huge 
additional resources. It can evolve to apply the lessons of Cooper and Heydon. Behavioural 
economics scholarly research supports this change in posture, regarding ex post strategies as 
‘behaviourally dysfunctional’ requiring a ‘counterintuitive shift of rule-making competencies: from 
public to private ordering.’11 In effect, Responsive Regulation, presently given lip-service rather than 
                                                                  
6 From greater than 50% of respondents in each city. 
7 Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Takeovers Panel were cited as examples. 
8 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive Regulation in the financial services sector’ 
(2011) 44(3) University of British Columbia Law Review 695, 702. 
9 Don Mayer, Anita Cava and Catharyn Baird, ‘Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial 
Fraud in the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses’ (2014) 
51(3) American Business Law Journal 515, 534 citing Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden 
Forces That Shape Our Decisions (Harper Perennial, 2010). 
10 Mayer, Cava and Baird, above n 9, 541. 
11 Sven Hoeppner and Christian Kirchner, ‘Ex Ante versus Ex post Governance: A behavioural perspective’ 
(2016) 12(2) Review of Law and Economics 227. 
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practical implementation. ‘[I]t is doubtful whether [ex post] monitoring can be done cost 
effectively’.12 Evolution to an ex ante Responsive Regulation model requires discipline in those that 
implement it. The Damoclean Sword over improper conduct is to be provided by fiduciary obligation 
in the investment chain enforced by effective regulators. 
  
                                                                  
12 Ibid 231. 
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2. ITINERA FIDUCIAE 
Re-establishment of trust in the investment chain 
‘We are never so vulnerable than when we trust someone’.13 Investment requires trust. Fiduciary 
obligation is the mirror of community expectation of trust in those that advise them or manage their 
funds. ‘Fiduciary law cannot be subsumed under contract … a violation of fiduciary duties carries a 
“moral taint”. … Unlike contract, trust is a moral relationship; its unwarranted violation is a moral 
principle’.14 
In Australia, there is a trust deficit.  
Since an underlying motivation of the imposition of fiduciary obligations is to maintain public 
confidence in socially important relationships like that of investment, the routine circumvention of 
such obligations raises public policy concerns.15  
Fiduciary relationships can and should be found at every point in the investment chain where there is 
discretion, information, reliance or advice. The need is to re-establish foregone trust, confidence and 
respect in fiduciaries required to act as if they should be trusted. This outcome is unlikely to be 
achieved with prescriptive administrative regulation. It is ‘not just a policy choice, but an architectural 
choice about how our law fits together’.16 The economic interests of investors and beneficiaries 
supported by holistic fiduciary standards in the investment chain is a different proposition from 
compliance with regulation. In the UK, as in Australia, it has led to a different result: creative 
compliance, regulatory arbitrage, creeping corruption. It also leads to different approaches to conflicts 
of interest. Identifying, disclosing and managing conflicts of interest in a complex investment chain 
controlled by multiple intermediaries is incompatible with the concept of a fiduciary having 
stewardship of client property if that fiduciary may have a conflict of interest. 
Investor and beneficiary expectations (with statutory support in superannuation best interest law) 
include the optimisation of their value outcomes. What they typically attain, especially in managed 
investment schemes (MIS) are contractual rights or legal interests. The economic consequences to 
the Australian economy are significant. Australia is not unique, but of the comparative jurisdictions 
                                                                  
13 Chan Sek Keong, ‘Trusts and the rule of law in Singapore’ (2013) 25 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
365. 
14 Richard Holton, ‘Fiduciary Relations and the Nature of Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 
991, 994 quoting Tamar T Frankel, Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 238. 
15 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 478, 516. 
16 Joshua Getzler, ‘“As If” – Accountability and Counterfactual Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 973, 988. 
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studied, it has made the least progress addressing systemic problems in financial services and 
financial products regulation. When considering the re-establishment of trust, other jurisdictions 
follow one of two paths: (a) accretive statutory reform, or (b) the application of behavioural 
economics theory to regulation, leading to ex ante industry based regulation underpinned by universal 
fiduciary obligations.  
Presently, Australia, the UK, and the US pursue accretive statutory reform, whilst Canada, Germany 
(with EU overlay), apply different legal mechanisms reflecting their different legal traditions. These 
are not without criticism.17 Singapore pursues a culturally nuanced approach drawing upon legal 
tradition but implements German fiduciary- like standards of responsibility. 
The application of behavioural economics research to financial regulation provides the theoretical 
basis for the imposition and extension of fiduciary principles to financial products and services. Each 
country has produced different but insightful results. There is recognition of the difference between 
compliance and values in Australian cases.18  
Funds management entities, including promoters, and their directors are fiduciaries, although some 
‘major investment banks have indicated publicly their belief that they operate unconstrained by 
fiduciary obligations’.19 Where managed investment schemes (MIS) are contractual rather than 
express trusts, that does not exclude the application of fiduciary principles, and a court may treat the 
relationship ‘as fiduciary under established principles of equity’.20 There is a tension between 
statutory prioritisation and fiduciary prohibitions, the result being whether an investment bank or 
funds manager ‘is obliged by fiduciary principles to avoid positions of conflict…’,21 or not. Fiduciary 
relationships can be created by reasonable expectation where the client relies on the advice 
                                                                  
17 Lisa Zhou, ‘Fiduciary Law, Non-Economic Interests and Amici Curiae’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 1158. 
18 See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] NSWSC 836 
[17] Barrett J citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss Securities Ltd [2002] 
NSWSC 684 Palmer J: ‘[I]t would have been folly on the part of the legislature to attempt to define or limit 
what interests should be protected or how: to do so would have been to ignore the sad reality that the 
ingenuity of fraudsters inexhaustible, their snares for the gullible pitiless and of infinite variety...’ 
19 Tuch, above n 15, 479. 
20 Pamela F Hanrahan, Funds Management in Australia: Officers Duties and Liabilities (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2007) 52. 
21 Tuch, above n 15, 488. 
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proferred.22 Presently for wholesale investors in Australia, that relationship can be avoided by 
contract.23 For retail investors, it is subsumed by the Corporations Act.24 
Fiduciary standards mitigate malfeasance by reducing the power imbalance resulting from 
asymmetries of knowledge and comprehension. They align interests. Fiduciary law is more than ‘legal 
polyfilla’25 requiring legitimate and reasonable client expectations of best interest to have primacy 
over contract. So who is categorised as a fiduciary has considerable importance to the investing 
community. ‘[A]ll of these are bound to the investor-beneficiaries by a web of fiduciary relationships 
both orthodox as well as unusual’.26 In a consolidating Australian NBFE market, these multiplicity 
of responsibilities are likely to become more widespread. 
This single question of financial consumer trust in the investment chain should determine all future 
policy development and implementation. This includes financial literacy (presently the role of ASIC), 
the future of financial services and financial products provision. Capital markets for SME’s to 
increase industrial productivity and skilled employment, retirement incomes, and Australia’s future 
as a world financial centre substantially rely on it.  
2.1 Whither Australia? 
Australian law has uncertain interpretation of the fiduciary status of best interest duties.27 If Australian 
NBFE directors were themselves subject to untreue doctrine (in its proscriptive and prescriptive 
formulations), supreme rather than subordinate, they would be less likely to hide behind transactional 
based disclosure requirements governed by statute and contract. The need to apply fiduciary law to 
investment banks (in their various formulations as financial conglomerates) has long been recognised 
in Australia.28 
The future of trust rests upon fiduciary principles: these need the legal support of culpa in 
contrahendo and untreue standards. As judicially recently interpreted in Australia, fiduciary 
principles, compromised as they are by statute and contract, have not been sufficient to deter 
                                                                  
22 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Smith [1991] 42 FCR 390 (Davies, Sheppard, and Gummow JJ); 
Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 (Austin J). 
23 Tuch, above n 15, 500–502. 
24 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 961A, B. 
25 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (Law Commission UK, Paper No 350, 30 June 2014) [3.1]. 
26 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities Limited 
and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [58] (Finn J). 
27 See above ch 4 s 2.5. 
28 See, eg, Tuch, above n 15. 
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malfeasance. Where there have been green shoots of more enlightened interpretation,29 judicial 
reticence seeks to limit their broader application.  
The deterrent effect of fiduciary law will require two components: these are (a) prohibition not 
prioritisation by informed consent; and (b) prescriptive and positive duties to include financial best 
interest, improved disclosure and education of the client to at least culpa in contrahendo standard. 
Informed consent should not be ‘a merely formal process’.30 That is to say, the implementation of the 
SRO model requires financial advisers to tutor their clients as they advise them. It also means 
transferring financial literacy statutory responsibility from ASIC to the SROs through reform of the 
ASIC Act. This evolution is theoretically, culturally and organisationally sound. It has a scholarly 
basis in behavioural economics research, increases the financial literacy of the community, and 
provides the human resources ex ante at the interface when and where they are needed. 
The imposition of statutory fiduciary duty directly in the investment chain has not been previously 
viewed with undiluted pleasure: 
the controversial suggestion … that the duty of directors to their ‘company’ can itself embrace some 
level of fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiaries of a trust of which their company is a trustee … is 
questionable … whether this heralded development in our law is as desirable or necessary one in the 
trust company context.31  
However, ‘superannuation entity director’ is now enshrined in the SIS Act with direct fiduciary 
obligations to the beneficiary,32 and in the Corporations Act33 for MIS securities holders. 
As Heydon34 also notes, cultural change to ensure ‘reasonable expectations’35 of fiduciary obligations 
and principles is a generational task. That loyalty to others, enshrined in the general law but subsumed 
by statute and contract, should require reinforcement is a sad reflection on the efficacy of Parliament. 
It is a public policy issue to enforce effective disclosure, require effective conflicts avoidance and 
balance information and vulnerability asymmetries between provider and client.36 Judicial and 
                                                                  
29 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64 [100] (Gibbs CJ, Mason J).  
30 Getzler, above n 16, 989. 
31 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS 
Securities Pty Ltd and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [77]–[78] (Finn J). 
32 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Act 2012 (Cth) 
Explanatory Memorandum [1.33]. 
33 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FD, 601FC. 
34 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report 
(December 2015) (Commissioner Heydon) [‘Heydon’]. 
35 Tuch, above n 15, 483. 
36 Ibid 505. 
339 
scholarly opinion appears to be open to further evolution of the law in questions of loyalty. Successful 
evolution of the Triple Peaks model of regulation and supervision will rest upon it. Triple Peaks is 
the interface between the financial, savings and industrial systems. 
Law reform requires: (a) simplification and harmonisation of the various statutes; and, (b) renewed 
focus on fiduciary principles of propriety, honesty, and uncompromised loyalty. ‘The fiduciary 
obligation is a demanding standard of propriety in conduct that is unequalled elsewhere in the law’,37 
requiring ‘complete loyalty to the service of another’s interests’.38 Any discussion of law reform 
needs to comprehend these two themes. The first imperative is better understood by reflecting on 
analysis of international practice in comparable jurisdictions. The second imperative will require a 
national sustained education campaign over a sustained period to inculcate industry participants in 
director, trustee, and officer roles with these fiduciary concepts.  
Presently in Australia, comprehension and application of fiduciary principles is not widespread, given 
lip-service, often ignored, eliminated in contract, and subservient to adherence to specific statutory 
provisions. Compliance with the letter of the law but not adherence to its spirit or community 
expectation. Canada and Germany have dealt with this problem applying their respective fiduciary 
and civil law duty of care standards. There is a public policy question as to whether Australian statutes 
‘adequately protects those to whom the general law would grant protection, if enforced, afforded by 
the fiduciary relationship’.39  
2.2 How statutes reduce regulatory efficacy: subsuming of fiduciary principles by statutory 
accretion  
A common theme from 1981-2018 has been an increase in the number of statutes and a large increase 
in their provisions. Resulting complexities have given rise to significant and recurring judicial 
                                                                  
37 Ibid 479 citing Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 [16] (Millett LJ). 
38 Ibid 481 citing P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Carswell, 1989) 1, 27. 
39 Ibid 514. 
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frustration.40 Empirical analysis demonstrates that the ‘Age of Statutes’41 has not prevented, in any 
meaningful sense, an elimination of systemic problems nor of their cyclical recurrence: they may 
have added to the problem.42 This has created a large compliance industry with attendant increasing 
direct and indirect costs, to be borne either by beneficiaries and investors, and/or market consolidation 
in attempts to capture economies of scale. Statutory evolution has been and remains politically 
contested, its effectiveness reduced as lobby groups pursue their particular interests. Similarly, misuse 
of ‘fiduciary’ the adjective by politicians and lobby groups has resulted in a mismatch of community 
expectations based on common usage and the legal reality of fiduciary law in Australia.43  
A second common theme is the relegation of fiduciary law to outlier status. Principles based general 
law has often provided the basis for the resolution of many specific NBFE cases. ‘Each of statute and 
equity influences the other [although] there is no judicial power to sunset some statutes’44 as there is 
in the common law. In the meantime, 
It is ironic, then that those same political processes that are privileging these nobler qualities [of 
fiduciaries] are in fact de-coupling the regulatory regimes from the general law antecedents in which 
those qualities were initially expressed. Political processes are ensuring that what the law expects of 
Mason J’s quintessential fiduciaries, or at least those whose activities encroach on areas of public 
policy, are regulated by multi-layered, highly specific, bespoke regulatory regimes that largely eclipse 
the proscriptions and prescriptions of the general law.45 
                                                                  
40 See, eg, ASIC v Vines [2006] NSWSC [14] (Austin J): ‘The application of the statutory language is 
difficult, because of the very wide range of activities conducted in corporate form’. Rares J succinctly 
expressed his frustrations with statutory accretion in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers 
Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 (Rares J) noting the Corporations Act and ASIC Act have lengthy 
and different definitions of financial services and financial products: he questions the costs of statutory 
complexity to the community, see ch 4 s 4.1.1. S 62 of the SIS Act is ‘complex, clumsy and lacks clarity … it 
takes over 900 words to say that a superannuation fund must be set up to provide benefits …’ quoted in 
Anthony Asher, Superannuation ‘objective’ likely to be captured by industry (The Conversation, April 
2016), <https://the conversation.com>. 
41 Mark Leeming, ‘Equity: Ageless in the “Age of Statutes”’ (2015) 9(2) Journal of Equity 108. 
42 See above, ch 3, tab 3.25. 
43 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142 [1]. 
44 Leeming, above n 41. 
45 Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’, above n 43, 142 [2]. 
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FIGURE 6.1 SYSTEMIC FAILURE IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 
 
Accretive statutory change is not enough. Whilst ‘we now live in an age of statutes and not of the 
common law,’46 it is not statute that has eliminated systemic failures and their cyclical manifestations. 
‘complying merely with the regulatory requirements may well leave the investment bank in breach 
of the fiduciary obligation’.47 Cyclical corruption rooted in cultural mores48 requires excision, not 
management. This requires a rethink of assumptions of robustness in statutory construction,49 and of 
the embracing of ‘principles drawn from the law of trusts and from fiduciary law...’50 In economics 
terminology, there is market failure: ‘These problems are at the core of the structure of the financial 
markets’.51 
In many cases, contracts mean that fiduciary expectations are not legitimate…’52 particularly in 
Australian NBFEs. Judicial reticence to interfere in arms-length contracting parties53 where best 
                                                                  
46 Paul Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’ (2010) 38 FLR 350. 
47 Tuch, above n 15, 516. 
48 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report, above n 
34. 
49 Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’, above n 46. 
50 Ibid 335. 
51 Tuch, above n 15, 516. 
52 Fiduciary Duties of investment Intermediaries (Paper No 350), above n 25, [8.48]. 
53 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64 [100]–[102] 71 (Gibbs CJ, 
Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) citing Paul Dainty Pty Ltd v National Tennis Centre Trust (1990) 22 
FCR 495, 515–516. 
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interest of clients are contractually overridden does not assist the vulnerable to mount equitable 
challenges to malfeasance.  
Even where the relationship is contractual (as it normally will be), the matter is too important to be 
left entirely to the agreement of the parties and the interpretation of that agreement … A too casual 
failure to recognise the requirements of a fiduciary position, and sometimes a short sighted assumption 
that all relevant duties are prescribed in contract, can be and has been responsible for serious 
misbehaviour in the financial markets and elsewhere, as shown by many litigated cases in the last 
quarter-century.54 
Assuming that statutory regulation alone can drive market behaviour is problematic. In practice, as 
in Canada and Germany, the intertwined European and national jurisdiction mix of misnamed soft 
law through self-regulation, co-regulation, and government regulation, disciplined by the primacy of 
fiduciary principles and the statutory powers of minority shareholders has resulted in ‘Firms begin to 
avail themselves of corporate governance principles codes, guidelines and laws, thereby leaving the 
“box-ticking” phase behind’.55 This is a salutary lesson for present Australian practice, its 
Corporations Act facilitating creeping corruption in MIS and other NBFEs through box-ticking 
compliance. 
The disconnection between community expectation and legal reality needs to be addressed. 
Community assumptions of fiduciary obligation of economic loyalty to investors by professional 
persons with whom they deal is not fact. FoFA reform has resulted in investor exposure to adviser 
compliance with statutory process, incomprehension of the legal difference between an employee and 
an authorised representative, inability to obtain general law remedy and exclusion of those not 
categorised as retail investors. This disconnection can be remedied by community financial literacy 
education and, as was proposed in the UK and practised in other jurisdictions, by revisiting the extent, 
nature, and content of fiduciary obligations. The exposure of the legal reality will mean further 
community anger.  
                                                                  
54 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisers (Law Commission UK Consultation Paper No 215, 22 October 
2013) 171 citing Peter Watt (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Sweet & Maxwell, 19th ed, 2010) [6–
043]. 
55 Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermuelen, ‘Private Equity and Hedge Fund Activism: Explaining the 
Differences in Regulatory Responses’ (2008) 9 European Business Organisation Law Review 535, 537. 
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2.3 Clarity in law: harmonisation of best interest duty 
There are five interpretations of best interest in the Corporations Act,56 two in the SIS Act,57 a 
traditionally lesser duty in the Fair Work (Registered Organisations Act) (now amended) as well as 
general law interpretations, fiduciary or otherwise, which add to the confusion.58 Whilst these 
interpretations are contextual they are, with limited exceptions, statutorily undefined. The 
community, and directors responsible to it in the performance of their duties, should not be expected 
to comprehend these nuances, for the most part determined in the general law.59 
  
                                                                  
56 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180-4, 601 FC (1), 601 FD (1)(b), 961B(1)(2).  
57 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 ss 52(2), 52(8), VN(a)–(b). 
58 See, eg, ASIC v Australian Property Custodian Holdings Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in 
liquidation) (Controllers appointed) (No 3) [2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 2013) [463] (Murphy J), Lewski 
v ASIC [2016] FCAFC 96 [347] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ), Lewski v ASIC (No 2) [2017] 
FCAFC 171 [190] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ) [‘Prime Trust’].  
59 See, eg, ch 1, s 11. 
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TABLE: 6.1 DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF BEST INTEREST IN AUSTRALIAN 
LAW 
Source of law Authority Application Interpretation 
Corporations 
Act 
s 181 Company Good faith & proper purpose; Objective 
Corporations 
Act 





MIS Best interest of scheme members 
Corporations 
Act 
ss 961A,B(1),(2) Financial advice 
client 
Compliance with process; safe harbour defence 
Corporations 
Act 
s 766E Custody of assets  
Corporations 
Act 
[New] Ch 8B Member Director to give member priority  
Corporations 
Act 
 [New] Ch 8B Depositary as 
fiduciary 
Depositary to act in best interests 
SIS Act ss 52 (2), (8)  Trustee Personal liability for s 52 covenants 
SIS Act s 29VN (a),(b) Beneficiary (My 
Super) 
Best long term financial interest 
SIS Act s 10 Custody  
Fair Work 
(RO) Act 
s 382 (amended 
2016) 
Company Qualified by belief as to best interest; Subjective; 
amended as CA 
General law Prime Trust Directors Uncertain boundary of best interest duty 
General law NSG Services Financial advice 
client 
Not addressed 
General law Pioneer Concrete 
Services 
Interests v best 
interests 
May be different or the same 
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General law Gladstone Pacific 
Nickel Limited 
Interests Of the company as a whole, not creditors only 
Fiduciary law Rouse v IOOF Undivided loyalty 
to trust 
Trust and beneficiary best interests may diverge 
Fiduciary law Cowan v Scargill; 
Nestle v National 
Westminster 
Undivided loyalty 
to beneficiaries of 
trust 
Procedural elements; Best financial interest; objective 
test; judged ex ante based on needs 
Fiduciary law  Custody of assets Differing interpretations of custodial trustee duties 
 
Best interests in these statutory formulations apply general law phraseology, itself of variable 
interpretation. This uncertainty is compounded by the more recent extension of superannuation 
covenants to directors of their corporate trustees personally, hence the need of trustee directors to pay 
homage to the boundaries of the general law. ‘[T]he case law directly interpreting and applying the 
relevant provisions is scant’.60 An important distinction between the duties of a superannuation entity 
trustee and a Responsible Entity (RE) MIS director’s duty (where trust principles have been subsumed 
by statute and contract) is that trustees are ‘required to engage with the issues they face, and not 
merely to ensure they have a pre-defined process has been followed accurately, or in the vernacular, 
that all the boxes have been ticked’.61 ‘[T]he RE model emphasises the importance of “compliance” 
arrangements … quite different from “performance” and it is worth examining whether an 
independent trustee (or other) model would provide greater oversight and be better at resolving 
inherent conflicts of interest’.62 This would return Australia to something akin to pre-1998 regulation.  
Performance and appropriateness are both important where there is no statutory definition of 
investment strategy.63 Directors best interest duties are severely compromised by lack of development 
of the law of what constitutes investment strategy, its deficient relationship with modern portfolio 
theory and practice, and the interface with investment jurisdictions that have developed the law. This 
                                                                  
60 Pamela F Hanrahan ‘The relationship between equitable and statutory “best interests” obligations in 
financial services law’ (2013) 7(1) Journal of Equity 46 [V]. 
61 M Scott Donald, ‘Prudence under pressure’ (2010) 4(1) Journal of Equity 44, 51. 
62 Christine Brown, Colm Trusler and Kevin Davis, ‘Managed Investment Scheme Regulation: Lessons from 
the Great Southern failure’ (2010) 2 The Finsia Journal of Applied Finance 27. 
63 Donald, ‘Prudence under pressure’, above n 61, 53. 
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affects decisions on inward outward capital flows. It puts directors at jurisdictional risk. There is a 
similar lack of definition of what constitutes a defence in due diligence. 
2.4 Fiduciary and non-fiduciary doctrines: a comparison 
TABLE 6.2 EXAMPLES OF COMPARATIVE FIDUCIARY AND FIDUCIARY-LIKE 
DUTIES 















Directors party to 
superannuation 
trustee covenants; 
















Scheme (a trust) 
Financial 










 Interests of 
MIS members 
have priority 
Corporations Act ss 606FD, FC 
Australia Corporations 
Act 




 [New] Ch 8B 










Duty of good 
faith; ‘belief’ 
replaced 
(former s 382) 
Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Amendment Act s 
290 
Singapore Proscriptive No statutory duty 
client financial 
advice; Business 













trustee in CIS; 
Best interest 
of company 
Consumer Protection (Fair 
Trading) Act; 
Companies Act s 157C; Financial 
Advisers Act s 27; Securities and 
Futures Act Cap 289; Trustees 


















Administrators Standard of 
Conduct; 
Investment Industry Regulatory 
Association Rule 29; Mutual 





















fiduciary duty for 
advisers; 










FCA Handbook conflict of 
interest provisions; 
Companies Act 2006 ss 172-178; 
Stewardship Code; 
Senior Management Regime 










Securities and Exchange Act; 
Investment Advisers Act; Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act; 
Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act; Financial Choice 













Aktiengesetz (Germany) 1965 §§ 
88 (1); 93(1), 93(2); 112; 
Civil Code (Germany) 1907 
§§31(4), 311(2); 242; 
Securities Trading Act 
(Germany) 1998 §31d; 
EU Directive 86/653/EEC; EC 




2.5 Who is to be categorised as a fiduciary? 
The objective is to provide clarity in and quality assurance of the investment chain. ‘The greater the 
degree of trust, vulnerability, power and confidence reposed in the fiduciary, the more likely that a 
reasonable person would have such an expectation.’64 Who is categorised as a fiduciary therefore is 
of paramount importance to the community. Historically, ‘this is a “notoriously intractable” 
problem65… [a] vague protean ethical standard embodied by the fiduciary obligation…’66 ‘[I]t is not 
easy to attempt to define the circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship will be found to exist,’67 
tests including the degree of mutual trust, confidence, and reliance.68  
All entities and persons in the investment chain, where not already defined, and where there is 
reliance, discretion, advice or information used in decisions should be statutorily defined as status-
based fiduciaries in the Corporations Act, equivalent provisions in the SIS Act and Fair Work 
(Registered Organisations) Amendment Act. These entities and persons include all those involved in 
the process of providing financial advice, investment advice, disclosure documentation and 
associated promotional materials, responsibility for assets, or discretionary decision making about 
financial products for clients. Inter alia, commercial banks (where advice is provided), merchant, and 
investment banks, investment promoters and manufacturers of those financial products, financial 
advisers, wealth managers, superannuation entity trustees, MIS trustees (REs), custodians, investment 
researchers, ratings agencies, securities brokers, insurers and their brokers, fund managers, directors 
and officers of finance companies. Fiduciary status is to be accorded to all directors, officers, 
employees and representatives involved in client facing activity in the investment chain with statutory 
personal liability with no power of delegation or liability. 
2.6 Fiduciary duties not to be excluded in contract 
Contracting out of fiduciary responsibility should be statute limited, otherwise the necessary cultural 
change can lawfully be ignored. Neither should it be contractually delegated. All contracts between 
entities and persons in the investment chain to be statutorily required, by amendment to the 
Corporations Act (and similar provisions in the SIS Act and Fair Work (Registered Organisations) 
                                                                  
64 Fiduciary Duties of investment Intermediaries (Paper No 350), above n 25, [3.23] citing J Edelman, ‘When 
do fiduciary duties arise?’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 302. 
65 Ibid citing Ernest Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25(1) University of Toronto Law Journal 1 
[5]. 
66 Ibid [22]. 
67 News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited v New South Wales Rugby League Limited and 
Others [1996] FCA 1256 [312] (Burchett J). 
68 Ibid [312]–[316] (Burchett J). 
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Amendment Act) to include acknowledgement of the objectives of the investment chain, being for the 
financial benefit of retail and wholesale clients and beneficiaries. Removal of the safe harbour defence 
in s 961B(2) of the Corporations Act eliminates statutory provision for contracting out of fiduciary 
duty, consistent with Canadian SRO best interest duty of fiduciaries and Singapore regulation of 
financial advice. 
2.7 To whom should fiduciary duties be owed? 
Fiduciary duties are generally owed to the proximal entity or person. These would normally be the 
recipients of financial advice, investment information, disclosure documents and expert opinions, 
where reliant upon discretionary decisions, or beneficiaries of third party custody arrangements. In 
Singapore this is broadened. Licensing whilst not fiduciary, includes any person (gatekeepers) 
offering advice, research, portfolio influence, have non-public knowledge or access to the portfolio, 
or is named or referred to in offer documents or marketing material. The practical effect is to quality 
assure the fund management chain by extension of personal fiduciary-like responsibilities. 
Circumvention by interposition of entities is prohibited. Similarly, there is statutory inclusion in 
contract of the objectives of investment and prohibition of disclaimed liability through non-reliance 
clauses. Statutory support should be provided by extension of consumer protection legislation by 
reform of the ACCC Act following the Singapore example.  
Contracts material to the veracity of the investment chain are to be lodged with ASIC with the relevant 
product disclosure statement (PDS). It is not proposed that ASIC have the powers of the German 
notary or commercial court (Handelsgericht), but as ex ante market conduct supervisor, it should 
have the power of review, but with greatly improved performance criteria which satisfy commercial 
time frames. 
This combination of tactics, in practice, should ensure Australian NBFEs, their directors and officers, 
proximal or not, serve the end investor and beneficiary. 
2.8 Financial literacy: the confluence of fiduciary doctrine and behavioural research 
Financial literacy is the third tenet of the Wallis reforms in Australia, designed to provide market 
discipline to those providing financial products advice. Empirical data demonstrate that there is a 
problem with financial literacy in Australia.69  
                                                                  
69 See above ch 2, s 5.8: Expectations measurement of financial literacy reports an alignment of ASIC and 
stakeholder views (external stakeholders 21%, ASIC 18%, variance -3%). It does not use absolute data. The 
Fit for the Future review concludes that ASIC ‘does lead international best practice in advancing broad 
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Canadian financial advisers, in contrast to Australia do not have a business judgment rule to rely on. 
It is in the interests of the adviser to assist their client to become financially knowledgeable. ‘Positive 
outcomes for some US financial literacy programs have been attributed more to the advice provided 
than to simple education’.70 
Many of the seemingly successful financial education courses studied to date may actually owe their 
success not due to the direct content of the information conveyed but due to their collateral 
consequences, such as individual counsel[l]ing with an instructor…71 
The Canadian SRO Client Relationship Model lends itself to the concept of financial advisers as 
fiduciaries being tutors in a symbiotic relationship. It provides the necessary human resource 
infrastructure with ‘skin in the game’. This also reduces paternalist pressures seeking to restrict retail 
investor access to financial products. The German equivalent is to be found in its civil law culpa in 
contrahendo doctrine being a requirement to not only fully disclose but to ensure financial consumer 
comprehension. This is the confluence of practical financial literacy education and fiduciary-like duty 
of care doctrine now codified in German and EU law. It reasserts German paternalist tradition withour 
reducing investment choices.  
Singapore also has paternalist traditions manifested by the codification of equitable principles in 
consumer protection legislation. The importance of ‘teachable moments’ is recognised by school-
based tutoring using the MoneySENSE platform. The UK recognises the long lead times to develop 
market disciplinary competencies by financial consumers.72 The then Financial Security Authority 
recognised the need for ‘collaboration among the public, private, and non-profit sectors,’73 including 
the free Money Advice Service. Importantly: 
                                                                  
consumer financial literacy … while the overall financial literacy strategy is comprehensive and world best’: 
Karen Chester, Mark Gray and David Galbally, Fit for the future: A capability review of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission – A Report to Government (Report, December 2015). This 
conclusion needs to be challenged. 
70 Mary Anne Waldron, ‘Unanswered questions about Canada’s Financial Literacy Strategy: A comment on 
the report of the Federal Task Force’ (2011) 51 Canadian Business Law Review 361, 376. 
71 John A E Pottow, ‘Financial Literacy or Financial Castigation’ [2011] 51 Canadian Business Law Journal 
394, 402. 
72 Building Financial Capability in the UK (Financial Services Authority, Financial Capability Steering 
Group, 2004).  
73 Saul Schwartz, ‘The Canadian Task Force on Financial Literacy: Consulting without listening’ [2011] 51 
Canadian Business Law Journal 338, 341. 
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[I]mproving financial capability [of consumers] is complimentary to, and not a substitute for, firms 
treating their customers fairly – and there are some firms which still have not embedded this principle 
into their management culture and which now need to do so.74 
Financial literacy is an imperfect tool for market discipline. Achieving widespread behavioural 
change (as ASIC has recognised in Australia) ‘will be a long process’.75  
[P]sychological rather than informational differences may explain much of the variation in financial 
capability … people’s financial behaviour may primarily depend on their intrinsic psychological 
attributes rather than information or skills or how they choose to deploy them.76 
Behavioural economics research suggests that the use of peer group norms and ‘active intervention 
by a counsellor and/or individualised advice, rather than passive information or education’77 are the 
most promising forms of incrementing financial literacy and its application. The Canadian SRO 
model and its adoption of fiduciary obligations provides the infrastructure to achieve such a result. 
The present Australian financial literacy strategies do not reflect the lessons of behavioural 
economics, the confluence with fiduciary doctrines, or the experience (other than tactically in web 
site availability) of comparative jurisdictions. Australia does not presently have the personalised 
tutoring infrastructure to develop financial literacies. It is also susceptible to rent seeking, without the 
necessary insight into what constitutes effective teachable moments: ‘[C]ontextual nuances can shape 
behaviour and alter choices’.78 
Should Australia adopt a Canadian SRO model, there would be some 23 000 financial advisers with 
potential professional accreditation as fiduciaries to address financial literacy in Australia. These 
advisers would also become tutors building symbiotic client relationships with common purpose. A 
systemic lift in financial literacy standards of client and adviser alike should result. ASIC presently 
has responsibility for financial literacy implementation. It has neither the resources nor culture to 
perform that role effectively. ASIC is largely restricted to tactical online information provision rather 
than involvement at teachable moments. Implementation responsibility therefore, should be removed 
                                                                  
74 Ibid. 
75 Adele Atkinson, Evidence of Impact: An overview of financial education evaluations (Financial Services 
Authority Consumer Research, 2008) 68 
76 David de Meza, Bernd Irlenbusch and Diane Reyniers, Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics 
Perspective (Financial Services Authority Consumer Research, 2008) 68.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Polina Demina, ‘Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: A Behavioural Economics Analysis of 
Competing Suggestions for Reform’ (2014) 113 Michigan Law Review 429, 439 citing Michael S Barr et al, 
‘The Case for Behaviourally Informed Regulation’ (2009) New Perspectives on Regulation 25–26. 
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from ASIC, and as national productivity policy, be awarded to those that can teach, preferably in the 
context of SRO Client Relationship Model (CRM) adoption. 
2.9 Fiduciary duty as a Damoclean sword  
[F]iduciary duties are difficult to define and inherently flexible. We think that is one of their essential 
characteristics: they form the background to other more definite rules, allowing the courts to intervene 
where the interests of justice require it79 
Creative compliance: ‘the use of legal loopholes in order to allow the legitimate circumvention of 
criminal/civil laws and regulations’80 becomes risky for their practitioner.  
This analysis is central to resolving causes of NBFE failure in Australia. Its statutory omission aids 
and abets creeping corruption underscoring the trust deficit between financial intermediary and client. 
‘[T]he term “fiduciary duty” means different things to lawyers and non-lawyers. Even lawyers use 
the term in different ways.’81  
There needs to be clarity about fiduciary responsibility, backed by a tough regulatory regime that says: 
if you misbehave, you are out – and for good.82 
That is the Damoclean Sword, to be wielded by a reformed regulator.  
Why is Australia reluctant to embrace statutory fiduciary obligation in the investment chain? Why, 
in Australia, are the economic interests of investors and beneficiaries subsumed by processes of 
statutory compliance? The Canadian model is ’admirably capacious’.83 ‘Nothing in the nature of 
fiduciary power suggests that it may be exercised only in relation to proprietary or economic 
interests’.84 Conversely, from a community expectations perspective, ‘[f]eelings of exploitation feed 
naturally into fiduciary law’s rhetoric of betrayal.’85  
There is a tendency to confuse principles based regulation, including reliance on fiduciary obligations, 
with light touch regulation, a misnomer: ‘a principles-based approach does not work with individuals 
                                                                  
79 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisers (Paper No 215), above n 54.  
80 Simon Ashby, The Turner Review on the Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services 
Forum (Nottingham University, 2009) 17. 
81 Fiduciary Duties of investment Intermediaries (Paper No 350), above n 25, [3.11]. 
82 Lord Myners, (Third Report of the Select Committee on Business, Innovation and Skills UK, 2013–14) 
House of Commons 603 Evidence 19. 
83 Paul B Miller, ‘A Theory of Fiduciary Liability’ (2011) 56(2) McGill Law Journal 235 [102]. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Richard Joyce, ‘Fiduciary Law and Non-Economic Interests’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 
237, 240. 
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who have no principles’.86 This is not the case: the extension of fiduciary responsibility over 
prospective malfeasors, properly enforced is certainly not light touch. Community expectations of 
fiduciary obligation, now enshrined in Canadian statute,87 are based on ‘the reasonable expectations 
of one person that another would act in his [practical] interests. This entails that a beneficiary may 
establish a fiduciary relationship unilaterally’, provided there is a reasonable basis,88 surely a 
Damoclean Sword. This is where Australian law89 and law of comparable jurisdictions may begin to 
converge: reflecting community expectations in the law. 
2.11 Statutory or judicial intervention? 
Scholarly opinion, ‘particularly in the exercise of discretionary power’90 supports broader general law 
fiduciary interpretation of best interest alongside its proscriptive statutory twins. Best interest requires 
positive actions of commission or omission, not mere process. There is no HCA judicial confirmation 
of this opinion. An alternate tactic, in the absence of consistent fiduciary obligation in the investment 
chain is to amend the Corporations Act and the ACCC Act following the thrust of the broadly drafted 
UK statute: directors ‘must act … to promote the success of the company. …’91 The amendments 
must include the economic objectives of investing and the fiduciary nature of those participating in 
the investment chain. Statutory reform should ensure that all NBFEs are included.92 As in the UK, 
judicial interpretation and the inclusion of general law principles will still be required, so the 
preferable view is for both tactics. Traditional fiduciary obligation assures the investment chain, 
enlivens Barnes v Addy liability of knowing colluders, with support from statutory reform.  
The objective always must be financial consumer confidence balanced with the encouragement of 
entrepreneurship through reform of the Business Judgment Rule (BJR). This objective could be 
written into an investment code, emulating the UK Stewardship Code, the German Corporate 
Governance Code, and the US Global Fiduciary Standard. These would be administered by the SRO 
architecture, with penalties imposed by an administrative arbiter, with ASIC as the ultimate 
enforcement agency of the SROs and the arbiter. 
                                                                  
86 Iain MacNeil, ‘The Trajectory of Regulatory Reform in the UK in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ (2010) 
11 European Business Organisation Review 483, 499. 
87 In Germany and the EU, civil law duties of care are now codified in EU statutes. 
88 Miller, above n 83, [70]. 
89 See, generally, Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’, above n 43, 150. 
90 Rosemary Teele Langford, ‘The duty of directors to act bona fide in the interests of the company: a 
positive fiduciary duty? Australia and the UK compared’ (2011) 11(1) Journal of Corporate Legal Studies 
215, 233. 
91 Companies Act (UK) s 172 adds six categories of positive actions required to be addressed by directors. 
92 The Hayne Royal Commission may address this issue in respect of insurers. 
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3. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS REFORM 
3.1 The nature of the problem 
The Australian NBFE sector has been plagued with abhorrent and egregious conduct associated with 
related party transactions (RPTs) and consequential conflicts of economic interest. The conduct may 
not strictly amount to legal malfeasance. Statutes and contracts are focussed on legal rights and 
interests rather than investor value outcomes. The correlation analysis of 199 senior court judgments 
demonstrates Australian propensity for related party transactions and their consequences.93 Notably, 
other professions are limited in respect of related party conduct. It is one of the factors preventing 
Australia from having a properly professional financial services sector.  
‘[R]elated party transactions are inherently problematic under any circumstances’94. They 
‘undermin[e] … fiduciary responsibility…95 RPTs ‘divert value from a corporation’.96 Their cousin, 
tunnelling, is the ‘transfer of resources out of a company [or other entity] to its controlling shareholder 
… [by] dominant shareholders and managers’.97 Prime Trust98 illustrates how value shifting by 
related parties can lawfully occur in Australia. Such deficiencies in the law strike directly at the 
veracity of Australia’s investment landscape.  
Some argue that RPTs are in the best interest of the company but this laxity in regulation leads directly 
to creeping corruption and systemic failure.99 Shareholder approval for a specific transaction easily 
leads to transfer of value and loss of control since only specific transactional approval is required, not 
its long term value impact approval. RPTs are regulated using a number of legal tools, of varying 
efficacy and depend on the efficiency of enforcement. Prohibition of some transactions, including 
related party loans and loan guarantees used to gain control of it would be effective in some Australian 
                                                                  
93 See above ch 3, tab 3.25. Where related parties were involved, 93.42% of those same cases involved 
deceptive, misleading or unconscionable conduct; 95.31% involved dishonesty, and 100% involved breaches 
of directors’ duty. See also Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian 
Financial System (Draft Report, January 2018) ch 7 ‘Dominance through integration’, fig 7.1; ch 11 ‘General 
insurance providers’, fig 11.3. See also Kevin Yi Liu, Australian Superannuation: Operational Structure, 
Investment Performance and Trustee Governance (PhD Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2013) 166–176. 
94 Duncan C Jessup, John H Farrar and Susan Watson, ‘Related Party Transactions in New Zealand: An 
Empirical Study of a Flawed System’ (2012) 30(2) Companies & Securities Law Journal 110, 113. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Luca Enriques, ‘Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with a Critique 
of the European Commission Proposal)’ (2015) 16 European Business Organisation Law Review 1, 2. 
97 Ibid 3. 
98 Lewski v ASIC (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 171 [190] (Greenwood, Middleton, and Foster JJ). 
99 In New Zealand it led to the complete collapse of its finance company sector: ‘almost 40% of all RPT’s are 
with executives…’. ‘The result is that New Zealand has been a relatively safe haven for Australian 
fraudsters’ quoted in Jessup, Farrar and Watson, above n 94, 136–38. 
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creeping corruption cases, but may not be in the best interest of the company when the related party 
is the only willing participant. Selective prohibitions may be more pragmatic than a total prohibition.  
3.2 Comparative insights 
The untreue100 principle, now codified in EU law and supported by the German Corporate 
Governance Code as general law governs intent. German directors are required to observe the spirit 
and intent of the law, not only its statutory manifestations. EU regulation of related party transactions 
recognises they may have potential value, has not pursued the prohibition philosophy, provides for 
business judgment but is balanced by codified civil law counterweights. This architecture reflects 
fiduciary stewardship concepts. This is not so in Australia unless there is a broadened fiduciary 
relationship where, as in the UK,  
It [creative compliance] is essentially the practice of using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and 
to do so with impunity.101 
The UK has, by widening director statutory responsibility to company long term success, introduced 
subjectivity. Disclosure, including the nature of the related party interest not just its existence, and 
prior fully informed consent of the disinterested members of the company form the basis of modern 
UK related party transaction governance.102  
Canadian regulation of financial advice requires consideration of whether a conflict may be 
‘expect[ed] to arise between the firm including each individual acting on behalf of the firm and its 
client’.103 Disclosure of itself is not sufficient. There must be a proactive business system of 
identifying conflicts of interest with prospective clients by the firm and participants in it, ‘consistent 
with the best interests of the client’,104 
3.3 Excision: prohibition not prioritisation 
RPTs and tunnelling are so deep seated and problematic in Australian NBFEs that cultural change 
requires at least selective prohibition, not prioritisation. This excision should be for a period of at 
least five years, or until governance practices demonstrably meet community expectations of trust 
and loyalty. ASIC needs RPT ex ante review and prevention powers, directly addressing the causes 
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of systemic failure identified in the correlation analysis. The evolution of Australian superannuation 
law provides guidance although it still allows prioritisation. In the superannuation sector, ‘71% of 
retail funds … employ related-party service providers, compared with 52% of not-for-profit funds’, 
with differing patterns of ownership and control.105 ‘Extremely high levels of concentration are 
…exhibited in a number of outsourcing markets’,106 most particularly asset allocation consulting, 
audit, actuarial and custody. APRA’s ex ante supervisory posture and small number of supervised 
entities is a different proposition to the difficulties presently facing ASIC. ASIC will need data. This 
will be provided by each NBFE having a proactive system of identifying and disclosing potential 
conflicts of interest and lodgement of relevant offer documents and supporting contracts. Whilst not 
the same as notarisation and commercial court lodgement powers in German law, it could emulate 
process extending contractual veracity to external independent review. 
Failure to disclose will result in loss of BJR protection under Corporations Act s 180(2)(b). It is a 
more stringent test than the present conflicts register which only requires disclosure of actual conflicts 
of interest. If these are reviewed at all, it is normally ex post. Different conflict of interest standards 
presently arise in NBFEs because of the fragmented statutory architecture: excision through 
prohibition will provide a period through which policy and statutory harmonisation can occur. 
For some vertically integrated NBFEs, this policy will be problematic, requiring divestment of 
controlled entities but an opportunity for directors to focus on their core business. 
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4. REDESIGN OF THE ARCHITECTURE ― FINANCIAL ADVICE AND WEALTH 
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 
4.1 Australian confusion 
Implementation of fiduciary principles and the elimination of conflicts of interest requires a national 
architecture which subscribes to those objectives. The financial planning sector should be divided 
into professional advice providers separately from product sellers,107 similar to the distinction 
between investment advisers and broker dealers in the US. 
Financial planners and wealth managers in Australia are not professionals in the accepted sense of 
that term. The FoFA108 reforms have not achieved that desirable evolution to status-based fiduciaries. 
Clients are in a lesser legal position than before those reforms. FoFA subsumes general law fiduciary 
duty behind compliance with statutory process, safe harbour defence for compliance with that 
process,109 has differing liability for employees of financial planning firms and their authorised 
representatives and does not extend procedural protections to non-retail investors (who may only have 
retail level skills). Political influence is the cause: it is a sop, without remedy, removing general law 
protection of undivided loyalty of financial and corporate advisers to their retail clients. It further 
entrenches the doctrine of prioritisation over prohibition. It ignores the essential contribution of 
financial products and services provision to daily life. It is industry centric, not consumer centric. 
4.2 Comparative insights 
Singapore does not apply statutory fiduciary duty to financial advice, but compared with Australia, 
Singapore does have other and greater statutory investor protections. For retail financial advice 
protections are underpinned by personal statutory responsibility which echoes German civil law 
fiduciary-like duty of care doctrines. These cannot be delegated. Similarly its intermediaries in the 
investment chain have statutory personal liability extending to the client, proximal or not. Singapore 
extends consumer protection law to retail financial advice. 
In Germany, the codified and contractual fiduciary relationships between adviser and client means 
that the client does not consume the information, but consumes confidence in their adviser. As in 
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Singapore, personal liability extends to the content of marketing materials which may be separate 
from the disclosure document. 
Germany and Singapore, in their own ways illustrate the unresolved tension in Australia between 
Coopers’ libertarian paternalism espoused in the superannuation context, and the Wallis inspired 
principles of disclosure, advice and financial literacy. In Australia there has not yet been evolution of 
the law (other than consumer credit and industry superannuation default funds) to reflect investors as 
consumers rather than capital providers.  
Neither does the UK does not impose a statutory best interest duty on financial advisers. The direction 
of regulatory policy is to embed ‘legal duties in an industry structure which provides the expertise 
and resources for good governance,’110 similar to the Canadian SRO model. It rests on fiduciary 
concepts without actually codifying them. 
4.3 Applying the Canadian model in Australia 
Whilst Canada and Australia share jurisprudence provenance, their fiduciary traditions differ. If the 
objective of further Australian reform is to transform its financial planning and wealth management 
sectors into a respected profession, this will require reform of how regulation is implemented and 
reform of Australia’s restrictive fiduciary tradition. The distinctive Canadian regulatory system based 
on fiduciary duty and responsive regulation has much to offer Australia in this quest for reform of its 
financial advisory sector. It evolves the regulation of financial services advice into an ex ante posture 
delivered and policed by the financial planning industry organisations themselves. They would have 
regulatory responsibility supervised, audited and enforced by ASIC.  
They will also have financial literacy objectives. They will replace government agencies including 
ASIC in financial literacy education. These are mostly tactical and antiseptic, ignore behavioural 
economics research which requires active interventions in teachable moments alongside the provision 
of proper, useful and comprehensible disclosure during active investing. One objective is to generate 
deeper client relationships akin to the traditional German private banking model and Canadian CRM 
both disciplined by fiduciary responsibility and improved client financial literacy. Proximity to the 
client engenders knowledge transfer and the re-establishment of trust. The fiduciary obligation is 
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underpinned by personal liability of directors and senior management extending to the approval of 
financial products sales to clients. Proximity renders the need for safe harbour defence obsolete. 
Robo-advice is likely to become more widespread and problematic: the temptation of ‘dark pools’ of 
capital irresistible. There will be no teachable moments requiring extension of of consumer law 
following NCCP and MySuper principles. The Australian equivalent of the CRM will need to account 
for the rapid march of technology. ASIC asserts a technology neutral regulatory environment.111 
Some scholars assert that ‘financial consumers are more willing to trust the digital platform than a 
face-to-face adviser,112 noting that ‘willingness … to trust the robo adviser comes close to Finn’s 
“fiduciary expectations’ thesis’.113 
General law fiduciary duties and their prescriptive extension are to reflect what best interest actually 
means. Inter- and intra-statutory definitions need harmonisation and simplified codification in a 
comprehensible standard. The Global Uniform Fiduciary Standard and some of the jurisdictional 
codes provide guidance. In Canada, best interest standards automatically include fiduciary and non-
fiduciary duties from all sources of law in a CRM enforced through SROs. This eliminates present 
ambiguity in Australian best interest interpretations. Duties would extend to the SRO, its directors, 
officers, professional advisers, and their financial planners.114 As in Canada, Australia would have a 
principles-based interpretation of the nature and scope of fiduciary obligations in financial advice 
which meet implicit community assumptions. It results in a uniform fiduciary standard previously 
proposed in the US,115 including fair dealing principles. In Australia, SRO models (eg in general 
insurance) have not met their customer expectations. It is not the SRO model that is faulty: it is the 
implementation of it by those willing to corrupt its objectives and engage in egregious behaviour. 
SRO models require the support of fiduciary law and effective enforcement by the regulator. 
The necessary national infrastructure presently exists in Australia. There are 24 323 registered 
financial planners, a number likely to diminish.116 The Australian SRO model would apply inter alia 
to the Financial Services Council (FSC), Association of Independent Financial Planners (AIOPP), 
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Financial Planning Association (FPA), Association of Financial Advisers (AFA), and the 
Independent Financial Advisers Association of Australia (IFAA). These organisations will require 
reform of their objectives, governance, culture, and operations to implement the model. They would 
become regulators generating ‘significant compliance and cooperation’,117 not industry lobbyists. 
There has been limited acknowledgement of a self-regulation model with the establishment of the 
Financial Adviser Standard and Ethics Authority (implementation commencing in 2020). Two 
strategic benefits arise: these are the removal from ASIC of the impossible burden of policing ex post, 
every financial advice transaction, and transitioning the financial planning sector into a self-regulated 
ex ante supervised profession with fiduciary status. Enforcement of Australian SROs would be 
ASIC’s role, similar to Canadian Securities Administrators.  
These reforms would solve the systemic problems in the financial advice sector in Australia which 
incremental Australian statutory reforms to date, including FoFA118 do not. Implementation must be 
statutorily supported: eliminate non-reliance clauses in advisory contracts which remove fiduciary 
liability; extend client fiduciary obligations to the directors and senior management (which cannot be 
delegated) of financial advisory and wealth management firms; and apply retail consumer protection 
law to the sale of all financial products and services. As in Canada, remove statutory safe harbour 
defence in retail financial advice. 
4.4 Licencing issues: entity and adviser  
Australian Financial Services Licences (AFSLs) operate as a franchise facilitating treaty shopping by 
advisers amongst corporate AFS licensees. Evolution of financial planning to professional status will 
require the licencing of financial planners personally based on personal educational and performance 
competencies. Competence already requires future tertiary examination, but should also require 
relevant work experience, professional year, and annual accreditations based on continuous 
professional development. Personal licensing facilitates transferability of skills sets and places 
responsibility directly with the individual fiduciary (as in medicine). This reform harmonises 
Australia with comparable jurisdictions. The SROs will be required to maintain lists of their 
accredited and licensed advisers and advise ASIC. It will maintain a national database as regulator of 
the SROs. The integrity of this register will be enhanced by lodgement of movements of advisers and 
reasons for termination if any.  
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Corporate AFSLs will continue since they provide financial services and sell financial products. As 
with other professions that are corporatised, personal licensing need not damage the economic value 
of their employer entity. AFSLs should not be a tradeable commodity. Ownership change should 
require ASIC approval, only to be granted as if it were a new AFSL. RSE and Banking licensing are 
examples. 
4.5 Redefine retail, sophisticated and professional investors  
Present definitions are arbitrary and serve to remove protections when they are needed and to 
eliminate or reduce investment opportunities for some able to discern the truth in disclosure and 
advice. The extension and primacy of fiduciary obligation serves to reduce or eliminate the need for 
arbitrary statutory typology of investor. In Wingecarribee119 and Bathurst,120directors and officers of 
local authorities, removed from the protections afforded to retail investors, nonetheless had the 
financial literacy of retail investors in respect of the complex financial products sold to them in their 
roles in their employing organisation. 
The implementation of the proposed reforms eliminates the need for arbitrary definitions. They also 
eliminate the pressure for ‘libertarian paternalism’. They eliminate the systemic deficiencies and 
provide the basis upon which a market conduct system can properly work.  
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5. MARKET CONDUCT REGULATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY ― REFORM OF 
THE ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF ASIC 
5.1 The nature of the problem 
Regulatory and supervisory agencies are an essential component of the national architecture. They 
too, must share the reform objective. Indeed, it is in their interest to do so: reform is the only means 
by which they can ameliorate and eliminate the excoriating criticisms they face. 
ASIC is mandated as an ex-post market conduct regulator with broad responsibilities.  
[E]x post strategies are often dysfunctional in the light of behavioural economics … [which] reveal 
that the traditionally highly legislated monitoring and control strategies need to be evaluated in a 
different light … to avoid mindless decision making…121 
As Australian judicial frustration and scholarly opinion illustrates, present policy has led to the Age 
of Statutes:122 a large increase in the volume and number of relevant statutes, with often conflicting 
and confusing definitions of important basic terms including financial services and best interest.  
ASIC is subject to considerable public and private criticism. It is a prisoner of the ASIC Act and the 
Corporations Act. It does not meet its stakeholder expectations. Reform is needed to ameliorate these 
expectations gaps. Strategic reform of ASIC is imperative. ASIC requires reform of its charter, 
mandate, governance, culture, employment arrangements and posture. It should lead, not follow, by 
setting out a proposed reform agenda having considered the research available to it. A redefined 
charter requires amendment of the ASIC Act.123 A redefined mandate leads directly to analysis of 
ASIC’s human and financial resources required for implementation. As with the Federal Financial 
Services Authority (Germany) (BaFin), a culture of natural politeness (in administrative compliance) 
and stakeholder respect (including in enforcement) is a component of the spirit of the law. 
Governance reform to a two tier board structure consistent with Uhrig124 with fulltime non-executive 
and executive roles should be implemented. As in the German governance system,125 stakeholder 
representation should be balanced with management competencies. Governance reform has since 
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been rejected by ASIC. Its mandate and its reactive, issue based posture is ‘not fully replicated by 
any other conduct regulator globally’.126 Or in Australia.  
5.2 Insights from comparative jurisdictions 
Balancing industry development with compliance cultures requires pragmatism. This pragmatism 
should extend to clarity, certainty, and consistency in public policy, law, and regulation both 
prescriptive and principles based. Singapore’s objective is to reduce ‘productivity sapping 
ambiguities’.127 Pragmatism, within a unified system of law, is an objective of German financial 
regulation. A combination of principles-based regulation observing the spirit as well as the letter of 
the law founded on natural politeness, consultation, civil law duty of care and fiduciary doctrines, 
and proximity to supervised entities gives predictability to stakeholders. Canada, similarly, has 
embarked on a regulatory journey cognisant of behavioural economics research and given legislative 
form as Responsive Regulation with implementation through its SROs. Australia’s box-ticking 
compliance culture could be made obsolete by emulation of these insights. 
Conversely, the UK as in Australia, community anger at misplaced expectations generates public 
demand for revenge for subversion of economic interests behind statutory compliance. Public demand 
results in political pressure for prescriptive supervision by the same regulators that have been part of 
the problem. There is some recognition in the UK that regulators cannot police every commercial 
transaction or dictate corporate culture. That is not recognised in Australia where ASIC is expected 
to do both at ever increasing cost, an impossible burden. That compliance with process has not led to 
expected investor outcomes will be a cultural challenge for it and proponents of statutory accretion. 
5.3 Ex ante or ex post regulation?  
Reform should apply models from Canada, Germany, and Singapore using existing professional and 
industry associations as bottom up quasi-regulators, educative and consultative: the SRO model. This 
eliminates inexhaustible demands for market conduct services from the central regulator.128 Ipso 
facto, ASIC regulation becomes ex ante and supervisory rather than ex post and reactive. Behavioural 
economics scholarly research supports this change in posture, regarding ex post strategies as 
‘behaviourally dysfunctional … [requiring a] counterintuitive shift of rule-making competencies: 
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from public to private ordering.’129 In effect, Responsive Regulation. Discipline in implementation 
will be strict: underpinned by fiduciary obligation in the investment chain enforced by an effective 
properly mandated ASIC.  
5.4 The contingent risk of regulatory interventions 
The timing of regulatory action on a NBFE can have significant and detrimental impacts on the 
credibility of that entity, its directors, and its investors. This includes the value of underlying assets, 
the return on investments, their liquidity, and member balances. Unintended consequences of 
regulatory action can easily result in loss of investor confidence (present and prospective), and 
compromise of underlying assets values.130 Reform of ASIC’s mandate to induce proximity reduces 
this risk. As does a holistic lift in standards. 
5.5 Educational standards, competencies, and culture in regulatory agencies 
Each of ASIC, APRA, and the FWC will require cultural and educational reform. This extends to 
powers being exercised in commercially relevant timescales. Cross-fertilisation of market conduct 
and supervision cultures within ASIC and APRA broadens the available tools. Whilst ’the role of a 
publicly funded regulator is to deter unlawful behaviour … it [ASIC] is tasked to regulate for the 
benefit of society as a whole’.131 This necessarily means lifting standards of behaviour and 
competence of market participants.132 Empirical analysis suggests this objective has not been reached. 
Effective regulators must have a stakeholder and societal teaching role including in the training of 
directors and trustees: it is a component of supervision, lifts standards and competencies of lay people 
appointed to boards. ASIC staff need skills sets to take personal responsibility for timely and useful 
relationships with client stakeholders who now provide ASIC’s funding. ASIC needs to build its own 
CRM. 
Surveillance, compliance and enforcement are important but not the only tools in market integrity. 
The human resources skills base in ASIC and APRA should be broadened to include senior staff with 
industry, capital markets, and microeconomics experiences. Remuneration and employment contracts 
require independent review to achieve effective recruitment, performance and allocation of financial 
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resources. This may require more independence from government, including relief from the Public 
Service Act and prosecution agencies. 
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6. DISCLOSURE REFORM 
6.1 Disclosure is an international problem 
Market based regulatory systems rely heavily on disclosure, including disclosure of conflicts of 
interest. ‘Such disclosure is worse than useless if it is not comprehensive’.133  
The belief that the best approach to information asymmetry is the provision of additional data … [is] 
acceptable if accompanied by full, even if largely incomprehensible, disclosure,134  
leads to documentation complexities under the acceptable guise of transparency which hide the 
narrative required to make sound investment decisions.  
Disclosure documents often follow legal form rather than economic substance focussed on the 
sustainability of business models. This has been a particular problem in non-prudentially regulated 
MIS in Australia and the UK which do not have US style Management Discussion & Analysis 
(MD&A) sections in their offer documents. These must be in plain English.  
‘Does suitable documentation exist at all’?135 Disclosure has become an end in itself, reflecting 
regulation of market behaviour through process rather than the primacy of the investor or beneficiary 
reliant upon trusted financial intermediaries. Regulation is seen ‘through the eyes of the industry 
rather than its customers’136 with penalties for ‘market abuse rather than customer abuse’.137 
Disclosure is at best an imperfect tool in a financial consumer market where conflicts of interest are 
permitted. What financial consumers need is trust generated by long term ‘deeper’138 relationships. 
This is the European fiduciary-like duty of care tradition, albeit subverted (as in the UK) in recent 
decades by the advent of product selling and transactional relationships.  
6.2 Insights from comparative jurisdictions 
In Germany, retail investors are treated as financial consumers rather than capital providers. This 
policy widens disclosure obligations to investors enlivening its culpa in contrahendo doctrine with 
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statutory ‘very detailed level of codification’.139 Disclosure must be in a ‘comprehensible form’.140 It 
is not information that is being consumed, but confidence in the person providing the disclosures.141 
Law reform designed to unlock retail investor savings, relying on their financial literacy (but without 
formal investor education) and on advice, also required liberalisation of financial products ‘easily 
understood by the “average retail investor”’…142 German law differs substantively from Australian 
law in these respects.  
Australia is not unique in suffering from systemic creeping corruption arising from disclosure 
limitations. In Australia, how is complete disclosure of economic rather than transactional interest to 
be enforced where there is no legal obligation to do so? Where there is no interest in it by the parties 
concerned? ‘It is necessary to shift legislator’s attention from ex post enforcement to ex ante 
supervised self-regulatory regime’.143 Proactive disclosure (including potential conflicts of interest) 
should apply to all in the investment chain.  
6.3 Information asymmetry: is a governance regime based on disclosure sufficient investor 
protection? 
Multilayered MIS structures can be complex for all but the most sophisticated and attentive retail 
investor to understand.144 It is ‘not uncommon that a MIS invests in another MIS to gain exposure to 
underlying assets in a cost effective manner (eg a retail feeder fund investing in wholesale funds that 
have greater economies of scale. It is therefore not unsuitable for retail investors’.145 Lack of product 
understanding also extends to financial advisers, wealth managers, directors of MIS and trustees of 
APRA regulated superannuation entities and self-managed superannuation fund trustees. In the US, 
lack of financial product knowledge by the fund manager has required regulatory intervention.  
Mandatory disclosure of portfolio assets held directly or indirectly in other investment entities by REs 
and Registrable Superannuation Entities (RSEs) would identify illiquid assets, increase investor 
scrutiny of investment manager behaviours, and provide a more efficient market. One of the problems 
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in disclosure is how to report underlying assets in multilayered structures, especially in foreign 
jurisdictions, where a custodian holds the assets and where there is constant asset turnover. The ASIC 
Act and the Corporations Act previously imposed restrictions on the investment strategy of registered 
MIS. These restrictions were removed to allow diversification provided that the investments were not 
made for the purposes of avoiding regulation. The removal of this restriction facilitated fraudulent 
behaviour in two Trio MIS in 2009.146 
6.4 Tactical statutory reforms to rectify systemic deficiencies in disclosure 
Problems in Australian disclosure can be addressed by the adoption of international standards. 
Examples include Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS) being 
‘a highly regulated, supervised, and transparent savings vehicle’,147 and which are used in non-EU 
jurisdictions (not Australia) for retail investment. Singapore’s implementation of a Code of Best 
Practice on Collective Investment Schemes aligns Singaporean Collective Investment Schemes with 
international developments in funds management (including UCITS compliance), the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 11/ Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (EU) from 
January 2018),148 and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
‘[R]egulators in Europe are practically falling over themselves to demonstrate their commitment to 
protecting the humble retail investor’.149 MiFID is supported by injunctive and compensatory 
remedies. These are all recognitions of the limits of disclosure alone as an efficient markets 
disciplinary mechanism.  
Australia does not participate in these international standards despite pretensions of becoming a world 
financial centre. For simplicity in reform of unregistered MIS, emulating MySuper default funds 
provides one in-country starting point. Emulation of Singapore’s Business Trust Act for actively 
managed MIS provides another. An Australian financial product with these characteristics could be 
compliant with UCITS and other international standards. 
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With limited exceptions,150 Australian NBFE investors are still not treated as financial consumers. 
Fair dealing principles found in other jurisdictions are subsumed by statutory compliance. 
Compliance and enforcement standards do not change the values and ethics of organisations. They 
merely encourage box ticking by those with executive responsibility for disclosure. This will increase 
as financial advice and products become algorithmic and robotic.  
Other problems need to be resolved by tactical reform of the ASIC Act and Corporations Act, and 
evolution of ASIC’s mandate. These reforms should include: ASIC having ex ante powers to 
intervene in financial products disclosure (including material contracts and intermediation contracts); 
eliminate the offering of unsound business models by the introduction of business planning (similar 
to US MD&A) in disclosure documents setting out the comprehensive business case certified by the 
directors; disclosure of economic not just transactional interest; prohibit financial products issuance 
where sales of MIS units to new investors are required to fund operational costs of MIS properly 
attributable to earlier investors (the Ponzi MIS); where business models are leveraged, detailed 
disclosure of economic and legal risks and an integrated analysis of the impacts of multiple leverage 
on the investor with attendant disclosure of any related party interests; for retail investors, apply the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act to MIS and other financial products; related party lending 
limited to non-recourse financing only; and reducing the burden of proof on investor litigants, 
requiring only that a disclosure statement was inaccurate at the time that statement was made.  
6.5 Primacy of investment objective in disclosure documents 
Murray identified lack of investment objective in the SIS Act, despite the sole purpose test. This defect 
in the law afflicts other NBFEs, including MIS. Value outcomes and economic optimisation for 
investors and beneficiaries, together with capital preservation, all pillars of trust law, are not legal 
rights in the Corporations Act or general law unless stated to be so in the governing disclosure 
documents or advisory contracts (retail and corporate). For MIS, this is the constitution, usually 
deficient in this key plank of investor protection. Statutory intervention enforcing disclosure of this 
missing link is entirely consistent with fiduciary principles, equitable concepts of stewardship and 
German civil law duty of care. 
This reform moves the offer document beyond description of legal rights, often complex if 
comprehensible at all to the financial consumer, being a positive duty to aid financial literacy through 
more meaningful disclosure. 
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6.6 Reform of whistleblower regulation 
Whistleblowing can be a dangerous sport in Australia, but together with empowered investors, a key 
market disciplinary method. There is little encouragement to be had either from institutional 
employers or regulators which may not act on or even read, the information with which they have 
been provided. Whistleblowing can impart the sunlight of disclosure. The spirit has been clouded by 
intimidation and bullying in banks, registered organisations and NBFEs regulated by the 
Corporations Act. Proposed reform151 needs to include: positive obligations placed upon ASIC, 
APRA, and the ROC to investigate disclosure within a specified period; harmonise each of the 
Corporations Act, SIS Act, and Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act with the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act for the provision and receipt of disclosures. Whistleblowers, emulating US 
judicial interpretation, should report directly to their relevant regulator, not their employer. 
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7. AUSTRALIA AS A WORLD FINANCIAL CENTRE 
There has been considerable discussion and government policy directed at Australia becoming at least 
a regional financial centre,152 originally dating to Campbell in 1981 and Wallis in 1997. Australia has 
not emulated the prominence of other regional centres in Singapore and Hong Kong. Partly, this is 
because of deficiencies in regulation and law. The Australian system is compromised, limiting the 
benefits of a market conduct posture through deficient legal implementation. The story of modern 
Australia is incomplete, incurring large direct costs to present investors and opportunity costs to their 
progeny. 
Modern German law recognises that regulation can have a negative burden on an entrepreneurial 
economy. In practice the intertwined EU and national jurisdiction mix of self-regulation, co-
regulation, (so-called soft law) and government regulation, disciplined by the primacy of fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like principles supports entrepreneurship. The UK, in an earlier context but relevant to its 
Brexit negotiations has a ‘clear interest in ensuring that those markets remain centred in London.’153 
‘[I]t cannot readily support forms of regulation that threaten its competitive position’.154 Singapore’s 
regulatory architecture is integrated with national economic objectives. Conversely, Australia cannot 
remain an international outlier: its regulatory architecture needs to reflect and build upon global 
norms. 
7.1 A Matter of National Productivity 
Trio exposed deficiencies in corporate governance, law and supervision which enabled international 
fraud on Australian superannuation savings using related party offshore hedge funds. There is an 
inevitable nexus between the world’s fourth largest pool of superannuation savings and its 
vulnerability to malfeasance.  
The interface between Australia’s industrial system and its superannuation savings system is a matter 
of considerable national significance, likely to have major economic implications for its future 
development and prosperity. As Murray and Heydon identify, this interface is largely unexplored 
territory which may expose Australian superannuation to substantial contingent risk. It directly 
influences and determines corporate governance practices and outcomes. These are inconsistent and 
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sometimes conflicted. Egregious behaviour is both contagious and widespread across NBFEs. The 
empirical data, if it has predictive veracity suggests that history will repeat itself without reform.  
7.2 Australian propensity for misfeasance, malfeasance and non-feasance 
‘The financial services industry is particularly vulnerable to the risk of international fraud’.155 The 
Australian Crime Commission noted that ‘Serious and Organised Investment Fraud is not an 
opportunistic crime, but a calculated, sophisticated, organised criminal event that can attract 
experienced investors…’156 Task Force Galilee was established in 2011 as a multi-agency response 
to these crime threats. 
Closer to home, whilst serious, international frauds have been comparatively small and rare by 
comparison with investor losses arising from internal systemic failures quantified in the empirical 
analysis. 
7.3 Strategic law reform for a globalised world 
Reform is essential to reduce Australian propensity for malfeasance by quality assuring the 
investment chain underpinned by enforcement of fiduciary obligations. This assists harmonisation 
with the more insightful jurisdictions. The law matters: Australian productivity is diminished by 
present law. Harmonisation is required with international standards and within its own legislation. 
Presently, there is no consistency of economic purpose or method. There needs to be clarity, 
consistency, certainty, and predictability in legislation and regulation. These are all missing. Best 
interest duties are an example. 
To start: define the economic objectives and purpose of the various components of the NBFE 
investment chain and give them statutory force in each of the SIS Act, Corporations Act, and Fair 
Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act. Similarly, harmonise director and trustee duties, 
categorise and define fiduciary status in these statutes. Harmonise corporate governance principles 
with the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules157 and enforce a Code of Governance 
for all fiduciaries, emulating the Global Fiduciary Standard. 
To reduce Australia’s outlier status, harmonise Australian law applying to financial products and 
financial services in similar jurisdictions, including adherence to IOSCO, MiFID, and Global 
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Fiduciary Standards of Excellence principles. Australian financial product disclosure documents 
should adhere to UCITS principles to enable the sale of Australian financial products in other 
jurisdictions. There has been some progress with ‘passporting’ but this remains far from complete.158 
Conversely, Australia should permit the domestic sale of international UCITS compliant financial 
products to stimulate competition. 
7.4 Aligning community expectations 
There is limited community understanding of a market oriented regulatory system, its benefits, 
importance in Australia’s future and the proper roles of the various market participants. It requires an 
un-politicised long term public education campaign. It should be designed to match community 
expectations with desired market conduct. Its mirror is a national sustained education campaign for 
investors and superannuation beneficiaries designed to develop a more sophisticated body of financial 
consumers. Implementation of the SRO system provides implementation architecture, its 
effectiveness to be underpinned by fiduciary obligation enforced by effective enforcement. Following 
the Hayne Royal Commission, the Parliamentary Committee should review quality assurance of the 
investment chain cognisant of models in comparative jurisdictions. This review provides the 
legislative basis for the subsequent education campaign. 
7.5 Quality assurance of the investment chain  
Fiduciary law can provide the basis upon which the investment chain is quality assured. It requires 
statutory support, defining the role and objectives of investment, cultural objectives, self-adoption of 
codes of conduct, and tactical statutory interventions. Statutory support includes licensing of all 
participants in the investment chain, their capital adequacy, prudential supervision; limitations on 
financial products leverage and much improved standard of disclosure. 
                                                                  
158 Originally proposed by Johnson in 2009, legislation for Asian Region Funds Passport (ARFP) and 
Corporate Collective Investment Vehicles (CCIV) incorporates new chapters 8A and 8B in the Corporations 
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7.5.1 Product manufacturers 
Many investment research houses are paid by the product manufacturer. In some cases, they have 
been owned by a related party. This industry structure produces manifest conflicts of interest and 
consequently the research is not demonstrably independent.  
Research houses and asset allocation consultants should be licensed as truly independent fiduciaries 
with SROs paying for the independent research costs, applying MiFID11 principles. Where a 
financial planning AFSL requires further opinion on the independent funds manager research, this to 
be a disclosed cost to the AFSL, not the client.  
7.5.2 Custodians 
Most Australian custodians act as transfer agents, in MIS acting on the instructions of the RE in 
accordance with the custody agreement and described in MIS PDS. They are not trustees (of any 
form), despite billing fees commensurate with the latter responsibility. The custodian is the legal 
owner of the fund assets. Assets can be custodially held or non-custodially held. The inference of a 
MIS having a custodian is that they are custodially held in trust. The custodian may only discover the 
existence of the assets for which they are custodian when there is a redemption. It is not clear that the 
custodian has a duty to report asset non-existence to the regulators.159 That responsibility lies with 
the RE, but in the event of non-compliance, there is no custodial check, and therefore a failure of 
consumer protection.160 In comparative jurisdictions, the custodial (depositary) requirement includes 
the ‘monitoring of cash flows’.161 Australian custodians do not have this responsibility. Other 
requirements include disclosure of portfolio interests.162 The custodial function should include asset 
due diligence, whistleblower obligation, monitoring and reporting of transactions to Austrac. 
The custody industry should be redefined and repriced into trust-based custodians and 
Transfer/Payment Agents. All custodians should be required to hold their own independent AFSL, be 
functionally independent, have fiduciary responsibility to the beneficial owner of the assets under 
custody, with regulatory capital reserve to match their reformed responsibilities. Eliminating related 
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party custodian ownership harmonises Australian and international standards. It puts downward 
pressure on custodial fees.163 
Elimination of custodial omnibus accounts reduces systemic risk, prevents conflicts of interest and 
ensures proper separation of investor property.  
A custodian can sell its custody business to another custodian. When the custodian changes, so does 
the legal owner. This can have substantial adverse tax effects and in some jurisdictions, requires 
shareholder approval in that jurisdiction which may not be forthcoming. Transfer of ownership should 
mirror that proposed for transfer of (other) AFSLs. 
7.5.3 Auditors 
The Corporations Act, SIS Act, and Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Act are 
inconsistent, requiring harmonisation. All auditors should require registration consistent with the 
Corporations Act.164 
7.6 Scale and critical mass in REs and RSEs  
Fragmentation, compliance costs and fee income pressures, together with limited ability to source 
prudential and regulatory capital are leading to NBFE consolidation and vertical integration. To some 
extent this is being encouraged by APRA and ASIC, partly through administrative pressure. It follows 
that potential conflicts of interest will result. It also follows, that, as some superannuation funds 
internalise funds management operations, systemic risk will increase. In some cases, this is 
investment bank risk, the subject of considerable US statutory intervention for bank systemic risk in 
the Glass-Steagall Act.165 
Industry consolidation can result in oligopolies. This is more likely in superannuation entities than 
other NBFEs, despite intervention to increase competition.166 Industry funds are sectorally mandated 
with accompanying default funds with real competition limited to non-price product feature 
mechanisms.167 Their market power would be enhanced by the impact of Cooper and its preference 
for libertarian paternalism. Logically, all superannuation entities will eventually become public offer 
funds. Harmonisation with international standards could result in inflows from other jurisdictions, a 
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desirable result if Australia wishes to become an international funds management centre. As with 
custody, this will also require the elimination of internationally uncompetitive fee structures.  
7.7 Systemic risk: reform of the regulation of MIS 
The systemic deficiencies in Australian MIS are much deeper than the poacher-gamekeeper paradigm 
and lack of prudential regulation. Present law facilitates egregious behaviour and provides limited 
investor protection from those behaviours, particularly for unregistered MIS. ‘Market failure on such 
a scale that regulatory intervention is needed to remedy the shortcomings’.168  
In Australia, there is no primacy of functional purpose over legal form. Trusts are used as large 
commercial trading enterprises. This is not the case in the US where legal convergence provides for 
substance over legal form. Much is made of the historic distinctions between a company (duty 
narrowly interpreted to shareholder owners) and trusts (duty narrowly interpreted to trustee-
members). The concept of a company is much developed from its antiquarian origins. Similarly 
modern superannuation entities and MIS, structured as trusts can be large, ever growing complex 
financial businesses, often with direct and related party commercial activities, increasingly 
international in their scope, more akin to large commercial trading companies.  
7.7.1 Liquidity 
Many MIS investors have discovered to their chagrin that stated liquidity policy does not mean that 
they can recover funds. This also can apply to superannuation entities. Redemption policy normally 
assumes minimal redemption requests. Ponzi-like MIS and smaller superannuation entities with 
ageing beneficiary demographics are particularly vulnerable. Prudential supervision of 
superannuation entities now recognises the importance of longetivity risk with trustee directors 
required to account for that risk. MIS are not prudentially supervised despite their size and financing 
from superannuation entities, some being related parties. 
7.7.2 The problem of unregistered MIS 
All MIS should be registered: unregistered MIS should be abolished. There is a market need for small 
actively managed collective investment schemes, particularly in small scale property development 
and agriculture. These would be regulated using the Singapore Business Trust model which provides 
greater fiduciary protection to investors than Singapore CIS. Its Australian equivalent as a specific 
purpose NBFE can be provided by amending Part 5C of the Corporations Act and abolishing 
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definition of registered MIS. Ie all collective investments are de facto registered MIS unless they 
come under the new active trust provisions. Further investor protection can be provided by extension 
of consumer finance law to these products. 
7.7.3 The problem of insolvent MIS 
Australian MIS are not subject to prudential regulation or supervision despite their size, commercial 
complexity, and systemic importance to the economy. There have been mismatches of cash flows, 
redemptions, liquidity for operations, reliance on leverage (sometimes multiple leverage), need for 
new investors to meet costs associated with older investors, all resulting in insolvency. To the extent 
that prudential risks are addressed at all it is the limited regulatory capital imposed on the RE, not the 
MIS. An RE can operate multiple MIS. 
MIS capitalisation concerns date from 1993.169 ASIC have had subsequent concerns.170 The SLE 
proposal171 for restricting the RE to a specific MIS would have improved investor protections arising 
from poor capitalisation of MIS and their RE, but was never adopted. The RE is typically only at risk 
for MIS capitalisation to the extent of the net assets of the MIS for which it is trustee, RE liability 
being contractually limited. Whilst RE regulatory capital requirements have increased, these are not 
necessarily available to the MIS, only to provide for orderly winding up of the MIS or transfer to a 
replacement RE.172 RE regulatory capital requirements is not MIS prudential capital. Some REs 
cannot provide additional statutory regulatory capital: one factor in industry consolidation. More 
recent statutory intervention extends limited regulation to Non-Approved Deposit-Taking Institutions 
(Non-ADIs).173 These are ‘corporations which are engaged in the provision of finance, lending of 
money and origination of loans…’174 Amendment of the Banking Act definitions to include Non-
ADI’ and inclusion of APRA data collection and directions powers175 for the first time does not 
‘equate to ongoing regulation by APRA … [which] will not prudentially regulate and supervise non-
ADI lenders as it does ADIs.176 Neither does the legislation capture all of the NBFEs involved in 
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lending since many fall under the statutory quantum applied. These tentative steps fall far short of 
what is required. 
For Australian financial products to be regionally competitive, ASIC should impose RE regulatory 
capital and MIS prudential capital similar to that applying for UCITS and IOSCO compliance in 
Singapore and Hong Kong. This is particularly important given Australian propensity for the use of 
trust structures in collective investment schemes. Unitholders may incur personal liability: ‘There is 
no implied or deemed limitation of personal liability for a trustee…’177[under Australian trust law]. 
For trust investors, where there is the ‘ability to control or actually exert control, over the trustee or 
its business decisions…’178 there is ‘no equivalent statutory assurance of limited liability in the 
Corporations Act, or … elsewhere in the law applicable to trusts…’179 In both cases, limitations of 
personal liability are attempted in contract, but there is ‘no uniformity across the Australian market 
… some … display a lack of understanding of some important fundamentals’.180 The Twin Peaks 
model of regulation and supervision should extend to all MIS. 
7.7.4 The problem of Workers Entitlement Funds (WEFs) structured as MIS 
WEFs are MIS but exempted on an annual basis by ASIC from operation of Part 5C of the 
Corporations Act, premised on workers’ entitlements not being investor offers. Many charities, as 
Heydon points out, are companies. This fact is ignored. The WEF exemption should be discontinued 
and all registered organisations be subject to the Corporations Act. 
7.7.5 The problem of poacher – gamekeeper in MIS: the RE as principal or agent 
In most comparative jurisdictions, there is a separation of principle and agent. Australia is unique in 
allowing the corporate trustee to also be the MIS promoter, investment manager and operator. Related 
parties of the RE often have additional roles as landowner, manufacturer, harvester, marketer, and 
financier to investors in that MIS.181 The tension between legal rights and economic interest is seen 
in the ownership structures of assets required for the proper operation of the MIS. In agribusiness 
MIS, it is rare for the MIS to own the land: it merely has a right of use, often limited, and often owned 
or leased from a related party of the RE. Land and other real assets (factories, processing facilities, 
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assets required to produce, market and distribute MIS outputs) should be MIS property and held by 
an independent custodian or trustee. 
International harmonisation will require Australia to return to the separation of trustee and promoter. 
Without that reversion, Australian NBFE financial products will find difficulty in attracting portfolio 
foreign investment and impossible to market in other jurisdictions. Where it does occur, mismatch of 
investor expectations and Australian practice is probable.182  
Criticism that this will deter entrepreneurship is self-interested. The increase in the number of cases 
litigated since the advent of the Managed Investments Act183 may be the result of increased endeavour, 
but also faulty implementation of that reform. It is not entrepreneurial for the economy to continually 
sustain direct losses set out in Table 3.17 and opportunity costs computed in Table 3.18.  
7.7.6 Use of leverage in Managed Investment Schemes 
A common strategy used by MIS promoters in Australia is to directly or indirectly provide financing 
to investors to fund their MIS capital investment and operating costs. Thousands of investors become 
substantially indebted (often a related party of the RE), without a saleable asset, ongoing liability to 
the MIS for management, maintenance and exit costs, and with recourse to their other assets often the 
family home. Related party financing should not have recourse to non-MIS other assets and no right 
of debt assignment to non-related entities. Prudential supervision will set limits on MIS leverage to 
reduce investor risk when borrowing MIS investment capital. 
7.7.7 Management problems in Responsible Entities  
A compliance plan is only as good as its drafting, its implementation by the compliance committee 
and the compliance plan auditor. Anecdotal evidence suggests problems with all three, and especially 
in a fragmented industry comprised of large numbers of small REs and where the MIS faces costs 
pressures. The compliance plan audit is to ensure that the compliance plan is current, not that it is 
effective,184 and there are no standards against which a compliance plan auditor must conduct the 
audit. Directors and RE liabilities attach to contraventions of the plan, not its efficacy. The 
Corporations Act does not specify what constitutes adequate compliance. This responsibility is left 
to directors of the RE to create compliance measures tailored for specific MIS.185 In practice, 
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compliance committees do not provide real time monitoring (as in an internal audit capacity) and can 
lack independence. 
7.7.8 Are Australian MIS Ponzi schemes? 
ASIC think not,186 but the microeconomics of many of them indicate that they are. Many rely on 
future investor subscriptions to fund operations properly attributable to earlier investors. In the 
absence of prudential supervision, the deficiencies in the MIS business model manifest as soon as 
new subscriptions to MIS unit slow or cease. Cash flow and liquidity deficiencies include reliance 
upon the RE (which can be conflicted, capital constrained, insolvent, or RE of multiple funds) for 
capital provision, use of leverage, investors funds not being held by an independent trustee or 
custodian, as well as reliance on future capital inflows to fund operations. Replacement of the RE for 
insolvency or conflicted interests is problematic, requiring costly private law actions which may result 
in adverse costs orders. The Corporations Act provides limited assistance (and none for unregistered 
MIS). Private actions have no indemnity recourse to MIS property.  
For Australian MIS, there is no equivalent of the public trustee to act as replacement or temporary 
RE, and no replacement REs since they assume all of the liabilities of the former RE. These are 
systemic business and legal deficiencies in which ASIC should play a proactive role including the 
role of temporary RE. ASIC does not have the internal skills, but could fulfil this role using a panel 
of skilled contracted REs indemnified by it.  
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8. NBFE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 
8.1 Reconciling stakeholder interests and board competencies 
There is considerable disharmony in Australia surrounding the governance of some NBFEs 
particularly industry superannuation funds. Some important reform attempts187 have prevailed. Others 
have not.188 Some superannuation entities are known to have egregious related parties and conflicts 
of economic interest. There is an unresolved conflict between perceived stakeholder interests and 
much-needed director and senior officer competencies. This conflict is politicised, legislative 
intervention highly contested, preventing rational reform. Many of these entities form significant 
proportions of the Australian capital market, operate globally, and some are assuming investment 
bank risk. Conflict and confusion arises from the different roles of representative stakeholders and 
board level competencies required to properly supervise management in meeting statutory and 
beneficiary objectives.  
Cooper and Murray focussed on the need for financial expertise and professionalism of trustee board 
members over the present equal representation selection method, 
free of the type of conflicts that may cause them (either intentionally or unintentionally) [to] serve the 
interests of the [employer and employee] sponsors, a related party or a subset of members, rather than 
the fund’s entire membership.189 
‘It is more important for directors to be independent, skilled, and accountable than representative’.190 
Empirical research supports this view: ‘[t]rustees lack experience, training or suitable knowledge, 
creating the potential for not fully understanding advice that they receive from outside experts.’191 
The politicisation of policy direction, as in this case, is clouded by antiquated ideas of the modern 
corporation and the modern trust, (including superannuation entities), and the role of directors.  
Vested interest, resistance to change, based on spurious argument or misunderstanding clouds serious 
reform. The lessons of other jurisdictions where there are governance models which do give effect to 
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the interests of all stakeholders as well as to the responsibilities of directors and executive 
management have been ignored or lost in these Lilliputian conflicts. 
Balancing stakeholder interests with supervision of management competencies has long been a 
feature of the German corporate governance environment.192 Adopting this model in the context of 
Australian superannuation entities, and others controlled by representatives of registered 
organisations may provide a better model of governance of those entities and a solution to present 
policy conflicts. Emulation in some NBFEs,193 without statutory support has not been successful but 
for different reasons. The ‘advantage of the German system is the clear division of function’.194 This 
separation of form and function echoes US governance reform promoted by the American Law 
Institute (ALI).195 The supervisory board is the German equivalent of ALI preference for ‘a majority 
of independent directors … free from any significant relationship with the corporation’s senior 
executives’.196  
Ultimately, the efficacy of governance in the Australian context will be a test of long term empirical 
performance. Performance is contested in Australia including in public advertising (‘Compare the 
Pair’ campaign). Empirical performance is related to cost structures as well as governance. Most 
NBFE’s outsource functions,197 but outsourcing costs ‘is virtually identical for not-for-profit (both 
related [party] and independent) and retail funds that use independent service providers’.198 This 
suggests that superior performance is driven by the competence of the director trustees. Scholarly 
Australian research notes that, in the superannuation sector, ‘retail funds and not-for-profit funds 
exhibit different board characteristics and governance practices’.199 [T]rustee directors’ fund 
ownership, rather than their compensation, is an effective means of aligning the interests of trustees 
and members’.200  
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‘Since 2002, [German] company law requires both boards of listed German corporations to declare 
their conformity to the German Corporate Governance Code’.201 Empirical analysis demonstrates 
that, 
the degree of compliance with the Code is consistently value-relevant information for the capital 
market…. Firms with a higher compliance are priced at an average premium … consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are capital market pressures (or at least incentives), suggesting a broad adoption 
of the Code…202 
It implies foregone value to Australian NBFE securities holders and beneficiaries as a result of less 
optimal corporate governance practices.  
Emulation of a two tiered corporate governance structure (Supervisory Board and Management 
Board) for NBFEs would reform Australian NBFE corporate governance in superannuation and MIS 
environments. The RE as trustee, effectively the supervisory board, would be separate from the 
management of the MIS. Stakeholders would appoint the supervisory board which then appoints and 
terminates a non-conflicted professionally competent management board. The voluntary Code of 
Trustee Governance for superannuation entities is not contested. It should be reviewed, become 
binding, and applied to other NBFEs, following the EU comply or explain paradigm. 
8.2 Applying the German corporate governance model to Australia 
The two tier board system achieves by governance design what Australia seeks to achieve by statute. 
It allocates authority to ‘alleviate conflicts of interest’.203 Adopting this model in the context of 
Australian superannuation entities, and others controlled by representatives of registered 
organisations may provide a better model of governance of those entities and a solution to present 
policy conflicts. 
How is reform to be implemented in Australia? What is the best mechanism to unlock economic 
benefits from governance reform in a contested political environment? ‘Conventional wisdom 
suggests parties on the left favour interests of stakeholders over shareholders’.204 This has not always 
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been the case in Australia, and is not the case in Germany. This provides a starting point for Australian 
reform: recognising in an uncontested way that reform objectives should be consistent with needs of 
beneficiaries in superannuation entities and securities holders in other NBFEs.  
For Australian superannuation entities and workers entitlement funds (being special purpose MIS), 
the supervisory board would represent the beneficiaries ― a representative board appointed by them 
supplemented by external independent appointments with specific competencies. They would have 
the same corporate trustee/RE functions as at present, but accountability directly to the beneficiaries. 
This direct accountability for superannuation entities is consistent with recent amendments to the SIS 
Act.205 It would add accountability, presently missing, to Workers Entitlement MIS.206 Beneficiaries 
would be in a position of determining, through their representatives, what is in their best interest. The 
management board would be appointed and dismissed by the supervisory board on the basis of skills 
sets and experience required to properly manage the entity. This model would eliminate the present 
conflicts within a unitary board paradigm between representation, conflicts of interest, and skills. 
Lack of knowledge and experience at board level is not unique to Australia: ‘It has also been conceded 
by employees[‘] union officials that a lack of knowledge in the fields of accounting and finance 
amongst employee representatives can be observed’.207  
These proposals are consistent with contested governance reform of Australian superannuation 
entities.208 The importance of form matching function increases as Australian NBFEs invest 
internationally and for those which seek international investment. German style corporate governance 
is designed not only for ‘the maximisation of shareholder value, but ensuring stability and growth’.209  
                                                                  
205 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52(8), 29VN. 
206 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Corruption and Governance, Final Report, above n 
34. 
207 Tüngler, above n 194, 238. 
208 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Governance) Bill 2015 (Cth). 
209 Andreas Hackethal, Reinhard H Schmidt and Marcel Tyrell, ‘Banks and German Corporate Governance: 
on the way to a capital market-based system?’ (2005) 13(3) Corporate Governance: The international 
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8.3 Profession of director 
Australian NBFE governance law is extremely complex.210 International regulatory principles 
designed to improve corporate regulation and behaviour,211 
emphasise managerial and directorial responsibilities and community expectations of a more proactive 
regulation of corporations, aimed at the steady maintenance of standards and integrity and competence 
in corporate governance. They reflect the view that participation in corporate governance is a privilege 
enjoyed by individuals subject to compliance with conditions. It is not a private right to be defended, 
as such, by notions such as the penalty privilege.212 
These important statements link the will of Parliament for an internationally competitive economy 
through recognised standards of corporate governance with the Corporations Act, other statutes and 
their interaction with the general law.  
This court should uphold, and not frustrate, the will of Parliament. It protects very important social 
and economic purposes. …213 That this court did impose a common law interpretation on that ‘clearly 
expressed will’ … seriously impedes the attainment of the Act’s important purposes for corporate 
governance in this country. …214 It contradicted the ‘primacy of statute’ and, by inserting judicial 
protections for managers, ‘undermines the provisions of the Act’,215  
                                                                  
210 See, eg, Drummond AJA in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No3) [2012] 
WASCA 157 [2051]: ‘The impacts of corporate decision-making on a wider range of interests than 
shareholders are now being given more recognition. The need to ensure protection of those interests also I 
think serves to explain why modern company courts have become more interventionist, in reviewing the 
activities of directors than was traditionally the case’; See also, Commonwealth, HIH Royal Commission, 
The Failure of HIH Insurance Final Report (April 2003) (Commissioner Owen) quoted in R A St John, 
CAMAC, Corporate Duties below board level (Report, April 2006) 47: '[t]he uncertain state of the law in 
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breach of the law ... '. As Kirby J acknowledged in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
[2004] HCA 42 [116]-[117], 'Such were the demonstrated abuses and errors in the management of Australian 
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on "bad corporate governance" being systemic "serious danger to the economy of the nation inherent in the 
multiple corporate collapses of the 1980's, repeated in equally spectacular form in more recent years"'. See 
also, Justice Michael Kirby, 'The company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Tasmanian Division, Hobart, 1998). See generally Du Plessis, 
'Reverberations after the HIH and other recent corporate collapses: the role of ASIC', (2003) 15 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 225. 
211 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Principles of Corporate Governance (1999); 
See also Jillian Segal, ‘Corporate Governance: substance over form’ (2002) 25 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 320. 
212 Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42 [119] (Kirby J). 
213 Ibid [132] (Kirby J). 
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in this case by favouring the personal rights of directors. These were dissenting views, but qualified:  
Most matters involving statutory construction – including as it relates to pre-existing principles of 
equity and the common law – are contestable by the time they reach this Court. Upon many such 
questions there is no absolutely correct decision, certainly in the objective sense.216  
The statutory intent was ‘turned, instead, into one addressed to the principles of the common law 
affording a privilege in certain circumstances against exposure to penalties or forfeiture’.217  
These statements go to the heart of systemic failure in the regulation of NBFEs in Australia. 
Uncertainty of the law leads Australia to the position in which it finds itself today. It is not only 
directors and trustees who are frustrated by uncertainties in the law.218  
Especially in an Act as large and cumbersome as that under consideration (with its history of 
patchwork accretions), it is impossible to be confident. …219 The construction of the Act now adopted 
needlessly restricts the Commission [ASIC] and the court in trying the claim. …220 Doing so seriously 
impedes the Act’s important purposes for corporate governance in this country.221  
A culture of retribution is now embedded in the general law relating to director and trustee 
disqualifications and enforcement actions. It is punitive and serves to diminish entrepreneurial 
endeavour. The author’s qualitative research reports board paralysis. Cases of corporate failure often 
result in public examinations of the directors who can be held up to ridicule, contempt, even when 
there is no breach of duty. A doctrinal approach should be rehabilitative.  
Daniels v Anderson222 is commonly cited to differentiate between the responsibilities of executive 
and non-executive directors. The judgments are rather more insightful into why Australia’s corporate 
governance environment is systemically weaker than in other jurisdictions and what should constitute 
a competitive corporate governance regime.  
                                                                  
216 Ibid [74] (Kirby J). 
217 Ibid [61] (Kirby J). 
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It is an anachronism to expect non-executive directors, meeting once a month, to contribute anything 
much more than decisions on questions of policy. The non-executive directors relied and were entitled 
to rely on management and the auditors.223  
Doubtless, there are many directors who subscribe to this view. However, the distinction was not to 
last: there is no history of unanimity. In a dissenting opinion: 
The time has passed when directors and other officers can simply surrender their duties to the public 
and those with whom the corporation deals by washing their hands, with impunity, leaving it to one 
director or a cadre of directors or to a general manager to discharge their responsibilities for them.224 
Older concepts of sleeping or passive directors are obsolete.225 The general law has attempted to 
define the responsibilities of a board: goals, CEO appointment, oversight of management, and 
monitoring progress.226 These duties are akin to the roles of the German supervisory board. Unlike 
German supervisory boards, the role of the non-executive director of an Australian NBFE is not 
defined in a manner that allows its discharge on a non-executive basis in statute or general law. 227 
The general law affirms the lack of distinction between executive and non-executive directors and 
the inability of non-executive directors to rely upon management and adviser delegation: ‘the non-
executive directors relied “completely” and “solely” on management, their advisors, and the 
processes in place’.228 A director can delegate subject to statutory provisions.229 Emulation of the 
German corporate governance model, tentative as it was in Healey, would provide relief. 
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What should directors actually do? What does ‘all reasonable steps’ mean in practice? 230 It means an 
objective analysis of each case: ‘the standard requires, at a minimum, that directors take a diligent 
and intelligent interest in the information either available to them or which they might appropriately 
demand from the executives or other employees and agents of the company’.231 Whilst this standard 
is derived from consideration of insolvency cases, the law is replete with references to reasonable. 
‘“[R]easonable steps” must be made in the circumstances of as they were at the time, rather than with 
the benefit of hindsight’.232 Standards evolve. The evolution of the reasonable steps requirement 
requires careful consideration by directors and particularly to the extent to which they can rely on 
specialist advice from senior management and auditors.233 In the UK, ‘a director will not be found 
liable of an offence unless he or she fails to take reasonable steps to secure compliance and had 
knowledge that the accounts did not comply with the Act, or was reckless as to that fact’.234  
The SIS Act235 prescribes standards applicable to the operation of superannuation entities including 
the disclosure of significant information to fund beneficiaries. The trustee of a fund ‘must give 
information to a member concerning any event in relation to the fund that the trustee reasonably 
believes the member would reasonably be expected to be informed of.’236 There are standards for 
trustees, custodians and investment managers.237 There are also specific standards for actuaries and 
auditors.238 If the governing rules of the fund do not contain the statutorily prescribed covenants, then 
they are taken to contain them.239 These covenants extend to the trustee directors personally, which 
is not the case for directors of entities which are not trustees of superannuation entities including MIS. 
These governing rules ‘must not permit the trustee to be subject, in the exercise of any of the trustee’s 
powers under those rules, to any direction by any other person’,240 and if they do, ‘they are invalid’.241 
Trustees have ‘no right to shift their duties on other persons’.242 
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That statutory intervention has been required to support established general law duties speaks loudly 
of the need for reform of standards of directors and trustee qualifications. Codification does not mean 
knowledge and comprehension. It only means the legislature addressed a problem. It does not mean 
the problem is resolved. Indeed it is not: corporate governance of Australian NBFEs requires 
substantive reform. 
8.4 Fit and Proper Test: Probity and competence 
There is no recognised profession of director from which to draw. ‘After 25 years the gene pool for 
super funds is showing signs of in-breeding. It is time for more diversity on boards’.243 
In practice, and in contrast with other jurisdictions, fit and proper testing rarely goes beyond police 
and public record checks for the majority of appointees and reliance upon good character or at least 
the absence of adverse public record. Traditionally, in Australia, there are few statutory, academic, 
business, or other qualifications required to be appointed as a director of Australian public or 
proprietary companies.244 
International harmonisation will require: mandatory professional training for directors and trustees 
with professional accreditation; continuous professional development including microeconomics, 
strategic and business planning, and ethics; significantly enhanced educational and professional 
experience for trustees and directors of trustees in fiduciary obligation; and, fit and proper 
examinations that focus on skills, experience and competence: traditional probity checks are not 
sufficient. 
8.5 Business Judgment: Rule or Doctrine? 
Situations occur regularly where directors must exercise their business judgment. There would be 
many directors who favour a strengthened business judgment rule in Australian law. But there is a 
distinction between entrepreneurship and much of the market conduct evidenced in the empirical 
analysis of Australian cases. However, given that the economy needs directors and boards who are 
entrepreneurial (a reason for the original concept of the corporation), a statutory business judgment 
rule that purports to protect directors may not be the best mechanism for balancing entrepreneurial 
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risk seeking strategy with director responsibility.245 An economy needs its entrepreneurs for society 
to prosper. However, entrepreneurs, like all market participants, need to operate within the framework 
of the Law Matters thesis as part of the trust requirement. That this trust has largely been lost in 
Australia diminishes an entrepreneurial economy, now quantified.246 Statutory intervention into 
business judgment should be designed to protect and enhance value outcomes rather than mere 
protection for directors and officers. Prescriptive statute has not achieved that nor recognised that 
there is risk in every investment. A doctrinal approach, as in Singapore, Canada and Germany, may 
better suit a fiduciary environment. 
Should Australia adopt German governance standards, its objectives can be sustained by significantly 
improving the qualifications and standards of directors, providing appropriate resources to enable 
them to carry out their functions, making directors proactively responsible for receipt of necessary 
information, provide them individually with the right to convene directors meetings and requiring 
mandatory participation of auditors in those meetings.  
These conditions are part of business judgment doctrine. No useful purpose is served by judicial 
emasculation of the BJR. Its role and effectiveness require review. It still does not provide relief in 
insolvency situations, despite limited recent reform. Nor does a codified BJR sit easily with culturally 
different and complex cross-border business. Broad economic policy encouraging entrepreneurship 
with statutory intervention to prevent director and trustee flight, following US and UK examples, may 
be better than a codified BJR. Singapore adopts the doctrinal model, as does Germany, requiring no 
violation of duty of care and loyalty principles. Directors and trustees must proactively search for, 
adequately source, explain, control and ensure comprehension by the recipients of information. A 
pure personal liability environment, conducive to fostering true entrepreneurship based on truth, 
wisdom and acceptance of responsibility. 
8.6 Board practices 
Directors and trustees must have the required resources of time, information and advice to perform 
their functions. The cases illustrate failures in Australian NBFE board practices which conflict with 
a reformed business judgment doctrine. These cases include: complexity and timeliness of board 
papers; stability of those papers; ability to pursue their diligent study; and document retention. These 
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are procedural failures: liability without resources. Board practices can be guided as part of a reformed 
business judgment doctrine. Existing governance codes do not suffice. 
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9. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM STRATEGY 
Whither Australia? 
Australian public policy is at a cross-roads. 2018 is the end of the financial reform period which 
commenced in 1981. There is a considerable risk that the egregious behaviour described in this thesis 
and for commercial banks and other entities examined in the Hayne Royal Commission247 will result 
in more statutory intervention, a less entrepreneurial economy, higher costs and reduced availability 
of capital, and fewer market participants. Perhaps not a return to oligopoly, but nonetheless more 
restrictive and less internationally competitive. Conversely, the Productivity Commission proposes 
to extend ASIC’s mandate to competition.248 Whilst acknowledging the need for substantive ASIC 
reform,249 it proposes to repeat the error identified by Ashby in 2009 following UK regulator reform 
in 2007: ‘our regulators have been part of the problem’.250 
2018 is the end of the beginning of modern Australian financial reform. Choice of road is at hand. 
Parliament must decide. It must be presented with alternative options. One option will stem from the 
Hayne Royal Commission. This thesis presents another option: it proposes the ‘Age of Statutes’ 
evolve to the ‘Age of Trust’, firmly rooted in the fertile soil of Scott Donalds’ ‘nobler qualities’251 of 
fiduciaries. Those fiduciary qualities are implicit in community expectation of trust and loyalty on 
whom they rely, forming the basis of a modern regulatory regime. 
What does Australia wish to achieve as a modern nation? Does it wish to develop its modern story as 
an entrepreneurial economy competing with its global peers? Does it remain largely reliant on 
resources extraction and low value employment? Does it want to leverage off innovation and skills? 
Does it want to develop its SME sector? The answers to these questions determine future public policy 
in financial services and products regulation. Egregious conduct is contagious. It becomes part of the 
culture. Does Australia continue its tradition of statutory accretion which has allowed it to flourish? 
Or do the insights in this thesis provide a framework? This the cross-road that Parliament must now 
traverse. It is a binary choice. 
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If the former road, then this thesis predicts that the future will be similar to the recent past. If not, 
then Australia must undertake reform of financial regulation as proposed in this thesis. 
Entrepreneurial freedoms must be matched by participant acceptance of fiduciary obligation to guide 
and enforce market conduct standards: the two are symbiotic. This is evolutionary, some may say 
revolutionary. It is not revolutionary: it returns Australian financial regulation to a positive culture of 
trust, honesty and fair dealing.252 That is a culture that provides for entrepreneurship, business growth 
and future employment. 
The Law Matters: its manifest deficiencies have been one reason for the paucity of global firms 
originating or based in Australia. This has led to fewer on-shore investment opportunities for 
superannuation funds, capital flight to other jurisdictions, entrepreneur flight, suboptimal GDP 
growth, reducing skilled employment opportunities for the population. Australia:  
needs a system that evades the risk aversion that has become common practice and returns to our roots 
as an entrepreneurial community breaking new barriers. In the 21st century regulation needs to avoid 
paternalism without completely abandoning prudent protection of interest.253 
It is not merely a matter of law, something missed by those who prescribe statutory remedy for every 
ill. That is the easier route: the quick fix, the instant medication. Evolution is rarely accidental: it is a 
response to environmental change and the opportunities afforded by new niches. This is the more 
thoughtful route, taking time to effect cultural change. 
Implementation of the four reform themes will require national leadership: from Parliament given 
form by the Executive. It will require four implementation teams for four years: stakeholder support 
is essential. Some of these will overlap. A senior Parliamentary ministerial champion supported by a 
special purpose Reference Group with Commonwealth financial support is required. It could be based 
on the inoperative but extant Financial Sector Advisory Council. Implementation should be 
considered as a decade long policy objective working in tandem with the Council of Financial 
Regulators (CFR). The CFR should have an enhanced mandate to supervise implementation within 
its regulator stakeholder group. Within each theme, specific tactical legislative interventions in 
disclosure, national productivity strategy, and governance are needed. The CLERP provides a 
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precedent. These four themes will require considerable statutory support, for consistency guided by 
the Reference Group and the responsible minister. The Reference Group should sponsor and 
supervise an independent arbiter to reduce dependence on the court system. The CFR will consider 
and publicly explain in a comprehensive transparent way what the impact of the reform themes are. 
It is: 
a vehicle for improving regulators’ ability to influence expectation in financial markets. It can build 
trust in the actions of regulators. But of greatest value is its capacity to be a forum that can test the 
proposition of a macroprudential intervention….254 
This is consistent with the need for a competition advocate. Competition should be seen as part of the 
overall thematic reform program, not separate from it. ‘For ASIC to act as a champion of financial 
system competition would require a clear change … and a change in its regulatory culture’.255 
Presently, there is no ‘framework or a process for effective external review of the performance of its 
[Australian government] financial regulators’.256 This was also proposed by Murray,257 who 
recommended updating the Statements of Expectations of ASIC and APRA. 
ASIC does not have a history of self-imposed reform in its governance, despite external 
recommendations by Uhrig in 2003, the ASIC Capability Review in 2015 or human resourcing 
constraints identified by Murray in 2014. Those expecting reform are therefore likely to be 
disappointed. Mandate extension without necessary reform is another Australian example of the 
‘poacher being the gamekeeper’. The Capability Review also identified deficiencies in ASIC’s 
strategic abilities. These extend ‘towards advancing consumer’s interest in financial products … That 
it has not already done so is of concern’.258  
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Some stakeholders will be challenged: others, the qualitative research identifies, will be supportive. 
All stakeholders must focus on the needs of investors and beneficiaries in the investment chain, not 
their own sectoral interests. There must be commonality of objective disciplined by a financially 
empowered literate community led by champions.  




If the predictive veracity of the empirical data in this thesis is correct,259 then the media reporting of 
egregious behaviour uncovered by the Hayne Royal Commission and in the Productivity Commission 
Draft Report should give great cause for concern. Reporting indicates that there is substantial 
continent risk in superannuation and non-superannuation NBFEs as posited above.260 These cyclical 
manifestations have deep systemic causes. 
As Hayne notes, 
given the existing breadth and complexity of the regulation of the financial services industry, adding 
any new layer of law or regulation will add a new layer of compliance cost and complexity. […] 
[T]here is every chance that adding a new layer of law and regulation would only serve to distract 
attention from the very simple ideas that must inform the conduct of financial services entities.261 [...] 
These ideas are very simple. Their simplicity points firmly towards a need to simplify the existing law 
[...] in the blizzard of [statutory] provisions, it is too easy to lose sight of those simple ideas that must 
inform the conduct of financial services entities.262 
The calls for this Royal Commission stemmed from 2014.263 Much of the case study material is old 
news.264 Its mandate and lifespan are limited and should be extended to all NBFEs. Hayne 
distinguishes between ‘ticking boxes’ and ‘[w]hat is the right thing to do?’265 The ‘right thing’ meets 
community expectations of fiduciary obligation in the investment chain. 
The Productivity Commission is mandated to improve competition in financial services and products 
provision as a disciplinary policy tool to improve consumer outcomes. It acknowledges the need to 
balance financial stability and competition. It also recognises the practical limits of disclosure 
regulation, limited financial literacy competencies, recognising that behavioural economics provides 
important insights into policy formulation.266 These practical limitations are exacerbated by conflicts 
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of interest, particularly in vertically integrated businesses, proposing a ‘legal duty of care’.267 
Canadian and German models thus become both relevant and insightful. 
That proposed duty includes design of a 21st century disclosure regime268 where ‘consumers resort to 
making decisions based on trust’.269 For the Productivity Commission to achieve this policy objective, 
fiduciary obligation to quality assure the investment chain is an essential and inviolable precondition. 
It is unfortunate that the analysis of best interests obligations of financial advisers under the FoFA 
regime is incomplete.270 An uninformed reader might assume this is a statement of the law, which 
would be incorrect. Similarly, whilst a useful analysis of investor typology, there are no clear 
proposals for reform.271 It is equally unfortunate to propose extending ASIC’s mandate without an 
agreed plan to reform it. For ASIC to adopt a supervisory proactive posture will require its substantive 
reform. The Commission merely proposes further examination.272 
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APPENDIX 1: PHD QUALITATIVE RESEARCH — CAUSES OF SYSTEMIC FAILURE 
























Intrusion of 'black' letter law 4 80.00% 6 35.29% 4 66.67% 14 50.00% 
Smart lawyer manipulation of complex 
'black letter' law 
2 40.00% 4 23.53% 3 50.00% 9 32.14% 
Financial regulation in isolation: 
accretive tinkering: need trust 
principles 
1 20.00% 10 58.82% 5 83.33% 16 57.14% 
Leverage and margin lending to retail 
investors 
1 20.00% 4 23.53% 1 16.67% 6 21.43% 
Financial planning not a profession 3 60.00% 7 41.18% 3 50.00% 13 46.43% 
Financial planners should have 
unqualified best interest duty to client 
 
0.00% 5 29.41% 4 66.67% 9 32.14% 
Ignorance of social licence to practice as 
a professional 
2 40.00% 2 11.76% 1 16.67% 5 17.86% 
Related party transactions 5 100.00% 8 47.06% 4 66.67% 17 60.71% 
Conflicts of interest - related trustees & 
investment 
managers/promoters/advisers 
3 60.00% 8 47.06% 3 50.00% 14 50.00% 
Remuneration of funds managers 
encourages more risk 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 3 10.71% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
Box ticking regulation by ASIC 3 60.00% 6 35.29% 4 66.67% 13 46.43% 
Ineffective leadership at ASIC/ wrong 
leadership motivations 
2 40.00% 6 35.29% 2 33.33% 10 35.71% 
Registered Organisations should be 
regulated as companies 
3 60.00% 1 5.88% 2 33.33% 6 21.43% 
Poor ethical standards  1 20.00% 5 29.41% 2 33.33% 8 28.57% 
Too many related parties 'clipping the 
ticket' 
4 80.00% 1 5.88% 2 33.33% 7 25.00% 
Black letter' law cannot be applied to 
culture 
1 20.00% 2 11.76% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 
Poor director and trustee training & 
expertise 
3 60.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 8 28.57% 
Trustees process driven as self 




0.00% 1 16.67% 3 10.71% 
Gender balance policies leading to 
suboptimal board appointments 
1 20.00% 
 
0.00% 1 16.67% 2 7.14% 
Custodians poor performers 1 20.00% 2 11.76% 
 
0.00% 3 10.71% 
Appearances of probity only: self 
interest rules 
1 20.00% 6 35.29% 4 66.67% 11 39.29% 
Reliance on ratings agencies 2 40.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 3 10.71% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
Government interventions increase 






0.00% 2 7.14% 
Separate commercial core activities 
from investment banking (banks & 
super funds) 
2 40.00% 2 11.76% 
 
0.00% 4 14.29% 
Impact of impairment charges result in 






0.00% 2 7.14% 
Conflicts of interest - insolvency 
profession acting as cartel under control 
of banks 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 
APRA is politicised 5 100.00% 3 17.65% 1 16.67% 9 32.14% 
APRA chases minor infractions, 




0.00% 1 16.67% 6 21.43% 
APRA 'best of breed' 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 2 7.14% 
ASIC is politicised & reform resistant 1 20.00% 5 29.41% 2 33.33% 8 28.57% 
ASIC brief is too broad 1 20.00% 3 17.65% 3 50.00% 7 25.00% 
ASIC has no clear strategic role 
 
0.00% 5 29.41% 2 33.33% 7 25.00% 
Regulators unwilling to learn from 
mistakes; stubborn; shy of scandal 
2 40.00% 2 11.76% 1 16.67% 5 17.86% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
ASIC has no institutional memory 
 
0.00% 2 11.76% 2 33.33% 4 14.29% 
ASIC compliance reviews positive and 




0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
ASIC doesn’t give definitive advice 
 
0.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 5 17.86% 
ASIC is scary, expensive and lacks 
common sense 
 
0.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 5 17.86% 
Lack of transparency and accountability 
in RO/FWC 
2 40.00% 4 23.53% 3 50.00% 9 32.14% 
Lack of transparency and accountability 
in regulators 
2 40.00% 2 11.76% 2 33.33% 6 21.43% 
Regulators and boards need experts, 
good culture, insight, not lawyers 
2 40.00% 4 23.53% 2 33.33% 8 28.57% 
Boards need more independent minds 2 40.00% 3 17.65% 4 66.67% 9 32.14% 
Legalised theft 1 20.00% 3 17.65% 4 66.67% 8 28.57% 
Australian financial sector not 
internationally competitive in structure 
or fees 
1 20.00% 7 41.18% 2 33.33% 10 35.71% 
Lack of financial literacy partly laziness, 
not all education 
1 20.00% 
 
0.00% 3 50.00% 4 14.29% 
Adviser financial literacy often flawed 
 
0.00% 7 41.18% 2 33.33% 9 32.14% 





0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
Investor expectations not matched with 
regulator mandate or performance 
1 20.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 6 21.43% 
Disclosure documents do not include 
management discussion 
 
0.00% 2 11.76% 1 16.67% 3 10.71% 
Parliamentary expertise lacking 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 3 50.00% 4 14.29% 
Problem is enforcement 
 
0.00% 3 17.65% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 
Strict rules may provide disincentive to 
comply 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
Extension of criminal sanctions  1 20.00% 2 11.76% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 
Need for common sense, honesty, and 
better culture 
 
0.00% 4 23.53% 4 66.67% 8 28.57% 
Commissions only to be paid on net 
results at end of investment 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 3 10.71% 
Ban commissions to financial advisers 1 20.00% 
 
0.00% 2 33.33% 3 10.71% 






0.00% 1 3.57% 
Financial planners to become educators 
 
0.00% 2 11.76% 3 50.00% 5 17.86% 
Reform of vertical integration models 2 40.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 





0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
All to be subject to fiduciary principles 
 
0.00% 12 70.59% 2 33.33% 14 50.00% 
Reform of related party transactions 
(Prohibition No; transparency; best 
interests tests) 
 
0.00% 4 23.53% 2 33.33% 6 21.43% 
Better remuneration structure for 





0.00% 1 3.57% 
Social licence to be enforced through 
extension of fiduciary principles 
2 40.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 
International harmonisation to generate 
reform 
2 40.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 4 14.29% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
APRA supervision model and HR to be 
emulated by ASIC and RWRO 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 






0.00% 1 3.57% 






0.00% 2 7.14% 
University standard training of 
directors and trustees (eg UK model; 
CPA model Aust.) 
3 60.00% 1 5.88% 1 16.67% 5 17.86% 
Directors need access to funds for 




0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
Ban trustee and promoter related 
parties 
2 40.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 7 25.00% 




0.00% 1 3.57% 






0.00% 1 3.57% 
Complete independence of Ratings 
Agencies & eliminate conflicts of 
interest 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 
ASIC to be more than a policeman after 
the event 
1 20.00% 3 17.65% 2 33.33% 6 21.43% 
ASIC needs to better apply its resources 1 20.00% 3 17.65% 3 50.00% 7 25.00% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
ASIC needs less reliance on box ticking 
 
0.00% 4 23.53% 4 66.67% 8 28.57% 
Regulatory model needs to use court 
intervention less:AAT & Takeovers 





0.00% 3 10.71% 
Singapore model - Central Provident 
Fund 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 




0.00% 1 3.57% 
Reform of remuneration model of 
research houses and ratings agencies 
1 20.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 





0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 




0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
Canadian model: bottom up regulation 
needed 
 
0.00% 5 29.41% 3 50.00% 8 28.57% 
Singapore & HK far ahead of Aust in 





0.00% 2 33.33% 2 7.14% 
Return to Prescribed Interest system 
not a solution 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
ATO product rulings misleads investors 
 
0.00% 2 11.76% 
 
0.00% 2 7.14% 
School level financial literacy education 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
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% Brisbane Total 
responses 
Total % 
ASIC and APRA removed from 
government 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 




0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
Extend UK SMR to MIS - market 




0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 





0.00% 1 16.67% 1 3.57% 
Senate inquiry into litigation funders 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
Need last resort compensation scheme 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
Disclosure needs to focus on underlying 
assets 
 
0.00% 1 5.88% 
 
0.00% 1 3.57% 
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Interpretation 
   
Top Quartile % Sample Top Decile % Sample 
Related party transactions 60.71% Related party transactions 60.71% 
Financial regulation in isolation: accretive tinkering: need trust 
principles 
57.14% Financial regulation in isolation: accretive 
tinkering: need trust principles 
57.14% 
Intrusion of 'black' letter law 50.00% Intrusion of 'black' letter law 50.00% 
Conflicts of interest - related trustees & investment 
managers/promoters/advisers 
50.00% Conflicts of interest - related trustees & 
investment managers/promoters/advisers 
50.00% 
Box ticking regulation by ASIC 46.43% Box ticking regulation by ASIC 46.43% 
Financial planning not a profession 46.43% 
  
Appearances of probity only: self interest rules 39.29% 
  




Ineffective leadership at ASIC/ wrong leadership motivations 35.71% 
  
Smart lawyer manipulation of complex 'black letter' law 32.14% 
  
Financial planners should have unqualified best interest duty to client 32.14% 
  
Boards need more independent minds 32.14% 
  
Adviser financial literacy often flawed 32.14% 
  
    
Most favoured reform options 
All to be subject to fiduciary principles 50.00% 
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APPENDIX 2: CORRELATION MATRICES: TOP DECILE, TOP QUARTILE AND SYSTEMIC FAILURES INCIDENCES 
 
 
2.1 Legal matters raised in the judgments Variable Top decile prevalence Variables
n =343 incidences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Related party transactions CA s 191 1 22.16% 1
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 2 20.70% 93.42% 1
Fraud 3 15.45% 69.74% 74.65% 1
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 601FD 4 14.87% 67.11% 71.83% 96.23% 1
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 5 13.70% 61.84% 66.20% 88.68% 92.16% 1
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 6 13.12% 59.21% 63.38% 84.91% 88.24% 95.74% 1
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 7 13.12% 59.21% 63.38% 84.91% 88.24% 95.74% 100.00% 1
2.2 Legal matters raised in the judgments Variable Top quartile prevalence Variables
n = 623 incidencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Related party transactions CA s 191 1 12.20% 1
Misleading & deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 
1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 52 2 11.40% 93.42% 1
Fraud 3 8.51% 69.74% 74.65% 1
Breach of fiduciary duties (statute & general law) CA s 
601FD 4 8.19% 67.11% 71.83% 96.23% 1
Financial services business CA s 911A/ financial 
advice CA s 781/ dealing CA s 780 without AFSL 5 7.54% 61.84% 66.20% 88.68% 92.16% 1
Breach of good faith, proper purpose, best interest 
duty CA ss 181-184, 961 (FoFA) 6 7.22% 59.21% 63.38% 84.91% 88.24% 95.74% 1
Conflicts of interest & duty CA s 191 7 7.22% 59.21% 63.38% 84.91% 88.24% 95.74% 100.00% 1
Unregistered unlawful MIS CA s 601ED 8 6.90% 56.58% 60.56% 81.13% 84.31% 91.49% 95.56% 95.56% 1
Insolvency of NBFE (Incl RE/trustee) 9 5.30% 43.42% 46.48% 62.26% 64.71% 70.21% 73.33% 73.33% 76.74% 1
Judicial/Court directions 10 5.14% 42.11% 45.07% 60.38% 62.75% 68.09% 71.11% 71.11% 74.42% 96.97% 1
Failure to properly disclose material matters CA s 191 11 5.14% 42.11% 45.07% 60.38% 62.75% 68.09% 71.11% 71.11% 74.42% 96.97% 100.00% 1
Untrue/defective/misleading prospectus/PDS 
disclosure CA s 728 12 4.17% 34.21% 36.62% 49.06% 50.98% 55.32% 57.78% 57.78% 60.47% 78.79% 81.25% 81.25% 1
Improper financial advice 13 3.85% 31.58% 33.80% 45.28% 47.06% 51.06% 53.33% 53.33% 55.81% 72.73% 75.00% 75.00% 92.31% 1
Uncommercial/unconscionable transactions 14 3.69% 30.26% 32.39% 43.40% 45.10% 48.94% 51.11% 51.11% 53.49% 69.70% 71.88% 71.88% 88.46% 95.83% 1




2.3 Legal matters raised in the judgments By systemic failure Variables
n = 801 incidencies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dishonesty 1 15.98% 1
Related parties/conflicts of interest CA s 191 2 15.23% 95.31% 1
Directors/trustee duties CA ss180-184, SISA s 62 3 15.23% 95.31% 100.00% 1
Disclosure 4 14.86% 92.97% 97.54% 97.54% 1
Misleading/deceptive/unconscionable conduct CA s 1041H, AA s 12DA, ACCA s 525 11.74% 73.44% 77.05% 77.05% 78.99% 1
Fiduciary duty (statute & general law) 6 9.61% 60.16% 63.11% 63.11% 64.71% 81.91% 1
Financial advice CA ss 780,781,911; Unlicensed/breaches of AFSL 7 8.86% 55.47% 58.20% 58.20% 59.66% 75.53% 92.21% 1
Unlawful unregistered MIS CA 601ED 8 5.37% 33.59% 35.25% 35.25% 36.13% 45.74% 55.84% 60.56% 1
Governance 9 2.75% 17.19% 18.03% 18.03% 18.49% 23.40% 28.57% 30.99% 51.16% 1
Financial literacy 10 2.12% 13.28% 13.93% 13.93% 14.29% 18.09% 22.08% 23.94% 39.53% 77.27% 1
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